


A photograph of an iceberg floating in the ocean. The tip of the iceberg is visible above the water line, while the much larger, dark, and jagged submerged part is visible below. The sky is a clear, pale blue, and the water is a deep, dark blue. The overall image serves as a metaphor for the hidden challenges of climate change and journalism.

Elisabeth Eide and Risto Kunelius (eds.)

Media Meets Climate

The Global Challenge for Journalism

NORDICOM

NORDICOM's activities are based on broad and extensive network of contacts and collaboration with members of the research community, media companies, politicians, regulators, teachers, librarians, and so forth, around the world. The activities at Nordicom are characterized by three main working areas.

- ***Media and Communication Research Findings in the Nordic Countries***

Nordicom publishes a Nordic journal, *Nordicom Information*, and an English language journal, *Nordicom Review* (refereed), as well as anthologies and other reports in both Nordic and English languages. Different research databases concerning, among other things, scientific literature and ongoing research are updated continuously and are available on the Internet. Nordicom has the character of a hub of Nordic cooperation in media research. Making Nordic research in the field of mass communication and media studies known to colleagues and others outside the region, and weaving and supporting networks of collaboration between the Nordic research communities and colleagues abroad are two prime facets of the Nordicom work.

The documentation services are based on work performed in national documentation centres attached to the universities in Aarhus, Denmark; Tampere, Finland; Reykjavik, Iceland; Bergen, Norway; and Göteborg, Sweden.

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Nordicom compiles and collates media statistics for the whole of the Nordic region. The statistics, together with qualified analyses, are published in the series, *Nordic Media Trends*, and on the homepage. Besides statistics on output and consumption, the statistics provide data on media ownership and the structure of the industries as well as national regulatory legislation. Today, the Nordic region constitutes a common market in the media sector, and there is a widespread need for impartial, comparable basic data. These services are based on a Nordic network of contributing institutions.

Nordicom gives the Nordic countries a common voice in European and international networks and institutions that inform media and cultural policy. At the same time, Nordicom keeps Nordic users abreast of developments in the sector outside the region, particularly developments in the European Union and the Council of Europe.

- ***Research on Children, Youth and the Media Worldwide***

At the request of UNESCO, Nordicom started the International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media in 1997. The work of the Clearinghouse aims at increasing our knowledge of children, youth and media and, thereby, at providing the basis for relevant decision-making, at contributing to constructive public debate and at promoting children's and young people's media literacy. It is also hoped that the work of the Clearinghouse will stimulate additional research on children, youth and media. The Clearinghouse's activities have as their basis a global network of 1000 or so participants in more than 125 countries, representing not only the academia, but also, e.g., the media industries, politics and a broad spectrum of voluntary organizations.

In yearbooks, newsletters and survey articles the Clearinghouse has an ambition to broaden and contextualize knowledge about children, young people and media literacy. The Clearinghouse seeks to bring together and make available insights concerning children's and young people's relations with mass media from a variety of perspectives.

Media Meets Climate

Media Meets Climate
The Global Challenge for Journalism

Elisabeth Eide & Risto Kunelius (eds.)

NORDICOM

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Preface

Transnational Media Events, Vol II.

This book is an attempt to address a moment where some of the key global challenges of today's journalism come into focus. For the editors of this book, as well as for many of the contributors, this is the second time around. In 2006 we launched a project studying the global controversy caused by the publication and re-publication of cartoons about the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. That project ended up producing a volume entitled *Transnational Media Events* which was published by Nordicom. Part of the network of researchers on that project decided to continue developing the art of transnational media research. In 2008, climate change was not a difficult choice for a focal point. The attention curves were rising and the Copenhagen summit (COP15) was closing in. The *MediaClimate* network was built.

As the *MediaClimate* network, earlier we looked at how media in different parts of the world makes sense of climate change by studying the local and national particularities of the coverage. In this book, however, we take a decidedly *transnational* look at the coverage of climate summits. We concentrate on a variety of topics and themes, looking at issues that cut across nations and localities, comparing and juxtaposing, drawing together common themes and underlining some differences.

By definition, such an undertaking is global by its nature. It demands a genuinely transnational effort involving researchers from a wide range of countries. Without all of the researchers in the *MediaClimate* network, working overtime to monitor national media, and writing together across borders, the book would not have been possible. We want to open the book by extending our sincere gratitude to all our fellow researchers whose chapters are included in "Media Meets Climate".

In the individual chapters of the book, members of the network tackle specific, thematically focused issues, but the intellectual ground work for the book has been collective effort undertaken over the last three years. We have been fortunate to work with an exceptionally talented group of people who

have committed themselves to this dialogic effort. It is also important to acknowledge the work of those of who were not able to appear on the by-lines of this book but who have made a strong contribution to our discussions. Peixi Xu has been our correspondent in China, and Daniel Hermann has been an essential part of the German team throughout the project.

In addition, we also wish to thank other researchers whose efforts have been vital in providing us with the necessary material to undertake the various studies in this book: Asbjørn Slot-Jørgensen, Kresten Roland Johansen and Jakob Krarup Bjerregaard in Denmark and Ellen Hofsvang in Norway. Richard Daly has tackled and calibrated our various versions of English with a solid professional touch, often adding thoughtful comments and questions beyond the duties of a language editor. Cover designer Marit Heggenhougen from Norway deserves a special thank you for her creativity.

Needless but important to say, Ulla Carlsson, the soul of Nordicom, is to be thanked for her enthusiasm about the initial idea and her solid support and patience for this project. Karin Poulsen at Nordicom has, again, managed to turn a heavy load of email attachments into a book that we can actually hold in our hands. This is our second volume on *Transnational Media Events* for Nordicom. It is difficult to imagine a publisher more professional and flexible – both key issues in projects like this.

Major funding for this work has been received from Norway: the Free Expression Foundation, Oslo; the Global Inter Media Dialogue project at Oslo and Akershus University College for Applied Sciences (helped by a grant from The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs); and the Climate Crossroads research project, based at the University of Bergen. In Finland, Helsingin Sanomat Foundation offered early support for the network, and we are still mindful of its grant that set us on our journey to a better understanding of transnational media relations in 2006. The Tampere Research Centre for Journalism, Media and Communication (COMET, University of Tampere) has provided financial, logistic and intellectual support of which we are grateful. Various home institutions of our network members have helped crucially in hosting our seminars and workshops.

The *MediaClimate* network has been – and continues to be – a process of learning. For us, it has been an opportunity to learn about the varieties through which climate changes are experienced across the world, about the different research traditions that co-exist within the field of journalism and media studies, and about working together, inspired and respectfully. There is much more to be done.

Oslo and Tampere, December 2012

Elisabeth Eide & Risto Kunelius

Chapter 1

Introduction

Elisabeth Eide & Risto Kunelius

This book looks at how the global climate summits organized by the United Nations are mediated across the world. It emerges from the work of the *MediaClimate* network, a cooperative venture started in 2009. Our work is based on the conviction that climate change is *the global challenge* of the 21st century. Our shared overall question is: what is the role – and responsibility – of journalism in communicating this challenge and the global attempt to solve it? In an earlier volume (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu (eds) 2010), we offered a look at how global climate politics from the Copenhagen summit were interpreted in the 18 countries of our network. This book studies global climate journalism from a set of transnational perspectives. In order to start unfolding them, let us first take you to South Africa, to the last UN Conference of the Parties – the Durban COP17.

The City

Durban had been painted green. You could ride the shuttle buses for free. Bicycles were lent out to those eager to use pedal power. Posters advertising South African climate initiatives were in abundance. Banners and T-shirts declared discontent and impatience with the negotiations' standstill. In the city center, the actual negotiation site, the 17th COP was busily underway, with some 15,000 delegates from every nation in the world, shuttling between plenary sessions and smaller negotiation tables, as industrious as a colony of ants. There were hopes that all the time-consuming preparations would not be totally in vain. Balanced against these hopes were the bleak expectations that had emerged in the post-Copenhagen, finance crisis-driven world. The site itself – Durban – gave extra impetus to this contradictory atmosphere. It would be a cruel irony indeed if the global climate negotiations should come to a final halt on African soil where the consequences of carbonized modernity will be severely felt. At the KwaZulu Natal University Campus, another set focus

of events took the form of a civil society festival. Here cynicism was met with passionate demands for climate justice. It was close to the campus, where the big demonstration on Climate Action Day started off, marching peacefully all the way to the summit site, led by police and followed by media and local people. The number of demonstrators was modest compared to the march in Copenhagen two years earlier.

The Fair

At the COP site, Connie Hedegaard, EU commissioner for Climate Action since 2010 is surrounded by a tight group of reporters and TV cameras. A couple of technical entrepreneurs help her as she tries to gracefully step into a large solar-powered car, which looks like a clumsy version of a major anti-climate icon, namely a Formula-1 race car. She succeeds with aplomb and does not lose her enthusiastic smile for even a second. After the media moment and a nicely built photo-opportunity, she is guided to a small lobby above the vast exhibition area. Five school children from Saxonwold Primary School in Johannesburg are already eagerly waiting for the commissioner. They have their notebooks open and are well prepared. Under the watchful eye of their two teachers, the interview starts with questions that many of the competent and competitive journalists seem to have forgotten during the frenzy of summit politics and political speculation.

CHILDREN: *Will the Earth benefit from this meeting – or will it be only talk?*

COMMISSIONER: I understand your concerns. This is so important that it cannot just be talk, thus we need a pressure from the outside. You should all ask us to give you a decision that really could make a difference.

CHILDREN: *What does humanity face if no decision is taken?*

COMMISSIONER: That will be very serious. We are already hit by more precipitation, storms and droughts. If we do not act more, it will be much worse. And it is always the poor people who are hit the hardest.

CHILDREN: *What is the difference between COP15 and COP17?*

COMMISSIONER: In Copenhagen (COP15) we mobilized the world, and leaders paid attention. Leaders are now more preoccupied with the financial crisis. In COP15 there was not enough political will. On Friday we will hopefully see new ambitions to take steps forward.

The commissioner's aide eyes his wrist watch. Muted cell phones are blinking impatiently. The moment budgeted for the kids is over. Notebooks are closed; the commissioner gets up and starts to leave. Two TV journalists are granted three minutes each before Hedegaard and her assistant push off towards the main conference hall.

In the exhibition hall hundreds of small stalls from a variety of official bodies as well as NGOs compete for delegate attention. Some hand out souvenirs from their countries. Many display large posters of the presumed victims of climate change. Here, in contrast to the conference itself, women are in abundance, smiling or worrying: their very being is situated in their natural, often threatened habitat.



Connie Hedegaard: At an In-summit Media Event.

Photo: Elisabeth Eide

The Summit

In the main conference hall, and in an adjoining one with enormous TV screens, delegates listen to President Jacob Zuma of South Africa: “We all agree that the Earth is in danger. We must overcome our differences. The world is looking at us”. Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia as well as Ali Bongo Ondimba from Gabon voice their disappointment with failures of fast-track funding and the lack of progress since the 1992 conference in Rio. Ondimba adds that Africa, the cradle of humanity, must not be remembered as the cemetery of the expectations of this world. And President Sprent Dabwido from the small island state of Nauru speaks next: “I am from the Pacific, the frontline of the struggle.



The Delegate from the Maldives, Listening to the Proceedings.

Photo: Elisabeth Eide

Climate Change is for us a matter of life and death. Much of my region will be uninhabitable for our grandchildren. The Pacific will take the lead and have 100 per cent renewable energy by 2020”.

There is scattered applause and scant attention on the part of the audience. This may be the official conference hall, but it is not the center of future plans and decisions. The real negotiations are elsewhere. After months of preparation, busy climate bureaucrats have for days gathered in groups, tackling specific topics. They do not speak of grandchildren or uninhabitable islands: They speak with an endless row of acronyms, in a technical vocabulary which has also been acquired by many NGO delegates. This is the realm of expert discourses, an area where compromises are tried, for better or worse.

Reporters wait steadily around such events, or circle around the country pavilions. At times, they pull aside a delegation member for an interview, or an NGO representative who tries her level best to influence “her” delegation. An occasional head of state appears and gains additional attention from the journalists. The Norwegian PM Jens Stoltenberg makes a seven hour speed visit to Durban on 7 December, and the media are hurriedly invited to a special press conference. Cameras follow him from the hotel to a large side event focusing on the UN climate fund, together with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi. This side event at the official summit draws a large audience. Delegates from the Global South are eager to hear whether there will actually be any funding for their climate mitigation and adaptation programs. From the rostrum one sentence is repeatedly uttered: There will be no fund without funding; a conclusion clearly inspired by the financial crisis. Hopes are somewhat diminished. Two questions come from the floor, carefully directed by a South African TV show moderator; and then the heavy weights really have to leave.



Mainly Male Politicians Came, Met, and Negotiated.
Norwegian PM Jens Stoltenberg (in the middle) Discussing the Climate Fund.

Photo: Elisabeth Eide

The Challenge of the 20th Century

This book is based on a simple claim: “climate change” is *the* challenge of the 21st century¹. This is so despite and partly because of all the controversy the issue has raised within all three major aspects that the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) has identified: *scientific facts*, *mitigation* and *adaptation*. These aspects continue to preoccupy journalists as well.

The debate about the *scientific facts* on climate change will continue. Mediating and reporting this will also be a major challenge for journalism. The science is as settled as it can possibly be when it comes to asking whether or not serious anthropogenic climate change “exists”. But given the economic and political interests built into the issue (in fact, they are also the very foundation of modern societies), intense lobbying will surely keep vulgar and basic debates on the agenda (cf. Oreskes & Conway 2010, Boykoff 2011, Pearce 2010, McKewon 2012). More importantly, debates around risk-estimations, actual consequences and the scientific basis for choosing particular action will continue as we continue to learn more about which predictions and scenarios actually turn into realities. A reasoned, well-informed opinion about climate change and the action needed is a lot to ask from anybody, and journalism – with all the powers and interests in the play – face a daunting task not only of keeping up with new scientifically established facts and future scenarios but also reporting them accurately and effectively.

The challenge of *mitigating* global greenhouse emissions will continue to fuel a political debate on effective political measures, on global justice and on power. This is certain for several reasons. First, because measures of mitigation

demand both new or modified market mechanisms and regulation strategies (e.g. carbon-tax systems, quota-trading). They also provoke the imagination about huge economic expectations (e.g. profits built into a new clean technology industry). A widely spread discourse of “sustainable development”, emerging from the 1970s and gaining international strength in the 1990s (cf. Chasek, Downie & Brown 2010: 319) offers a frame where a myriad of practical political and economic initiatives are launched and discussed. Climate change has become a key issue within this “sustainability” talk, articulating market-decisions and environmental concern.

But, second, there are also discourses beyond the conceptual/linguistic solution of “sustainable development” (for a variety of these, see e.g. McKibben 2009). Here, some argue that market-reliant neo-liberal solutions for “sustainable growth” are self-deceiving and dangerous, that mitigation demands political and social innovations, not merely new applications of free market ideology (cf. Giddens 2009: 91-128, Watts 2011, Barnes & Gilman 2011). Some voices provoke questions of justice connected to the whole notion of development, arguing that without genuinely addressing global and historical structural inequalities, any cooperative mitigation effort will be ineffective and in vain (cf. Parks & Roberts 2010).

Third, the need for locally sensitive and sensible *adaptation* mechanisms and practices will keep climate change in our minds. “Climate” has already partly taken over the terrain of development discourse, revitalizing old disagreements about global development. We have seen, for instance, that the “commitments” of Northern industrial nations to various adaptation mechanism (and mitigation) funds has partly been done by re-directing money from other development initiatives. News of ever more extreme weather events will increase and so will discussions about the most effective ways of preparing to meet the challenges they pose. The media have already shown their ambiguous global potential in amplifying “suffering-from-a-distance” and promoting sentiments of solidarity (cf. Chouliaraki 2010, Silverstone 2006). Climate change has a potential of developing these now often sporadic moments of philanthropy into consistent debates about responsibility.

Even on such a sketchy and abstract level, the debate over various dimensions, alternative calculations and disputable futures of climate change offers strong arguments for predicting that climate change has the potential of being a strategic, game-changing issue. This is obviously true in a “constructionist” sense. Climate change has become a major new signifier in many fields of life. It can be used to frame, analyze and justify everyday choices such as eating habits but also for contextualizing high level global power dynamics such as US-China relations. It has not yet led to paradigmatic changes in action and practices in these fields, but it has surely become a standard part of our discourses of evaluation and planning.

A De-centered Focus on the Media and Mediatization

This book looks at how climate change is “mediated” around the world. This means that we focus on how the media represent climate change and climate change politics, zooming in particularly on the performance of journalism / media institutions – rather than on the ways various publics or audiences interpret these messages (cf. Olausson 2011). Despite the fact that media research must – by definition – center its attention on the media and its performance, our investigative frame in climate reporting is decisively *anti media-centric*. We do of course analyze media and their texts and practices, and in this sense, we look at the media as the context in which climate change appears and is made sense of. But at a more fundamental level, we see the issue turned upside down: media institutions’ practices are in fact situated *in* climate change. There is a working dialectical relationship, captured well by Fairclough when defining *discourse* as “an element of social practices which constitutes other elements as well as being shaped by them” (Fairclough 1995: ix).

To elaborate drawing a parallel with science is useful. We can argue that climate science is a paradigmatic example of “post-normal” science (Hulme 2010: 77-80, Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993)². Climate scientists can no longer just describe an “object” for the sake of knowledge (be it positive or negative knowledge), nor can they claim to be practicing traditional “applied science” or even exceptionally demanding “professional consultancy”. Instead, climate science exemplifies a situation where both the stakes and uncertainties are high but still action, choices and decisions are immanent. Climate scientists (be they oriented to nature or to society) are actually participating in the reconstruction of the very ground on which modern society – and its science, for that matter – stands. The institutional duty and task of scientists to “describe” and form theories about nature or society (or to criticize and doubt the empirical truth of existing theories) is challenged and partly shaped by the need to predict the future and offer advice. Despite all the institutional forms of repression (such as the call for neutrality, objectivity, and scientific procedures and roles) and personal factors of denial (such as upper middle-class lifestyle), scientists know that while they represent climate change they are also – in their roles as natural scientists, citizens and human beings – situated *in* climate change, just as social scientists are situated in the global society they describe and analyze. This at the very least suggests a partly new level of potential reflexivity: what you look for and find out in research may have a decisive effect on the very institutions you live by.

In analogous manner, climate change forces a number of “post-normal” questions for journalism, calling into question some of its fundamental contextual links. Here are some obvious and crucial ones. Modern journalism has a unique link to the *category of the “nation”* and the institutions of nation

states. Journalism has evolved in tandem with the modern nation state and the idea that social problems are solved and negotiated mainly within the nation state's geographical and identity boundaries (Sonwalkar 2005, Machin & van Leeuwen 2007, Nossek 2007, Löffelholz & Weaver 2008). Climate change does not obey such geopolitical limitations, and thus reporting has to transcend or at the very least renegotiate them. We know that journalism has borrowed its *epistemological* perspective and *ideals* from modern science, claiming to talk either in the name of (fairly naïve of technical) objectivity or at least in the name of organized skepticism to the existing authorities of knowledge. However, just like scientists, journalists covering climate issues will have to come to grips with the serious discourses and deliberations around all the issues of climate change before certainty can be established regarding such issues, as well as to be capable of understanding the various levels of (un)certainty therein. We might be approaching the limits of "post-normal journalism" in other fields of risk-driven public discourse as well (cf. Beck 2009), but surely climate journalism is an example of the challenge to re-think some of the epistemological commitments on which journalism rests. Furthermore, we know that politically (and as part of the objectivity regime) journalism has often emphasized its critical distance from authorities, administration and political institutions. This critical attitude and its public performance is part of the doxa of journalism (cf. Bourdieu 2005), and one of its indicators is the popular and academic discussion or lament on "mediatization", the way media (as a supposedly independent factor with its own logic) penetrates other institutions and forces them to adapt (cf. Ramonet 1999, Lundby 2009). This distanced and often implicitly cynical mode is still the default position of reporting, even in global climate change matters (Kunelius & Eide 2012). On the other hand, some research suggests a re-politicization of (parts of) the press (cf. Hjarvard 2007). Climate reporting also at times carries signs of various strands of "advocacy" and new alignments with political actors and positions.

By this analogy, we do not wish to suggest that climate change/global warming has somehow revolutionized journalism, the media in general or their routine performances. Forces of systemic resistance to new forms of journalistic engagement are strong indeed (and much of our book is proof of that). But we think that climate change offers an exceptionally good opportunity to study modern institutions such as journalism and learn about and from them, through their reactions, mistakes, innovativeness, weaknesses and strong/weak signals of change. Thus, from the "post-normal" era point of view, then, this book is a case study of what kind of communication system (dominant and emerging) we have today when facing an unforeseen global challenge. This implies also that our take on the media is normative, taking the precautionary principle towards future climate changes as one point of departure³; and also exploring how journalistic norms and ethics apply when facing this global challenge.

It is crucial that like other public actors, media and journalism do not reduce their interpretations to earlier categories and routines of action but rather that they imagine and test new ones.

A Global (Media) Event

We have chosen to focus our study on coverage of the UNFCCC climate summits. The summits, the COPs (Conference of Parties, now running towards number 18), offer a fruitful opportunity for collecting a set of transnational data to illuminate and compare diversity in journalism's performance around the world. To be sure, focusing on these summits is also accompanied by restrictions. It narrows our material and probably overemphasizes the role of political actors and explanation frames. Although part of our material suggests that some media (particularly during the attention peak of COP 15) saw the summits as an opportunity to focus on climate change more broadly, it also suggests that some media angles routinely applied in other contexts do not appear in summit coverage at all. This is particularly evident in journalism that looks at climate change in the context of everyday life choices and consumer politics, for instance. Also, summit coverage omits parts of journalism in which climate change becomes a part of argumentation in stories that are mainly about something else (migration, for example, or energy efficiency, food choices, etc.).

These restrictions notwithstanding it is reasonable to claim that by studying the summit coverage we can catch a relevant glimpse of journalism's role in one *sphere of global climate politics*. In a sense, there is a common core event that provides a shared starting point for journalists. There is also the massive amount of knowledge production, background deliberation, lobbying and pressuring, advertising and advocating that comes together at the COPs, providing journalists with an overabundance of information and opinions from which to draw on as they compose their coverage. Politicians, bureaucrats, scientists and other experts, lobbyists and activists – and professional colleagues from all corners of the planet – are available, often on site, for journalists (cf. Painter 2010). The conditions and supportive structures for quality transnational coverage are there.

The idea of a “shared starting point” for journalists, however, also has to be qualified. The summits should not be seen as events that exist independently from media attention and coverage. Instead, they must be seen as a particular example of repeated “global media events” (Hepp & Couldry 2010). This emphasizes important aspects of the COPs and underscores Hepp and Couldry's call for the need to re-evaluate and adjust the concept of media events.

The original concept of “media event” was introduced by Dayan and Katz in 1992, in a different media age. It was inspired by a sense of “festive view-

ing of television” (Dayan & Katz 1992: 1), emphasizing the *ritual* and national character of particular media moments that were “*preplanned*, announced and advertised in advance” (ibid 7)⁴. Media events were seen as events “presented with reverence and ceremony” where “journalists who presided over them suspended their normally critical stance and treated their subject with respect, even awe” and coverage could be seen as “ceremonial efforts to redress conflict or restore order, or, more rarely, to institute change” (Dayan 2010: 24-25). Originally, the focus was mostly on the “three Cs” of media events: *contests, conquests and coronations*. This supersaturation of national attention to rituals no longer sits easily with us. Dayan himself (2010) recognizes the explosion of media channels, such as the fragmentation of television. The “kind of exclusive focusing on one event at any given time is now becoming almost impossible”, instead there is a “field of events in which different candidates compete for privileged status, with the help of entrepreneurial journalists” (Dayan 2010: 27). Katz and Liebes note that shocking, interruptive and conflictual events were originally not included in the “media event” definition, but now conclude that “such major events deserved inclusion” (Katz & Liebes 2010: 33), even if they are and were disruptive, not integrative⁵.

Climate summits are, of course, not merely events constructed for media attention and for creating audiences. Nor are they primarily meant to “restore order”. Rather, they are intended to “institute change” through a UN-led process of transnational political negotiations. But they are events that are created and preplanned in intense interaction with the assumed media attention that they will get. This applies both to the summits as a whole, often serving, for instance, the PR-goals of the host countries and to the various participants, who will plan their summit actions with a close eye on the possibility of catching global coverage.

The event itself is, then, partly constructed from the assumption of media attention. It is then reported in the media. This continuous structure of interaction and anticipation of coverage and attention shapes a considerable amount of what is said – and not said – at a summit, especially outside the negotiation rooms. Thus, the climate summit coverage is not just an example of climate journalism. It is also an example of another transnational genre of journalism, i.e. “summit journalism” (cf. Kunelius & Kumpu 2010, Rivenburgh 2010) that often follows particular forms and formats of its own. And these formats, in turn, shape the performance of actors inside the COPs, be they politicians, celebrities or civic activists.

Dayan and Katz (1992) illustrated the ritual features of media events by talking about *contests, conquests and coronations*. Inside the COP coverage we find instances that may be said to involve symbolic coronations, as when the Norwegian PM was represented in a major Norwegian newspaper as the “King of the Rain Forest” in Bali 2007 (Eide & Ytterstad 2011) or when media

pronounced some particular personalities as the heroes of the current negotiations. To some extent, when President Barack Obama arrived at the Copenhagen Summit (2009), he *conquered* the media attention with his brief but prominent presence and his implicit definition of partners who were worth speaking to. It is also not far-fetched to envisage the summits as *contests* for media attention, as demonstrated above with the Connie Hedegaard examples or as observed from the exhibition hall. Some NGOs launched their “negative contest” by their “fossil of the day” event – which could also be seen as a “counter-coronation” posted in the same exhibition hall, an event meant to “speak truth to power”.

It is also clear from our material that COPs do compete in a “field of events” with other candidates, be it wars, catastrophes, or national events such as elections or indeed royal weddings. Their chances of winning such a competition depend to a large extent (as did the Sadat visit to Israel that Dayan and Katz originally drew from) on the presence and actions of men in power. Indeed, COPs (Bali 2007, Copenhagen 2009 and Durban 2011) are a particularly interesting case to look at the problem of “global media events”. In his rephrasing of the characteristics of media events Dayan (2010: 25) points to four analytical themes that also help to underscore some characteristics of the COPs.

Insistence and Emphasis

Media events are moments of emphasized attention and repetition, disrupting organized schedules, making them somehow *omnipresent* (Dayan 2010). They are thus focal points of intensified attention, taking place via many modes of communication. Climate summits have not radically disrupted the routine flow and schedules of journalism (as some other spectacular global media events tend to do, like the Olympics). However some of them, particularly COP15 in Copenhagen, almost reached this level of “omnipresence” due to the presence of high-profile leaders and the publicly emphasized expectations that *this time* negotiators would reach a lasting and constructive global agreement. This summit also represented a peak in the global coverage of climate change⁶. The other COPs have had less media attention, and in some countries, national concerns overshadowed even Copenhagen (e.g., national elections in Russia and Chile in 2009). In many parts of the world – if not globally – the Copenhagen summit was something that the media *could not* ignore. Thus, there was a sense of insistence and forced emphasis among journalists.

Performativity

Noting that media events are also *performative* complicates the issue and distances us from looking at their coverage through notions of balance and neutrality. They are mediated and somehow orchestrated gestures that actively

create realities, often loaded with power struggles, aiming to produce effects according to their performance. For performativity, COPs offer conflicting evidence. On the one hand, they primarily take place out of public view, and appear as power-driven international bargaining processes; moreover, conflicting interests mean that they are interpreted and domesticated in different ways and few if any shared realities are created (see Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010 for 18 variations on COP15). But, on the other hand, the COP process has – despite the failure of Copenhagen and conflicting power relations – proved also quite resilient. The way that the talks and the process have often dramatically gone into “overtime” but have still been kept “alive” (Bali, Copenhagen, Durban) suggests that the ritual, performative structure of the process is something that all participants – different countries, transnational organizations, media and NGOs etc. – somehow value⁷ and have not had the public nerve to abandon. It seems nobody really “dares” to spoil the play for good. If this sense of performance is valid, then at some level also the assumption of omnipresence is stronger than the mere evidence suggested in the media coverage. Even if the harder “realities” of global politics are still the driving force of climate politics, the summits’ intensively globally mediated performances have had their effects on these core power relations. Think, for instance, about the way the European Union seemed to re-capture its momentum in the talks by building a coalition with the most vulnerable countries at Durban, thus at least momentarily out-performing the “right to develop” argument of China and India.⁸

Loyalty

Media events also construct *loyalty* when they successfully mediate the definition of the organizer. As Dayan puts it, “the proposed dramaturgy is not questioned but substantially endorsed and relayed” (ibid 26). In the case of COPs, loyalty to the organizers’ definition, is an interesting question. In the media coverage, one could say that much of the build-up and early coverage of the COP 15 was a strong example following the official script of the event, emphasizing Copenhagen as a “decisive moment” in global climate politics. This dramatic, somewhat alarmist and historical narrative about the decisive moment was widely accepted – in the media. And while in the pre-Durban period, public expectations were much lower, one could also suggest that this was precisely the interpretation favored by the organizers: against moderate hopes, the Durban performance received relatively positive media comments. When it comes to other field loyalties, our observations in Durban indicate that most actors “inside” the summit work according to the conference rules and structures. This has been proven for example by the way in which NGO leaders adopt the particular acronym-rich, technological language of the negotiations, and thus, for the most part, take as a “given” the limitations within

which the negotiations have taken place. The demonstrations “outside” COPs vary much in size and coverage, but they represent a different kind of loyalty, to grass roots initiatives, climate victims and their future and present living conditions; but on the other hand they confirm the (relative) importance of the event itself.

Indeed, as media events, COPs are interesting because there is a continuous *struggle* – the “conquest for ownership” (Dayan 2010: 30) – over the dominant meaning of the event⁹. This struggle is on the one hand part of the script of the event, but on the other hand its outcomes are not always ritually predetermined. For instance the Copenhagen summit entailed some, albeit vague, perspectives of “victory” or “success” – it attracted global leaders, among them President Obama, and on that occasion he and the leaders of the BASIC countries (China in particular) may be said to have won the conquest for ownership over the issue, while the EU leaders were sidetracked. The later COPs have been preceded by gloomy predictions, and thus global leaders may have found few valid reasons to attend. On the other hand, such global events may – for the host countries – be an opportunity to pursue image-building, even if this entails risks (Rivenburgh 2010). COP15 in Copenhagen may illustrate this, by the mediated turn from “Hopenhagen” to “Brokenhagen” (Eide, Kunelius, & Kumpu 2010). At COP17 in Durban some African leaders stated that the Kyoto agreement should not be allowed to be buried in African soil¹⁰ and thus demonstrated how the articulation of regional solidarity plays a role. But these articulations also have to do with such events being opportunities for host countries to assert themselves (Rivenburgh 2010), and more effectively so if the summit concludes successfully.

Shared Experience

Media events not only provide knowledge and information, but a shared experience, a construction of some kind of participatory, inclusive “we” for the benefit of the audience. For Dayan, this emphasizes “formats that rely on narrative continuity, visual proximity, and shared temporality” (ibid 26). Again, COPs are a difficult case. On the one hand, the global coverage they invoke often still relies on very localized and nationalized constructions of “we”, as our earlier work shows (Eide & Kunelius 2010). But on the other hand, the coverage also reveals aspects of shared realities. This is reflected most evidently and with great clarity in the way summit coverage builds on the accepted knowledge of the climate science community. But there is also the presence of a moral narrative and this leaves the science with more ‘normative’ vocabularies – albeit in contested form. Think of the rise of the discourse of global climate justice, for instance, in its many forms. While it may not be taken for granted and accepted by mainstream media all around the world, it is an essential part of the

landscape in which the different global “we” identities are constructed. Thus, if it is conceivable that in local or national contexts, some media events can indeed produce a shared emphasis, a set of performative regional consequences, as well as commanding loyalty and building a shared “we” for the audience of the ritual, then in a transcultural, global context all these dimensions have to be reconsidered. Global media events cannot – in the same manner as national or local ones – build or functionally mediate the “center of society” (Couldry 2003). But global media events momentarily capture the attention of the global audience, providing a “thickening” of discourses (Hepp & Couldry 2010: 11), as well as a thickening of cultural assertions, actions and struggles for meaning. The events are “shared” in the sense that there is a common core script that the event follows and which offers roles and opportunities of performance for various actors.

Whether the COPs are *global* media events may thus quite well be disputed, but elements of the concept help us to underscore the spectacle and see the *event nature* of the COPs. As such, and despite the contradictory evidence, it is clear that the summits operate on an “imagined self-image” of a global media event.



NGO-created Media Event: The Fossil of the Day, in the Summit Exhibition Hall.

Photo: Elisabeth Eide

Opportunities Lost ...?

The summits are meeting places for a variety of actors: scientists, politicians, activists, business and media people, all trying to get their messages across. In such situations, discourses emerge from different fields. At times they compete, at other times they merge or clash. In the inter-discursive space and moments they create, journalists have an opportunity to utilize discursive links to fundamental ideological and material drivers of modern history: the belief in economic growth, the close relations between political and economic powers, and not least, the psychological sense of an at least partially shared fate on Planet Earth (moments of a “Global We”). When journalists cover summits, contradictory discourses *about* these questions appear. There are moments that provide journalists with a critical *outsider's* point of view. By playing the discourses against each other, the journalistic field thus demonstrates its relative independence from other fields, sometimes in a transnational manner. For instance, reporters in summits have access to rich resources for doing critical-reflexive coverage of their own national governments' performances when it comes to the subject of climate change mitigation. The fact that a summit is on or approaching can also invoke publishing other stories on climate change, from places and people already suffering the consequences, the latter also being demonstrations of journalistic transnational solidarity (cf. Roosvall 2010).

When measured against its potentials, journalistic and media coverage of summit meetings seems in many ways like an opportunity lost. A major explanation for not being able to take full advantage of the summits is that most of the media still remain solidly nation-based. Our results show varying degrees of dependence on international agencies, but more importantly, a substantive degree of nationalistic domestication (Rivenburgh 2010, Nossek 2006). Journalists tend to address their ‘own’ politicians, NGO leaders and scientists. This is also a bias in our data. It may very well be that a study of more transnational media would have generated somewhat different results. But the fact still remains that most of the global media landscape is still made of nationally anchored media outlets. On the one hand this domestication (uncritically) enhances the national interests (be it the nation presented as a global player, important donor or as a nation in need). On the other hand, the national emphasis can also lead journalists into taking the watchdog role and challenge politicians (often helped by NGO voices) for their lack of action and the superficial nature of their dedication. After a series of disappointing summits, it seems as if the conclusion of many political leaders as well as journalists is that these global events have not moved the planet in the right direction. Thus, it may be more important to undertake studies of the everyday climate journalism performed “at home”, since nations – and sometimes regions – may be a more important battleground for coming to grips with practical approaches to climate change.

The *MediaClimate* Project

One aspect of “post-normal science” is that facts are uncertain and values disputed. The *MediaClimate* project realizes these features, but simultaneously it stands united in its adherence to the general conclusions of the UNFCCC when it comes to the UN general conclusions of human contributions on climate change *and* the need to respect the precautionary principle. We also realize that media play a vital role for the public understanding of climate change, however much this role varies across nations both in volume and content.

The network came into being among a group of people whose ambition was to monitor this variety. The choice of the summits as the sources of key material was consciously made to prioritize moments of high attention, and simultaneously provide a manageable structure for a transnational research project. As core material on each of the chosen summits (COP 13, 15 and 17) we have selected, for each of the participant countries, the coverage prior to, during and after the event in two national newspapers; one elite and the other providing a more popular angle. This entails some 21 days of coverage during each summit; it also includes non-summit coverage of climate change in those periods. Our shared materials are limited to newspaper coverage. To be sure, adding TV and radio coverage – and particularly – online publications would have provided a richer material, and future studies will move in this direction. However, even if newspapers in some of the network countries are read by relatively small groups of elites, they play an important role in informing these elite circles. We believe they still provide a reasonable and relevant sample for making sense of climate politics in general and local journalistic choices and conventions in particular. Detailed country reports, mainly from the most covered summit, COP15 in Copenhagen, were compiled in an earlier volume produced by the network (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010). The present volume presents chapters largely cutting across national borders where the aim has been to highlight specific topics generated from our findings and observations, some of them also from field work at the Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011) summits¹¹.

This book takes a decisively *transnational* and comparative look at summit coverage. The contributions are organized in three sections. The first part offers analyses that are set in dialogues with broad global and discursive questions. Chapter 2 presents a reading of the general dynamics of public climate debates in the Post-Copenhagen era. Chapter 3 focuses more on the perspective articulated in the Global South, using two African countries (Egypt and South-Africa) as examples. Chapter 4 discusses the summit coverage in the context of the structure of global news flows. Chapter 5, in turn, looks at the discursive dynamics of development discourses and national interests, studying the coverage of the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative in the donor country as well as in two of the largest recipient countries (Brazil and

Indonesia). Chapter 6 looks at the future scenarios represented in the climate coverage and how, by comparing Bangladesh and Finland, we find a stark contrast between “the future is now” coverage in Bangladesh and the more abstract and scenario-oriented coverage in Finland.

Part Two addresses more directly the professional challenges and tensions that journalists face in climate change coverage. Chapter 7 discusses a unique initiative of the editors in the British *Guardian* which led to the publication of the same editorial in 56 newspapers across the world during COP15 in Copenhagen. Chapter 8 zooms into Bangladesh and the question of advocacy in climate coverage, discussing the seemingly national consensus on the need for action within the fields of politics *and* journalism. Another kind of advocacy is central in Chapter 9, which analyzes the coverage of a controversy over what has been called “Climategate”, the e-mail leaks from researchers at the Climate Research Unit at East Anglia University. Chapter 10 illustrates the power of the carbon lobby interests and its effect on media, taking a special look at Australia and the local debates on the new carbon tax; it also raises some disturbing questions about professional accountability. Chapter 11 dwells on the boundary line between traditional and new media, assessing the new and diffuse nature of news distribution across the world in different contexts.

Part Three offers a series of analyses that come together under the question of representation, with regard to issues, interest and identities. Chapter 12 is concerned with the challenges of visualization of climate change, looking at some trends both when it comes to “real” and constructed images. It looks at how the “evidence of things not yet seen” poses a particular problem for visual journalism. Chapter 13 takes up the representation of civic activism at the summits, analyzing both the representation of climate activism and the way in which the “good sense” of their message meets more hegemonic interpretations in journalism. Chapter 14 treats another aspect of the relationship between journalism and the “popular”, asking whether some newspapers in South Africa and Brazil, despite their tabloid character, may serve and represent a broader public. Chapter 15 builds on the general finding that women’s voices are under-represented in the summit coverage, discussing its consequences in the broader perspective of women’s potential and actual roles as guardians and providers. Chapter 16 examines representations of indigenous (particularly Arctic) peoples, who, at times appear in documentaries and visual representations. However, much like the representation of women, they are seldom heard in the summit material. Chapter 17 presents, in a condensed format, some of the main findings of the overall content analysis from which many individual chapters also draw.

We close with a short Epilogue looking ahead at further challenges for transnational media research within this particular field. Anthony Giddens suggests that the “politics of climate change” has not been developed yet; that we “do

not yet have a developed analysis of the political innovations that have to be made if our aspirations to limit global warming are to become real" (2009: 4). As we write this, it has become clear that the Rio 20+ conference in June 2012 did not take the planet further when it comes to national and global commitments to mitigate climate change. The result was, yet again, a declaration full of lofty promises and few concrete results. The scant global news coverage repeated the familiar pattern: politicians articulated official optimism, NGOs provided sharp criticism and the business community largely stayed out of the limelight and away from the public realm.

Such media formats seem to be repeating themselves and climate change mitigation meets with little progress, while the notion of (need for) change is still strongly present. Climate coverage shows that conflicts between outside and inside development discourses – between empowered and disempowered – are growing more intense and complex in the new millennium. Much coverage still seems to promote an assumption that the traditional linear development discourse (implying that the “Rest follows the model of the West”) is the road ahead. This is well articulated for instance in the idea of “technological transfer”. There is a discourse coloured by “fear”, in the hearts and minds of some, built on the recognition that if every Chinese or Indian citizen develops the same level of consumption as a US or European citizen, the planet is doomed. For some, this very same image represents the discourse of historical justice and the right to develop. Finally standing in opposition to all these grand scale progress narratives are numerous alternatives: new directions, values and futures.

For journalism, and for media research, times could hardly be more interesting.

Notes

1. We will mainly refer to “climate change” in this book, although we are mindful and aware of the problems of naming. Climate change might very well have been introduced into public and political vocabulary as part of particular interests and political campaigning (e.g. Boykoff 2011: 8-9), suggesting a milder and more vague concern than “global warming”. But as a term it also has the advantage of referring to broader systemic changes in the climate and to their social and political consequences, not merely denoting the rise of average temperatures.
2. Post-normal science: “the application of science to public issues where facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Funtowitz & Ravetz (1993).
3. See http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1355
4. The original analysis focused particularly on the first visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 (Dayan & Katz 1992), in a world where broadcast television still represented the medium of national integration. However, they did already note then that “the nation-state itself may be on the way out, its boundaries out of sync with the new media technology” (1992: 23).
5. “For the fact is that media events of the ceremonial kind seem to be receding in importance, maybe even in frequency, while the live broadcasting of disruptive events such as Disaster, Terror and War are taking center stage”. (Katz& Liebes 2010: 33)

6. See Maxwell Boykoff: Media Coverage of Climate change/Global Warming, measuring the coverage from 2004-2012; http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/media_coverage/ accessed 2 June 2012.
7. Although at Cancún and Durban this was evident to a lesser extent.
8. See also Cottle's definition of "mediatized rituals" as the "exceptional and performative media phenomena that serve to sustain and/or mobilize collective sentiments and solidarities on the basis of symbolization and a subjunctive orientation to what should or ought to be" (2006: 415).
9. The "multiple tensions and the calculated moves of various public actors interested in the exploitation of the event's charisma ask the question of "legitimate ownership" and undue appropriation" (Dayan 2010: 30).
10. The Democratic Republic of Congo, speaking on behalf of the African Group, at the Durban Summit. Source: http://ifg.org/pdf/durban_update07.pdf Accessed 20 June 2012.
11. One team member was present in Copenhagen; in Durban 11 team members were present.

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Part I

Global Discourses

Chapter 2

Varieties of Realism

Durban Editorials and the Discursive Landscape of Global Climate Politics

Risto Kunelius

At first glance, it seems almost unbelievable. The beginning of the millennium saw an unforeseen rise in public interest, attention and concern related to climate change. In the wake of the fourth IPCC-report (2007), Al Gore's rise to global stardom, Hurricane Katrina (2005), and the Stern Review (2006), global warming made a breakthrough from a concern of scientists and science journalists into a major focal point of public discourse. The media became thick with lobbyists, politicians, advertisers, filmmakers, popular journalists, apocalyptic preachers, civic activists and independent bloggers, all of whom wanted to be part of the debate. The media attention peak has been duly noted in research (Boykoff & Mansfield 2011). It can be seen as an exceptional example of journalism acting as a diffuse but meaningful transnational institution. Of course, there still remains vast diversity in the standpoints of mediated public actors (from different shapes of "sceptics" and "deniers" [cf. Painter 2011, Giddens 2009] to "gradualists" and "alarmists" [Urry 2010]); there remain huge differences in the level of public consciousness around the world as well as within journalism – and its ability to link concrete life experiences and choices to climate change. But in an embryonic form, the principal ingredients for a transnational public, in all its necessarily conflicted and polyphonic appearance, were in place: attention focused on a commonly accepted problem, recognition of at least some key actors and consequences, representations of interests, channels and forums of debate and possible links to power (political institutions and networks of transnational actors) (cf. Dewey 1954, Fraser 2007, Davis 2010: 114-130). Given the way journalism is historically dependent on the modern structures of governance and lifestyles, and how these are the very things that become contested in climate debates; overcoming such historical embeddedness is no small testimony of journalism's potential to critical rationality and reflexivity.

Against the upswing of attention and activism of the 2000s, the new decade (2010-2020) looks almost equally unbelievable. At first sight it hints at striking features of anti-realism in journalism. If "realism" means a humble attitude to-

ward facts backed by evidence, media attention has proven to be anything but that. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere rose steadily between COP15 and COP 17, from 388 p.p.m. in December 2009 to about 393 in December 2011 – a rise of 1.3 per cent in merely two years. Meanwhile, global newspaper attention focused on the summits in Durban plummeted to an average of 28 per cent of that of Copenhagen (see table 4.1).

There are a number of obvious reasons for the decrease in journalistic attention. The *financial crisis* has, since 2008, changed the agendas and the space of maneuvering of decision-making elites, increasing political pressures to concentrate attention to local, national, concrete and immediate problems (e.g. unemployment) instead of global, transnational, abstract and partly future-situated issues (e.g. consequences of sea level rise). In 2006, The Stern Review was published in a relatively stable and self-confident global economy where the “costs” of future scenarios in climate change could be plausibly (albeit optimistically and one-dimensionally) calculated in a way that suggested reasonable action. In 2012, the future for all economic and political elites and their predictions is much more uncertain – and certainly enjoys less public trust. We know journalism largely follows the agendas of (national) political elites, and the decline of climate journalism is a direct testimony of this.

Since the upswing of attention at the beginning of the new millennium *climate politics has stagnated*, and this has decreased the plausibility of and trust in global governance. Fundamentally, this is linked to the ongoing shifts in the global power regime, and the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) negotiation process has come under increasing pressure from different sides and interests. The pressure emerges not only from those who would rather see less climate action, but also from those who wish to see more fundamental steps taken or more diversified and locally sensitive policies chosen. If at some point there was a vague (internally diffuse, but still existing) coalition of the “willing” that extended from some political elites (e.g. progressive voices in the European Union, hopes directed toward the Obama administration and the eloquent pleads of some of the most vulnerable countries) to some economic actors (e.g. new technology companies, national innovation policy actors) and to a range of environmental movements, that “coalition” seems now to have disappeared. The UNFCCC process is barely alive; it hangs from vague and ambiguous wording that in the Durban final statement calls for developing “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force”. We know that the political authority of journalism is often borrowed from the political process and institutions. The stagnating global climate policy and decreased authority of the UN-process has no doubt accelerated and encouraged the decrease in media attention.

Climate politics has also fragmented from an overarching, global concern into particular models concerning different sectors (“horizontally”, e.g. between

energy efficiency, emission mitigation, forest protection, etc.) and different contexts (“vertically”: between application of models and solutions in different countries) around the world. This would have been inevitable even if building the global political framework had been successful (cf. Zelli & van Asselt 2012). But in the absence of the overall deal, it will in all probability strengthen, as some experts suggested and hoped (cf. the Hartwell Paper 2010, Ostrom 2009, Hulme 2010). For journalism this poses two challenges. First, covering the applications of different mechanisms of climate governance (for instance: quota trading, carbon taxes, the REDD [Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation-mechanism], etc.), all the professional critical skills of journalists will be sorely needed in the future. Assuring that such models function, even reasonably effectively, calls for a quality of climate journalism that provides transparency to local decision making, accountability for powerful actors and opportunities for being heard for local stakeholders. (For a variety of such cases dealing with these themes, see Chapter 5 and Chapter 10).

Second, fragmentation increases one main challenge that faces journalism (with the support of the UN and international NGOs) – namely, to sustain the viability of an overarching political imaginary of climate change as a global issue. If we are to understand how journalism succeeds in this, we need to understand better the way in which the Post-Copenhagen discourse of climate politics is structured. This chapter makes a preliminary effort to explore this issue, suggesting a conceptual map to elaborate the different *arguments* of what is “real” and valid in climate politics. After sketching the map, I will look at how different arguments and their combinations appeared in newspaper editorials commenting on the results of the Durban (2011) summit.

Climate Claims in a Conceptual Space

Actors in *public* discourse build their positions by evoking combinations of arguments. Arguments, in turn, are usually backed by fundamental presuppositions about what *makes sense*, i.e. what is rational, reasonable, justifiable, functional, effective, real, etc. An argument is (always) based on an *assumption* that there is “solid ground” as the foundation for its position. In public discourse, a naked claim “because I say so” functions badly. Some kind of quasi-universal validity claims are always made – and either challenged or accepted. Different theories of “discourse” emphasize this logical presupposition in various ways, underscoring either the *dialogical potential* of a “discourse” (e.g. Habermas) or the way power and routines create *closed, taken-for-granted* definitions (a muted or repressed dialogue) of social reality mobilized and reproduced in a “discourse” (e.g. Foucault).

In global climate politics, the “solid ground” on which arguments are based varies. By way of making a preliminary elaboration, we can distinguish (at least) two fundamental dimensions that shape these arguments.

The epistemic dimension concerns the nature of our relationship to reality, or *ability to know* things; in other words, how can we represent reality? Some key arguments in climate politics are based squarely on a *realist epistemology*; they claim that there are universal facts and laws which set limits for human and social activity, and consequently, also for the representations humans can (in the long run) use for signifying reality. Thus, we really (!) can know the facts about climate change. The correspondence between our claims and the facts is the ultimate measure of rationality and realism. Or alternatively, we can know the facts about how political action is shaped and structured and distinguish between realism (based on facts) and wishful thinking. A realist argument, then, spells: “I am not making the claim, reality is!” A *constructivist epistemology*, by contrast, claims that there is always a gap between the “real” and representations (filled by fantasy, ideology, discourses of power, etc.). When this approach is taken to extremes, the only “fact” for a constructivist is that all facts are socially constructed and are products of a particular social order in time and place. Ultimately, from this point of view, facts are effects of power. In point of fact, a constructivist argument is de-constructionist, saying “Show me a claim for factuality and I will show you the power behind it!”


In climate politics, the dimension between realism and constructivism is both crucial and insufficient. It is crucial because of the global (universal) nature of the issue and its potential ability to suggest a framework that surpasses local differences. It is analytically insufficient, since there are fundamental differences and contradictions among realists and among constructivists.

A more *ontological* dimension of climate arguments can be evoked if we look at *what is it that we claim is important to know* in climate politics (This takes us beyond simply our ability to know). Roughly we can then distinguish between two fundamental *reference points* through which claims are rationally validated. On the one hand, there are arguments where the ultimate reference point is in the realm of nature – here the “objective” is real. On the other hand, there are arguments where the ultimate reference point is the nature of human political communities. For the former arguments, what matters is evidence and knowledge about *nature*, the hard core arguments are about natural processes. For the latter arguments, claims concerning *human nature* constitute the hard ground. In climate politics, arguments in the discussion about whether or not climate change is “real” are mostly situated in the realm of “nature”. Arguments about “what is”, and what would be globally “fair” in climate politics, are mostly situated within the frame of “human nature”.

These rough dimensions construct a conceptual map (figure 2.1.) for describing some of the dynamics of argumentation in public climate discourse.

Since the nature (!) of climate discussion is to grapple simultaneously with complicated assumptions and implications, both on the epistemic and ontological dimensions of the map, this map *cannot* translate into particular positions in the climate debate. However, it helps us, at least provisionally, to describe and think through the terrain in which climate debates move, how some of the key argumentative ingredients of the space are opened up by the global imaginary of “climate change”.

Figure 2.1. A Conceptual Map for Distinguishing Arguments of Climate Politics



The upper left corner (1) identifies the *scientific concern* arguments referring to the state of the natural climate system. This is the main and original point of departure of climate scientists, such as James Hansen (2008), where the “objective” state of nature is the hard ground focused upon and argued about. Indeed, the whole idea of anthropogenic causes of global warming detaches itself from the egocentrism of “human nature” and assumes the position of “nature” (see also Mann 2012). These arguments can of course assume different levels of potency, from apocalyptic visions of alarmism to more tempered arguments of concern. The common thread in these arguments is that evidence

about natural reality should direct climate policy: “The globe is warming, there will be dire consequences, and this is a fact.”

The upper right corner (2) identifies arguments referring to the intrinsically strategic, *self-interested* reality of politics and human actions. Such arguments frame climate politics as an attempt to govern a system made of essentially egoistic actors (individuals, companies, nations, groups of countries) searching for the maximal realization of their self-interests. Political actors are framed as “rational” in an instrumental and interest-driven manner, and this is the hard ground upon which solid arguments of climate policy and estimations of what works can be constructed. Ultimately, this thread of argumentation reduces climate politics to a power-game. Actors can only be persuaded to climate action through an argument that proves that this is in their best self-interest. Nations, peoples and communities are mobilized by positive and negative sanctions and interest calculations: “Climate politics is essentially a power-game.”

The lower left corner (3) identifies a thread of arguments emphasizing more or less organized *doubt or skepticism*, the constructed, “paradigm” driven and always “biased” nature of human knowledge about “nature”. In a classical and epistemologically modest form, this is the key line of argument of modern, scientific knowledge, a positivism spiced with Popperian fallibilism. This is an argument many concerned and alarmist scientists would appreciate too (upper right corner) (see for instance Mann 2012). Similar argumentation, however, has appeared powerfully in the arguments of various skeptics, ranging from claims that the “climate” is a much more complex system than publicly concerned scientists have recognized (and thus scientists do not see that the “facts” are just constructions) to other claims such as the charge that climate change is a “belief”, or in other words, a form of “religion” (cf. Painter 2011). Another variant of this line of argument (drawing also upon the last variant below) is to criticize the universalizing hubris of “globalized knowledge” implicit in some climate science (Hulme 2010). The fundamental claim: “Climate change is too complex an issue to be represented and known in a universal way.”

The lower right corner (4) identifies an argument that emphasizes the fact that human nature is a (historical, cultural) *situational construct* and subject to change, development and from a political perspective, crucially a question of *recognition*. For instance, it might emphasize the notion that what looks like progress and natural development can and should be questioned. It suggests that not only self-interest but also a sense of fairness is needed to produce effective political argumentation and legitimation of action. One variant of such argument is the de-colonialist discourse which calls for a historical sense of *justice* in climate politics. In a formal and modest articulation, this approach is based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” that one often finds spelled out in climate negotiations. Calls for various kinds of climate justice adhere to certain presuppositions: that while one often sees the

world system functioning in a power-driven way (i.e. their representation of the system follows the rhetoric of political realism) one's *argument* is actually counter-factual in relation to this representation, referring to identities that cut across and transgress the national egoistic logic political realism. The basic claim here is that "rational arguments of climate politics will have to take identities, recognition and localized claims for justice seriously".

The point of building such an abstract analytical device is to underline the fact that most actual positions in climate politics are constructed through *combination* or arguments that pay attention to many, or most, of these threads, combining and articulating them in different ways.

Editorial Sense-making of the Durban Summit

In order to illustrate the discursive landscape on climate change created and mediated in global journalism, I will examine some newspaper *editorials* from different parts of the world and look at them *against* the conceptual map and divisions developed above. Editorials, of course, do not represent journalism in its totality. Different genres and changing technologies enable different kinds of arguments and actors to access journalism and articulate their positions better. Elsewhere in this book we see several examples of this. The popular press articulates climate concerns in a different way from quality outlets (Chapter 14). Visuals capture meanings of climate change yet in a different way (Chapter 12), and feature writing seems to at least offer marginal space for indigenous voices (Chapter 16). New media environments open up space for more diverse arguments (Chapter 11), blurring the boundary between the actors and commentators of negotiations by bringing in actors who are more distanced from the mainstream negotiation circles. However, it is interesting and useful to analyze editorials for two reasons. First, they are a genre of journalism that is closest to the "field of power" (cf. Bourdieu 1989): in editorials, journalists speak with and comment on the dominant public *language of politics*. Second, and consequently, editorials work by identifying the *legitimate* (in relation to hegemonic significations recognized in the field of power) *diversity of opinions*, arguments and positions in a given matter. In editorials journalists construct a publicly legitimate discursive space (cf. Alasuutari 1994). Thus, just as is the case with other kinds of political speech, editorials carve out a conceptual space and argue within it, thus describing the key possibilities and potentials that the current debate on climate politics offers. They help both the reader and the analyst to see what arguments are possible, probable, and easy in the current landscape.

I concentrate on editorials that comment on the end result of COP17, Durban 2011 (for an analysis of editorials on Copenhagen, see Eide & Kunelius 2010).

I discuss three broad themes: 1) *the shared features* of editorial argumentation across countries, 2) *variations* of argumentation (in relation to political location), and then, 3) I close with some remarks about *permanence and change* of argumentation, over time¹.

Shared features: dominating (political) realism

One of the first points to take note of is the fact that one common feature of Durban editorials is their argumentation based on scientific *concern* (upper left corner). What repeatedly appears in these editorials is a factual paragraph or sentence paraphrasing scientific warnings. These warnings come in slightly different versions, but most frequently gravitate toward the key figure of “2 degrees Celsius”.

While hopes weren't high.... the biggest carbon spewers ... unexpectedly defied the pessimists by agreeing to negotiate a common binding agreement in the next few years. Of course there's reason for scepticism. Even if they succeed, that will kick the can forward to 2015, and any deal won't bite until 2020. So we face another wasted decade in the drive to cap the rise in Earth's temperature to a tolerable 2 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial era, instead of a more destabilizing 3 or 3.5 degrees (*Toronto Star*, December 14, 2011).

Such references build a momentary critical stance for journalism against the slow political negotiation process. Although this shows journalism leaning on science to pressure politics, it is noteworthy that it is usually based on a rather modest version of natural realism. The central “2 degree” target is, after all, a heavily bargained compromise, emerging from the *intergovernmental* grinding mill of the IPCC. Thus, by relying on this figure, editorial climate discourse is actually working inside a sphere defined importantly by *political* realities. It would not be difficult to find factual backing for a more nature-realistic (more concerned) position and build much more tension between alarming numbers and the negotiations.

Political realism also dominates Durban editorializing in a more explicit sense. The summits are repeatedly described as a political game, often from a rather cynical angle (an argument that hints at a consciousness that is well aware of the weakness of its “concern”). This frame of political realism (or indeed, *political skepticism*) expresses frustration about the way negotiations work and the meager results they produce. It appears clearly in the reciprocal national political blame mode (see below), but also in part it registers a sense of frustration over the UN global governance and its ineffectiveness.

Startling new evidence that global carbon dioxide emissions are rising faster than ever did little to increase the urgency of the climate talks in Durban, South-

Africa, which concluded earlier this week. Once again, the world's negotiators kicked the can down the road (*The New York Times*, December 16, 2011).

In reality it is possible that the decision to sign the agreement [in Durban] has been more driven by PR-considerations than by a new more positive take on the idea of a global, legally binding deal on emission reductions." (...) "Not least China, having huge commercial interests in Africa, might have chosen to take a softer position in Durban due to tactical considerations (*Dagens Nyheter*, December 12, 2011).

Realism as a default mode of editorials reflects both epistemological commitments of journalism (to various kinds of "objectivity") and its dependency upon the (political) field of power (most acute in editorials). Its dominance also explains why more constructivist claims about climate politics (radical climate justice angle, indigenous experiences, post-colonial arguments) appear much less frequently. They do appear, but only in particular contexts. First, and not unexpectedly, challenges to official global political realism come up in editorials in vulnerable countries, such as Bangladesh.

While the action has been hailed as a 'historic breakthrough' by some, others have criticized it for not being aggressive enough, and as containing a loophole which may be exploited by the major polluting countries to get out of a legal binding (...) Political will, especially of the rich and major polluting nations, is lacking (*Daily Star*, December 13, 2011).

Claims referring to justice arguments are interestingly and importantly linked to the construction of the imagined "we" (or: the implied audience) of the editorials. The two examples here are somewhat more nuanced; the first is taken from the global economic newsmagazine *The Economist*, addressing an explicitly international elite audience.

A cynic might reflect that all this signals how toothless the UN process has become. Yet the Europeans' efforts were appreciated by many poor countries, particularly African ones and some small island nations which feel their very existence is threatened by global warming. The support these places gave to the EU's proposals made it harder for the Indians and Chinese to decry them as developed-world plot against the poor and helpless.

The Indians do, however, have legitimate cause for worry. They fear the impositions of costs they can ill afford, and which constrain their country's ability to grow and thereby lift millions out of poverty (*Economist*, December 17, 2011).

A second example of the variation in justice arguments is found in the Finnish *Helsingin Sanomat*. The paper took an explicitly domestic angle to the Durban outcome. Contrasting the official happiness of the Finnish Minister of Environ-

ment (to the Durban outcome) with the sharp criticism from national political opposition (claiming Finnish negotiators sold short Finnish forest owners' interests), the paper argued:

It is not right if people from thinly populated areas [periphery in Finland–RK] are made to pay for the fact that Finland was forced to accept further costs in order to save a global deal. This is a national burden which should not be made to be born only by one part of the population (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 16, 2011).

Such instances of justice argumentation are interesting in two ways. First, they enable us to ask *in what kind of discursive frame* context they appear? Clearly, justice arguments are strongly linked to a language of national interests or national identities. In the telling example from the *Helsingin Sanomat*, the whole question of what is *right* or just is discussed inside the borders of the nation state of Finland. In the language of *The Economist* it is the “small island nations” and “the Indians” whose claims are recognized and given legitimacy. Thus, claims for justice are here importantly shaped by the nationally grounded political realism. Somewhat similar to the case of arguments of scientific concern, the vocabulary of justice appears here in a form that is explicitly controlled and policed by political realism. Nonetheless, we can also read more into the implicit validity claims embedded in the examples. In the case of *The Economist*, the legitimate concern of Indians emerges from a right to economic growth². Thus the ideology “economic growth” legitimizes and controls the use of justice argumentation, but at the same time it also transgresses the national framing, suggesting a shared, transnational vocabulary. In the case of *Helsingin Sanomat*, the “nation” dominates the discourse, but the editorial also takes it for granted that there is a global price for climate politics, a price that Finland will have to pay. The underlying question is how the global justice demands are to be met locally in a just manner.

Variations across political locations

As already shown, depending on *where* you look, the realism-dominated editorial discourses show some variance. A stronger argument of scientific concern emerges – almost naturally, one is tempted to say – often in more vulnerable countries. I quote from a South African source, bringing in other vulnerable locations as well.

The Alliance of Small Island States and a few others, including some non-governmental and activist organisations, have been calling for emissions reduction targets to be aimed at keeping average global warming below 1.5 C, not the 2 C agreed at the 2007 United Nations negotiations in Bali, this would be enough to hold damaging climate change at bay.

Even the “father of global warming”, James Hansen, director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York, says the 2 C “safe” target is not so safe. Prof. Hansen called for a lower target earlier this year (*Business Day*, December 13, 2011).

If editorials globally often seem to share an *abstract* understanding that climate politics is a form of political power game, *concretely* they are themselves deeply involved in the conflicts of the the power game. An obvious example is comparison between the USA and China. In the USA, *The New York Times* recognizes many of the global issues and concerns over climate change, but when it comes to assessing global responsibilities, its arguments have a clear address.

China and India consented to participate in any future agreement limiting emissions and play by the same rules as everyone else. Those nations are huge, and until now, have disclaimed responsibility for reducing them. Latest figures show that China and India each had emission increases of about 10 percent since 2009. Since 1999, China’s emissions have tripled; India’s nearly so.” (...) Along with all other developing countries, China and India refused to sign on the legally binding reduction targets agreed to by industrial nations at the Kyoto conference in 1997 (*The New York Times*, December 16, 2011).

Somewhat startlingly, then, the *The New York Times* here manages *not* to mention that the USA itself did not ratify the Kyoto agreement with its “binding reduction targets”. In China, one cannot find editorials in the same sense as in the West, but a news analysis published by *Xinhua News* illustrates the point.

(...) Chen Ying, vice director of the Research Center for Sustainable Development of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said the achievements made at the conference will boost the efforts in coping with climate change.

However, the lack of developed countries’ political will hinders cooperation on addressing climate change by the international community, Chen added.

At the end of the Durban conference, Xie Zhenhua, head of the Chinese delegation, criticized “some countries”, referring to developed countries with binding emissions-cuts obligations under the Kyoto Protocol that had not met their commitments to reducing greenhouse emissions and supporting developing countries in this regard with financial and technical aid.(...)

In contrast, China, which does not have mandatory emissions cuts obligations under the protocol, has been making efforts in energy saving and emissions reduction, even though China’s economic growth will certainly means more energy consumption.

China first promulgated its control on greenhouse gas emissions in 2009, when it pledged to reduce carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent compared to 2005 levels by 2020 (*Xinhua News*, December 14, 2011).

Granted that the “distance” between the journalistic field and the political field has an effect on editorials (the fact that Chinese newspapers *do not have* editorials is a case in point), in broad strokes, the localized rationalizations concerning climate politics in editorials reflect the “position” of a country in various rankings that are related to climate change. Editorials domesticate the summit results in locally different ways. In the case of the USA and China, climate politics clearly becomes part of a struggle for global power and dominance. The way countries are differently dependent on or linked with the fossil fuels industry (import, export, energy efficiency [see Chapter 4]) has an effect. These global variations are further complicated both by a sense of vulnerability and by resources of imagined adaptation capacities. Furthermore, the co-existing multiple global dimensions make domestication an issue that, at least potentially, can be extremely complex.

One logic of domestication can be illustrated by an example from Sweden. This example articulates the contradictions of global economic competition (between nations). But at the same time (in order to argue for a national *self-interest*) it relies on being globally concerned with the overall emissions (*concern*). Again, we can see national realism foregrounded, but at the same time a key part of the argument is a global reference to the pressing facts from the realm of nature.

A Sweden that would dramatically raise carbon taxes and cause its industry to have a higher cost level than its competitors in other countries would primarily force the activity to move abroad. This would make it possible to lower the national carbon emissions while the global emissions would remain the same or even increase (*Dagens Nyheter*, December 12, 2011).

Sweden is a prime example of a country with a relatively high level of climate awareness combined with a low level of political tension over climate issues. The situation in Australia, on the other hand, offers an opposite example (cf. Chubb & Bacon 2010). Accordingly, the arguments in the editorial discourses covered a somewhat broader spectrum. *The Daily Telegraph* (owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd.) has consistently taken a pro-carbon-lobby position in its reporting (see more in Chapter 10). In its editorial on Durban, it combined a number of rhetorical moves to declare the outcome as bad for Australia.

Opposition leader Tony Abbot, (...) might be closer to the money with his observation that Australia is now out of step with the global climate change mood. (...)

Australia contributes only a tiny amount of human caused carbon dioxide output. Penalizing that output without similar schemes elsewhere around the planet means a lot of pain for Australian consumers.

According to Climate Change Minister Greg Combet, for example, the outcome was “historic”. And then there's Greens' deputy leader Christine

Milne, who criticized the outcome as an unhelpful compromise. Milne took matters further by complaining about the numbers of Australian media representatives in Durban. A larger press contingent, Milne suggested, could have forced Australian delegates to aim for a bolder outcome.

Milne, not for the first time, misunderstands media's role. Durban had delegates and cheerleaders by the thousand. It didn't need more media (*The Daily Telegraph*, December 13, 2011).

The argumentation flirts with climate denial by aligning with the stance of the opposition leader (who is a public climate change denier). This denial does not explicitly take place in the register of natural-realism (which is an integral part of journalism's own professional ideology) but rather in the register of political realism (which is an easier alliance with the audience). The added self-defense of journalism is (from accusations against the scarcity of coverage from Durban) also a part of this same position (journalism as separate from politics). A stark local contrast is provided by the *Sydney Morning Herald* praising the fact that Australia seems to be a bit ahead of others in terms of carbon-tax plans:

For the first time, big emitters in the developing world, notably China and India, will be subject to the same legally binding agreements that so far have bound Australia and other rich countries. We can only welcome this, even if much of it still has to be worked out.

(...)It [the outcome of Durban] also shows how unpredictably international dynamics can shift. The failure of the UN talks at Copenhagen just two years ago partly triggered Kevin Rudd's loss of nerve in prosecuting a carbon price regime, which in turn sparked his downfall as prime minister. The passage of the Gillard government's carbon tax last month leaves Australia well-placed to deal itself into any outcomes from Durban. The opposition's reaction sounds woolly: that it will be 2020 before any international carbon market emerges, five years after Australia's tax becomes an emissions trading scheme. Does that really matter? As the rich world's biggest carbon emitter per person, Australia can claim some kudos for relaunching climate action just as the rest of the world has rediscovered its nerve (*Sydney Morning Herald*, December 13, 2011).

Permanence and change

Newspaper editorializing before Copenhagen (2009) and even somewhat after it – first in the declarations of hope and in the lament and blame for the failure – reflected a vague belief in some kind of success in global governance (cf. Eide & Kunelius 2010, see also Chapter 6 below). By the time of Durban, the dominant tone of the discourse on global climate politics had moved a notch or two towards political realism. This does not mean that journalism could be

reduced to the sense of realism which seems to be emitted into public discourse by the national political representatives with regard to the recent summits. Journalism – even in the politically driven genre of editorials – has partly its own dynamics, calling for both *an alliance with* and *a sense of detachment from* the discourse of political actors. These aspects can briefly be illustrated by two observations from Durban editorials in relation to earlier summits.

First, and critically speaking, the alliance and dependency is strikingly reflected in a (almost scary) form of *amnesia* evident to anyone who reads summit editorials diachronically over time. To a staggering degree, editorial commentary on the summits seems to repeat the same storyline. Just as in the summits themselves (ending in all-night dramatic sessions 2007, 2009 and 2011), a particular configuration of thought repeats itself in editorials. I quote from my home ground, Finland, here.

The most important achievement of the extended summit was that the US and the developing countries which the Kyoto protocol did not include are now set to participate in the negotiations of the next climate pact (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 16, 2007).

However, many already brought to mind on Saturday that a complete dead-lock was, despite everything else, avoided. And that now it can be said that there is a world-wide consensus that climate change is a threat and has to be stopped. In this respect, the change compared to the time let's say a year ago, is a big one. Climate change negotiations are a process which proceeds step by step (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 20, 2009).

The long awaited Copenhagen climate summit two years ago failed badly, and last year's meeting in Cancún was not able to repair the damage. This is why the climate negotiations 'roadmap' agreed on in Durban is an important achievement (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 16, 2011).

On the one hand, again we see how the official political interpretation of the event has a strong grip over the rationalizations of journalism. Editorials are part of the bureaucratic "repair-work" of journalism, a service that journalism provides to existing organizational structures also more generally. Here, it continuously suggests that the political process goes forward even when it does not actually produce much results.

Parallel to the transmission of this official truth, journalism needs to show at least a formal detachment from political discourse (otherwise, it would not be "journalism" and would just be part of politics). As we have seen, in Durban, a degree of political detachment arose momentarily, emerging from scientific concern, from controlled articulations of what would be just and from a sense of political skepticism towards global governance. But the journalistic frustration sometimes also grew into more tragic (and cynical) expressions of detachment

which were not quite present, even a couple of summits ago. A tragic register of commentary was clearly presented by some of the vulnerable countries in Bali and in Copenhagen (cf. Eide & Kunelius 2010, Rhaman 2010), in the Durban editorials glimpses of this also reached those with a usual tendency to see things more positively. I will close with a quote from an editorial from the host country; it oscillates between a pressure to praise the results of “our summit” and an increasingly tragic sense of failure.

DEPENDING on your viewpoint, the Durban- hosted United Nations climate change talks (COP-17) were either successful or a complete failure. The negotiations delivered a deal, one that at least allows SA, as COP-17 host, to hold up its head in international multilateral negotiation circles. But from the perspective of saving the planet from what science tells us will be irreversible and damaging climate change, it was a dismal failure (*Business Day*, December 13, 2011).

Conclusion

The editorials from Durban illustrate journalism’s relationship to the global, conflicted field of political power in a moment when climate politics is overshadowed by systemic changes and uncertainties in the global economy and is dominated by a sense of stagnation and fragmentation. Underneath the explicit day-to-day climate politics, the historically deep trajectory of global capitalism grinds its way forward (cf. Arrighi 1994, Harvey 1989, Silver and & Arrighi 2010), predicting at least an intensifying struggle over energy, resources, possibilities of economic growth and world hegemony. One structural and constant feature of this landscape is the fact that the general, universalist cosmopolitanism informing and legitimizing arguments of global governance is in dire straits. Hopes of a “global deal” (particularly) in Copenhagen represented perhaps one of the last weak glimpses of “globalization” as an ideology and a theory emanating from the dominance of the US and “the West” in a momentarily and deceptively “unipolar” world with common global interests. A return to earth, to a greater degree of political realism in this sense, must also be welcome; yet, as long as the terms of the “global deal” are seen as inherently unjust by some, they will be ineffective and will not help achieve the changes needed to curtail emissions.

While there are always merits in being a “realist” – who would wish to be called unrealistic, after all – an era of increasingly dominant political realism also calls for sensitized and nuanced forms of criticism and deconstruction of the so-called “realities” of politics. As many theorists of deliberative democracy (or reason) argue, public discourse always includes some seeds and opportunities for corrective criticism. Without dwelling upon the specifics of deliberative

theory (either in relation to environmental issues and climate change in particular [Stevenson & Dryzek 2012] or to transnational democracy in general [Bohman 2007]), here, I will draw from its basic assumptions (cf. Habermas 1984, 1987), defining at least three validity dimensions in rational public discourse: truthfulness, rightness and honesty. They provide one theoretical way of identifying lessons that the analysis of the Durban editorials suggests.

First, journalism – even in the editorials – is grounded in the need to publicly distinguish (sometimes only rhetorically, but still) its position and voice from that of dominant political actors. In global climate journalism this distance has been sought at least from three argumentative directions: from various degrees of scientific concern, from arguments of doubt (mostly doubts about the political process, but also about the scientific facts) and from recognition of (locally rooted) justice claims from the margins of (universalizing) global power regime. Thus, there are diverse and conflicted resources of criticism *recognized* in a shared field of climate discourse. The interplay and argumentative mobilization of these discourses provides weak but real resources for transnational argumentation in journalism. In a landscape of fragmented climate politics, local and sector-specific models of climate action, journalism can keep up the basic validity questions concerning multiple aspects of the rationality of political action: is a local climate policy choice *effective*, is it *acceptable*? Some would say that our profession must do this in order to remain *journalism*.

Second, the way argumentative dimensions have been applied by journalists also shows how modestly journalism applies some of the critical resources at its disposal. Sure enough, editorials are in this respect perhaps a particularly muted genre, and there are moments in other chapters of this book that *point* to more radical forms of criticism (drawing from scientific alarm, from calls for systemic change or from radical calls for justice). Still, these “under-used” resources of criticism are a testimony of the need to ask the third essential question of validity concerning the *honesty* of public representations. In the case of climate journalism, this could be turned into an analysis of *forms of denial* or repression. While the most explicit forms of denial have been mostly (if not always) discarded by journalism, more sophisticated forms are viable, often keeping the more alarming scientific information out of public political discourse, or limiting calls for justice with ideological and hegemonic constructs such as growth or national interest. There are, to be sure, signs of journalists being aware of these limitations, but also much evidence of how institutional routines and structures keep the radical potential at bay.

Finally, the analysis above points to questions concerning the *relationships between different modes of argumentation*. For those of us convinced that the current path of global climate politics needs to change, two observations are particularly important. To begin with, there is an almost seductive way in which the default mode of journalism – political cynicism and realism – can

be linked with the denial of scientific concern (and by implication, the denial of recognition of the justice argument). The example from Australia above is a particularly explicit case in point. It shows us how nationally framed political realism aligns itself with denial of natural scientific facts and the denial of journalistic, institutional accountability. But the same discursive strategy is familiar elsewhere, and if we are to stop public discourse from lapsing into denial (that constitutes self-imposed dishonesty), we should be wary of such rhetoric as that which mutes both cognitive (Is this true?) and normative (Is this right?) validity claims. In a less defensive sense, those of us wanting to resist this alliance of denial should look more carefully into ways in which the normative claims for just climate action and the cognitive claims for action based on scientific evidence can be presented as mutually compatible.

Notes

1. All emphasis in the quotations in this section are added.
2. And the claim of the Island states is rhetorically weakened as something they "feel".

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Chapter 3

Ups and Downs from Cape to Cairo

The Journalistic Practice of Climate Change in Africa

Ibrahim Saleh

Public risk perceptions are a crucial driver of natural hazards policy and management response (Kellstedt, Zahran & Vedlitz 2008). Despite the fact that information about global warming is readily available to average global citizens, understanding ecological *risks* is underdeveloped. This is particularly true in developing countries where either there is confusion regarding stratospheric ozone depletion and greenhouse effects or there are common misunderstandings of climate variability in terms of the relationship between CO₂ concentrations in the atmosphere and temperature change (Sterman & Sweeney 2002). Often perceptions of climate change risks also correspond strongly with demographic, ideological, identity-related and institutional trust variables (O'Connor, Bord, Yarnal, & Wiefek 2002). News reporting and media coverage, as “a sort of instant historical record of the pace, progress, problems and hopes of society” (Bennett 2002: 10), is a key contributor in shaping both policy discourse and public understanding of risks. Media shape the way people rank problems and make sense of their everyday choices. Local practices of journalism also affect translations between science and policy (Weingart et al. 2000).

If climate change is a major challenge for journalism globally, in Africa the urgency of the challenge is even bigger. To begin with, the continent is very vulnerable to the effects of global warming. In many parts of the continent, agriculture is heavily dependent on rainfall patterns, and increasingly frequent and unpredictable droughts and floods cause enormous disasters. Social problems such as the poor state of economic development, extreme poverty and low adaptive capacity serve only to increase the problems. In addition, the media landscape includes many complicating factors. In the West the media took shape primarily in urban centres as mass-circulation print presses and this gave rise to increasingly powerful social, political, economic and cultural institutions (Starr 2004). However, this is not the case in many African countries, where legacies of colonialism, strong state-control over the public sphere, low rates of literacy and technological capacity shape the landscape.

Journalism in Africa is thus often trapped within the gap between; on the one hand, the knowledge produced by climate science, and on the other, the political media realities. On the one hand there are the links between local elites and global climate politics. On the other hand there are the hard realities of everyday life and survival (cf. Saleh 2010).

This disconnection magnifies the difficulties in transmitting and translating scientific uncertainty into the decisive media narratives, which are sorely needed to support adaptation measures. As a result of these contradictions, the media has often further amplified the dysfunctional aspects of the science policy interface in many parts of Africa (Bradshaw & Borchers 2000). In general, news reporting about climate change in Africa is usually inadequate, reflecting the contradictory and unfruitful modes of identification and denial (Brown 2001, Shanahan 2010).¹

One way of stating the problem is to point to the different logics of media and politics (and partly science). For politics, media is influential in how it reports (or does not) the causes and solutions of global warming and how it covers (or does not) climate related socioeconomic phenomena and their regional characteristics (for instance, environmental degradation). For media, the politics is crucial in how it mobilizes and frames climate issues in public debates. Today, convincing explanatory frames of climate change are often lacking, which in turn limits public understanding of how governments and industries are responding. It is the interplay of such media and political logics that explain why editors and reporters have tended to cover climate change as a politicized matter, with two sides deserving equal attention (cf. Boykoff & Boykoff 2004, Saleh 2010). Looking beyond the media-politics axis, especially from the point of view of scientists, climate change reporting requires much to become effective. There is an urgent need to explain the climate change repercussions on the Earth's systems and, consequently, on future generations of human beings. In March 2009, Katherine Richardson, a marine biologist and convener of the International Scientific Congress on Climate Change in Copenhagen, Denmark, emphasized the urgent need to rethink the current communication strategy (Abano 2009):

We want you [the media] to understand what we really know about climate change and its potential consequences and what we can do about it, so that you can make this available to society at large. We're not always good at talking to you and explaining ourselves in non-technical language but we want to talk to you. So if you don't understand, please ask (Richardson 2009).

Thus, on the one hand, scientists stress the necessity that the right and true message get across to the general public. On the other hand, journalists tend to wish that scientists would be able to clarify their message and not overemphasize complexity (cf. Painter 2010).

Framed by these remarks on the particular challenges of African climate change coverage and general tensions in the relationship between the media, politics and science in terms of climate reporting, this chapter attempts to map out how transnational political summits on climate change (as news events) are received by local journalism in Africa. The observations are based on an analysis of the coverage of COP 15 (Copenhagen) and COP 17 (Durban) in four African newspapers and the findings include a discussion of how journalism is linked to national elites and national expert systems of governance. The discussion arising from this investigation focuses on the media treatment of practices, politics and public opinion on climate change. In this context, local practices of journalism reflect an expression of the unequal geography of global capitalism. That there is a lack of economic and technological resources in Africa is not the fault of corrupt African governments, nor the effect of bad governance, market protectionism, a lack of investment conditions for Western capital, etc., but rather, it is the effect of hundreds of years of colonial and post-colonial exploitation, exclusion and dependency that caused the very conditions that Africans have to face today.² Consequently, it has projected a uniquely Southern perspective on the ethical principles being advocated by the media and media theorists (Rao & Wasserman 2007). This critical, postcolonial angle, rooted in African conditions, offers important tools of self-reflexivity. Hopefully it can show how the domestication of climate change news coverage is misread in some situations. From this perspective it is very problematic to use apparently universalistic ethical standards, arising sometimes from Western ethnocentricity about the critical dialectic between truth-telling, empowerment and human dignity, without re-interpreting them in the actual geopolitical context.

Egypt and South Africa

This chapter looks at Egypt and South Africa. I focus on two newspapers in each of these countries, elite newspapers (*Al-Ahram* and *Business Today*) and tabloid newspapers (*Al-Masry Al-Youm* & *Daily Sunday*), and their reporting of climate change during the summits of Copenhagen (COP 15) and Durban (COP 17). While these countries in no way represent the whole diversity of Africa, they offer different geopolitical takes on the continent. Both are also very vulnerable in terms of future climate change.

Egypt (Africa's "Northgate") is very vulnerable to global warming. The IPCC (2007) warns of three serious implications: 1) the rise in sea-level affects the Nile Delta and people living in other coastal areas, 2) the uncertainties in flow of the Nile and a projected decline in precipitation causing water stress for a growing population (179 million by 2050), 3) temperature rise reducing

major crops and increasing their water requirements. There is an increasing gap between the limited water availability and the escalating demand. For example, agriculture consumes about 85% of the annual total water resource, while more than 70% of the cultivated area depends on low-efficiency surface irrigation systems.

It is estimated that South Africa (Africa's "Southgate") will experience an increase between (1°C) and (3°C) during the next fifty years. A clear reduction of rainfall (5-10 %) can be expected, accompanied by increasing droughts and floods, prolonged dry spells being followed by intense storms (Kiker 2000). The health sector will be also stressed (e.g. increased heart attacks and strokes, dehydration, skin cancers, increasing rates of cholera, vector-borne diseases, of malaria and shistosomiasis [Madzwamuse 2010]), and maize production, plant and animal biodiversity and rangelands will suffer. Economically, the mining and energy sectors are particularly vulnerable to climate change mitigation measures, especially since South Africa is a Non-annex I country³, not yet required to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases. The situation is made more complex by the country's high dependency on fossil fuels. South Africa can be judged to be a significant emitter which naturally increases political pressures, both internally and externally.

The two countries thus are situated in diverse political, cultural, technological, economic conditions. Egypt is a marginal player in global negotiations and was in a condition of fierce domestic transition between the two summits. South Africa's media and political landscape were more diverse and more settled between the summits. South Africa was an important partner in negotiations (both generally as the final Copenhagen negotiations showed, and particularly, in its role as the host of COP 17).⁴

Volumes and Voices

The basic research data consisted of all stories in these newspapers which mentioned either the word "climate"⁵ or "Copenhagen." With regard to Copenhagen, the material from the summit was gathered during roughly the same period, 1-22 December, aiming to capture the coverage from a few days before the summit was in session, throughout the sessions and negotiations period and on to the first interpretations of the summit's final achievements.

In both countries, the coverage followed the same pattern: elite newspapers were considerably more eager to cover climate summits. This reflects the way the summit coverage is driven by national elites and their viewpoints. In Egypt, the popular (non-state owned) *Al-Masry Al-Yuom* was fairly active in 2009, providing also more civil society views (Saleh 2010), but in 2011, the whole newspaper front in Egypt was (naturally) preoccupied by the domestic

Table 3.1. Volume of Coverage, Number of Stories, Egypt and South Africa, Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011)

			Copenhagen	Durban
Egypt	Al-Ahram	(elite)	50	3
	Al-Masry Al-Youm	(popular)	26	2
South Africa	Business Day	(elite)	77	92
	The Daily Sun	(popular)	7	20

election agenda following the changes of the Arab Spring. In South Africa, the home-ground coverage of Durban increased the interest of the popular press (see also Chapter 14), but the elite interest remained much higher, reflecting the elite economic and political interests of South Africa.

Table 3.2. Distribution of Voices in the Coverage in Egypt and South Africa, Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011)

	Egypt Durban	Egypt Copenhagen	South Africa Durban	South Africa Copenhagen
National political system	50	2	67	64
Transnational political system	27	2	37	27
Civil society	33	1	25	42
Business	3	1	14	47
Science, expertise	24	0	19	26
Other	16	1	1	1
Total	153	7	163	207

Examining the coverage to find out who managed to express themselves (Table 3.2), the study found, first, how national political actors dominated the climate summit coverage, despite the different political and media cultures. This is, in itself, consistent with the overall global findings (cf. Eide & Kunelius 2010: 23; see also chapter 17). In both South Africa and Egypt, the role of transnational political actors (such as the UN) was considerable – and their frequency higher than in many Northern countries (ibid: 25), suggesting that transnational actors often articulated viewpoints that the papers and journalists deemed relevant. Given the global governance nature of the summit, one can of course also claim that the presence of transnational actors could have been much stronger.

Looking at the role of civil society actors, and beyond the obvious collapse of coverage in Egypt, the home-ground effect in South Africa 2011 is evident. The space given to civil society actors in South Africa increased clearly in Durban, no doubt reflecting the local activism in 2011. Even more distinctly, the local business community gained more visibility in the South African coverage. This at least suggests that the local variations and more concrete narratives of action were being mobilized in 2011.

Table 3.3. Domestic, Foreign and Transnational Voices in Egypt and South Africa, Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011)

	Egypt Copenhagen		Egypt Durban		South Africa Copenhagen		South Africa Durban	
Domestic	58	38 %	2	29 %	35	21 %	127	61 %
Foreign	50	33 %	1	14 %	89	55 %	38	18 %
Transnational	27	18 %	2	29 %	37	23 %	27	13 %
Unknown	18	12 %	2	29 %	2	1 %	15	7 %
Total	153	100 %	7	100 %	163	100 %	207	100 %

When one examines the relationship between *domestic* and *foreign* actors, the figures suggest some differences (Table 3.3). In Copenhagen, South African newspapers gave a clear priority to foreign voices (55-21%) while in Egypt the distribution was more equal (38-33%). The exceptional context of 2011 in Egypt does not allow interpretations about how the domestication pattern will develop there, but the Durban coverage in South Africa shows how the home-ground summit lifted the volume and intensity of domestic voices, many of which were voices *outside* the national political elite. Thus, with civil society and the business community activated for the Durban summit, the South African coverage was able – at least judging from this distance – to enhance the diversity of views and voices.

In both of the case study countries, the contextual levels are projected on the close correlation and intersection between the levels of the story on one hand and on the other the macro-levels of political economic factors as well as micro-level processes such as journalistic norms and values in shaping news content of climate change in the two transnational events. These norms directed the role of journalists to be translators for the public. This role is magnified further with the scientists' persistence, even in Africa, to use jargon language that describes their research findings within a propensity to discuss implications of their research in terms of probabilities (Jasanoff 1996).

Media, Politics and Climate Change

Recent studies suggest that media and journalistic practices have become a key factor in political communication (Plasser 2004). The emerging discussion on “mediatisation” (cf. Lundby 2009) focuses on three factors: the growing fusion of media, political and social “reality”, the increasing perception of politics (both by the people and politicians themselves) through the media and the orientation of political action and behaviour towards the rules of the media systems (Jarren et al. 1998).

From this point of view the Egyptian developments may at first look bleak. Egypt between COP 15 and COP 17 shows that the press lost considerable interest in climate change. But of course, even if the attention of the Egyptian media was in 2011 solely focused on domestic politics and elections, realising the hope for gradual democratization of the political scene was a prerequisite for improving the mediatisation-democratization process. Indeed, in the 2009 coverage, still under the old regime, there were signs of civil society activism and the appearance of local critical voices in the summit coverage (Saleh 2010: 172-174), even if this level of coverage remained detached from the official agenda of global elite politics.

Generally speaking, we know from earlier research (Downs 1972) that public attention rarely fluctuates in a systemic “issue-attention cycle”, even if the problem it involves is of continuous importance to a given society. Problems suddenly leap into prominence, remain there for a short time, and then – though still largely unresolved – gradually fade from the center of public attention, yet as they fade they often leave public opinion on a higher, more informed level than before the media attention peaked.

Carvalho and Burgess (2005) also remind us of three key phases of the media’s role in climate change: public discourse, media consumption, and personal engagement with climate change. Public discourse is shaped by macro economic and political factors (the production of news), and the norms and needs of journalists, editors, and news actors. In terms of media consumption, climate stories compete with other issues for public attention – and consequently are subject to the budgetary priorities of public officials. At the level of engagement, reports on the uncertainty in climate science, and the influential role of climate “sceptics” can have a paralyzing effect. In all three dimensions and at all levels there are powerful mechanisms that can result in the public being demobilized by their fatalistic feelings of isolation, hopelessness, powerlessness, and their lack of trust in government to effectively address the issues.

A key question in overcoming this paralysis is the ability of media to provide not only convincing explanations of climate change but also relevant, local narratives that would frame and mobilize action. In the social sciences, a “narrative turn” has for some time suggested that story-telling is fundamental to meaning, as well as to knowledge, and relating knowledge to our own identities. In the last three decades thinking about stories has significantly been changed with an increased focus on theorising the narrative’s ontology, politics, epistemology, ideology, cognitive status, and disciplinarily (Kreisswirth 2000). We know that the narratives and angles of media are primarily dependent on how elites choose to frame issues and which issues they choose to prioritize (Gamson & Modigliani 1989).

One essential obstacle in developing convincing and useful narratives about climate change in Africa is the cumulating inequalities both between and within

countries. We know inequality dampens cooperative efforts by reinforcing “structuralist” and deterministic worldviews and causal beliefs, polarizing policy preferences, promoting particularistic notions of fairness, generating divergent and unstable expectations about future behaviour, eroding conditions of mutual trust and creating incentives for zero-sum and negative-sum behaviour. In effect, inequality undermines the establishment of mutually acceptable “rules of the game” which could mitigate these obstacles (Bradley, Parks and Roberts 2008).

A brief look at how the newspapers in the two countries framed the summits and global climate governance offers a view of the contradictory situation the countries face.

Egypt 2009. In Copenhagen, the Egyptian newspapers followed closely the international political debate, often providing a national twist to its frames. The state-run *Al-Ahram*, naturally, followed more closely the national and international political frame, whereas the popular-commercial *Al-Masry Al-Youm* underscored to a greater degree the angle of global justice and Egypt’s place in the global climate regime. Here are some illustrations of the headlines in Egypt 2009.

Al- Ahram	Al-Masry Al-Youm
Leaders of 98 Nations Meet in Copenhagen	Egypt Expects the Copenhagen Summit Will Fail! (Dec. 4)
CO2 Reason for Global Warming	Global Warming a Victim of Clash of Interests (Dec. 6)
Debates in Copenhagen Face Serious Dead-lock	The Arab Delegation Express Concerns about Being Used as Scapegoats (Dec. 8)
Closing Curtains on the Copenhagen Summit Protecting Delta and Learning from the Dutch Experience	Environment Expert Warns from the Erosion of Africa (Dec. 15)
Global Warming Summit and Future of Humanity Conflicts Shadow Discussions	Egypt asks for \$ 860 Billion Per Annum to Deal with the Issue of Climate Change (Dec. 18)
Non-Mandatory Agreement Separate Agreements not Collective One	Environmental Experts Reject the Copenhagen Summit, and Warn of Further Escalation of the Global Summit (Dec. 19)

These excerpts from the Egyptian headlines suggest that the coverage was dominated and framed by the official voices, especially focussing on both the international political bargaining and the Egyptian take on it. The coverage focused on the vulnerability of Egypt to the impacts of sea level rise that would affect six million people with some 12-15 per cent of agricultural land in the Nile Delta region possibly lost. The domestic frames were very alarmist. One can also see signs of a critical frame on the lack of transnational justice in the

negotiations. The coverage also reported on some national demonstrations and underlined the Egyptian particularities of climate challenges, but (at least in the summit context) the link between everyday life and climate challenges remained fairly weak. But there was not – at least yet in 2009 – a narrative that built up a clear link or connection between the political potential and actual daily events. Thus, climate change coverage can be referred to as the “dialogue of the deaf” (Saleh 2010).

Egypt 2011. In relation to the Durban summit, the Egyptian media were – understandably so – concerned with other things. Still this drop in media attention to the climate summit – even if it was on African soil – was dramatic and the coverage was sporadic. At the time of the summit, Egypt was preparing for its parliamentary elections.

South Africa 2009. Looking at the way the South African newspapers covered Copenhagen, one finds an interestingly divided set of frames. On the one hand, *Business Day* quite distinctly articulated a sceptical position to the global, inclusive deal attempted in Copenhagen. Among the stories it published were the following:

<i>Let the Confusion over Climate Talks Begin</i>	Dec. 2, 2009
<i>SA in United Front for 'Fair' Climate Deal</i>	Dec. 3, 2009
<i>Accidental Heroes, Climategate Saga Could Be a Blessing in Disguise</i>	Dec. 4, 2009
<i>Ensuring Southern Africa Is Not Roasted in Copenhagen</i>	Dec. 7, 2009
<i>Treaty May Bridge Too Far</i>	Dec. 7, 2009
<i>What Gets Lost in Fog of Carbon Priorities</i>	Dec. 9, 2009
<i>African Countries Must Unite to Block a Copenhagen Route</i>	Dec. 10, 2009

But particularly in its news coverage South African media also gave the event prominence. For example, the Inter Press Service (IPS) Africa led a team of nine reporters from community newspapers across South Africa; they first attended IPS Africa training and then provided daily coverage. This resulted in a twelve-page printed *TerraViva* supplement as part of *The New Age* newspaper. Nonetheless, the insufficient knowledge about the topic was echoed by the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) Board Member Phelisa Nkomo: “We are sitting on the deficit of knowledge in terms of understanding climate change” (IPS, 2011). In such a context of high national and local media interest, a diversity of frames, voices and genres naturally appear. Thus, in addition to the business-driven realism about the negotiations, a viewpoint of

globalized alarmism also appeared (cf. Kunelius & Eide 2012). Here are some of the headlines:

<i>Doctors Urge Cycling, Less Red Meat to Beat Global Warming</i>	Dec. 1, 2009
<i>Low-carbon Economy Is the Way</i>	Dec. 7, 2009
<i>US Greenhouse Gas Ruling Raises Hope for Deal</i>	Dec. 8, 2009
<i>Migrate Researchers Warn 'Climate Refugees' on the Rise</i>	Dec. 9, 2009
<i>Tiny Island's Plea for Stricter Terms Falls on Deaf Ears</i>	Dec. 10, 2009

In 2009 *Business Day* fairly strongly articulated the local, national economic interests while at the same time giving expression to global climate concerns. This dialectics – or perhaps a schizophrenic narrative, or “balancing act” (Orgeret 2010) – was explicitly recognized in the final editorial that *Business Day* published on the 2009 summit in Copenhagen:

Watered Down (editorial)

Though the developed nations are responsible for the bulk of carbon emissions, it is developing countries that are expected to be worst affected by global warming”... “SA has an unusual status not only because it is Africa’s largest economy but because in a sense, it straddles the carbon divide between industrial and developing economies” ...

... “But we were so thrilled to be included that we went along with a bad deal” (*Business Day*, December 20, 2009).

South Africa 2011. Reporting on Durban, *Business Day* remained, unsurprisingly, partly faithful to the critical agenda towards the global emission targets and the Kyoto-policy. It kept expectations about a Durban agreement pretty low. At the same time, however, the Durban coverage was characterized by much more action-oriented frames than the Copenhagen reports. *Business Day* depicted the business community as not only potential stakeholders but as active agents in climate issues. The following examples of headlines illustrate this business-action frame.

<i>Tightrope Act for SA as It Seeks to Balance the Need for Jobs with Ambitious Climate Targets</i>	Nov. 23, 2011
<i>Corporate SA Reinvents Itself</i>	Nov. 23, 2011
<i>Companies Take Initiative on Action</i>	Nov. 23, 2011
<i>Carbon Budgets Needs Checks to Prevent Abuse</i>	Nov. 28, 2011
<i>Business Takes Bull by Horns as Leaders Talk</i>	Dec. 5, 2011
<i>SA Companies Keep Pace on Climate Change</i>	Dec. 7, 2011

The Durban conference activated – as it did in earlier summits in other countries – the local society and of course its local business community. It also created a local supply and demand for climate related, concrete stories, which would show – both to South Africans themselves and to the world at large that the country is “worthy” of its hosting role. Thus, the activated business actors were framed in the solution role more than they had been before.

Another aspect that seemed to become activated was the *justice* and legal frame. Again, one can suggest that this had a lot to do with the home ground summit. As the host, South Africa had a key role to play in the summit itself, and as a host – just as Denmark had done before – it had to take on some of the extra burden of working for the success of the conference. This seemed to activate a more global or transnational frame also in the media. The following headlines, again from *Business Day*, illustrate this.

<i>Quest for Policy Consensus, Both Locally and Globally</i>	Nov. 23, 2011
<i>Climate Change Talks Are at a Crossroads in Durban</i>	Nov. 29, 2011
<i>UN Warns of Global Land Degradation</i>	Nov. 29, 2011
<i>Africa Needs Real Support from COP 17</i>	Nov. 29, 2011
<i>North “Owes South Trillions in Damages”</i>	Dec. 1, 2011
<i>Gap in Global Climate Finance Will Be a Disaster</i>	Dec. 2, 2011
<i>Developing World Cannot Duck Carbon Vows</i>	Dec. 6, 2011
<i>Dirty Dozen the Real Rulers of the World</i>	Dec. 6, 2011

Finally, it is worth pointing out that this active role also extended to the popular press in South Africa during the Durban conference. Not only did *The Daily Star* write much about the home front summit, it also mobilized forceful, action oriented frames in its coverage (for more on the role of popular press, see Chapter 14):

<i>It is Time to Go Green!</i>	Nov. 29, 2011
<i>Rural women lead the change</i>	Dec. 5, 2011
<i>Women Turn Waste into Art!</i>	Dec. 5, 2011
<i>Urgent Call to Fight Climate Change</i>	Dec. 6, 2011
<i>Release COP17 Activists Now!</i>	Dec. 7, 2011
<i>Zuma’s Call to Farmers</i>	Dec. 9, 2011

Conclusion

Many of the communities in Africa face great climate-related risks, yet they typically receive little attention in the mass media. The two country case studies in this chapter do not reflect the whole global South or the practice of journalism within the different countries in Africa – nor do they reflect the diversity within other media. Despite these limitations, this study points to the challenges that remain in linking the global scientific concern for climate policy to local political realities and everyday level action.

A look at climate summit reporting in two African countries suggests a journalistic emphasis on the struggle for power, with people and institutions acting strategically to improve their prestige and socio-political leverage through media coverage. This power-action frame explains why most of the stories in the country cases are not linked to deeper social analysis. The need for a “news peg,” (Wilkins and Patterson 1991) combined with the “repetition taboo” (Gans 1979: 169) feeds into a preference for coverage of crises, rather than chronic social problems. Therefore, when it comes to climate change coverage “the underlying causes and long-term consequences are often overlooked in the day-to-day grind to find a new angle by deadline” (Wilson 2000: 207). But sometimes – as in the case of South African Durban coverage – one can also see how the search for prestige and positive images diversifies the narratives and frames used.

Despite growing scientific consensus about the risks of global warming and climate change in Africa, the local news attention fluctuates and often portrays the matter as a great scientific controversy and debate. At the same time, studies have not sufficiently examined public awareness or public confidence in climate scientists, nor have they examined the role of personal action in affecting global warming outcomes. Clearly, more research focus with original and national representative materials in the South is needed. In particular, we need audience studies in the two countries dealt with here to understand the implications of the interaction between scientists and the general public, and for the public discussion of global warming and climate change in particular.

A conceptual explanation for the cycles of ups and downs of local journalistic practices of covering climate change suggest the interplay of four criteria in the course of time and events between COP 15 to COP 17. First, based on the *proximity* of events of the summits, the two countries have had varying conceptual and linguistic characteristics. Second, the *local political landscape* has influenced how the events were commonly observed in the journalistic practices. Third, the vulnerability and the political agenda over the years in the two countries has had its impact on the frames. Fourth, the domestication of events is characterized by a rather consistent *absence of post colonial critical perspectives* as mentioned in the introduction above.

The findings emphasize the importance of studying framing effects on understanding climate change challenges, and the promotion of specific, local interpretations of the main political narrative. Media in both South Africa and Egypt often followed episodic frames (Entman & Rojecki 1993), depicting global warming challenges in terms of concrete instances related to COPs, focusing on discrete events involving individuals located at specific places and at specific times, mostly without addressing the other related issues.

One can also point to a *possible gap of knowledge related to vulnerability*. For example, the reporting in Egypt (2009) included many facts on Egyptian vulnerability which support an elite press discourse in which Egypt is seen taking part in the global negotiations – but where there was little reflection on the performance of the government measured against the global political aims, and the volume of coverage remained low, perhaps due to another overriding domestic discourse on the rising level of poverty and political discontent (Saleh 2010). In South Africa, the elite approach was also dominant as it clearly took some pride in the fact that it was invited to be part of the final bargaining in Copenhagen and indeed took pride in being the host of Durban. In South-Africa, however, the press also critically asked – given the fact that Africa is among the more vulnerable regions of the world – whether its leaders had paid a high price for this entry into the inner circles of global climate power. In other ways too, the home front focus on the Durban summit diversified the coverage, making room for both concrete action frames and abstract, global justice frames.

It is also important to bear in mind that challenges for climate change coverage have been faced with the competitive nature of information dissemination in Africa. Climate change is certainly not the sole issue of importance; rather, it is only one among other serious issues that deserve attention and action. This makes reporting climate change a mighty conceptual challenge that needs careful assessment and serious reconsideration. As a result, there is a lack of access to timely, clear and understandable information on climate change, as well as the problematic ways scientists, NGOs and institutions use excessive jargon in communicating the issue. There is also a common challenge of insufficient financial resources, which in turn constrains the first-hand reporting, as well as possibility of allocation of time to a special “green” news beat in newsrooms. And finally, of course, there are media habits and priorities of covering stories of crime and violence because they are “sexier” and sell better, and are thus preferred by editors and advertisers.

The two country case studies reflect a paradox, given the current ups and downs of climate change coverage and the local journalisms practiced in Africa. A change in the current status quo and an increasing demand for better or more professional reporting of climate change requires a truly revolutionary change in society as a whole. This, in turn, would mean the allocation of significant

resources for adaptation to climate change in order to make the issue less threatening to the rather elite system that supports these media outlets. Until then, from Cape Town to Cairo reporters are still in the position of having to write stories mostly toned with the “classic journalism norms of drama” between negotiating countries. Unless climate change reporting is given a chance to improve, even worse damages are likely to occur. By then, it may be too late. In the field of research, the recent focus on African journalism has been too oriented toward technology, paying too little attention to news production routines and practices. There is a lack of close examination of how African journalists have forged new ways of practising journalism in the context of technological changes in newsrooms as well as in the wider context of news production (Atton 2011). In the context of climate change, it is also crucial to understand the links between the local and the global which shape and influence African journalism.

Notes

1. For example, since the early 1990s, many countries refused to adopt greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments in the name of fairness, especially in the absence of an effective global agreement that brings rich and poor nations together to protect the climate. This situation has raised other relevant questions about the determinants of interstate cooperation related to transnational environmental threats (Detlef 1994). Besides, environmental politics have been occasionally criticized for being shaped by material self-interest, bargaining power and the ability to strong-arm weaker states through more coercive forms of power (Victor 2001).
2. This situation has portrayed the current journalism practice in Africa with unequal material, usage, skills, benefit, and institutional access to new information and communication technologies that influence the functionality of how politics and media serve national interests; in particular in countries that are described to be very vulnerable with high rates of poverty as in the case of Egypt and South Africa. In an attempt to answer this question, the research poses sub questions that include inquiry into the role media play in influencing personal, national, and international action to address climate change? How much has the media covered climate change, and what is driving changes in that coverage? How do climate change stories come to be reported, and who gets cited as legitimate sources in those stories? What influence do the media play in forming public opinion?
3. According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed countries are designated as Annex I countries and have specific commitments applicable only to them. In terms of the principles embodied in the convention, in developing countries, such as South Africa, specific development needs and vulnerabilities should be taken into account, recognizing that economic development in such countries is essential.
4. The media systems in the two countries are not comparable in any simple manner, and it is virtually impossible to find “functionally equivalent” news media. Besides, newspaper readership varies much between them. Still the study can help give useful insights into how global climate change is represented in local journalistic and political fields. Obviously, results can neither be generalized in the rest of the African countries and even in reference to other media (traditional and new) within the country cases.
5. “Copenhagen” and “Durham” stories which had no connection to the summit or climate (e.g. pure tourism stories), other news were omitted, and when the word “climate” was used in a completely unrelated way (e.g. talking about the ‘political climate’), this too was excluded.

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Chapter 4

News Flows, Global Journalism and Climate Summits

Hillel Nossek & Risto Kunelius

The question about flows of foreign news has been an important part of media and globalization research since the 1950s (Boyd-Barrett & Thussu 1992, Wu 2003, Wu 1998, Wilke 1987, Gozenbach, Arant & Stevenson 1992). Several generations of scholars have studied the factors that underlie international news flows, often focusing on the global “balance” of information flows. Pioneer studies by UNESCO from the 1950s on outlined many of the key dimensions of the debate: most foreign news coverage was political, economic, and security related “hard” news, emphasizing the role of elite political figures; it followed a “continent-based orientation”, stressing news from the cultural, political and geographical place of publication itself. A consistent imbalance in international coverage was often found; the United States and Western Europe produced most of the news, the developing countries were mostly receivers – or objects of negative stories of tension and crisis. Vast geographical regions received no coverage at all, and when they did it was through the lenses of Western press news values (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1984, Sreberny et.al. 1985). Later follow-up studies showed similar localization trends, despite the increase in global information sources (Sreberny & Stevenson 1999, Nossek 2010) and a long history of policy initiatives to address the issue (New World Communication Order [NWICO] emerging from declarations of the MacBride Commission [1980]).

Changes in international relations, intensification and transnationalization of the global economy, the speedy development of global media channels and technologies have partly re-stated questions concerning global news flows. We have entered an era of global communication that calls for re-evaluating our references, or at least checking them in relation to news flows and their global flaws. In this chapter, we use as an empirical basis for reflecting on this question our study of the coverage given to global climate change summits. The COP-coverage, potentially, offers a good test case for this issue. At the summits, the world media are focused on a similar event. Northern or Western journalists are exposed to Southern perspectives. Climate change as a global

political issue brings together both strong structural, nationally grounded issues of the changing global power regimes and normative, transnational value discourses, such as “climate justice”. The problem tackled in the summits is a shared one, but suggested solutions and actions vary enormously. In theory, then, should there ever be a “global news” arena or a new kind of global news network emerging (something that would differ from the earlier structures of news imperialism), summit coverage should be a relatively good place to look for it¹.

Foreign News Research: The Story So Far

Already in the 1960s, Galtung & Ruge (1965) suggested that news coverage between countries is determined by an interplay of economic, political, social, and geographical variables. Later, Patterson (1979) and Zaharopoulou (1990) verified that cultural proximity and differences influence foreign news. More recently, Wu (2000) argued that “economic interaction” between countries explains foreign news coverage between countries: news flows follow money flows. Similar relations have also been seen to dominate the Internet (Chang, Lau & Hao (2000) and Himelboim, Chang & McCreery 2010).

Such cumulative evidence can be brought together under a broader theory of global power, such as “world systems theory” (cf. Wallerstein 1974), dividing countries into “core”, “semi-peripheral” and “peripheral”. In the flow of news, then, historical, economic, and political conditions situating a country and their location within the global power-hierarchy and determine how attractive a country is (Golan 2008, Himelboim, Chang & McCreery 2010). Such a structural approach (cf. also Varis 1985) is often combined with a claim about cultural domination (or imperialism), a claim that suggests the imbalances of attention are part of the enhancement of the global hegemony of the rich and powerful countries (cf. Giddens 1990; Sparks 1998). Besides and partly parallel to the world system perspective there have been other critical approaches that suggest shared ideology and cultural affinity as explanations for different directions taken by the foreign news flows. These include “common national interests” (Kim & Weaver 2003), for instance, the more a country is viewed as elitist or “charismatic”, the more likely it is to receive coverage (Kariel & Rosenvall 1984, Kim & Weaver 2003, Lao, Chang & Xiaoming 2000). Mere geographical proximity (or regionalism) as an explanation has not been verified (Wu 2003, Wu 1998, Lao, Chang & Xiaoming 2000).

Explanations of the nature and content of news flows have also been located at the level of news actors and professionals where geopolitical and macro level systemic dependencies are actually reproduced (albeit seldom consciously). In this regard, the role of global and international news agencies has been deemed

crucial (e.g. Boyd-Barrett & Rantanen 1998, 2004). Leading news agencies have acted as central gatekeepers as news is transferred from the world to the local and national agencies and the media, defining what generally speaking looks like news in the eyes of professional journalists (Wu 2003, Wu 1998, Meyer 1989). We know, for instance, that the newsworthiness of items from developing (periphery) regions is often enhanced by violence or negativity, which in turn fits the use-value of the news, particularly in its main markets, where the news that is presented seeks to fulfill established identity expectations (Golan 2003, Chang et al 1987, 1992, 2000). At the level of professional action, there are also logistic explanations: several communication resources (or lack of them) constrain the production and publication of foreign news.

Some research has also focused more closely on the *domestication* of foreign news (Clausen 2003, Gurevitch et al. 1991, Cohen et al., 1996, Shoemaker & Cohen 2006), often arguing that news organizations are fundamentally local (mostly national) in terms of their orientation. Even when they follow a “common” issue in the global agenda, they frame it from a nationally grounded perspective. Elaborating on this point, Nossek (2004, 2006) has suggested that in the selection and reporting of foreign news, what takes precedence is the national and cultural identity of media organizations, journalists and editors. Journalists tend to ask the question “Is this ‘Our’ news or ‘Theirs’?” There is an inverse relationship between foreign news correspondents’ and editors’ western, normative professional values and their national identity. This has a crucial impact on the way a foreign news item is framed. In a case of affinity (or cultural affinity) between the foreign news, the journalist, and the media organization’s nation state, the journalist will identify a story as “our news” and give its coverage a national “closed” frame. A closed frame is unbalanced, biased, emotional, subjective, lacking multiple perspectives, and relies on familiar social and cultural myths. But, if a foreign news story is defined as “their news,” the coverage has a more professional “open” frame. It explicitly aims at balance, factual, rational and multi-angled reporting. Albeit nominally “global”, such channels as Al Jazeera or CNN are basically local media hybrids offering no guarantee that the foreign news they broadcast is not “national news” shaped by patriotic sentiment (Hafez 2011).

In sum, then, there are well-developed traditions presenting of evidence about the permanence of the structures of information flows. Globally, contours of coverage can be reduced to the macro power hierarchies of international politics: the “global” is defined at the “center” and distributed as “common”. The ideological/hegemonic “global” (say: climate change as a secondary concern to financial crisis) is often compatible with the national frame of domestication (for instance, one might find the following assumption: The European debt crisis is more important to “us” than climate change right now). Both explanations are also based on the idea that power and interests ultimately rule over

news agendas. A number of researchers have argued against the dichotomies underlying the approaches above, claiming that we have to apply richer perspectives with multiple variables and inter-disciplinary approaches that address local and global political processes and also seek to understand the various dynamics of the individual media organizations (Boyd-Barrett 1998, De-Beer 2010, Rao 2009, Thussu 2007).

The end of the twentieth century brought with it the popular, political and academic discussion about “globalization.” Globalization theories were articulated as the concrete continuation of modernization, the spreading of industrialization, capitalism, the nation-state system and technologies (Giddens 1990), as the formation of “scapes” of technology, ideologies, ethnicities, finance and communication (Appadurai 1990) or as the increasing extent of global networks and intensity of global interconnectedness (Held et al. 1999, Sreberny 2008, Sparks 2008). Echoing and elaborating these themes, some media and journalism researchers have suggested re-casting the debate about global news by emphasizing the new features in the *distribution systems* and routines of news, the *focus on global/transnational events or crises*, or in the broader focus on *global outlook* in the news.

Reese (2001, 2008) has suggested looking at global journalism as a *system for collecting, editing, and distributing* material that is not bounded by national borders. This, he claims, creates a “global news arena” that enables world citizens to engage with one another. In this arena “multiple perspectives and interpretations are in circulation at any given time, but still with a heightened mutual awareness, reflexivity, and timeliness in their reaction to one another” (Reese 2008: 242). This can lead and has already led to increasing and intensified interconnectedness of journalists in the world and to a possible emerging “horizontal” (global) professional awareness. Reese’s argument can also be stretched by referring to the effects of “new media” on journalism and information flows, as the rise of web 2.0 has changed the conditions in which news organizations and other institutions work. Some, like Castells (2009) have argued that this is changing the way power works in the world. However, evidence for this is not simple (cf. Wu 2007, Gasher & Gabreile 2004, Reese, Rutigliano, Hyun & Jeong 2007, Thurman 2007).

Cottle (2011) argues that the coverage of *global crises* (avian flu, SARS, etc.) demonstrate the dark side of the global era – but they can still be seen as promoting and influencing globalization and increasing our control over it. An example of the ambiguity of global, often dramatic news events is the Mohammad Cartoons controversy (2005-2006) and the riots around the world it caused (Kunelius & Eide 2007, Eide et. al. 2008). Berglez (2007, 2008) maintains that news is becoming increasingly less local and nationally oriented (and less *international*, concerned with relations between countries). If relations between different regions of the world are based on capital, trade, and

human mobility, then “global journalism” is journalism which “makes it into an everyday routine to investigate how people and their actions, practices, problems, conditions etc. in different parts of the world *are interrelated*” (Berglez 2007: 151, emphasis added). Berglez suggests a distinction between “global outlook” and “global culture,” arguing that if “global culture” involves “the homogeneous dissemination of values,” “global outlook” (in a news story) is (merely) the outcome of the intellectual work of journalists, manifested in the way they report, the vocabulary they use and the background they give to a story. Rather than producing a unified global ideology, the economic and technological interdependencies leave their mark on many different ideologies. CNN, BBC or Al-Jazeera reports are international but this does not make them “global”. Meanwhile, a local news story on immigration can – through a focus on transnational interdependence – be highly global. Global *journalism*, from this perspective, is news that portrays the complex relations which cut across organizations (UN, NATO), identities (middle class/working class), and institutions (political/economic). In Berglez’ view, this type of journalism also has a moral and ethical dimension, the news becomes more democratic as journalists report on problems, power struggles, and politics on the transnational level.

In sum, then, recent media research on news flows and global journalism shows a field of study that is trying to come to grips with the evident changes of the new millennium. We have entered what Beck (2006, 2010) suggests is a “cosmopolitan era”, not referring to a shared, and simple benign culture of understanding, but rather to a world-view increasingly defined by a sense of global conflict, crisis and risk.

The Challenge of Climate Change

One obstacle in clarifying the debate on global news and news flows is the fact that journalism is always *about* something. Thus, it is one thing to look at evidence on reporting terrorism and perhaps another to look at news about the global financial crisis. In different spheres (or indeed, “scapes”, as Appadurai [1990] said journalism may act differently. Global climate change politics and the COP-summits, are, in this sense, a particular – but also perhaps particularly illuminative – context. They are an exceptional example of systematized and partly routinized events for gathering and distributing news and information, they are events saturated by discourse about transnational, multi-level interdependency, and they are centered around the image of a global, transnational crisis. During summits it has also become increasingly clear that it is not that easy to define the “center” or “core” of the global power situation: it is evident that China, India, Brazil and Russia have increased their role, suggesting that if power structures determine news flows and contents, there could be changes.

In climate politics, countries are situated differently in the *climate power order*. For instance, Chasek, Downie and Brown (2010: 182) suggest that there are at least three kinds of countries in global climate politics².

- 1) States with few indigenous fossil fuel resources and relatively dependent on imported energy (Japan, most of EU).
- 2) States with large supplies of cheap energy resources and a culture of highly inefficient energy use (BRIC, the United States).
- 3) States highly dependent on fossil fuel exports for income (Arab oil states, Australia, Norway, the UK).

Thus, an examination of the coverage of intense climate change negotiations offers a chance to determine how the general changing power structure of the world is reflected in the coverage and how the differentiated national interests play into domestication. Climate change covers much of globalization discourse (industrialism, capitalism, nation-state system, technology, universal humanistic values). Climate change reveals this discourse with all its contradictions made visible and concrete. At least potentially, it offers an exceptional chance and challenge for journalistic reflexivity.

Covering COPs: Some Evidence

This book, through an extensive global content analysis (see chapter 17), detailed country analysis (found in Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010), and by drawing on thematic analyses elsewhere, finds data for at least three interrelated themes – themes that offer some evidence of the state of global climate summit journalism. We discuss here 1) the attention the summits received in world media, 2) the origin of the stories in the news distribution system, and 3) the sourcing of the stories.

Attention and power: core and peripheries

Our basic overall data on the summit coverage suggests that the two general claims of news flow research – structural dependency on global power hierarchies and dominance of nationally driven interest/perspectives – are hard at work in summit coverage. An overwhelming proportion of actors quoted in stories is composed of representatives of national political institutions (albeit not always domestic (cf. chapter 17)). This structure is very stable from one summit to another, indicating that the language and frames applied are linked to the system and the interests of states. Also, the shift from the high point of coverage in Copenhagen to the lower level of Durban reflects the

unwillingness and an inability, on the part of major world powers, to tackle the problem of carbon driven economic growth (or recovery). Both for the existing dominant countries like the USA and emerging economic powers like China, India or Brazil, revitalizing or sustaining economic growth consistently trumped climate concerns in Durban. The elite countries' decreasing interest and political investment in climate summits lowers the level of coverage almost everywhere. Power at the top of the world hierarchy defines the global agenda – also for journalists.

Table 4.1. Relative Decrease or Increase of Stories from Copenhagen to Durban

Country	Copenhagen number of stories	Durban number of stories	Relative drop/ increase in attention (Durban volume as % of Copenhagen)
Egypt	76	5	7 %
Australia	247	19	8 %
Israel	85	8	9 %
Russia	32	4	13 %
Indonesia	95	18	19 %
Brazil	171	35	20 %
Denmark	710	159	22 %
Norway	264	64	24 %
Germany	114	30	26 %
Finland	216	58	27 %
Total/ Average drop	3 210	893	28 %
Canada	262	73	28 %
Bangladesh	317	90	28 %
USA	102	31	30 %
Chile	48	15	31 %
Sweden	158	106	67 %
Pakistan	58	62	107 %
SouthAfrica	84	116	138 %

There has been a general decrease in attention paid to climate change summits, but if we look at the change of coverage from Copenhagen to Durban in different countries, a slightly more complex picture emerges. The world media interest from COP 15 to COP17 followed a global, declining trend (relative average drop in Durban to 28 per cent of the coverage experienced at the peak in Copenhagen), reflecting other worries in powerful countries (financial crisis, recession). But inside this general structural trend, we find that media in different countries follow many agendas and there are several intervening factors. Take for instance the highly vulnerable countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan and Egypt. In Bangladesh, the drop of coverage followed the general, global relative trend (Bangladesh's COP17 coverage amounted to only 28 per

cent of COP 15), but the absolute level of coverage still remained relatively high (in terms of number of stories; this coverage was three times (!) higher than that of the USA, for instance). In Pakistan, by contrast, the media coverage of Durban reached the highest media attention by far. Thus, at least by some rough measure, the *sense of vulnerability* (cf. Rhaman 2010, see also chapter 7, 2011) in a country like Bangladesh seems to offer journalists (at the level of professional action) some strength in terms of national legitimacy in evaluating climate change in a way that differs from what the global trend would suggest. No doubt this work is helped by the support of national, local political elites. In Egypt, of course, the explanation is even more local: the events surrounding the November 2011 elections eclipsed almost all interest in Durban.

In a different way, some European countries can be used as examples of a context where a *high level of public awareness* (without an immediate sense of vulnerability) and an active transnational (EU) political agenda created a news agenda that at some point clearly countered the views at the core of global power. Our qualitative readings show that when reporting on the Bali summit (2007), European news frames were often highly critical of the US negotiation tactics and that in Copenhagen the circle of culprits also included emerging economic powers (India, Brazil, China and South-Africa) (cf. Eide & Kunelius 2010). By the time of Durban, however, this exceptionalism played a much less accentuated role and in terms of volume of coverage, as table 4.1. shows, Germany and Finland seem to follow the structurally determined global political realism (see also Chapter 2) and conform to the tide of diminishing attention. Sweden, however, is an interesting exception. The Swedish media seem to have sustained a relatively high level of coverage, perhaps signaling a high level of climate consciousness (also by journalists) and perhaps an exceptional internalization of a climate-aware ideology possessed by the general public (Höijer et al. 2009, Berglez 2012, Olausson 2011). In Norway, the low level of attention paid to Durban (a relatively *greater* drop than Finland and certainly greater than Sweden) perhaps signals an increasingly intense awareness of the contradiction between Norway's high national stakes in fossil fuels exports and its official global policy as a climate action benefactor (see Eide & Ytterstad 2010, see also chapter 5).

Story origin. Another indicator of *how newsrooms deemed the summit newsworthy* is to determine whether the stories originated from news agencies, from home desk reporters or from reporters sent out on site (table 4.2). This can be taken as a rough signal of how newsrooms invested in summit coverage resources. In an era of increasingly tight newsroom budgets, this is a highly relevant measure.

The figures verify that COP 15 in Copenhagen constituted an exceptional peak moment in global climate coverage, also in terms of investing reporting

Table 4.2. Story Origin in Three Summits, All Stories³

	News agencies (or syndicated)	Staff home desk	Reporter at the summit site	Other	Total
COP 13 Bali	109 16 %	320 48 %	124 19 %	112 17 %	665
COP 15 Copenhagen	413 17 %	1 060 43 %	506 20 %	511 21 %	2 490
COP 17 Durban	120 16 %	352 47 %	123 16 %	156 21 %	751

resources at the scene. From Copenhagen (and Bali) there were clearly more on-site stories than from Durban. The proportion of agency stories remained fairly stable (16-17 %) in all three summits, and the “self” production by newsrooms clearly overwhelmed this (constantly more than 40 %). National reporter involvement (at the home desk or on site) does not necessarily denote an emphasis on nationalistically domesticating news frames, but rather, the figures suggest that newspapers around the world made at least a formal point of covering the event from “their own” perspective. This perspective, of course, can be both transnationally “professional” and “horizontal” (emphasizing interpretations similar to those of journalists from other countries) or nationalistically oriented (emphasizing national interests and identities). But in any case, the fact that directly attributed news agency material did not rise in Durban suggests that newsrooms around the world – within the limits of their resources – felt the need to show that they were still investing on the topic, even while the global political attention was clearly fading away.

Sourcing and story origin

Table 4.3 elaborates the data on story origin with the main voices quoted in the stories. It shows a constant inverse relationship between foreign and domestic voices and the role played by news agencies and home desk reporting. Thus, the more agencies dominated the coverage, the more foreign news sources framed the reporting. This verifies the old truth that a reliance on news agencies can reproduce dependencies. But on the other hand newsroom home desk resource investment can – at least in terms of who gets cited – counter balance this. Decreasing attention and investment of summit coverage was, however, linked to increasing use of domestic sources, suggesting that there was straight dependency beyond the attention volume. This is underlined by the fact that the reporters sent on site to Durban overwhelmingly quoted *domestic* sources. Thus if there were weak signs of journalists being part of a “transnational professional field” in Copenhagen (cf. Kunelius & Eide 2012), by the time that the Durban summit was held, the tide had turned and journalists

were eagerly following and quoting their “own” national sources, even when they reported on site. This is climate specific evidence against both the thesis of global journalism and the thesis of structural dependency.

Table 4.3. Domestic, Foreign and Transnational Voices According to Story Origin, Copenhagen and Durban

COP 15 Copenhagen	News Agencies		Home desk		Reporter on scene	
Domestic voices	122	16 %	903	54 %	445	34 %
Foreign voices	448	57 %	487	29 %	590	46 %
Transnational voices	136	17 %	112	7 %	206	16 %
Unknown	78	10 %	172	10 %	51	4 %
Total	784	100 %	1674	100 %	1292	100 %

COP 17 Durban	News Agencies		Home desk		Reporter on scene	
Domestic voices	23	12 %	356	64 %	204	54 %
Foreign voices	129	68 %	91	16 %	105	28 %
Transnational voices	28	15 %	46	8 %	49	13 %
Unknown	11	6 %	66	12 %	22	6 %
Total	191	100 %	559	100 %	380	100 %

Agencies and dependencies

Comparing countries and their dependency on news agencies also points to new variations (table 4.4). In many countries, news agencies increased their proportion of the coverage (from COP 15 to 17), in some cases even to a considerable degree (cf. the USA). This fits well with the decreasing global interest in general: the less a newspaper invests on the issue the more it uses agencies (also: decreasing resources spell increasing levels of dependency). The consequences of this, however, depend on where you look. In a powerful core country such as the USA we can at least assume that the large amount of news agency stories did not radically alter the voices and frames of the coverage. In less centrally situated countries, such as Bangladesh, however, increasing reliance on agencies would (according to the traditional structural hypothesis) easily lead to an “alien” perspective. Against this, it is noteworthy to see that countries which decreased their use of agencies (or at least did not increase their usage) were from the category of the vulnerable ones, especially Bangladesh and Pakistan. Also, using “agencies” can produce very diverse and polyphonic stories (see below)⁴.

Table 4.4. Stories Taken from News Agencies in the Various Countries

Country	COP 15, % (N)	COP 17, % (N)
Finland	4 (8)	3 (2)
Canada	9 (24)	14 (10)
Israel	23 (19)	38 (3)
USA	8 (8)	39 (12)
Germany	5 (6)	0 0
Indonesia	3 (3)	6 (1)
Russia	13 (4)	0 (0)
Norway	7 (17)	11 (5)
Bangladesh	34 (108)	26 (23)
Egypt	66 (50)	80 (4)
Sweden	4 (6)	8 (8)
Australia	2 (6)	6 (1)
Chile	6 (3)	20 (3)
South Africa	49 (41)	3 (3) *
Brazil	27 (47)	6 (2)
Pakistan	57 (33)	53 (33)
Denmark	3 (22) **	8 (13)

* Hosting country 2011.

** Hosting country 2009.

A peek beyond the numbers

The rough quantitative global numbers suggest that news flows are still crucially tied to the structural dependencies reported in earlier studies and decades. But, to be sure, there are significant signs and evidence that journalism and journalists can act as counter-balancing forces. While the general news flows reflect the *strategic* structures and relations of power, “global journalism” is a more momentary, small scale *tactical* phenomenon, if any, and is also related to local contexts and specific issues. To illustrate this, let us look at two examples of coverage at the end of COP 17 in Durban.

Diversity in dependency: Bangladesh Daily Star, December 12, 2011. *The Daily Star*, an English language newspaper which stands on the periphery of global power wrapped up its coverage of the Durban summit in a news story attributed to “agencies”. The headline described the outcome somewhat positively.

UN charts new climate course

Nations approve a late deal for 2015 global pact, agree on fund for climate aid to poor countries; critics say gains made

The news story lead listed the achievements of the summit: the “roadmap” towards a new deal, the EU’s pledges for emission-cutting, the “Green Climate

Fund”, and the progress on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). It then went on to quote a number of jubilant evaluations by the participants and some commentators:

“I believe that what we have achieved in Durban will play a central role in saving tomorrow, today,” declared South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, who chaired the talks.”

(...)

UNFCCC chief Christiana Figueres was exultant (...), citing the words of Nelson Mandela, she said on Twitter: “In honour of Mandela: It always seems impossible until it is done. And it is done!”

“I think in the end it ended up quite well,” said US chief negotiator Todd Stern. (...)

The European Union hailed the outcome as a “historic breakthrough”.

Thus, the main frame of the story routinely distributed the official optimism of the primary actors of the summit. But importantly, it also collected an impressive number of different kinds of counter-voices and elaborated the terms of the success, the “roadmap”.

“The grim news is that the blockers led by the US have succeeded in inserting a vital get-out clause that could easily prevent the next big climate deal being legally binding. If that loophole is exploited it could be a disaster,” said Greenpeace director Kumi Naidoo. (...)

The final text said parties would “develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force”.

That compromise averted the use of “legally binding”, likely to trigger a backlash among the conservative right in the United States during a presidential election year.

The story, in factual terms, laid the burden of responsibility on the “Big three” emitters of the world – China, USA and India. But it also brought in India’s Environment Minister Jayanthi Natarajan, who criticized the outcome from the perspective of an emerging economic power:

“We’ve had very intense discussions. We were not happy with reopening the text but in the spirit of flexibility and accommodation shown by all, we have shown our flexibility... we agree to adopt it”, she [Natarajan] said.

From a different critical perspective, representatives of vulnerable countries were given a voice:

“I would have wanted to get more, but at least we have something to work with. All is not lost yet,” said Selwin Hart, chief negotiator on finance for the coalition of small states.

Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu, head of the Africa Group, added: “It’s a middle ground, we met mid-way. Of course we are not completely happy about the outcome, it lacks balance, but we believe it is starting to go into the right direction.”

The *Daily Star* round-up story shows that although summit news flows in many ways reproduce the old news hegemony structures, at the level of actual stories the picture is more complex. The story is heavily dependent on foreign voices and strongly framed by the official (and somewhat euphemistic) political rhetoric of the summit. But at the same time, it shows a remarkable diversity of positions, a level-headed (in the best sense of the word) critical analysis of the outcome (the rhetoric) and a staunchly informative attitude on the state of actual emissions and their consequences. In this sense, it is characterized by small counter currents and diversity and builds a small, momentarily effective representation of the interdependency of its actors across borders. What is missing is only a national voice which would have even more effectively linked the reader to the global debate. One may reasonably ask: is this not “global journalism”?

Critical Dependency and Pessimism: The New York Times, December 10, 2011. John Broder, a veteran summit reporter and environmental journalist for *The New York Times*, offers another example of the diversity, this time coming from the core of global power, the USA. Directly after the final outcome of the summit, Broder wrote an analysis that appeared in the environmental section of the paper, as well as in the *Green* blog of *The New York Times* web-version.

In Glare of Climate Talks, Taking On Too Great a Task

By John M. Broder

DURBAN, South Africa – For 17 years, officials from nearly 200 countries have gathered under the auspices of the United Nations to try to deal with one of the most vexing questions of our era – how to slow the heating of the planet.

Every year they leave a trail of disillusion and discontent, particularly among the poorest nations and those most vulnerable to rising seas and spreading deserts. Every year they fail to significantly advance their own stated goal of keeping the average global temperature from rising more than 2 degrees Celsius, or about 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit, above preindustrial levels. (...)

The decision to move toward a new treaty (...) remains merely a pledge, and all details remain to be negotiated.

For starters, Broder sharply distances himself from the whole COP process, thus exemplifying a “professional” detachment from a bureaucratic negotiation process. But he is also writing in the register of frustration used by numerous climate activists (coming close to Kumi Naidoo’s position in the *Daily Star* story above). This pessimistic perspective was anchored in two interestingly contradictory levels of argument. First, in the mode of political realism (see also chapter 2), Broder argued that we might be asking too much.

(...)The issues on the table are far broader than atmospheric carbon levels or forestry practices or how to devise a fund to compensate those most affected by global warming.

(...) What really is at play here are politics on the broadest scale, the relations among Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan and three rapidly rising economic powers, China, India and Brazil. Those relations, in turn, are driven by each country's domestic politics and the strains the global financial crisis has put on all of them. And the question of "climate equity" – the obligations of rich nations to help poor countries cope with a problem they had no part in creating – is more than an "environmental" issue.

Effectively addressing climate change will require over the coming decades a fundamental remaking of energy production, transportation and agriculture around the world – the sinews of modern life. It is simply too big a job for those who have gathered for these talks under the 1992 United Nations treaty that began this grinding process.

After recognizing the hard political realities of climate politics, then, Broder's argument digs deep into the very context in which journalism itself works: modern societies and their way of life, and this, it seems to us, is his own actual position. But interestingly (for our purposes of discussing flows of news content), this criticism is also synchronized with the position of the United States in the negotiation process. The analysis continued by bringing in the US chief negotiator Todd Stern.

Todd D. Stern, the chief American climate negotiator, revealed his qualms about the inability of the United Nations climate bureaucracy to deal with the broad political and financial questions posed by climate change. "We want to see a green fund that is going to draw in a lot of capital from countries all over the world, including the United States," he said at a briefing. "And although I love climate negotiators and spend much of my time with them, they are not necessarily the most qualified people to run a multibillion-dollar fund."

On the one hand then, Broder presents a deep critical argument about a whole way of life and global power (forcefully expressed also elsewhere the DotEarth Blog of the NYT, see chapter 11). On the other hand, he echoes the US negotiation policy and tactics, critical of the COP process. In the analysis, they come together, in a way also supporting each other⁵. Broder's story illustrates that even within the perspectives of the "core" players in global news structures (NYT journalist, US climate negotiator) there is momentary room for substantial criticism of global climate politics – room for producing an "outlook" that questions modern life to its core. But at the same time the story remains fairly benign regarding the official state position of the US and thus, its internal small counter flows notwithstanding, it rather neatly fits the domestication thesis.

Conclusions

Overall, our analysis (based on mainstream newspaper material) shows that many old global routines and structural dependencies are still in place. News flows and attention flaws obey global power structures and reflect the way nations consider their interest in relation to the power game. In that mode, the natural “primary definers” of attention and news frames are the elites: especially the elite of international or transnational organizations (UN, EU), elite nations, and elites within nations. From this perspective, it would be misleading to talk of the invention of a new “global” variant. Rather, one is tempted to say that in spite of all the apparent changes in international politics, intensified globalization of the economy, various cosmopolitan intellectual trends and discourses, academic and professional criticism and new technological developments, journalism still remains tightly linked to and determined by relations of power, national identities and imagined national interests. This remains so also in the case of climate summits, despite the exceptional potential of the topic and massive information investments of many stakeholders trying to question the status quo of power. This is true even of Copenhagen, the so far momentary apex of hopeful, cosmopolitan climate politics. The story thereafter strengthens the result: by the time of the Durban gathering, climate summits as such had lost their high ranking even in terms of attention.

However, examining the contents of the news flows in greater detail, one finds that two modifications to earlier research literature do come to mind. First, the *locale* of a global news event seems to make a difference: third world voices can gain in volume when expressed in elite states’ locations (as in Copenhagen). Second, *the nature of the issue* at hand can make a difference. On one hand, wars, terrorism, political and economic issues and religious conflicts can follow stricter rules of one-sided domestication and power hierarchies. On the other hand, natural disasters, environmental issues and perhaps civil rights activism are more potent launching pads for counter flows. The contours of global journalism are dependent on the *transnational discourses* (political, ethical, environmental, etc.) available for framing concrete news. These are crucial questions for future projects that study international news flows.

There are plenty of rational reasons why quality journalism could take a more independent position and apply a more global journalistic approach in covering climate change, emphasizing the transnational nature of the problem and the interdependence of people and nations implied in all possible solution scenarios. And indeed, there are counter-currents. These can be seen in particular sectors of media, such as in social media activity around the summits. Within mainstream journalism, looking closer to the texture of reporting, there are also distinct moments of textual “counter-flows”. Factors related to journalistic tradition, to the status of climate change in a local political agenda, to identities

and history and to the role that fossil fuels play both in the everyday lives of local news consumers and fortunes of the states, shape the immediate micro conditions of writing. For climate change coverage to become a launching pad for “global journalism”, one must not underestimate the dependencies. But it is even more important to study and learn about the complex contingencies. They are, after all, the space of agency in which any realistic form of “global journalism” – momentarily, locally, sometimes unexpectedly and always driven with contradictions – can come into being.

In this spirit, we close with a quote from Joydeep Gupta, an Indian environmental journalist writing for *Thethirdpole.net*, a web based transnational environmental journal focusing on the Himalayan region. From Durban he reminded his readers that with the current *promises* the world is heading towards a 3.5 degree increase in the *average* temperature. He also defended the Chinese and Indian arguments on the historical responsibility of the West. In the general stream of global news, neither of these were uncommon points. But from a journalistic point of view, he also neatly stated the frustration that fuels global climate journalism.

There is no sign that any government is heeding these warnings. (...) Instead, the annual UN climate summits have become a game of brinkmanship, where every country holds out on making any promise at all to the last possible moment, while NGOs fret and fume and the world's media watches in despair. One journalist who was covering his fifth summit this year asked hopelessly, “In how many ways can you write that nothing's happening?” (Joydeep Gupta, *Thethirdpole.net*, December 15, 2011).

Notes

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2. 1) States with few indigenous fossil fuel resources and relatively dependent on imported energy (have learned to maintain high living standards while reducing their use of fossil fuels): Japan, most of EU (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
 2) States with large supplies of cheap energy resources and a culture of highly inefficient energy use: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia and the United States.
 3) States highly dependent on fossil fuel exports for income: Arab oil states, Australia, Norway and the UK.
3. All countries available, except hosting countries. COP 13: Finland, Canada, Israel, USA, Germany, El Salvador, Russia, Norway, Bangladesh, China, Sweden. COP 15: Finland, Canada, Israel, USA, Germany, El Salvador, Indonesia, Russia, Norway, Bangladesh, Egypt, China, Sweden, Australia, Chile, South Africa, Brazil, Pakistan. COP 17: Finland, Canada, Denmark,

- Israel, USA, Germany, Indonesia, Russia, Norway, Bangladesh, Egypt, Sweden, Australia, Chile, Brazil, Pakistan.
4. News agencies in the coding book included also domestic agencies, but their role in summit coverage was often to synthesize coverage from international agencies.
 5. A couple of days later Broder published a longer interview with the US negotiator Todd S. Stern who expressed satisfaction by the US delegation as to the outcome (U.S. Envoy Relieved by Climate Talks' Outcome). NYT, Green, A Blog About Energy and the Environment, December 14, 2011).

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Chapter 5

Saving the Rain Forest – Differing Perspectives

Norway's Climate and Forest Initiative and Reporting in Three Countries¹

Elisabeth Eide

At the Bali Climate Summit in 2007 (COP13), the Norwegian delegation launched what it called the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative (NCFI). The three billion dollar initiative was recognition of the fact that preservation of the rainforest is a globally precarious issue. The Norwegian initiative – which then became part of an organizational mechanism for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) – was largely applauded, both by politicians at the receiving end (i.e. Indonesia, Brazil and other prominent tropical forest nations) and by the Norwegian media. The then largest newspaper in Norway depicted Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg as the “King of the Rainforest” (VG, December 4, 2007, see also Eide & Ytterstad 2011). Later the following year (2008) Stoltenberg visited Brazil with his Minister for Environment and Development, Erik Solheim. The Norwegian media coverage of the visit – with some exceptions – consisted largely of praise (Eide & Orgeret 2009). There were other positive reactions as well, particularly since the initiative did not presuppose any quotas or offsets linked to the new funds. Since then, however, the REDD mechanism has faced criticism. Some NGOs fear that the funding from the Global North will attract “a panoply of different agents [...] seeking an attractive and topical green veneer for their activities” (FOE 2010).

This chapter will look at newspaper representation of the NCFI² – and partly also the REDD framework – in Norwegian, Brazilian and Indonesian newspapers³. I concentrate on the coverage of the issues in relation to the climate summits, but I also draw on other news items and opinion articles to broaden and enrich the analysis. The study is assisted by critical discourse analysis.

Norway, the Humanitarian Superpower?

Norwegian development aid policy dates back to the 1950s, when assistance for a fisheries project in Kerala was launched. This, along with other early development projects was later criticized on one hand for not being sensitive enough

to local traditions and needs, and on the other, for lack of sustainability. One of the historians with a thorough knowledge of the history of the Norwegian engagement in Kerala, Helge Pharo, writes that in the Kerala project one will find the roots of modern Norwegian development assistance (Pharo 1987). In more recent years Norway has represented itself as one of the few nations that provides one percent or more (at present 1.06 %) of its GDP for development assistance⁴. Since the “red-green” coalition government came into power in 2005, Norway’s Overseas Development Aid (ODA) budget has increased every year⁵. After the release of the Fifth Assessment Report from the IPCC in 2007, Norway planned out its contribution to rainforest preservation, and currently one tenth of all development assistance from Norway has to do with rainforest preservation. For the last three years in particular, a substantial part of the increase of ODA has thus been related to climate change.

Due to Norway’s dual character, on one hand, as international advocate for the mitigation of climate change, and on the other, as a large exporter of oil and investor in the global petroleum sector, the press coverage of Norway’s role and profile when it comes to climate change is diverse and at times polarized. In some coverage of the NCFI, reporters relate this initiative to Norway’s role as a polluter, while much of the early NCFI coverage was less critical. Worries have been raised in general about the broad REDD mechanism, under which the Norwegian initiative is situated. Researchers (Thompson et al 2011) criticize REDD for complicated governance, top-down approaches and oversimplification concerning diversity of countries and local communities. The NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth (2010) center their critique around three points: the fear of corruption in the recipient countries and its possible disruption of the projects; the inadequate consideration of the conditions and claims of indigenous people; and the commodification of the problem whereby they question whether trading with quotas leads to unfruitful commercialization of the climate change mitigation (FOE 2010). On the other hand, several NGOs, including local organizations and indigenous groups (especially if the policies are implemented with sufficient safeguards towards the issues raised by the FOE) regard REDD as an opportunity both for protecting the forest and strengthening local community rights – and as such consider it a welcome alternative to the destructive government policies in many rainforest countries today.

A Rainforest Coalition

Greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation represents 15-20 per cent of the global emissions, but are not included in the Kyoto protocol mechanisms. Thus, some nations formed a Coalition of Rainforest Nations, and at the COP11 in Montreal, Canada, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea raised a request for funding from the North to Southern countries that would be able to cut emissions

by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. At the Bali Summit (COP13) a sentence included in the agreement declared that there is an “urgent need to take further meaningful action to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation”. Today, the REDD is called REDD+ and according to the UN it “goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation” since it “includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.”⁶ This wider concept of forest preservation is intended as a safeguard against pitfalls such as giving incentives to bodies exploiting the forest in non-sustainable ways.

For the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, the largest recipient countries have been Brazil and Indonesia. An examination of the Norwegian media coverage of the NCFI compared with media coverage of the Norwegian initiative in these two countries may therefore be of interest.

Post-colonial Goodness

The REDD and the NCFI should also be seen in the broader context of international aid. Lim and Barnett distinguish three perspectives on what they call the “determinants” of international aid. The *realist* paradigm “regards international aid as an extension of national security policy”. The *idealist* perspective, is based on the humanitarian and neoliberal paradigm; it is “more optimistic about cooperative relations between nations” and relies on both GDP parameters and a promotion of “economic development of recipient benefits of improved international trade.” The *globalist* or world-systems perspective, drawing more from Marxism regards international aid as “an extension of the exploitative relationships based on the economic disparity between rich and poor countries” (Lim and Barnett 2010: 91). The latter may be seen as part of the “dependencia” school emerging among radical scholars of the 1970s and 1980s (see, for example, Amin et. al. 1982, Amin 1989).

According to Lim and Barnett the first paradigm has been on the decline since the end of the Cold War (ibid., 92), while the economy-driven motives have become more important. One may of course question this assumption in a post 9-11 world, where, in terms of security, the passive consent of certain nations, if not their explicit agreement with the dominant western doctrine of “War on Terror” has been vital to justifying the pursuance of the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya as well as other “counter-terrorist activities” across the world. It is thus not hard to detect a confluence between the first and the third perspective, with the additional awareness that from a post-9/11 perspective much development aid may today harbour a dimension of security policy.

These three development logics also provide help in the analysis of the media coverage of the rainforest initiative. If we define the *realist* perspective

broadly, we may envisage a *global security* perspective, both in a purely climatic sense, the rainforest destruction contributing largely to a worsening of the global climate – *and* from a rich nation's perspective, the fear that throngs of climate refugees will land upon their shores. The second (idealist) paradigm may be central in the sense that the initiative is seen as a “give and take” relationship, where the perceived poorer nations will gain something from financial support, while the rich nation (here Norway) may be represented as relieved of some of its national emission reductions burden (and guilt?). Third, we may look for more critical coverage, seeing this initiative as a way of continuing a relationship of dependency between rich nations (Norway is just one of several nations involved in the REDD initiative) and poorer nations. We might also expect criticism from the perspective that both Brazil and Indonesia are not among the poorest of nations, but rather are today emerging regional powers with an expanding growth economy.

The press coverage of the Norwegian initiative can also be studied as another critical but topical example of Norway's international profile and politics. By introducing the term “goodness regime”, Terje Tvedt recommends an analysis based on such a regime being a “system in which actors may dress up and be dressed up in the garb of goodness helped by the simple mechanisms of goodness rhetoric, and thus may judge (according to [the] lack of] positive sanctions) the good and the evil” (Tvedt 2003: 34). According to Tvedt an important task is to

[...] reveal how the power of this national regime of goodness (and the actors within) are woven into the structures (albeit often concealed) of society and how power is demonstrated in and via the discursive practice about the world and the world development and in further relations of co-operation between societal institutions and individual actors (ibid.).

The relevance of this perspective may be supported by the fact that Norway is often labelled a “humanitarian superpower” (at least at home) in the press as well as in other political rhetoric. In 2011, a search through the Norwegian newspaper text archive, Retriever, revealed 350 hits for this concept within the previous twelve months.⁷ This is not to say such labelling is always laudatory. Quite a few of these references may be critical towards Norway's international role, and thus of the concept itself. As the foreign editor of Norway's largest newspaper wrote during the COP15 period, “Our perception of our own excellence, impartiality and high ethical position in international society may be substantially stronger at home than abroad”.⁸ On the other hand, the fact that the notion appears frequently indicates that it is fairly well established in the Norwegian public sphere.

Transnational Representations

By finding and studying media texts from countries at the receiving end of the NCFI, we may start to reveal other, transnational perspectives on Norwegian “goodness,” from media in radically different contexts from those of the donor country. In this chapter, I look at two main questions:

- How is the NCFI represented in the Norwegian mainstream press? And in which way do the media relate to the discourses of the NCFI initiators, i.e. to the government?
- How is the NCFI represented in a selection of press texts from two main countries where the initiative is implemented?

The selection of texts from the three countries is limited to a few media. In Norway, I selected the two largest newspapers *Aftenposten* (elite, subscription paper) and *Verdens Gang* (popular non-subscription, tabloid). But in order to achieve a broader impression of the way in which the Norwegian press covered and covers this burning issue, I also surveyed a broader range of newspaper coverage of the issue, particularly in relation to PM Stoltenberg’s visit to Brazil in 2008. In Brazil, the examples have been taken from *Folha de Sao Paulo*⁹ and *Estado de Sao Paulo*.¹⁰ In Indonesia most texts examined have been from the prestigious newspaper *Kompas*, supplemented by findings from a few other newspapers and from the government news agency *Antara*. It is worth mentioning that the coverage of the NCFI is not extensive in the receiving countries, and much coverage tends to be about the rainforest initiative without any mention of Norway at all. As the search options for media texts in the three countries vary, the sample must be seen as more illustrative than systematic. However, the search has not been steered by any wish to find critical or non-critical voices on certain issues, and thus, may be treated as a random sample of sorts. And in any case, it opens up the essential questions of the diversity of voices both inside Norway and between Norway, Brazil and Indonesia.

Norway’s Various Role Appearances

The rainforest coverage is just part of a larger collection of press items on climate change where Norwegian politicians or expertise are represented as do-gooders. From the Bali coverage we find headlines such as “Siri is Norway’s Al Gore”¹¹ and “Strong effort with Norwegian Aid”, and in Norwegian hydro power assistance to Serbia (*VG* December 8, 2007). The launch of the NCFI was presented in the same newspaper on December 10: “Buys 12 x emissions. Stoltenberg’s rainforest commitment: 600 mill. tons of CO₂. Norway’s yearly emissions: 55 mill. tons CO₂”, with a flair for optimism, and another article

mentions the Norwegian PM as the “King of the rainforest” (VG, December 10, 2007). However, the hero is not untainted. In a smaller article, one NGO-leader is quoted as saying (headline) “- Norway is the worst CO₂ emitter in the world” (VG, December 11, 2007), and other newspapers joined this critique.

In the subscription newspaper *Aftenposten*, the reporters seem to have anticipated the launch. Thus, on December 4, a headline read “Hopes for Norwegian rainforest support” followed by “Deforestation creates headache at Bali” (December 6, 2007) and “The Parliament awaits Stoltenberg’s Bali speech” (December 7, 2007). Both newspapers represented Norway in a rather heroic way, by stating that Norway’s initiative gave important positive dimension to the COP13 (Eide & Ytterstad 2011), but also published articles reminding of Norway’s double standards, its high CO₂ emissions due to oil exploration.

During the COP15 in Copenhagen, the tropical forest was less of a topic than in Bali. Instead, the emphasis was on the fact that opinion polls demonstrated public opinion was not taking climate seriously (enough); thus a “blame the people” discourse seemed to be on the rise (Eide & Ytterstad 2010).

One article in *Aftenposten* was based on a book launch in Copenhagen, and titled “Great danger of rain forest corruption” (headline); “Researchers warn against hastened protection” (*Aftenposten*, December 8, 2009). The main source, Terje Angelsen, Professor of Development Economics, admits, though, that the danger “is perhaps somewhat lower than in usual [development] assistance, since many follow this closely.” He criticizes the donors’ urge for rapid results and says there is a danger that too much funding has been handed out too early; Angelsen also says that Brazil, as a middle income country, might be expected to pay for more of its tropical forest protection; although he does not rule out Norwegian support.

A related story in VG – “Swindle Alarm” – warns against quota trading, and cites EU sources who have found massive frauds related to climate quotas (December 17, 2009). A feature story from the same newspaper “Job number 1” (December 17, 2009) reports from the Democratic Republic of Congo¹² about how logging increases CO₂ emissions, attached facts frame relates this to the REDD mechanism and the Norwegian initiative. It also cites the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation’s Lionel Diss, who emphasizes the necessity of taking forest peoples’ interests and needs seriously, and warns against superficial plans “from eager donors” that may “undermine the small, democratic progresses made for Congo’s forest peoples during the last years” (ibid.).

In another story in *Aftenposten* (“Billions to rain forests”, December 17, 2009), the Norwegian donations are mentioned together with other countries’ contributions, and PM Jens Stoltenberg is quoted saying “the aim is to achieve a 25 per cent reduction in deforestation before 2015 [...] Reduced deforestation is the quickest, cheapest and most efficient climate mitigation we can implement.” This news was treated as a positive example in the midst

of a gloomy sentiment prevailing at the negotiations as they were heading towards the end.

Since 2009, investigative reporters have revealed that Norway's Pension Fund is involved in a palm oil production project in Indonesia, which threatens the same forests that its NCFI is out to protect, and this was highlighted in a story in *Aftenposten* during the Durban summit ("Accuses Norway of Climate Hypocrisy", December 8, 2011).

Visiting Brazil

In 2008, Jens Stoltenberg and his Minister for the Environment, Erik Solheim, visited Brazil in connection with the NCFI, with a group of journalists in their entourage. Several articles in this coverage articulate the *Norwegian Hero Discourse*, stating "Jens [Stoltenberg] fights for the glaciers in the jungle" (Headline, *Dagsavisen*, September 18, 2008), thus also confirming that this is about "our" environmental security as a country with glaciers, both on the Norwegian mainland and in Spitsbergen: "(I)t is in Brazil that the future of the *Norwegian* glaciers is decided" (ibid., my emphasis). Such a news item illustrates the *global security discourse* in action: Norwegian goodness in certain countries benefits the whole world – and benefits Norway's own areas of interest (i.e. Spitsbergen) in particular. An editorial in another newspaper, *Dagbladet*, follows up by stating that "This is not a gift, but an investment" (*Dagbladet*, September 18, 2008), a business-like *cost-efficiency discourse*; and thus corresponds both to Lim and Barnett's "idealist" (neoliberal) perspective (ibid.) and to the *security* paradigm, articulated in a business/utilitarian language. *Aftenposten*, to an extent follows the same trend, quoting the PM in its headline "The greatest thing I have done" (September 17, 2008) and "Pays for rain forest, hectare by hectare" (September 16, 2008). *VG* is more critical, hinting at possible corruption and at the Norwegian double standards as an oil nation ("Santa Claus from the North", editorial opinion September 16, 2008, "Calculates with misuse of rain-forest funds", referring to the PM in a news item Sept 15, 2008). *Dagsavisen's* correspondent, in another article, leaves the euphoria around President Lula da Silva and the Norwegian PM to venture out in the NGO world, where she finds some people highly critical of the government when it comes to plans for a highway crossing the Amazonia, the forest-to-be-protected (*Dagsavisen*, September 17, 2008).

This double-edged coverage must be seen in the light of the general debate in Norway, where heated exchanges are found on the questions of increased national oil exploration (particularly in the northern areas of Norway), as well as of Norwegian oil exploration abroad (particularly the highly disputed Tar Sands oil project in Canada¹³ where *Statoil* is deeply involved), and of (delayed) CO₂ cleansing at existing gas power plants. Leading NGOs have been in the

forefront, and the most environmentally friendly parties have objected to the government policy. It needs also to be judged against a press which in recent years has become more critical towards Norwegian engagement abroad (See Eide & Simonsen 2008).

The Double Standards Discourse

It seems as if the Norwegian coverage of the NCFI in the first phase (2007-2009) judged that the initiative has mainly had a positive effect. But this assessment is simultaneously, from a broader coverage and viewpoints, 'balanced' by other perspectives. These take up Norway's general role in climate change, as a major, polluting oil nation that does not live up to the requirements for leadership in terms of good governance; it does not currently fulfill the requirements of the Kyoto protocol. At the COP15 in Copenhagen and thereafter, even more criticism has been raised of the initiative itself, starting with an article in *Aftenposten* warning against corruption ("Rainforest corruption a substantial danger", December 8, 2009). In 2010 several critical voices are heard, though the majority seems come from niche newspapers. In the mainstream press the coverage mostly remains positive, except for an article where the Rainforest Foundation Norway¹⁴ articulates its scepticism towards an accord with Indonesia, an accord that "permits Indonesia to continue massive destruction of its rainforest" (*Aftenposten*, June 10, 2010). The same critique is repeated in leftist *Klassekampen* in November 2010, highlighting Indonesian plans for large plantations replacing original rainforest, and exposing that Indonesia is breaking the accord by planning to cut down an area of rainforest equal in size to Norway. (*Klassekampen*, November 8 and 9, 2010). One article in the Christian newspaper *Vårt Land* presents a world map depicting all recipient countries and a professor at the University of Bergen saying that environmental protection "is a new brand of colonialism", since projects often do not take the local people's needs and voices into consideration, (*Vårt Land*, November 23, 2010) and may thus be seen as related to the *dependency* paradigm. The statement corresponds with the critique from FOE when it comes to the REDD mechanism. Even Norway's leading business paper reveals Norwegian double standards in a post-Cancún-article, where the lead reads:

The government wants to save the rain forest in Brazil. Simultaneously the petroleum fund invests billions in Brazil's worst [companies]... [The fund] has invested in nine out of ten of the most polluting companies on the Brazilian stock exchange. They emit about twice as much CO₂ as Norway's total emissions in 2009 (*Dagens Næringsliv*, January 18, 2011).

The last example demonstrates more of the general trend in Norwegian coverage. There is the occasional critique of the NCFI often based on alleged corrup-

tion or mismanagement at the “receiving end.” But the main critique has to do with what Norway does when it is *not* out there trying to save the rainforest. In other words, the *double standard discourse* challenges the discourse of *Norway the saviour of the rainforest* or more generally, *the Norwegian global do-gooder* in the Norwegian press coverage. The former seems to be linked to representations of NGO voices, while the latter occurs when national political leaders are involved. Yet another way of interpreting the press items is by seeing them with the practice-what-you-preach-discourse, which has often come to the forefront of Norwegian investigative journalism.

Brazilian and Indonesian Voices

What is being said, then, at the “receiving end” – in two major rainforest nations? The impression from the Brazilian material is that NCFI has, not surprisingly, received much less coverage in Brazilian main newspapers than it did in Norway. In post-Bali Brazil, mainly during the visit of the Norwegian PM, *O Estado de S. Paulo* largely endorsed the funding. The paper cited the Norwegian PM on forest preservation being “the fastest and most impressive way to reduce the effects of the greenhouse gases.” Its coverage also featured the then-Brazilian President Luiz Inácio da Silva (“Lula”), on the mutual agreement respecting the Kyoto Protocol and on the need to monitor real deforestation carefully. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, September 16, 2008). The non-imposition character of the donation was underlined:

It is an intelligent mechanism, with the potential to trigger a virtuous cycle in the Amazon. It creates a strong incentive for the government to preserve anti deforestation polices, because the funds will not be available if deforestation is not controlled.

At the same time, the fund goes against the traditional objection, which is based on the argument of national sovereignty, instead of being supervised by foreign donors. Rich countries pay Brazil to do what is right, but do not gain jurisdiction over our politics. (*Folha de S. Paulo* Sept 22, 2008: «Amazônia bilionária»)

The newspaper assures its readers that there will be no foreign dominance. This corresponds well to the Norwegian declared policy of non-interference, albeit insisting upon corruption control. The only critical part of the article is concerned with “sustainability.” The writer fears that more voluntary donations for the initiative will not be made. Furthermore, the text expresses admiration for the speed with which this donation came into place and the sheer amount: “To give an idea of the value of this amount, we can mention that it is the double what the Brazilian government planned to use to fight deforestation

between 2008 and 2010.” (ibid.) In addition, the article gives credit to Norway as a “pioneer” and there is no mention of the donor background, i.e. Norway’s ability to provide funding due to its immense oil riches.

More than a year later, an article in *Estadão de S Paulo*, published during COP15 in Copenhagen, was titled “Obama compliments the partnership between Brazil and Norway to preserve the Amazon forest”. The citation originates from Obama’s visit to Oslo where he was to receive the Nobel Peace award.

The American president said that this partnership is an efficient model against deforestation. [...] Obama said that he is very impressed with the partnership between the two countries and said that this model “is probably the most efficient way in terms of costs to deal with climate change. (*Estadão de S Paulo*, December 10, 2009)

This article was published within Obama’s first year in office, when his popularity around the world was still considerable. To cite him as authority and thus endorse the solidity of the agreement might serve as an attempt to further convince the readers of this ‘fact.’ The *cost-efficiency discourse* is underlined here, by the terms “efficient model” and “efficient way in terms of costs”.

Brazil’s Ambiguous Role

The initial euphoria about the initiative largely lingers on in the Brazilian materials. But it turns more critical after COP15, and other discourses occur, as when *Folha de S. Paulo* publishes an article under the headline “Amazonia Fund faces lack of projects, says Minc”¹⁵ (March 27, 2010). The story claims that only one fifth of the money available for deforestation projects has been allocated, but that several projects are waiting to be launched. The article is echoed by *Estadão de S. Paulo*, where the same minister again speaks: “Minc criticizes the slow selection process of projects for the Amazonia fund” (*Estadão de S. Paulo* March 26, 2010). The story emphasizes Brazil’s global responsibility, but also stresses impatience and eagerness. The Amazon Fund leader from BNDES (The Brazilian Development Bank), Claudia Costa, is quoted as saying that “Because Brazil has become a window to the world, we need to show a good project execution. We need to speed up without losing the rigour” (ibid.).

During the Cancún conference, an article appeared reflecting how Brazil has entered the BASIC¹⁶, a group of large “emerging nations” that received special attention during COP15 in Copenhagen through Obama’s initiative. The headline reads: “Less vulnerable, Brazil should not receive ‘green’ money” (*Folha de S. Paulo*, December 12, 2010). This headline indicates that Brazil is a power to be reckoned with.¹⁷ The article calls the COP15 (in Copenhagen) a “fiasco;” it is moderately content with the small achievements in Cancún (COP16), and refers to the “Green Fund” to which several “developed” nations pledged donations:

It is unlikely that the Green Fund will benefit Brazil in a direct way. The priority is to countries less developed and vulnerable, like the ones in Africa. Moreover, Brazil already created the Amazonian fund [...], with the donation of more than US \$100 million from Norway in 2009, the first part of total US \$1 billion promised by this Nordic country. Finally, in Copenhagen, President Lula had already offered the possibility of Brazil being a donor to the fund in the future. (*Folha de S. Paulo*, December 12, 2010)

In other words, the Norwegian funds are okay, but there is no need for more. While the first two of the 2010 articles seem to be preoccupied with governmental inefficiency when it comes to absorbing the funding from abroad, this third one posits Brazil as a no-longer-so-needy country, situating Brazil outside of the traditional North-South development discourse. The article furthermore ends on a note of critique of the US for its slowness in setting concrete targets for its own emission reduction. We may here observe a “shift of discursive mode,” or a new way of positioning the nation Brazil from receiver to provider – as well as a global actor criticizing the US – confirmed by elite voices.

All in all, judging from the selected articles, the two newspapers seem to be positive towards the Norwegian donation, but worried about (and simultaneously somewhat proud of) the country’s ability to perform according to its relatively new role as a global leader and as example to other poorer nations.

Indonesia: Programs Well Implemented ...?

Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim majority nation and the fourth most populous country¹⁸ in the world. However, Indonesia is not in the same position as Brazil, even if it has a growing economy.¹⁹ *Kompas*, a prestigious elite newspaper²⁰ framed the initiative ahead of the Copenhagen Summit, with a headline “Norway helps Indonesia Reduce Emissions” (November 24, 2009). The text elaborated on the initiative and the role of UN-REDD, “a UN collaboration program to reduce emission from the forestry sector which was launched in 2008 by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and the Norwegian Prime Minister.” It also mentioned that the Ministry of Forestry in Indonesia has co-operated with Australia and Germany in a pilot project on calculating the release of carbon and its absorption. The Norwegian Minister of the Environment, Erik Solheim was quoted, and Norway was favourably mentioned: “Among other developed nations, Norway’s commitment is the most certain one, with the plan to reduce emissions by 30 % by 2020. Other countries are still playing around with their rhetoric” (ibid.). Indonesian officials were shown to be very content with Norway’s pledge, and as a sign of reciprocity, the Indonesian Minister of the Environment, Gusti Mohammad Hatti was offered the closing line: “We are ready to reduce emissions by 26 % in 2020.”

The same minister was highlighted in an article from a business paper half a year later, where he says that the “REDD+ program has been well implemented. This shows that the government has been serious in saving the environment” (*DetikFinance* 28.07.2010).

By this time, in a Post-Copenhagen spirit, *Kompas* also issued a critical article on the REDD function. This highlighted in particular the Letter of Intent (LOI) signed by Norway and Indonesia, which gives “all stakeholders, including indigenous people, local communities and civil society through national legislations, and where applicable, international instruments, the opportunity of full and effective participation in REDD+ planning and implementation” (“REDD Carbon Market, July 23, 2010). The article, written by academics from a university in East Kalimantan, concludes: “Don’t sell dreams about REDD to the international world, only for the sake of getting loans.” This sentence may be interpreted as part of a radical post-colonial discourse *critical of a clientist position*, which the writers deem not fit for Indonesia, but simultaneously remains appreciative of Norway’s approach. A related (critical) *discourse on global inequality* occurred in an article on the co-operation with Norway, it writes that “we” (i.e. Indonesia) need to be careful about the REDD program due to the “fact that the developed countries which are the cause of most of the pollution in the world can run away from their responsibility, claiming that they have contributed funds through REDD to reduce emissions in developing countries.” (*Kompas* June 8, 2010).

Controversies

The controversy emerging from industrial plans in rainforest areas is mentioned in several publications in the autumn 2010, particularly in October, when the Norwegian Minister of the Environment visited Indonesia to prepare a Letter of Intent on further co-operation, including a moratorium on new concessions in pristine rain forest areas. A moratorium is not the same as a ban, as *Antara* news agency explained via the voice of the Minister of Forestry, Mr. Zulkifli Hasan: “The LoI is basically the foundation for stopping temporarily the issuance of licenses to cultivate the primary and peat forests between 2011 and 2012” (*Antara* Oct 26, 2010). On the same day the agency quoted the Norwegian Minister of the Environment on his satisfaction with the Letter of Intent (including a cessation of logging) signed in May. From the available Indonesian press material, the writers seem still to be content with this temporary solution.

There is one important exception though. At the time of the COP16 in Cancún, a *Kompas* journalist issues a rather gloomy article headlined “Talking to the Wind” (December 4, 2010). As seen from the above, criticism was raised in Norway on the prospects of Indonesian CO₂ reduction through rainforest protection. The reporter mentions the bilateral agreements (and the Norwegian

provision of funds) as the best way forward, since a larger global agreement seems unlikely, and continues:

[...] it is still not clear what will happen to the Indonesian forests, since according to a Greenpeace report on “the Protection Funds,” various Indonesian ministries have planned contradictorily to use approximately 63 million hectares of land for [...] various kinds of industries, thus threatening the existence of the remaining 40 per cent of natural forest we still have (ibid.).

The *Kompas* story is also critical on behalf of the “people who live in the forest areas and the surrounding areas” who have not heard anything of the accord between Norway and Indonesia. It also refers to the rights of these communities and “those of the *adat*²¹ community” in line with the critique raised by FoE.

The last part of this highly critical article may be said to represent a discourse of *the wide gap between rulers and ruled*; or *globalization is still not making itself understood locally*; as expressed in the following passage:

There is a gap between the people’s hope to be able to understand climate change which is so close to their daily life and the effort of the government which relies on global funding resources which focus more on mitigation programs.

We seem to witness the government preaching about climate change, but unfortunately they seem to be talking to the wind. [...] Fishermen only see that they catch fewer and fewer fish while farmers find their fields unable to produce crops while communities living near forest areas get confused as the “city people” come and go, taking measures of their forests ... (ibid.)

It is worth quoting this at length since it is one of the few traces in the material where the people whose livelihoods are dependent on the rainforest development are referred to, even if not quoted directly. The writer visualizes an estrangement of sorts on behalf of the forest people, who, according to her have not been made partners in the process of stopping deforestation/preserving the forests.

Conclusion: Transnational Critique

I have mapped Norway’s rainforest initiative both from “within” and from the “outside.” Edward Said, in his critical reading of English and French literature (and with his background as a musician) suggests what he calls “contrapuntal reading”. This reading implies a

[...] simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominant discourse acts. [...] In the same way, I believe, we can read and

interpret English novels, for example, whose engagement (usually suppressed for the most part) with the West Indies or India, say, is shaped and perhaps even determined by the specific history of colonization, resistance, and finally native nationalism. At this point alternative or new narratives emerge, and they become institutionalised or discursively stable entities (Said 1994: 59-60).

Said is here primarily concerned with the colonial period and fictional literature, but his critique is also a “post-colonial” endeavour and his suggested mode of analysis may well be utilized in a period like our own, in which the North-South relations still markedly lack a degree of balanced reciprocity and equality. Said’s perspective does not only imply asking what is *excluded* from the text – but also what is there *indirectly* – presupposed, taken for granted. In the materials studied here, for instance, journalists largely took for granted the proposition that the REDD mechanism is the most important way in which to reduce CO₂ emissions in the years to come, despite the hurdles observed and recognised.

Complicated transnational mechanisms like those embodied in the REDD represent a challenge to journalists. Mike Hulme observes that the rise of international carbon trading “and the associated variants such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and voluntary carbon offsetting – also offers a challenge to the pre-eminence of the nation-state in the negotiating and governing of climate change” (Hulme 2009: 303). He points out how the private sector – (investors, companies etc.) “become the agents of climate governance and national governments become second-line managers merely to set and administer the rules” (ibid.).

While this may be an exaggerated instance of downplaying the significance of the roles of the nation states, Hulme’s warning remains important as a signal of an increased commercialization of the climate mitigation processes. Strong business interests will try to interfere in the future of the REDD mechanisms and thus also in the directions they may take and thus possibly also create obstacles to the stated targets of the UN plans. So far, no quota trading linked to the REDD has been sanctioned, and there is no consensus as to how such trading would be organized.

Nonetheless, the signals Hulme observes correspond with Lim and Barnett’s “idealist perspective” and its familiarity with neoliberal and cooperative politics, coupled with an (over)optimist view on international development aid (Lim & Barnett 2010: 91). Thus, a tense relationship between nation states and business may be strengthened – while the weaker players who will be governed by the new trading and new environmentally informed trade agreements may be marginalized – both by politics and by the media.

As Thompson et al. suggest, there is a need to study “how REDD+ is such an emerging project of environmental governance – that is, a set of social

norms and political assumptions that will steer societies and organizations in a manner that shapes collective decisions about the use and management of forest resources” (2011: 100). As mentioned above, their critique runs deep, and raises profound doubts about whether the whole initiative will succeed with its top-down and “recentralized” (ibid.: 108) approach. While some of the same critical perspectives are raised by NGOs (especially when it comes to representation of indigenous people and forest dwellers in the decision making bodies and processes), this critique is not voiced in the mainstream media studied here. The few critical exceptions seen in this limited press material belong to researchers (and one reporter) in Indonesia and Norway. Thus, the relative marginalization of scientific voices in the press coverage of climate change, as seen particularly from the summit material in the *MediaClimate* study (Eide & Kunelius 2010) is accompanied by the politicians being given centre stage. This may add to the simplifications inherent in media conventions – and in political discourses – simplifications that are also mentioned as a danger in the REDD mechanism itself (Thompson et al 2011).

This study clearly demonstrates that one perspective needs to be added to the three mentioned by Lim and Barnett: The post-colonial critical perspective emerging in the global South (but which is also reflected in media coverage inside the global North, as in the case of Norway). On the other hand, the national politicians in Brazil and Indonesia, more or less in unison with their Norwegian counterparts, mostly adhere to the neoliberal development paradigm, leaning on a pragmatic-realist North-South perspective. This discourse dominates the coverage, while post-colonial critique in various shapes – mostly from NGOs and scientists – is emerging as the initiative comes of age.

The cosmopolitan perspective is being allowed to have somewhat wider exposure – the view that all human beings are of equal worth, and an alternative universalism is possible from below (Nandy 1990). Thus we begin to see that the people who actually live with the consequences of climate change – including those whose livelihood is intimately connected with the rainforest – are allowed more of a say. The growing existence of these “voices from below” may be seen as reflected to some extent in the “double standards” critique that bubbles to the surface from time to time not only in Norway but also in Brazil and Indonesia.

Kwame Appiah warns us that “Scientific stories are not the only words we live by” and argues that the methods practiced by natural science do not necessarily lead to an improved understanding of values:

So we may be able to learn about values from societies where science is less deeply implanted than in ours: if scientific method has not advanced our understanding of values, then its superiority offers no reason to suppose that our understanding of values is superior (Appiah 2006: 43).

Top-down approaches offered by the UN and the World Bank as well as governments, may have a long way to go to acquire this wisdom; consequently, media workers will have to struggle hard to combine a universalist (including a grass roots) perspective with the contrapuntal reading of transnational initiatives, and simultaneously critically examine the contributions of their own nation states.

Notes

1. A special 'thank you' is due to Ellen Hofsvang who has read this chapter and provided insightful critique.
2. See the initiative, as presented by the government: www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/Vedlegg/Klima/klima_skogprosjektet/faktaark%20og%20brosjyrer/RKlimaSkogProsj_E_2605.pdf The other countries involved are Mexico, Guyana, DR Congo and Tanzania. In UN's REDD programme a total of 37 countries are involved.
3. The material from Brazil and Indonesia is provided by partners in *MediaClimate*, who have followed the coverage of the Norwegian initiative over some time. Thus special thanks are due to Caroline d'Essen and Oni Sarwono for their assistance in bringing this material to my attention. I would also like to thank Margaretha M. Adisoemarta for her translation into English of the Indonesian articles.
4. The others are Luxemburg and Sweden; in addition, Denmark and the Netherlands meet the UN target of 0.7 per cent of the GDP (2009-figures, OECD statistics). http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR
5. 18 billion Norwegian kroner in 2005, 27 billion kroner in 2011.
6. See <http://www.un-redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/Default.aspx> Accessed 8.2.2012.
7. Search performed June 9, 2011, restricted to printed media.
8. *Aftenposten*, December 12, 2009, accessed June 9 2011.
9. *Folha de S Paulo* is the second largest newspaper in Brazil, with a daily average of almost 300,000 copies. It was founded in 1921, and is considered one of the most influential in Brazil
10. This newspaper, founded in 1875, is the fifth largest according to circulation in Brazil, with a daily average of almost 240,000 copies (2010), and the largest one in São Paulo city. It is known as an elite newspaper, leaning towards the right.
11. Siri Kalvig, a Norwegian meteorologist has been frequently in the media, and six days before the Nobel ceremony where Al Gore received the Nobel Peace Award together with IPCC leader Rajendra Pachauri, this article was printed in the then largest Norwegian newspaper (VG, December 4 2007).
12. According to the story, 40 million out of a total population of 65 million depend directly on the forests for their livelihood.
13. See <http://www.newsenglish.no/2011/02/11/more-trouble-for-statoil-in-canada/> accessed June 22 2011.
14. See <http://www.regnskog.no/languages/english>
15. Carlos Minc is the Brazilian Minister of the Environment.
16. The BASIC is a bloc of four strong nations, Brazil, South Africa, India and China, also called G4. It was formed ahead of the COP15 in 2009, and pledged to stand together during the Copenhagen negotiations. Another bloc in which three of them participate, is BRIC, where Russia replaces South Africa, the latter being more concerned with economic issues.
17. Brazil is by far the most populous country in Latin America, with more than 190 million inhabitants. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population, accessed June 22, 2011.
18. Indonesia's population is almost 240 million. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population, accessed June 22, 2011.
19. One of the reasons for it not being included among the BASIC countries may be that the Asian giants, China and India, are there, while Brazil and South Africa are regionally dominant.

20. *Kompas* was established in 1965 and is published from Jakarta, with a circulation of 550,000. It caters mainly to a well-educated readership and is close to the Indonesian government, albeit not uncritical.
21. *Adat* is largely synonymous to *indigenous*.

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Futures of the Implicated and the Bystander

Comparing Futures Imagined in the Coverage of Climate Summits in Bangladesh and Finland

Ville Kumpu & Mofizur Rhaman

Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, climate change is the issue taking hold of collective visions of the future across the globe. It is an idea weaving together highly tangible things in our everyday life such as the weather outside, what we eat and how we move about, connecting them to the abstract notion of a globally shared climate system and describing the cause and effect nexus between the tangible realities of the present and the intangible, yet-to-be-materialized futures. It is something to *believe in* because the consequences of present day actions of individuals, institutions and nations will only materialize as facts in the “future presents” (Adams & Groves 2007: 200) of someone, somewhere, after being aggregated and redistributed across the globe. Despite the wide consensus on the overall process of human induced climate change, justification for inaction and supporting the status quo have been possible in the public debates about climate change because there exists a temporal discordance between the slow feedback mechanisms of the Earth’s climate system and the rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emissions. The paradox of the situation that is made even more complex by the uncertainty related to current knowledge about the functioning of the climate system is that inaction does not mean just leaving the issue unresolved but, as time goes by, makes more substantial and robust the future actions needed to curb the changes (Giddens 2009: 2).

In terms of worry over the future generations and the future habitats, the situation is alarming. It is just the complicated and highly meaningful nature of climate change that makes it a good context for studying journalism; the instincts it relies on in efforts to make the intangible tangible, in bringing “future presents” into present debates about futures and in articulating what is “near” and what is “far” in both spatial and temporal terms. This chapter builds on the distinction between *present futures* and *future presents* as developed by Barbara Adam and Chris Groves (2007). Present futures refers to approaches to the future “from the standpoint of the present through which we seek to

predict, transform and control the future for the benefit of the present” (Adam & Groves 2007: 200), while future presents “positions us with reference to deeds and processes already on the way and allows us accompany actions to their potential impacts in future generations” and thus “enables us to know ourselves as responsible for our timeprint and the time-space distantiated effects of our actions and inactions” (Ibid. 2007: 196). Moving from the former approach towards the latter means allowing futures that are “on the way” to enter discussions as real and as factual as the present day realities. They are in the progress and in the making, but have not yet materialized or congealed into empirical form. From this point of view the annual United Nations climate summits studied here are an interesting mix of both approaches: on the one hand the negotiations are tightly bound to present day political realities of controlling futures in a way that prioritizes present day and near future prosperity, progress and economic growth over long term futures. On the other hand the very rationale of the summits is to bring the “time-space distantiated” effects of our actions and inactions into the discussion.

The chapter compares the approaches to the future that has been manifested in the newspaper coverage of UN climate summits in Bangladesh and Finland. The comparative starting point allows us to study how social, political and cultural context impacts the ways futures are approached and understood. From this point of view, journalism can be understood to reflect the interpretative resources “easily available” for understanding climate change and futures in the two cultural contexts. From another perspective, we study journalism as a distinct knowledge practice and look at the ways futures are imagined in the coverage. From the former point of view, climate summits are interesting because they force different kinds of actors, forms of knowledge and visions of the future into a compressed time-space, functioning as moments of visibility and exposure which enables a kind of a global scrutiny of societies and their leaders that is not possible in normal circumstances (Kunelius & Eide 2012, Urry 2011: 116). From the point of view of journalism specifically, summits allow us to ask how journalists deal with the wide array of actors, arguments and visions available.

Climate Change, Public Opinion and Media in Bangladesh and Finland

Bangladesh and Finland are situated at the opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of both contribution to climate change through emissions and vulnerability to its potential consequences. Bangladesh is a developing country that became independent relatively recently (1971). Historically, Bangladesh has had little significance in terms of greenhouse gases released but as the ninth

most populous country in the world it represents a potential influence. Finland is an industrialized Nordic country with affluence that has been partly achieved during the 20th century with high-emitting, energy-intensive industries.¹ In 2008 Bangladesh with a population of around 160 million produced 0.15 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions, which was 0.29 metric tons per capita and 0.24 kg. per \$1 GPD. Finland with a population of circa 5 million produced 0.19 per cent of the global total, 10.65 metric tons per capita and 0.32 kg. per \$1 GPD.² Bangladesh is considered to be one of the countries that are most vulnerable to climatic change. It is already prone to floods, tornados and cyclones which are all projected to intensify due to the increase in mean temperatures and sharpening of seasonal variations. According to present knowledge, impacts of such scale and severity in the territory of Finland are not likely.

Climate change is well acknowledged as an issue in Finland but in recent years the high worry over the issue, as reflected in public opinion polls, has declined, having peaked in 2006.³ Politically climate change falls into a fairly solid tradition where environmental politics are merged with the main stream political agenda. This dates back at least to the emergence of the environmental movements of the 1970's.⁴ Though well acknowledged, climate change has never been a highly loaded issue in Finnish domestic politics. As a member state of the European Union, Finland has been committed to the targets set by the EU in transnational climate negotiations. The EU targets and ambitions in climate politics have not been truly contested in domestic politics, despite the fact that the public opinion towards the EU in general is relatively critical.

In Bangladesh, climate change is a significant issue in domestic politics. All parties irrespective of their political or ideological differences in other fields endorse climate change as a serious problem for the country and therefore urge everyone to be proactive in this field by lobbying for western compensation packages by making initiatives and by mobilizing resources to tackle the challenges. A majority of people in Bangladesh (85%) understand climate change as a serious problem and 70 per cent of the people believe that there is a scientific consensus on climate change and that it is an urgent issue to act upon (World Bank 2009). The general public awareness seems quite high in Bangladesh but it is connected to the respondents' demographic profiles: "People who are having formal education, media access, personal or family experiences of environmental problems are more likely to be concerned about environment and climate change and more likely to develop proper environmental attitudes" (Hasan & Akhter 2011). Bangladesh plays an active role in the transnational climate negotiations. UN climate summits have been significantly represented by Bangladeshi delegates. At international summits and negotiations, Bangladesh operates under G77 and LDC countries.⁵

Despite the steady decrease in readership over the past decade, newspapers still have a prominent position in Finland. 78 per cent of Finns say they have

read a newspaper during the previous day (34 minutes expended on a daily average) and the newspapers' share of the media markets is relatively high (Tilastokeskus 2010). Newspapers in Finland had strong ties to party-politics during the first part of the 20th century but currently almost all papers have declared themselves to be politically unaffiliated (Salokangas 1999). The two Finnish newspapers studied here are both published by the largest publishing company Sanoma whose newspaper titles cover 31 per cent of the total circulation (Tilastokeskus 2010). As the only national daily *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS) functions as the "journal of record" in the Finnish context; it has had a strong agenda-setting function among both the political elite and other media. In an international comparison it can be described as "semi-serious" newspaper (cf. *The Guardian* in the UK) (Sparks 2000). *Ilta-Sanomat* (IS) is the other of the two tabloid newspapers published in Finland. It can be best described as "serious-popular" (c.f. *USA Today* in the US, *Daily Mail* in the UK) (Herkman 2005: 288, Kivioja 2008: 26).


Media in Bangladesh today operate in a much more democratic environment compared to what has been the case in the past. The Bangladeshi newspaper industry is entirely owned by the private sector but most of the newspapers have also political leanings, and this is often reflected in the news selection, treatment and contents. The lack of professionalism in news gathering and writing, absence of editorial independence and vested corporate interest still have severe implications for the practice of quality journalism. Considering the literacy rate which is 52.6 per cent, (according to the national assessment survey of 2008) Bangladesh has an overwhelmingly high number of newspapers.⁶ Bangladeshi print journalism can take pride in their significant role in the democratization process of the country as well as for their role in the struggle for national emancipation. Newspapers pay considerable attention to human rights, equality, environmental pollution and corruption. They often play an advocacy role by creating awareness, bringing about policy change, protecting minority rights and calling for a just society. Yet newspapers are also involved in political hate speech. The Bangladeshi newspapers studied were *The Prothom Alo* (PA) and *The Daily Star* (DS). The former is a widely circulated Bangla language newspaper with a special reach to the younger generation, while the latter is considered as the dominant English language daily in terms of circulation, quality and prestige in the society.⁷ PA has a daily circulation of 437,350 copies and the DS 40,652 copies (DFP Media list 2011). Both newspapers are very influential and often set the national political agenda and can be considered as trend setters in the Bangladeshi journalistic field. Environment and climate change journalism gets much attention in both newspapers compared to other politically aligned newspapers. Though there is no clear practical distinction between "elite" and "popular" press in Bangladesh, the elitism of DS is easily understood from its non-native language and

from the socio-demographic profile of its audience. On the other hand the “popularity” of *PA* while being obviously restricted by literacy rates and other socio demographic factors is nevertheless defined by its reach, circulation and acceptance among the various types of audience as well as by its use of the vernacular language, Bangla.

The Newspaper Coverage of Climate Summits

Compared to other countries involved in the study the newspaper coverage of the Bali (COP 13), Copenhagen (COP 15), Cancún (COP 16) and Durban (COP 17) summits in both Bangladesh and Finland can be described as extensive (see Chapter 17). Of the four newspapers only the Finnish popular paper *Ilta-Sanomat* (IS) was clearly different with its scale of coverage heavily dependent on the general buzz around the summits, leaving less hyped summits (Cancún, Durban) practically unnoticed. The selection of sources that were quoted in the coverage of the four summits in the two countries gives a rough overview of how journalists interpret the event (see figure 6.1). Despite the contextual differences discussed earlier, the selection of sources in the two countries was strikingly similar. The main difference was that voices representing transnational political institutions (e.g. the UN, the EU) were quoted far more frequently in the Bangladeshi press. This reflects the more general tendency of transnational actors being more prominent in the developing countries’ summit coverage which arguably reflects the tendency of the UN, for example, to emphasize the call for developed world to commit to action (Kunelius & Eide 2012, Eide &


Figure 6.1. The Institutional Background of People Quoted Directly or to whom Indirect Quotations are Attributed in Coverage of the Bali, Copenhagen, Cancún and Durban Climate Summits in Bangladesh and in Finland



Kunelius 2010). In Bangladesh the share of transnational voices has however declined from the 19 per cent in the Bali coverage to just 6 per cent in the Cancún coverage. Civil society actors such as NGOs have a somewhat more prominent role in the Finnish coverage. The lack of voices representing the business community is notable in both countries.

The similarities between the coverage in the two countries were also evident in the rough estimates of the future orientation of the coverage.⁸ The difference between the two countries in the share of the future oriented stories in the coverage of four summits – 54 per cent of the Finnish coverage considered as oriented towards the future, 46 per cent of the Bangladeshi coverage – was so marginal that it can hardly be interpreted as significant given the rough nature of the classification. In both countries the coverage of the Durban summit was the most future oriented and the Copenhagen coverage the least. The differences between the newspapers in the respective countries were similar: the “elite” papers *HS* and *DS* were clearly more oriented towards the future than their “popular” counterparts *P4* and *IS*. The difference in orientation between

Figure 6.2. Years Most Often Explicitly Mentioned in the Newspaper Coverage of Three Recent Climate Summits in Bangladesh (BD) and Finland (FI)



“elite” and “popular” papers was borne out by the data collected from most countries involved in the study.

The years that were most often mentioned in the coverage in the two countries were closely linked to the COP-process. 2020 was the year most often explicitly mentioned in the two countries’ coverage with the exception of the coverage of Cancún in Bangladesh, where the year most frequently referred to was 2012. There was a clear shift manifest in both countries’ coverage away

from long term futures (2050 and beyond) which comprised 25 per cent of years mentioned in the coverage of Copenhagen in Bangladesh and 20 per cent in Finland but only 7 per cent and 2 per cent respectively in the Durban coverage. Arguably the shift reflects a shift from a discourse of hope and fear connected to the consequences of climate change as a phenomenon towards a discourse of political realism more concerned with the immediate near future. In the Bangladeshi coverage the years more frequently mentioned were those in the immediate near future (2019 and before), while Finnish coverage was more centered on mid-term futures (2020-2049).

The journalists in the two countries tended to situate voices in different “time-zones” in a similar manner (see table 6.1). In the coverage of all four summits, in both countries, political actors were always clearly more visible in stories considered to be future oriented while civil society actors like NGOs were more likely to appear in stories with no future orientation. The only exception to this rule was the coverage of the Bali summit in Bangladesh where civil society voices were allowed to enter the future-zone more frequently. While such quantitative data does not reveal exactly who is talking about futures inside the stories, it remains clear that the political future with identifiable processes of decision making has been isolated (in the journalistic discourse) from civil society actors. Although they may discuss futures in more general terms, as representatives of “future generations,” for example, the fact remains that their discourse is not very well connected to futures discussed at the summit negotiation tables and represented as decisive features in the ensuing journalistic discourse. This is well illustrated in the coverage of demonstrations: the demands and targets presented by the demonstrators are rarely specifically reported or reflected in journalism but rather the demonstrations are reported as spectacles, celebrations or clashes.

Journalism Compelled by the Negotiations

Most of the climate change stories published during the climate summits can be described as “summit journalism,” that is to say, the focus of the coverage was on the summit as an event, and as such, journalism emphasized the negotiation process over the actual contents of the negotiations and reproduced the strict division between the official and the powerful (negotiators) and the unofficial and the spectacular (demonstrations) which marked the scene of the summit (especially in the case of Copenhagen) (Kumpu & Kunelius 2010). To follow up the quantitative analysis above we now study in greater detail the stories considered to be future oriented in Copenhagen and Durban coverage.⁹

The similarity between the approaches to futures that were manifested in the two countries was also evident in the very core of “summit journalism” in

Table 6.1. Sources Quoted in the Future Oriented and Not Future Oriented Stories in the Coverage of Bali ("13" in the table), Copenhagen ("15"), Cancún ("16") and Durban ("17") Coverage in Bangladesh and Finland

COP		Bangladesh					Finland						
		National political	Transn. political	Civil society	Business	Science expertise	Other	National political	Transn. political	Civil society	Business	Science expertise	Other
13	Future	41	24	18	0	11	7	47	6	18	10	18	1
	No f.	30	11	13	0	30	17	26	0	32	16	19	6
15	Future	41	18	21	1	15	4	47	8	23	3	16	3
	No f.	34	9	35	1	13	8	28	6	41	4	16	6
16	Future	54	13	14	0	13	6	30	5	21	2	30	12
	No f.	49	7	15	0	22	7	27	7	23	0	40	3
17	Future	49	9	14	0	25	4	40	2	29	12	17	0
	No f.	27	2	15	20	27	8	23	0	54	15	8	0

stories concentrating on the negotiation process. The most common way of approaching futures in the material was through references to emission reduction targets discussed in the negotiations which were replicated in the coverage in a precise, technical language. Instead of emissions, money was sometimes used as the currency in quantifying futures. This type of *funding discourse* was clearly more prominent in the Bangladeshi coverage but it appeared sporadically in the Finnish coverage as well, as in the discussions about climate aid pledged by the EU during the Copenhagen summit:

Industrial countries should reduce their emissions by 25–40 per cent from the 1990 levels and developing countries 15–30 per cent by the year 2020. By the year 2050 global emissions should be crunched by 50 per cent which in developed countries means emission reductions in the scale of 80 per cent (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 7, 2009, news story¹⁰).

They say by 2020 greenhouse gases must be reduced by 25 to 40 per cent below 1990 level. That would keep the temperature rise in the less dangerous range of 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (*Daily Star*, December 16, 2009, news story).

The fate of the fund still hangs in balance as the US wants further review of a draft report on its formation. In the last climate conference in Cancún, it was decided that the fund would have \$100 billion a year from 2020 to be given to the poor countries to face climate change impacts. Bangladesh also said donors should start contributing to the fund from 2013 to avoid any gap in climate financing. The fast track fund that is now operational expires in 2012, which makes it important for early capitalization of the green fund (*Daily Star*, December 4, 2011, news story).

As a counterpart to the precise target discourse, implicitly or explicitly explaining why the targets were important, a more vague discourse concentrating on the possible consequences of climate change often appeared. Recurrent points of reference were the small island states, floods, droughts and glacier melting:

For example, the whole basis for Inuit hunting culture is in danger of collapse as Arctic ice melts. The Solomon Islands, the homeland of Maylen Sese, are about to be drowned. The melting rate of glaciers and arctic sea ice has accelerated. The sea level is projected to rise even 30 centimeters in a hundred years. Developing countries dependent on agriculture are already suffering from heat, droughts and heavy rains. Coastal flooding has become more common in Finland (*Helsingin Sanomat*, December 9, 2009, comment by a journalist).

The two approaches comprised the core of future discourse in the coverage of Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011) summits. Journalists in both countries

mostly stayed in the comfort zone by neither challenging nor elaborating the targets discussed in the summits or the consequences referred to as justifying the negotiation process. From this perspective the futures in the two countries' coverage seem unanimous. But a closer look soon revealed differences in the journalists' approaches.

Futures of the Implicated and the Bystander

The main difference between the two countries was not in the futures referred to but in their connection to present day realities. The Bangladeshi coverage was deeply embedded in the idea that it was the very fate of Bangladesh that was at stake in the negotiations (cf. Rhaman 2010). While the Bangladeshi journalists did not challenge or elaborate the futures put to offer as targets in the negotiations they did construct a pronounced nationalistic perspective from which the negotiations were interpreted. The role of Bangladesh in the negotiations, the difference between "rich" and "climate-hit" countries, and the possible consequences of climate change at the present time, were all highlighted in a way that differed markedly from the Finnish coverage.

All eyes on rich nations

Climate-hit countries count on their promises as Durban meet gets underway.

As the stories emerging from Africa to Americas, Asia to Australia tell the same grave situation of ever increasing drought, floods, storms and hot spells, a Climate Change Conference began here yesterday with hopes that the rich nations will keep their commitments to extend helps to the poor and that they would themselves reduce carbon emissions. (*Daily Star*, November 29, 2011)

The name of Bangladesh comes up again and again in this city of the climate summit. If the target that is being spoken of and set, that the world temperature will not be allowed to increase beyond 2 degree Celsius, is not met, Bangladesh will be submerged. Maps and photos of Bangladesh, the big victim of climate change, are hanging here and there in Copenhagen... (*Prothom Alo*, December 9, 2009).

If in the Bangladeshi coverage Bangladesh was situated in the middle of the playing field fighting for its future then the role implicated for Finland in the Finnish coverage was that of a sympathetic spectator. The national interest of Finland only emerged in the Finnish coverage sporadically, for example when the decisions regarding the effect of logging on calculating emissions was discussed after Durban. The role of the Finnish delegation in the negotiations was not reflected at all. The *Helsingin Sanomat* correspondent at the scene in both Copenhagen and Durban aptly described the approach in a research

interview¹¹ when asked about interpreting the summit from an “activist” position compared to an interpretation more grounded in the political realities of individual nation-states: “Well, I don’t know whether it would make much sense to be here as a Finland journalist. This is more of a... let’s save the world kind of a thing.” In terms of futures, the general difference in the approaches meant that the similar core of future references flowing from the targets discussed in the negotiations was presented in a more emotionally distanced context in the Finnish coverage.

The Finnish coverage reflected a gradualist approach to climate change: futures related to climate change can and should be controlled by appropriate mechanisms, such as international climate treaties, enabling societies to adjust and adapt to the rather slow changes climate change brings about (Urry 2011: 21). The gradualist approach was also evident in the ways futures were portrayed in stories diverging from the summit context and discussing climate change in more general terms. The journalists took some effort to try and describe what climate change means in the context of Finland, but the consequences appeared to be uncertain and unclear rather than certain and threatening. The gradualist approach was abandoned when the general consequences of climate change (e.g. floods, droughts, sea level rise) were referred to. But at these moments the geographical distance of the consequences and cliché-ed way of listing them side by side with the targets of the negotiations served to distance and abstract them from immediate Finnish concerns. In the Bangladeshi coverage the futures described both in the stories discussing climate change in more general terms and in stories directly related to the summit were closer, more abrupt and more personal.

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS

1.5cr People to be Displaced in Bangladesh by 2050

Say environmentalists:

About 15 million (1.5 crore¹²) people in Bangladesh alone could be on the move by 2050 because of climate change causing the worst migration in human history.

“They’ll get displaced as temperatures are rising and desertification has set in where rainfall is needed most. They’ll be on the move since more potent monsoons are making flood-prone areas worse”, said AFM Shahidur Rahman, an environmentalist.

“They’ll desert their homesteads because they’ll find their villages under water due to sea-level rise caused by melting glaciers, and the slow and deadly seepage of saline water into their wells and fields,” he added. (*Daily Star*, December 2, 2009).

Journalists as Visionaries

So far we have described the similarities and differences in approaches to futures in the two countries but have not said much about the specific role journalists have played in shaping these approaches. We now focus on the moments in the coverage of Copenhagen and Durban summits when journalism engaged in imagining futures. In these moments journalism transcended the routine references that usually dominated the coverage. We discuss here the similarities and differences in such activities in the two countries.

The first thing to notice is that editorials were not considered as suitable platforms for imagining futures. In both countries the function of editorials was to discuss the negotiation process and the targets proposed. This resulted in futures being mostly referred to in similar ways as in the core of “summit journalism” described earlier. In the Finnish coverage, comments and columns written by individual journalists were the most important genre for imagining futures while in the Bangladeshi coverage such comments and columns were marginal. The elite paper *Helsingin Sanomat* published 24 comments or columns during the Copenhagen summit and 5 during the Durban summit of which 10 and 5 respectively were oriented towards the future. The summit context clearly facilitated more commentary than climate change in general has.¹³ The role of the correspondents in the *HS* coverage was to reflect the presence of the paper at the potentially world changing summit rather than to tap into the wide array of information and opinion about climate change available at the summit site and in the numerous side-events organized around the summit. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, it was in the comments written by *home desk* journalists that a more critical, distanced discourse emerged – a discourse that proved the most fertile ground for genuinely *imagining* futures. The emission reduction targets of the city of Helsinki (*HS*, December 7, 2009), wind power targets set by the Finnish government (*HS*, December 12, 2009) and the false pride of the Finnish environmental minister at having reached the Kyoto targets of emission reduction (*HS*, December 10, 2009) were all discussed in this genre. In these stories, the target discourse was not just flatly repeated but made thicker by taking into account the possibly conflicting trends, progressions and movements in current social reality. It is notable that when journalists did engage in imagining futures in this manner it was from the perspective of the nation (or the city) but not from the abstract global activist position otherwise dominating the coverage:

In the report a target was set to reach the total output of 2000 megawatts from Finnish wind turbines by the year 2020. If this target is reached, 6 per cent of the demand for electricity will be met with wind power. Currently the share of wind power is 0.3 per cent. [...] One turbine will produce 2-3 megawatts. Thus there is a need for 1,800 megawatts worth of new capacity

which is roughly equal to 600 turbines, to reach the target set. The height of 3 megawatt wind turbine is around 80-100 meters. Structures in these sizes in the scenery are likely to spur emotion. It is thus likely that the building process will be slowed down by popular movements and appeals. After planning permissions, money is needed. [...] [T]o reach the target set by the government investments in the worth of at least two billion euro is needed. [...] At least one conclusion is available. It will take time, money and willpower before the target is reached (*HS*, December 3, 2009, column).

In the Bangladeshi coverage of the Copenhagen and Durban summits only 6 comments or columns by individual journalists were published of which 2 were considered as oriented towards the future, both published in the *Prothom Alo* during the Copenhagen summit. Instead of journalistic commentary, expert writers frequently filled the commenting function. The two papers published 65 expert pieces during the two summits and such articles comprised 22 per cent of the *Daily Star's* Durban coverage. The considerable power of the expert discourse is well reflected in the fact that one expert appeared in the *DS* coverage of the summits as a writer of both opinion pieces and news and also as a source quoted in a news story.¹⁴ The stories written by experts were not included in the research material of this chapter since we were interested in looking at the *journalistic* imagination about the future but arguably the dominant role of expert writers is an implication of a more diffuse and maybe less independent journalistic field in Bangladesh compared to Finland. The consequences such a difference might have to the approaches to futures available in a society are beyond the scope of this study.

The approaches to futures in the two Bangladeshi newspapers were more similar compared to comparable approaches in the Finnish papers. For the popular Finnish paper *Ilta-Sanomat* it was clearly difficult to include international summits and climate change in its news agenda which emphasizes celebrity, entertainment and scandal. In the case of the Copenhagen summit, the general buzz around the summit (e.g. conflicts between demonstrators and the police, celebrity quests) and its geographical proximity helped to increase the coverage but the less appealing Durban summit was only covered in two editorials. Despite the minimal coverage in *IS* the coverage gave at least a hint of a clearly differing approach towards futures. The difference was visible in stories that discussed climate change in general rather than the summit in particular. In such stories in *Helsingin Sanomat* the consequences of climate change were described as uncertain in the context of Finland. In *Ilta-Sanomat* there was a more pronounced attempt to describe futures in terms of concrete events bound to the national context or peculiar but improbable events anywhere.¹⁵

In the Durban coverage of *DS* and *PA*, stories concentrating on the consequences of climate change were sparse, but in the Copenhagen coverage

they were plentiful. The main difference compared to the Finnish elite paper *HS* was that while in *HS* futures were likely to be described as uncertain and involving complicated ecological changes, in the discourse of *DS* and *PA* the future was both much more immediate (consequences of climate change already tangible) and more straight-forward (consequences presented with little reference to uncertainties). In general there was a clear shift in both countries' coverage away from discussing climate change as a phenomenon. This was reflected by a reporter of the Bangladeshi paper *PA* in a research interview¹⁶: "the consequences of climate change are established worldwide so now we need to focus on the activities and actions to be done either at the summit or at local level."

Conclusions: Shared Targets, Differing Approaches

The main difference between the two countries in terms of approaches to futures was not in the futures referred to but in their connection to present day realities. Journalists in both countries took as face value the targets discussed in the negotiations and they were often repeated in the coverage without further elaboration. From this perspective it was the present day targets through which futures were made tangible in the coverage. The similar target discourses were embedded in different kinds of interpretative contexts in the two countries. In the Finnish coverage it was an idea of global activism that prevailed, producing a position of a sympathetic bystander. Finnish journalists did not feel the need to contest the optimistic atmosphere of the summits by questioning the plausibility of the targets put forward in the negotiations, by connecting the targets to the national interests of Finland or by building on populist suspicions or interpretations which – given the decline in public worry over the issue – must be available in some form. The Bangladeshi coverage was deeply embedded in the idea that it was the fate of Bangladesh that was at stake at the negotiations. While the Bangladeshi journalists did not challenge or elaborate on the futures that were raised as targets in the negotiations, they did construct a pronounced nationalistic perspective from which the negotiations were interpreted. The overwhelming focus of the role of the Bangladeshi delegation was at some points ironically commented upon by the journalists¹⁷ but the nationalistic interpretation of the summit was not contested.

We suggest that the differing approaches have differing implications in terms of climate change and public opinion. In Finland, the extensive coverage embedded in an abstract idea of global activism can serve to alienate people who are more inclined to interpret the world from a nationalistic perspective. As members of the general public's worry about climate change has declined, so too has the justification of the global activist narrative that overrides na-

tional interests. On a wider scheme of things, the rise of populist movements throughout Europe and the conflicts highlighted by the economic crisis are also eating away at the plausibility of such narratives. Thus the narrative of global activism is more and more the narrative of small elites and the Finnish “elite paper” *Helsingin Sanomat* did little to re-connect it into the changing social reality. From this perspective it is also notable that the Bali and Copenhagen summits were covered in the “popular paper” *Ilta-Sanomat*, while for Cancún and Durban there was practically no coverage. In Bangladesh, the increasing worry over climate is harnessed to national needs, which serves to create strict distinctions between them (“emitters”, “rich countries”) and us (“climate hit”, “vulnerable”) or even “vulnerable countries” and “most vulnerable countries.” In contrast to Finland, the global activist position was not used by Bangladeshi journalists to reflect the nation’s position. In both countries there was a shift in the coverage of the four summits from describing the phenomenon of climate change towards concentrating on the political dimensions of the issue.

In terms of the distinction between “present futures” and “future presents,” it is clear that the former perspective is more pronounced in the coverage mostly treating emission reduction targets. In both countries’ summit coverage, the targets were rarely elaborated or critically scrutinized. Often the present futures suggested by the emission targets were accompanied by clichéd listings of the potential consequences of climate change functioning as the future presents justifying the targets discussed. These descriptions were not critically reflected which can also be seen as an indication of journalists’ unwillingness to challenge the very basis of the debate. With a more vigorous use of imagination, tapping into different kinds of knowledge, taking into account the possibly conflicting trends, progressions and movements in social reality, journalism could transform the present futures suggested by the policy targets into descriptions of future presents – or at least elaborate the future presents routinely referred to in the coverage. While in the actual summit coverage such activities were rare, in more general stories about climate change (published during the summits) journalists made more of an effort to describe and imagine future presents. In Finland, the genre of journalistic commentary was the most fertile ground for this type of imagining, especially in the elite paper *HS*. There was a general difference in approach between the two Finnish papers: the elite paper *HS* was more inclined to describe the consequences of climate change as uncertain but plausible while the popular paper *IS* made more of an effort to cover either spectacular futures despite their improbability or futures related to tangible things with precise probabilities. The Bangladeshi papers were more uniform in their approach but instead of journalists’ commentary it was expert writers who were important in elaborating futures. The general approach to highlighting futures was more urgent and concentrated on the dire nature of near futures in Bangladesh.

In conclusion it can be noted that in the summit coverage in both countries, what was most discussed was the same futures suggested in the negotiation process. The targets passed from the negotiations to journalism mostly unattached. The difference between the countries was in the general approaches towards international climate politics that the targets were connected to. In terms of communicating climate change it can be noted that climate summits are a case in which journalists working in different contexts tend to re-produce the explicit public policy targets discussed in the summit (and considered as shared) but at the same time journalistic instincts tend to connect the targets to differing narratives. In the case of the Finnish elite paper, and to some extent the popular paper as well, this narrative was one of global worry and global activism exerting pressure on the negotiators to sign a binding deal. In both Bangladeshi papers it was a nationalistic narrative with the fate of Bangladesh being highlighted as a reason for a binding deal and funding for the vulnerable countries. In the Finnish case the narrative of global activism seems to be undermined by recent developments but thus far the nature of the summit coverage has not significantly changed. In Bangladesh it can be argued that the coverage concentrating on national interests and the failure in producing an extensive and binding international accord may serve to create frustration against “them” who are not taking the fate of Bangladesh seriously enough.

Notes

1. In the 1950s Finland was an agricultural country but in the following decades a significant growth of industrial production was experienced. This was reflected in the doubling of energy consumption in the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s. In 2008 heavy industry contributed to 48 per cent of the final energy consumption in Finland, the EU average being 28 per cent (Teräväinen 2010).
2. Data derived from United Nations Millennium development indicators. See <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx> (cited December 12, 2011).
3. According to national surveys commissioned by the Finnish business policy forum (EVA), a policy and pro-market think tank, 86 per cent of the respondents agreed (fully or somewhat) with the statement “climate change is the greatest threat of our time and action to prevent it should be taken immediately in all countries” in the autumn of 2006. The corresponding figure in the autumn of 2004 was 79 per cent, in the winter of 2010 66 per cent and in the winter of 2012 71 per cent (Haavisto 2010, 2012). Similar decline is manifest in national surveys commissioned by the newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* where 82 per cent respondents rated climate change as a “great” or “reasonably great threat” in September 2007 while the corresponding share in September 2010 was 63 per cent (*HS*, September 15, 2010: “Worry over climate has faded”).
4. The environmentally oriented party The Greens of Finland (registered as a party in 1988) has gathered 7-8 per cent of the votes in parliamentary elections in the last decade.
5. Recently Bangladesh has also led the forum of Most Vulnerable Countries (MVC). As a part of it Bangladesh hosted a conference in Dhaka before the Durban summit and conveyed its position to the world leaders.
6. There is a total of 471 total print outlets; 297 of them being daily newspapers. 101 daily newspapers are published from the capital Dhaka (DFP Media list 2011).

7. Both newspapers came into being in the 1990s, which is considered as the decade of print media growth and development in Bangladesh.
8. In the quantitative analysis of the coverage of the Bali, Copenhagen, Cancún and Durban summits all stories were categorized as being either “future oriented” or not. A future oriented story was defined as making any kind of a reference (from vague remarks to explicit dates) to some point in the future exceeding the immediate near future context of the summit itself. In the analysis of the coverage of Copenhagen, Cancún and Durban summits, stories mentioning specific years were also assorted and five first years were mentioned in these stories.
9. All future oriented reporting (such as news and feature stories), editorials and comments written by individual journalists in the coverage of the two summits were selected for this part of the study. Because of an overwhelming coverage of the Copenhagen summit in the two Bangladeshi papers (317 stories) only major (over 3000 characters) future oriented stories from the reporting genres were included.
10. Translations from Finnish and Bangla to English are by the authors.
11. Risto Kunelius, research interview, December 8, 2011, Durban, South-Africa.
12. A crore is a unit in the South Asian numbering system equal to ten million.
13. The number of columns and comments written by individual journalists from Finland, mostly the correspondents sent to the scene of the summit, was substantially higher during the summit periods than is the case typically in the climate change coverage of HS. This observation is based on a yet unpublished study about climate coverage in HS in 2008.
14. This expert was Salemuul Huq, a Bangladeshi scientist based in London. While expert commentary is a common phenomenon in Bangladeshi journalism, news reports are rarely written by experts.
15. The most representative examples of these peculiar futures were published in the coverage of the Bali summit. In the stories the possible “extinction” of “girls” because of warming climates possibly resulting in the rise of the share of male babies being born and the probability of white Christmas were discussed.
16. Mofizur Rhaman, Research interview, December 2011, Durban, South Africa.
17. For example, *DS*, December 20, 2012: “Moreover, the name of Bangladesh was pronounced several times in the Copenhagen summit as one of the most vulnerable countries what many members of the Bangladesh delegation think a big achievement. Many of the delegates were seen counting how many times the speakers named Bangladesh as one of the most vulnerable countries”.

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Part II

Professional Issues

Chapter 7

An Editorial that Shook the World ...

Global Solidarity vs. Editorial Autonomy

Elisabeth Eide

Newspapers have never done anything like this before – but they have never had to cover a story like this before.

Alan Rusbridger, editor-in-chief, *The Guardian*, 2009

Global risks reflect a new form of global interdependence to which national politics or the established forms of international cooperation do not do adequate justice.

Ulrich Beck, 2007

Climate change challenges the world media in new ways, both by being global and by being a phenomenon that is or will not be felt in the same way simultaneously in the different corners of the world. At the same time, common decisions are urgent. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has underlined the need for global measures to prevent the overall situation from deteriorating. It is in this light that we may look at a particular press initiative which occurred during the COP15 in 2009, the climate summit which so far has gathered most media attention.

On 6 December, 2009, the British newspaper *The Guardian* posted an editorial on their website titled “Fourteen days to seal history’s judgment on this generation.” The following day, the same editorial filled the entire front page of their print version. The COP15 negotiations were underway in Copenhagen, and the expectations had been high. The editorial opened with the following words:

Today 56 newspapers in 45 countries take the unprecedented step of speaking with one voice through a common editorial. We do so because humanity faces a profound emergency. Unless we combine to take decisive action, climate change will ravage our planet, and with it our prosperity and security. The dangers have been becoming apparent for a generation. Now the facts have started to speak: 11 of the past 14 years have been the warmest on record, the Arctic ice-cap is melting and last year’s inflated oil and food prices provide

a foretaste of future havoc. In scientific journals the question is no longer whether humans are to blame, but how little time we have got left to limit the damage. Yet so far the world's response has been feeble and half-hearted.¹

The fact that newspapers from all continents except Australia and Oceania (in 20 different languages) printed the same editorial, many with large or small references on their front pages, suggested an editorial action aimed at underlining global solidarity and alertness. The coordinated publication is, according to the publishers, unprecedented in newspaper history.²

This chapter aims at mapping the history behind and the dilemmas associated with this special editorial as well as the debate it created. It discusses this initiative in the light of the press ideals of independence and the editorial as journalistic genre.



Logo of the 'global editorial'.

Since newspapers or editors climbed on board this initiative with such alacrity, this action led to many questions being raised about the editorial independence of the individual participating newspapers. Similarly, by their joint action, these newspapers endorsed a media campaign of sorts. In a global context, these are new and fascinating issues, and the *Guardian* initiative can well be studied in order to illuminate some key questions of global journalism. This chapter is an attempt to open up two questions:

- The initiative: activism vs. autonomy? How did the initiative come about, and which eventual discussions on editorial autonomy vs. global action did take place in the editorial room – and between editors – beforehand?

- What kind of reader responses followed the initiative on *The Guardian's* website, and which discourses may be identified in the editorial text and the debate that followed on *The Guardian's* home page?

The methodology selected for answering these questions is a close reading, inspired by critical discourse analysis of *The Guardian's* own text (Fairclough 1995, 2003) combined with an interview with the writer-initiator Ian Katz who was a member of the group of editors at *The Guardian*. Further discourses were identified by an in-depth study of the text that explained the initiative and its responses on the web page of the initiator newspaper.

Alarmism?

Current trends in risk communication research suggest that climate change is represented in a variety of ways between alarmism and various strands of optimism, not least “techno-optimism.” Hulme has suggested that the media coverage of the IPCC’s 2007 report (Working Groups 1 and 2) adopted an “overwhelmingly alarmist repertoire.” He also warns that that “‘alarmist’ discourses seeking changes in public behavior have been shown often to be counterproductive (Hulme 2009a: 126-127). Elsewhere he suggests that one of the “reasons that we disagree on climate change is that we receive multiple and conflicting messages about climate change and we interpret them in different ways” (Hulme 2009b: 215). Research on audience responses to the climate catastrophe film *The Day After Tomorrow* shows that respondents had ambiguous responses to what they saw, but that their attitudes, in the short term, changed and that they also became more aware of other environmental risks (Hulme 2009b: 213).

The alarmist position demands a level of certainty, while science always implies a degree of uncertainty when it comes to what can be said about the future. However, as sociologist Beck also says, this does not mean “that risk annuls all forms of knowledge. Rather it amalgamates knowledge with non-knowing within the semantic horizon of probability” (Beck 2009: 5). Problems may arise since the journalistic doxa³ promotes certainties and extremes more than Beck’s “inability-to-know” (2009: 53). What is particular about climate change as other global risks, is its “delocalization”, causes and consequences not being limited to one location, “they are in principle omnipresent” (2009: 52).

But can we conclude that *The Guardian* and other newspapers that answered their call, resorted to alarmism, and did they ignore the principle of editorial autonomy in their two-thronged attempt at global press unity and political change? During the recent decades, the traditionally established political affiliations of the press have declined with the development away from “party

presses,” while economic interests and the drive towards more commercially-driven and individual-oriented newspapers has gained ground (Hallin 2005: 228). There is, however, as Hallin sees it, no “unilinear move toward greater differentiation; there are important processes of de-differentiation at work simultaneously” (op.cit. 230). Furthermore, as Champagne reasons, the “history of journalism could well be in large part the story of an impossible autonomy – or, to put it in the least pessimistic way, the unending story of an autonomy that must always be re-won because it is always threatened” (Champagne 2005: 50). Schudson warns against what may be seen as a collective “news judgment” and writes that the “corruption of conformity to a climate of opinion in a group can be serious and damaging in its own right.” Furthermore, he cites Kuhn who “shows that conformity to a reigning scientific framework continues even in the face of a growing array of puzzles that cannot be understood within it” (Schudson 2005: 219).

The latter reasoning on journalism may not apply so well to *The Guardian*’s belief in anthropogenic global warming in general. The development of the IPCC position has been from “likely” to “most likely” on this vital issue, and many journalists have endorsed this view from a wide array of scientists (Eide et.al. 2010, Painter 2011). It is perhaps more right to say (e.g. with Hulme) that journalism does not capture the nuances and uncertainties within the (relative) certainty of climate science – and thus the temptations of alarmism occur. On the other hand, as Schudson argues, there are arguments for journalism being “dependent to a degree – a degree difficult to define – on the market. The market here is an imperfect proxy for the general public” (Schudson 2005: 221). If what Schudson aims at here is media accountability – and indeed also responsibility for not only the living, but also future generations vulnerable to a global problem – and scrutiny of political leadership, this may apply well to *The Guardian* initiative. Journalistic autonomy need not be posed as an alternative to journalistic solidarity in situations when both journalists and the world’s population are faced with a global challenge and require both news and knowledge. In such conditions, stressing the threat that such an action may pose to the *individual* autonomy of one particular newspaper can be inappropriate. Often on global issues there are forces at work that transcend all kinds of borders; even politicians can transcend their local interests and organize transnational (media) events to try and cope with perceived crises.

In addition, it seems appropriate to distinguish between “alarmist hype” and “alarming” as Risby (2007) does. After assessing a series of criteria, he concludes that many of the terms associated with “alarming” are appropriate and in compliance with the science.

The climate discourse is changing to reflect more grave assessments of the problem in recent years. Some climatologists think that shift is concordant

with science community understanding of the nature of the problem ('alarming'), and some think that the shift is rhetorical and inconsistent with the science ('alarmist'). [...] That is, the view of the discourse as 'alarming' is not inconsistent with the science. Nevertheless, a divide exists, and that divide is reflected in part within the community of climatologists (Risby 2007: 34-35).

In general, mainstream news coverage of climate change does not share the purpose of changing people's or politicians' opinions and practices, or changing the world. Journalism's ideals are complex, ambiguous and conflicting – giving fair and balanced coverage of events and processes, while also taking up the role of the critical Fourth Estate; as such, they are also challenged to be the voice of the powerless and voiceless. Thus, also within news coverage there is space for taking a stand in favor of some issues and implicitly being against others, while still not usually promoting and agitating for action.

Editorial as Genre

Opinionated genres may, however, have more clear aims: conveying a message to the public and to decision makers. This was certainly the case of *The Guardian* initiative. One may also see the (joint) editorial as a statement of 'post-disagreement,' in the sense that the IPCC's latest reports provide further evidence of anthropogenic climate change⁴, and thus do away with at least a proportion of disagreement over the causes of climate change.

The editorial as genre – a "nameless force" (Nordenson 2008: 43) "may be characterized both as a special type of media discourse, as well as belonging to the large class of opinion discourses" (van Dijk 1996: 14). According to Nordenson, editorials have been less subject to research than news and other journalistic genres (Nordenson 2008: 43). An exception is Lars Nord's work (2001, see below). Van Dijk, , distinguishes between knowledge and opinions; the former being "true, justified beliefs" that "satisfy socioculturally variable but shared truth criteria or verification instances" (Van Dijk 1996: 5), i.e. they may be seen as true or false; while the latter does not satisfy these criteria, and are more evaluative beliefs linked to norms and values; good or bad (ibid.: 6).

Editorials may still – 15 years after van Dijk wrote about the genre – be considered as "mass communicated opinion discourse par excellence" (ibid.:19), but the media landscape has been diversified to the extent that they (as communicative texts) have to compete much more heavily for attention. But as for their appeal to the elites of nations, their impact may have changed less. Van Dijk assumes that "members of parliament or Congress, cabinet ministers, corporate managers, and other leaders follow the opinion of the most respected newspapers" (ibid.: 19). Nord's findings conclude that editorial writers find it

of utmost importance to be consequential, adhere to the newspaper's general profile in their editorials (Nord 2001, Nordenson 2008). One may easily conclude that *The Guardian*, seen as a left-leaning liberal newspaper with a special profile when it comes to environment does precisely that. Unlike many newspapers it has a special environment section, which is rich in content and seems to be a main priority⁵. Thus, the initiative to publish a joint editorial may be seen as being in line with their general profile.

Other than that, editorials in general are expected to express the viewpoints of a collective *we*, i.e. the opinion of the newspaper, and are otherwise subject to "contextual constraints," for instance, whether the mother paper is elite or popular matters. According to van Dijk they usually follow these "schematic categories":

1. Summary of the event (factual, what happened).
2. Evaluation of the event – especially of actions and actors. (good – bad, social actors' rights or wrongs).
3. Pragmatic conclusion (recommendation, advice, warning).

Below we shall see whether the special "global editorial" adheres to this script and to other relevant criteria – and also list the discourses identified in the text.

The Text Itself

From the very outset the editorial states that the Copenhagen conference (the event) will be decisive for the future of the world. The headline in *The Guardian* thus reads: "Fourteen days to seal history's judgment on this generation", and the whole text is placed on the newspaper's front page, unlike its placement in most of the other newspapers who took on the initiative (the Norwegian *Dagbladet*, Danish *Politiken* and Canadian *Toronto Star* are among the exceptions), and thus underlining its prominence. Many newspapers also selected their own headlines, but otherwise stuck to the text, although it may have been abbreviated in certain cases. Some newspapers made the editorial prominent by creating their own context, as with *Politiken*, where, on the front page they interviewed a group of people present at the COP15 about their views on climate change and how they personally were affected by it.

One way in which this global editorial deviates somewhat from van Dijk's schema is that the text treats an event (i.e. the COP15) that has not yet been concluded and that the newspaper wants to encourage a long hoped-for agreement between global leaders set to meet at the final days of the Copenhagen conference. On the other hand, in the first paragraphs it mentions a series of events and processes leading up to the needed agreement, all having to do with the deterioration of the global climate.

The (more complex) structure of the editorial may be seen as this:

1. Descriptive of the past and future – and a world response that needs to improve due to convincing scientific consensus (paragraphs 1 -3)
2. Blame (of the US), discussion of relations between rich – poor countries (4-8)
3. What needs to be done by national leaders: individuals and collective ‘salvation’ (9-14)
4. The spirit of (and rationale behind) this special editorial: and the global leaders’ historic chance (1-3, 15-16)

The editorial ends with this short paragraph:

The politicians in Copenhagen have the power to shape history’s judgment on this generation: one that saw the challenge and rose to it, or one so stupid that we saw calamity coming but did nothing to avert it. We implore them to make the right choice.

When it comes to the relations between *knowledge* and *opinion* as posited by van Dijk, this editorial shuttles between the two. Temperature increase and melting ice caps are mentioned, as are rising oil and food prices, although the facts are clad in affective language: “last year’s inflamed oil and food prices.”

At one point the editorial refers to another global crisis – supposedly one of the few that was easy also for other editors to adhere to: “The transformation will be costly, but many times less than the bill for bailing out global finance – and far less costly than the consequences of doing nothing.” This paragraph may also serve as an example of the problems in distinguishing between knowledge and opinion, since mitigation and adaptation costs in the future is impossible to imagine in any exact manner.

The Global Editorial as Discourse

As a globally oriented initiative, the editorial can be viewed as structured by one overarching discourse, which takes the form of a call to the global political leaders to prevent the planet’s climate from deteriorating further. Briefly, it is a *from knowledge to action*-discourse, or put even more succinctly: *Act now*. Under the umbrella of this unison call, the editorial text conveys five partly separate discourses:

The *discourse of fear and gloom/future is bleak*, demonstrated by the selection of words to describe what the future generations will have to live with if no decisive action is taken in Copenhagen. Climate change will “ravage our planet, and with it our prosperity and security.” The melting Arctic ice cap is

mentioned as one ingredient leading to “future havoc.” We have “little time” left to “limit the damage.” Continents will be parched, half “of all species could become extinct, untold millions of people would be displaced, whole nations drowned by the sea.” These are dramatic statements, an interpretation of scientific conclusions. They concentrate the severe consequences of climate change in few words in order to underline the urgency of the message to political leadership around the world, a theme that is strongly linked to the next discourse.

The *trust in science/facts*. The first and third paragraphs state clearly that the “science is complex, but the facts are clear” and refers to “scientific journals” where “the question is no longer whether humans are to blame, but how little time we have got left to limit the damage.” Furthermore it explains what is required for the world to reach the two degree target. The editorial also takes a stand after the “controversy of emails” at East Anglia University, admitting that it has “muddied the waters but failed to dent the mass of evidence on which these predictions are based.” “Muddied” suggests that the general public can no longer see clearly, but the editorial fit to guide people to clarity. This is supposedly an acknowledgement of how the leaks from East Anglia were subject to heated debate in the media, where not least climate “skeptics” or “deniers” took an active role. We can suggest, along with Hulme, that from the two first discourses the editorial corresponds with the “science–policy model [...] founded on a classical view of discoverable and objective scientific ‘facts’ which are socially and politically neutral and the belief that all the relevant facts can be revealed by science” (Hulme 2009: 103). Both findings by *MediaClimate* (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010) and by Painter (2010) suggest that scientists were not covered in much detail at COP15 (see also Duarte and Yagodin in this volume). Several reasons for this are suggested by Painter: the overwhelming concentration on the political negotiations; many media professionals were not science journalists; poor information strategies were employed by the science itself, and the general tendencies in journalism to concentrate on episodic frames and travelling in pack formation (Painter 2010: 64–66).

The *discourse of blame/blaming the rich*. Previous research (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010) suggests that during the media coverage of the Bali summit (COP13) a larger portion of the blame was directed at the US (by then still the main polluter) and the developed/rich world. At COP15 in Copenhagen the blame shifted, and an increasing emphasis was now placed on the so-called emerging nations, China and India. But the editorial – printed before the final negotiations at COP15 took place – blames the US, for “years of [...] obstructionism.” Furthermore, “Rich nations like to point to the arithmetic truth that there can be no solution until developing giants such as China take more radical steps than they have so far. But the rich world is responsible for most of the accumulated carbon in the atmosphere.” The editorial also urges the rich world

to “take a lead” by committing to “deep cuts.” Linked with this discourse is also the editorial’s acceptance of an assessment of “exported emissions;” in other words, to let burdens be shared between exporters and consumers.

The discourse of *individual morality* / *‘we can make an impact’*. The editorial explains that it is far more costly – supposedly for everyone – to accept transformation of society than to “do nothing”. “Many of us, particularly in the developed world, will have to change our lifestyles,” the text reads, highlighting cheap airfares as an example of what has to go in our adaption to new rigors. This discourse was found in the coverage of several countries of COP 15, too (see for example Roosvall 2010).

The *discourse of hope*. The editorial places some hope in the fact that with regard to the US and China: “the recent commitments to emissions targets by the world’s biggest polluters, the United States and China, were important steps in the right direction.” Thus some hope remains with the global leaders who took center stage at COP15. The discourse of hope is also represented in the language of ‘techno-optimism’ in the sense that the text envisages a “prospect of more opportunity than sacrifice,” and with “a feat of engineering and innovation to match anything in our history.” The editorial resorts to almost biblical terms when, near the conclusion it says that “the coming carbon race must be driven by a collaborative effort to achieve collective salvation.” And it is no less religious in the next paragraph which cites Abraham Lincoln, who called for the triumph of “the better angels of our nature.” Thus hope is given voice and placed with the main political stakeholders of the COP15.

As Fairclough reiterates, the “order of discourse of a social institution or social domain is constituted by all the discursive types which are used there” (Fairclough 1995: 55). In the context of climate politics, the summit can be seen as a momentary “social domain” to which this editorial is addressed, as an appeal to the powerful to secure the future for the (not yet born or marginalized) powerless. By this appeal the joint editorial both opposes the powerful by critiquing (some of) them for their negligence of the risks caused by climate change and urging them to do more to save the planet – *and* affirms their powerful position by placing trust in their ability to change the course of world events.

Furthermore, the character of the “mother newspaper” needs to be taken into account. *The Guardian* may be said to be a critical left-leaning newspaper in opposition to the New Labour view where economic change “is presented as a process without social agents – as something which is just happening rather than something that people or companies or governments are doing” (Fairclough 2003: 127). The initiative most likely could not have stemmed from other main newspapers in the UK. Furthermore, *The Guardian* has prioritized the environment as one of its main areas of coverage, as seen above all from its website where it regularly takes those global leaders to task who do not

take global warming seriously, but where there is a good space for debate. It is also a globally read newspaper, not least through its web page and its special weekly issue (*Guardian Weekly*).

Field Autonomy?

The editorial ends on a positive note, underlining 56 editors' global importance (or media importance in general) with the statement that "if we, with such different national and political perspectives, can agree on what must be done then surely our leaders can too." If anything, this editorial may be seen as an attempt at transcendence on two levels: both transcending the traditionally *national realm of journalism* – and next, as aiming to have a strong impact on the *global political field* and decisions made there. Seen in the light of the journalistic field – a field associated with rather weak autonomy – and prone to influences and pressures particularly from the business field, the editorial may represent a complex relation to autonomy: (i) an attempt at autonomous action in the face of both economic and political power and (ii) compromising individual media autonomy for a 'greater good' in unison with others, i.e. the battle against the risks/threats of climate change.

Bourdieu writes that "scientists are also obliged to enter into competition for the notoriety that only the media can give" (2005: 41). Here we find a text granting confidence to one of the hitherto largest world groupings of natural and other scientists, and thus (iii) the newspaper is highly inspired by the field and the findings of the sciences as it wants their globally compiled results to be communicated forcefully to the field of global politics, accompanied by an interpretative mediated warning. It is, as we shall see below, when it comes to editorial autonomy, that the editorial harvests the most vocal criticism, for engaging in politics, instead of sticking to the purity of "objective journalism" (which is, by the way, not a criterion for opinionated genres). On the other hand, the newspaper is also subject to criticism for lacking editorial and ethical purity, substantiated by the fact that *The Guardian* features ads from prominent oil companies.

The Story Behind

Newspapers seldom explicitly explain why they cover what they cover and how they do it. The exceptional nature of this global editorial was thus underlined by the fact that not only did *The Guardian* initiate the text, but is also defended this action in a pre-emptive way. *The Guardian's* own rationale is presented in a story called "Article history" on their website. Initiator Ian Katz here explains in detail how they came to print the story:

How can it make sense to find a story about the disappearance of arctic sea ice on page 17 of a newspaper, sandwiched between an unexceptional murder trial and the latest bickering over MPs' expenses? Or even on the front page, when the same slot the previous day was occupied by a story about plans to trim civil service jobs?

At the Guardian, we have tried to answer the challenge by covering the story in ever greater depth, devoting more space and resources – six specialist reporters – as well as a dedicated environment website.⁶

The initiator(s) voice their frustration about what may be seen as the journalistic routines (or doxa), where the essentials of the future are encroached upon by more trivial news; while simultaneously the ethos of the newspaper itself is raised by highlighting the efforts (and human 'risks') put into covering climate change.

The article furthermore explains how the initiative first came about through "an early, enthusiastic conversation with the editor of one of India's biggest dailies," and what followed was similar conversations with Chinese editors; after these discussions *The Guardian* editor realized that if he could get influential media leaders from these giants on board, the effort was worthwhile. Katz quotes Editor-in-chief Alan Rusbridger's statement: "Newspapers have never done anything like this before – but they have never had to cover a story like this before." The difficulties and challenges of the endeavour are admitted, thus also the problem of editorial independence: "Given that newspapers are inherently rivalrous, proud and disputatious, viewing the world through very different national and political prisms, the prospect of getting a sizeable cross-section of them to sign up to a single text on such a momentous and divisive issue seemed like a long shot." The arguments supporting the initiative rely on the uniqueness of the story (of climate change) and the forthcoming COP15. Thus pride can be sacrificed.

After meetings with the editor of *The Hindu* (India) and *The Economic Observer* (China), *The Guardian's* editorial conclusion was that "If we could reach a common position with papers from the two developing world giants most commonly identified as obstacles to a global deal, then surely we could crack the rest."

When interviewed,⁷ Ian Katz confirmed that the editorial initiative is unique, as a joint initiative of the sorts has not even happened in the UK. Within the newspaper staff it did not meet with any opposition. Around one hundred newspapers were approached, and initially several other UK papers agreed. But in the end they did not join the initiative, as Katz suggested, "due to the competitive, tribal character of our press system." He agrees that it could also be due to the "Climategate" leaks. In *The Guardian* version of the editorial the Climate Research Unit at East Anglia University leaks were mentioned, but this

paragraph was not necessarily published everywhere. “I think the East Anglia story broke after the international agreement on the text, thus the text was re-circulated with the added part, but people could treat it optionally.”

In hindsight Katz was ambiguous of the effect of the editorial. He had supportive messages for competitive papers, and heard (he was not present) that it created “quite a buzz” in Copenhagen. The positive reactions, according to Katz, came both from media, NGOs and from politicians, for example Ed Miliband, the then UK minister for climate issues, and his delegation.

–Did it contribute to an unfounded optimism at Copenhagen?

–That is a reasonable critical question. It may have contributed to a naïve optimism, slightly divorced from economic and political realities underlying the performance of the delegations. After Copenhagen the green movement seems to have entered a state of depression; deluded optimism. I guess we were just a bit politically naïve.

[...]

–But a related question in hindsight is whether the joint editorial did more harm than good. Did it perpetuate a sense among sceptics that we were bullying by creating a global conspiracy? [...] Copenhagen came apart, overwhelmingly, and the leader got forgotten quite quickly.

The hindsight seems to be triggered by the fact that COP15 turned out to be a grand disappointment to all those who hoped for a substantial agreement. Thus, the part of the editorial text stating that when editors can agree, so should global leaders, may have – as Katz also admitted – signalled an over-optimistic view on how the media field can influence the political field in vital issues.

When it comes to editorial autonomy, Katz defends the collective effort. To *The Guardian* editor, on this question:

[...] editorial autonomy is not an issue on which sane people disagree. We published a set of views where there has been no really substantial divergence. Of course there is a kind of sacrifice – but it is small, has to do with some compromises – but they were not of any great importance. [...] At that moment most people were engaged to find a place to form a common position. We could imagine maybe greater difficulty if we were to do the same with international trade or freedom on the Internet (ibid.).

In this latter statement Katz refers to the publishing of scientific consensus, and his argument is supported by common-sensical argumentation (“sane people”). His minimization of the sacrifice involved – which had to do with how to edit the text to fit the preferences of important editorial actors on four continents – does confirm a thinking process where there are “greater goods” than the insistence on editorial sovereignty.

The Net Response

The text was published in 20 languages, including global ones (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish). On *The Guardian's* website, the editorial came under debate; the editorial itself harvested 1,072 comments – more than usual for an article of this nature – while the article *explaining the initiative* had 103 comments posted before the discussions were both closed by the moderator about 60 hours after publication.

An analysis of the first 100 postings to the editorial itself reveals the following results:

1. Totally 40 items – i.e. 40 per cent – were removed “by a moderator because it didn’t abide by our community standards.” This may signal much rough language, and possibly by people who were not very supportive of the initiative, although the latter is hard to know.

2. Among the remaining 60, 34 were supportive of the initiative and/or of the science that presents the current climate changes as anthropogenic, albeit many with very pessimistic views on *The Guardian* initiative’s ability to change anything.

3. Only seven entries can be said to be outright negative to the initiative and the science about climate change, and only two refer more or less explicitly to the “Climategate” affair. 16 of the items are ambivalent, and some seem to want more information and are questioning both the initiative and the IPCC science, while five of the items are irrelevant, in the sense that they treat others, remotely related issues.

Roughly speaking, the (meta) debate linked to the article explaining the initiative, had some of the same patterns, also with a large portion of items removed due to web policy. The debate is somewhat different from the other one, as the participants dwell more with the media event – i.e. *The Guardian* endeavor. Thirty-eight entries are mainly positive towards *The Guardian* initiative. One also mentions “Climategate:”

I say it’s a great move a[sic]⁸ critical time. The nutters on the blogosphere can give an impression that “Climategate” has changed something. I very much doubt that’s true, it’s a few people flinging their hubris about in a loud way. [...] No matter what happens at Copenhagen, this is an important step. Congratulations. (SpangleJ, December 7)

About 20 online comments voice criticism, often on the grounds that the participating newspapers sacrifice their editorial independence and thus journalistic ideals of autonomy. As one participant puts it:

So here we have a group of newspapers who have decided that instead of merely reporting the news, they will attempt to blatantly manufacture it. And you think this is a *good* idea? The self destruction of mainstream journalism all makes perfect sense now. (recyclenot, December 7)

It seems that at times the “editorial freedom” discourse is linked up with a general critique of *The Guardian*’s assessment of climate change:

I am appalled that the guardian has handed over its editorial independence in order to further a global scam. The whole purpose of a free press is to provide varied and contradictory opinions, to publish data others might not, to search for truths and lies with equal tenacity. Shame on you and your editorial team for handing over your hard won freedom. (...) (diskotroop, December 7).

This critique has several aspects, some of the above arguments pointing in the direction of the scientific ideals of journalists. Another aspect was clear already in the initial text explaining the initiative, where the exception (to all the positive editors around the world) was quoted, in the shape of a “US paper response: ‘This is an outrageous attempt to orchestrate media pressure. Go to hell.’” The focus in the above excerpt is more on how the initiative plans to influence the political field than the mere conglomeration (autonomy-weakening) efforts of *The Guardian*.

Other contributors raise questions (to find out more, in particular about which papers did or did not join and for what reasons); entries critical to the US (papers) for largely not joining the initiative, except for the *Miami Herald*. In other words, a continuation of the ‘blame the US’ discourse may be identified here, and simultaneously this part of the debate may be seen as an example of how discourses in Internet debates, more often than in traditional media, may drift away from the original topic. In addition some voices are concerned about how the initiator paper can allow oil company ads (of allow printing on paper at all, since this is a non-eco-friendly act); raising the debate on double standards, or “the live as you preach” discourse:

Cool. Well done. Now since climate change is an issue of such prime importance, maybe it’s time you stopped taking adverts from oil companies and SUV manufacturers. Y’know, act like you actually mean it. (thesheikofalamut, December 6).

The Guardian editor Ian Katz responds on three occasions, each time, lumping together several questions and comments, and one of his colleagues enters the discussion once. The discussion provides few hyperlinks. In this instance only nine comments were removed by the moderator. This may partly be explained by the meta-discussion being adhered to by a narrower audience more positively inclined towards the newspaper.

Conclusion: How to Be Global?

The Guardian did not repeat its global experiment during the Cancún or Durban conferences, neither did any other newspaper. However, it continued to be actively covering the COPs, not least by dedicated bloggers, and the debates continue, increasingly on many platforms, as is described by Hulme in the following:

Different climate change discourses use different linguistic repertoires, often related to the specific goals of the discourse coalition involved. [...] At the same time, trends in new media practices, most notably through digital and Internet technologies, are opening the way for even greater fragmentation, liberalisation and democratisation of social discourses about a whole range of public policy issues (Hulme 2009: 245).

This diversity may be a source of optimism when it comes to empowerment and increased access to debate for more citizens, but it is not likely that such a media environment will “promote or enable greater agreement about climate change” (ibid.).

The editorial as it occurred constitutes a part of the struggle in the field of climate politics: a field being simultaneously global and national. What makes this initiative and text special is by demonstrating how a text originating in one more or less national context may, through the transnational field of journalism, become more global and through this “global-ness” it may in turn be part of a diversity of national contexts and discursive domains.

Furthermore the initiative may be seen as a way of coming to terms with the new media environment, which is both global and technically more diversified, by proactively gathering and engaging actors on a global scale, and operating both via the Internet and print versions of newspapers. Technically that is easy. Ideationally, though, such efforts risk both being labelled as “alarmist” and/or on one hand taking for granted the greater importance and impact of the endeavour while on the other, underestimating the counter-forces at work in the struggle for the future of the planet.

Notes

1. The editorial text is in appendix one, while a list of newspapers that published the editorial can be found in Appendix 2.
2. Here is *The Guardian*'s own explanation of the Australian decline : “Another Kyoto holdout is also unrepresented: both the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Melbourne Age* dropped out of the project after climate change convulsed Australian politics, demanding, they felt, a more localised editorial position.”
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/gallery/2009/dec/07/copenhagen-climate-change-newspapers>

3. Doxa is here seen as a universe of tacit presuppositions that organize actions within a field. As Bourdieu puts it, doxa implies "A system of presuppositions inherent in membership in a field" (2005: 37).
4. "Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is *very likely* due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations" (IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: *Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Avery, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf> Accessed March 24 2011.
5. See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment>.
6. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/gallery/2009/dec/07/copenhagen-climate-change-newspapers>; accessed Nov. 11, 2010.
7. Ian Katz was interviewed by this author by telephone March 31, 2010.
8. When words are missing or misspellings occur, these are maintained in this chapter.

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Appendix 1. The Editorial (From the launch)

This editorial will be published tomorrow by 56 newspapers around the world in 20 languages including Chinese, Arabic and Russian. The text was drafted by a Guardian team during more than a month of consultations with editors from more than 20 of the papers involved. Like the Guardian most of the newspapers have taken the unusual step of featuring the editorial on their front page.

Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 'Fourteen Days to Seal History's Judgment on this Generation'

Today 56 newspapers in 45 countries take the unprecedented step of speaking with one voice through a common editorial. We do so because humanity faces a profound emergency.

Unless we combine to take decisive action, climate change will ravage our planet, and with it our prosperity and security. The dangers have been becoming apparent for a generation. Now the facts have started to speak: 11 of the past 14 years have been the warmest on record, the Arctic ice-cap is melting and last year's inflated oil and food prices provide a foretaste of future havoc. In scientific journals the question is no longer whether humans are to blame, but how little time we have got left to limit the damage. Yet so far the world's response has been feeble and half-hearted.

Climate change has been caused over centuries, has consequences that will endure for all time and our prospects of taming it will be determined in the next 14 days. We call on the representatives of the 192 countries gathered in Copenhagen not to hesitate, not to fall into dispute, not to blame each other but to seize opportunity from the greatest modern failure of politics. This should not be a fight between the rich world and the poor world, or between east and west. Climate change affects everyone, and must be solved by everyone.

The science is complex but the facts are clear. The world needs to take steps to limit temperature rises to 2C, an aim that will require global emissions to peak and begin falling within the next 5-10 years. A bigger rise of 3-4C – the smallest increase we can prudently expect to follow inaction – would parch continents, turning farmland into desert. Half of all species could become extinct, untold millions of people would be displaced, whole nations drowned by the sea. The controversy over emails by British researchers that suggest they tried to suppress inconvenient data has muddied the waters but failed to dent the mass of evidence on which these predictions are based.

Few believe that Copenhagen can any longer produce a fully polished treaty; real progress towards one could only begin with the arrival of President Obama in the White House and the reversal of years of US obstructionism. Even now the world finds itself at the mercy of American domestic politics, for the president cannot fully commit to the action required until the US Congress has done so.

But the politicians in Copenhagen can and must agree the essential elements of a fair and effective deal and, crucially, a firm timetable for turning it into a treaty. Next June's UN climate meeting in Bonn should be their deadline. As one negotiator put it: "We can go into extra time but we can't afford a replay."

At the deal's heart must be a settlement between the rich world and the developing world covering how the burden of fighting climate change will be divided – and how we will share a newly precious resource: the trillion or so tonnes of carbon that we can emit before the mercury rises to dangerous levels.

Rich nations like to point to the arithmetic truth that there can be no solution until developing giants such as China take more radical steps than they have so far. But the rich world is responsible for most of the accumulated carbon in the atmosphere – three-quarters of all carbon dioxide emitted since 1850. It must now take a lead, and every developed country must commit to deep cuts which will reduce their emissions within a decade to very substantially less than their 1990 level.

Developing countries can point out they did not cause the bulk of the problem, and also that the poorest regions of the world will be hardest hit. But they will increasingly contribute to warming, and must thus pledge meaningful and quantifiable action of their own. Though both fell short of what some had hoped for, the recent commitments to emissions targets by the world's biggest polluters, the United States and China, were important steps in the right direction.

Social justice demands that the industrialised world digs deep into its pockets and pledges cash to help poorer countries adapt to climate change, and clean technologies to enable them to grow economically without growing their emissions. The architecture of a future treaty must also be pinned down – with rigorous multilateral monitoring, fair rewards for protecting forests, and the credible assessment of "exported emissions" so that the burden can eventually be more equitably shared between those who produce polluting products and those who consume them. And fairness requires that the burden placed on individual developed countries should take into account their ability to bear it; for instance newer EU members, often much poorer than "old Europe", must not suffer more than their richer partners.

The transformation will be costly, but many times less than the bill for bailing out global finance – and far less costly than the consequences of doing nothing.

Many of us, particularly in the developed world, will have to change our lifestyles. The era of flights that cost less than the taxi ride to the airport is drawing to a close. We will have to shop, eat and travel more intelligently. We will have to pay more for our energy, and use less of it.

But the shift to a low-carbon society holds out the prospect of more opportunity than sacrifice. Already some countries have recognized that embracing the transformation can bring growth, jobs and better quality lives. The flow of capital tells its own story: last year for the first time more was invested in renewable forms of energy than producing electricity from fossil fuels.

Kicking our carbon habit within a few short decades will require a feat of engineering and innovation to match anything in our history. But whereas putting a man on the moon or splitting the atom were born of conflict and competition, the coming carbon race must be driven by a collaborative effort to achieve collective salvation.

Overcoming climate change will take a triumph of optimism over pessimism, of vision over short-sightedness, of what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature".

It is in that spirit that 56 newspapers from around the world have united behind this editorial. If we, with such different national and political perspectives, can agree on what must be done then surely our leaders can too.

The politicians in Copenhagen have the power to shape history's judgment on this generation: one that saw a challenge and rose to it, or one so stupid that we saw calamity coming but did nothing to avert it. We implore them to make the right choice.

Appendix 2. Newspapers where the Editorial Occurred

Asia: *Economic Observer*, China; Chinese; *Southern Metropolitan*, China; Chinese *CommonWealth Magazine*, Taiwan; *Joongang Ilbo*, South Korea; *Tuoi tre*, Vietnam; *Brunei Times*, Brunei; *Jakarta Globe*, Indonesia; *Cambodia Daily*, Cambodia; *The Hindu*, India; *The Daily Star*, Bangladesh; *The News*, Pakistan; *Daily Times*, Pakistan; *Gulf News*, Dubai; *An Nabar*, Lebanon; *Gulf Times*, Qatar; *Maariv*, Israel; *Der Standard*, Austria, German. Europe: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Germany; *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Poland; *Delo*, Slovenia; *Vecer*, Slovenia; *Dagbladet Information*, Denmark; *Politiken*, Denmark; *Dagbladet*, Norway; *The Guardian*, UK; *Le Monde*, France; *Libération*, France; *La Repubblica*, Italy; *El Pais*, Spain; *De Volkskrant*, Netherlands; *Kathimerini*, Greece; *Publico*, Portugal; *Hurriyet*, Turkey; *Novaya Gazeta*, Russia; *Irish Times*, Ireland; *Le Temps*, Switzerland; Africa: *The Star*, Kenya; *Daily Monitor*, Uganda; *The New Vision*, Uganda English; Zimbabwe Independent, Zimbabwe; *The New Times*, Rwanda; *The Citizen*, Tanzania; *Al Shorouk*, Egypt; *Botswana Guardian*, Botswana; *Mail & Guardian*, South Africa; *Business Day*, South Africa; *Cape Argus*, South Africa; North and Central America: *Toronto Star*, Canada; *Miami Herald*, USA; *El Nuevo Herald*, USA; *Jamaica Observer*, Jamaica; *La Brujula Semanal*, Nicaragua; *El Universal*, Mexico; South America: *Zero Hora*, Brazil; *Diario Catarinense*, Brazil; *Diario Clarin*, Argentina.

Chapter 8

Applying Advocacy in Climate Change

The Case of Bangladesh

Mofizur Rhaman

This chapter¹ investigates ideological underpinnings in Bangladeshi print journalism on climate change; it is based upon a three-week period of newspaper coverage during the UN climate summits in Copenhagen 2009 (COP15) and Durban 2011 (COP17). The analysis is based primarily on the newspaper discourses published in *The Daily Star (DS)* and *The Prothom Alo (PA)*. Relying exclusively on media representations subjected to either quantitative or qualitative approaches would partly neglect how journalists and editors themselves interpret, or challenge the process of reporting on climate change. This would be reductive not least because there is often a considerable space between how media scholars write about reporting and how the journalists and editors in the field experience their work. Hence, in this chapter some journalists' and editors' views and experiences are included in addition to the discussion of media coverage.

At the global level, the central question of this chapter does not have a single answer as journalism is situated and considerably influenced by different media systems which are the products of the structure of power, the ideological leanings of respective governments and media owners with respect to the media's role in society. It may also be due to the ontological and epistemological complexity of understanding climate, climate change and its consequences. For Hulme (2010), climate change is a very complex issue; the nexus between nature and culture, the present and the future as well as the global and the local; this complexity makes understanding climate much more nuanced and hybrid. Hulme states:

Climate change has become both a resourceful idea and a versatile explanation which can be moulded and mobilized to fulfill a bewildering array of political, social and psychological functions. It is an idea as impressive, complex and slippery as democracy and an explanation as ubiquitous, alluring and yet inadequate as our genes (Hulme 2010: 267).

In this context, journalism has various options and faces challenges as “journalism has always been an institution ‘in between’[...] On the one hand, there is a natural bent towards the *global* in journalistic culture [...] On the other hand, [...] journalism is deeply anchored in *local* communities it aims or pretends to serve” (Eide & Kunelius 2009: 5-6). References to journalism’s “professional” or “occupational cultures” (Pasti 2005: 101) resonate with earlier conceptualizations of professional and “occupational ideologies” (Golding & Elliott 1979: 214; Schudson 1990: 24). As Thomas Hanitzsch (2007) has shown, even though this occupational ideology, associated with the values of impartiality, objectivity, and accuracy is often granted universal status by journalists and researchers, the rise of counter-hegemonic articulations and practices (e.g. advocacy journalism, public or civic journalism, and peace journalism) raises many challenging questions, including the following two: Does such a common professional culture, sharing a common occupational ideology and understanding of journalism exist? And if it does, how does climate change challenge the practice of the traditional professional ideology?

With respect to professional imperatives, journalistic writing, more specifically news, is expected to be balanced, fair, accurate, honest, responsible and decent. These global professional unifying norms are emphasized to make a news report true, objective and, neutral. However, these professional concepts are also inherently value laden – they generally function within journalists’ communicative contexts and due to the differences in the rules of journalists, these concepts may bring different ontological meanings and consequences to different journalists. Moreover, they have relational implications to the issue being reported; especially if the issue itself is not certain, such as climate change. Thus, when it comes to the practice of journalism about climate change prior to, during and after UN summits, one recognizes divergent modes, styles and representations.

Climate change can be understood as a case of global injustice (Hulme 2010). Therefore, climate journalists may advocate in favor of climate victims; in so doing they are adhering to another journalistic ideal: siding with the oppressed, the subject of injustice. The mandate for such behaviour by the media is well grounded in the history of journalism. Media seem to have played a very significant role in different parts of the world where justice was unmet; where disparity and discrimination were pervasive between rich and poor, male and female, and between ethnic, religious or ideological groups. When shedding light on injustice and contributing to change, the media not only can play an ordinary everyday role of informing the public but also can develop voice and mobilize opinion to bring society into a more desirable condition. Raja Rammohan Ray, a renowned social reformist, advocated social change and ran his reformist movement for women’s emancipation through his newspapers *Mirath-ul-Akhbar* & *Sangbad Komoudi* in nineteenth century

India (Islam 1993; Dhar 1986; Ray, 1990). The rebellious national poet of Bangladesh, Kazi Nazrul Islam, used his newspapers *Nabajug*, *Dhumketo* and *Langol* in support of the anti-colonial movement when people in the Indian sub-continent faced injustice and were oppressed by the British colonial power (Rhaman 2001).

This trend might be seen as opposed to the everyday norms of journalism but is grounded in human ethical values, support for just causes and belief in a framework of justice. If journalism is seen as part of the struggle, as it was considered in the context of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and in many other parts of the world, then journalism is not to be considered as situated within the Anglo-American objective style (Beer 2004: 173). As journalism has to operate within the larger social system, it is very much guided by the local social fabric of society; hence journalism takes on national colouring and shape and carries local values to uphold national interests.

With a three phase circuit of communication through which information pass over the time, Carvalho (2007) analyzes the way in which climate coverage occurs in the media in general. These are: 1) News production phase: framing, power and the power of framing at the macro (the field/terrain) and the micro levels (the level of story); 2) News in the public sphere: legibility of climate discourse; and 3) Personal engagement with climate change via the mass media. Informed by this framework, this chapter argues that some journalistic practices on climate change carry a kind of advocacy tone in Bangladesh, where government, civil society, political actors including the media work together, toeing more or less the same line.

The Concept of Advocacy and Advocacy Journalism

The notion of advocacy in the journalism world relates to the concept of advocacy used in the development communication field. Advocacy is, “giving support to a cause”². It has been used in the NGO world to influence actors, systems, structures and ideas at many different levels and in many different ways (Edward 2002: 98). Keek & Sikkink (1999) and Molyneux & Sian (2003) categorically emphasized the use of media, i.e. publishing articles in newspapers as a vital aspect of advocacy. However, the mandate of doing advocacy is usually grounded in ethical values around the specific issue. Whaites notes that “Advocacy in theory is related to one of the higher ideals – the search for justice” (Whaites 2000: 508). Advocacy may also be seen as a struggle in the communication realm to establish a perspective on an issue; it is usually practised from a marginalized point of view that seeks to gain primacy, legitimacy, justice and favor (Pascual 2002: 6). Advocacy journalism is to be seen within this theoretical framework of advocacy.

Max Weber termed journalism as "... [one of the] most important avenues of professional political activity" (Gerth and Mills 1946: 98 as quoted in Waisbord 2008: 372). In the Western democracies, there used to be structural links between political parties and the press. Party communication was strategically packaged by the party press and therefore "...journalists typically approached news reporting as a way to get politically involved and to promote viewpoints generally associated with political parties" (Waisbord 2008: 372). This changed though as the American journalistic tradition developed a strong professional base and West European journalism moved from party-press connections to a business-press model. In the developing nations, the party press trend is still dominant and the press is in many cases owned/ financed/ controlled directly or indirectly by political parties in power.

Taking sides or engaging in advocacy in journalism is often related to the marginalized, denied and discriminated groups in the society³. Janowitz notes that "advocacy journalism assigns journalists the role of active interpreters and participants who 'speak on behalf' of certain groups, typically those groups are denied..." (Janowitz 1975 in Waisbord 2008: 371). Traditionally, advocacy journalism has been exercised by the alternative media, usually for strategic reasons brought forward by human rights groups, NGOs and citizen groups. However, nowadays mainstream media are also at times playing an advocacy role. "Taking sides" in media and news discourses may happen explicitly or implicitly. In the explicit manner, a particular medium may declare openly that it is serving a particular cause and thus the audience becomes aware of its role on the issue. However, in the implicit manner, a media institution may want to promote some causes without announcing it openly. They do this by employing various techniques, i.e. producing a huge volume of discourse on the issue; dedicating more spaces to citizen groups and NGOs working on the field; inviting more outside contribution for analysis and reflection; and quoting voices from active participants in the field. When they do this, they add color, sense and meaning through the strategic use of language and words. By determining the treatment of the news items, editorializing news contents and publishing cartoons and illustrations, the media may promote a cause defined by the pre-set intentions of their owners, financial backers and managers.

Waisbord (2008) theorizes advocacy journalism from two perspectives; 1) Journalistic advocacy where the media themselves promote the cause, since journalists are seen to be guided by reformist ideals in general or might have relations with party politics; 2) Civil society advocacy where the media are used by civil society organizations and citizen groups strategically in order to get broad coverage for a particular cause. This is called the civil society model of advocacy journalism. However, these models may work together in the context of a global issue and may become even more partisan when political actors/

governments also take the same side on the issue. The confluence of (a) media/journalists' active role in covering, promoting and interpreting a certain issue, (b) civil society initiatives and (c) government positions with respect to that issue may lead the practice of advocacy journalism into yet another dimension.

Climate Change Journalism: Trends, Norms and Ideologies

Climate change has been increasingly high on the media agenda worldwide since the 1980s. However, it seems to have appeared first in *The New York Times* in the early 1930s with this observation: "The earth must be inevitably changing its aspect and its climate. How the change is slowly taking place and what the result will be has been considered" (*The New York Times* 1932 as quoted in Boykoff & Roberts, Report 2007: 4). The coverage took a new direction with regard to anthropogenic climate change in the 1960s and 70s. Later, subsequent UN climate summits spurred media attention on climate change dramatically (ibid 2007). Many more journalists than before are nowadays involved in climate reporting. Reuters's study conducted on COP15 observes: "Never before had so many journalists from so many countries come to the same place to cover an event that wasn't the World Cup or the Olympics"⁴ (Painter 2010: 7). However, the research done on media coverage of climate change by individuals, institutions and networks, though abundant in numbers mainly covers newspapers and most of them are done in the context of developed nations. Painter's 12-nation study focuses on newspapers from developed and developing nations and investigates the climate coverage as science reporting. But the question remains that this study's focus on science reporting may not give the full account of the media coverage in victim countries where people are currently suffering from the effects of climate change.

Anabela Carvalho investigated media coverage of climate change in British quality newspapers, focusing on the coverage as a conveyor of ideologies. Her sample includes *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Times*. She notes "... ideology works as a powerful selection device in deciding what is scientific news, i.e. what the relevant "facts" are, and who are the authorized "agents of definition" of science matters" (Carvalho 2007: 223).

Boykoff and Boykoff's study conducted on the USA prestige press⁵ endorses Carvalho's observation articulated in the context of British quality press. Yet, in their essay entitled "Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press" they note: "While some research has focused on the cultural and philosophical systems that affect news coverage...this study explores the journalistic norms that influence this coverage" (2004: 126). Widening their analysis from two contested dimensions of climate science reporting, such as existence of an anthropogenic contribution to global warming and actions with respect to

global warming, they argued that journalistic reporting in the US press is biased but disguised and deeply rooted in reporting from the “norm of balance”. This professional norm⁶ is also influenced by the political and economic norms of institutions and societies where journalism is located. “Balanced coverage does not, of course, always mean accurate coverage. [...]In the end, adherence to the ‘norm of balanced’ reporting leads to informationally biased coverage of global warming. This bias, hidden behind the veil of journalistic balance...” (Op. cit., pp. 126, 134).

Earlier studies of the *MediaClimate* Network⁷ have argued that summit journalism is somehow fluid, but “offers possibilities for journalists to overcome the routinely nationalistic and local instincts of their professional practices” (Eide & Kunelius 2009: 1). However, summit journalism is also often domesticated and this often has to do with calls for action in the respective countries. This may indicate journalists’ subjective engagement and agency concerning climate change. The recent *MediaClimate* study, including COP15 in Copenhagen, confirms this domestication trend. However, attempts at global journalistic action were also registered with the publication of a global editorial (see chapter 7). “One could argue that, journalists in many parts of the world joined in a kind of ‘advocacy of hope’ – movement” (Eide & Kunelius 2010: 41-42). This adherence to hope may be observed also at the government level in Bangladesh. Referring to the media role with respect to environment and climate change *The Climate Change Action Plan* states:

Bangladesh media has been pro active in mounting public awareness on climate change for the last two decades. Journalists have been proactive in sensitizing the country on various environmental issues. But, given the scale of climate-induced adverse impacts on the national economy, livelihoods and eco-systems, [...] Bangladesh’s vibrant print and electronic media can play that effective role in a very comprehensive manner to help bring in positive changes in public opinion to make policy changes. Media can also help take people in climate-friendly low-carbon development pathways. [...]raise national negotiation capacity by infusing public debate on climate change issues in both print and electronic media and keep track of ongoing negotiation streets as watchdogs (BCCSAP/GoB, 2008, T6P5).

This indicates what is being expected of Bangladeshi media by government and policy makers. In what follows we will see how Bangladeshi newspapers engage with advocacy journalism in responding to governmental expectations as well as civil society in favor of climate victims.

The Journalist-Advocate Model with a Focus on Bangladeshi Press

In the area of climate summit journalism, the Copenhagen study (Eide, Kuneilius, & Kumpu 2010) undertaken by the *MediaClimate* network, found 3,210 items were produced in 38 newspapers in 19 countries from five geographical continents in a given period of three weeks. The results show that the second largest coverage occurred in the Bangladeshi press with 317 textual items and 104 visuals in the *Daily Star* and *Prothom Alo* respectively. The Durban study finds Bangladesh as the third highest in covering climate issues with 90 textual and 40 visual items in *DS* and *PA* in the same period of time. A total of 38 Bangladeshi journalist registered for the Copenhagen summit and around 25 journalists attended the Durban summit, a fact that indicates their serious attitude to climate issues. These results may relate to the national context and how the country is hit by and perceives the consequence of climate change. Bangladeshi newspapers' high coverage compared to most other developing countries⁸ investigated is likely to be much more influenced by their attitude to the understanding of local public good and national interest.

Table 8.1. Total Coverage of Climate Issues in the *DS* and *PA* of Bangladesh During COP15 & COP17

Name of newspaper	Copenhagen Summit (COP 15)	Durban Summit (COP 17)	Total
The Daily Star	160 (text items) 51 (visuals)	65 (text items) 35 (visuals)	225 (text items) 86 (visuals)
The Prothom Alo	157 (text items) 53 (visuals)	25 (text items) 5 (visuals)	182 (text items) 58 (visuals)
Total	317 (text items) 104 (visuals)	90 (text items) 40 (visuals)	407 (text items) 144 (visuals)

The Copenhagen study identified 1,135 items of different opinionated genres out of a total 3,210 items. In the Bangladeshi press 71 items out of 317 were identified as opinionated articles. Almost half of the Bangladeshi Durban coverage was opinionated⁹. However, this coverage did not only inform the readers; it also reflected on the pros and cons of the climate change issue in general and the climate summit in particular. Through the coverage, certain tones and values occur, especially concerning which countries to blame, who are the victims, who should pay for adaptation and so on.

However, we might ask whether this large coverage is warranted by its newsworthiness or is due to other factors? I would argue that such extensive coverage can only happen to this extent when the media pick up an issue intentionally with a view of advocating for change. The qualitative aspect of the coverage supports this position (see below). This also goes hand in hand

with the manifested aims and objectives of *The Prothom Alo* and *The Daily Star* in the context of climate change. In an interview, Mahfuz Anam, editor-in-chief of *The Daily Star*, told that he truly believed that process journalism¹⁰ was important for good reporting. Using climate change as an example, Anam stressed the need for process journalism at the expense of more traditional event reporting. He described how the two most important things during his 18 years of creating and leading the largest English newspaper in Bangladesh were the *people perspective* and *process journalism*. And, according to Anam, the most important case, for present generations and perhaps for all times, is climate change. He continues:

When it comes to climate change, event journalism, where single events are covered with no further explanations or perspective would be useless. We believe in process journalism, keeping the focus over time, providing the large picture (Interview with Anam, May 2009).

Similarly, journalists are also very concerned about their responsibility concerning climate change. One journalist said it is his ‘passion’ to write about climate change as it has a tremendous impact on our economy, society and life. It also casts a deep and long term impacts on our present and future generations (Interview with Roy from *DS*, May, 2011). Another reporter said:

I consider my journalism on climate change not only as professional duties, but rather I see it as my responsibility towards my country and its masses of people. I want to make our people aware about the implications of global warming and climate change. I want to help society raise a voice against global warming as well as put pressure on the developed countries, the most responsible, to give compensation to the victim countries, including Bangladesh (Interview with Mahmud from *PA*, May 2011).

Institutional Culture, Values and Ideology

The extra-journalistic activities such as campaigning against violence against women, organizing round table discussions on different sociopolitical and rights issues, humanitarian aid and many others, give *The Prothom Alo* an additional identity not only as a newspaper organization but also as an advocate of rights and justice. The relentless anti-corruption, anti-pollution and anti-discrimination efforts of *The Daily Star* also level it as an advocate of rights and good governance in the society. In this ideological condition, undoubtedly, their professional practices employ advocacy journalism. To elaborate a bit more, these two institutions are seen by their respective managements as newspapers and institutions where journalism and advocacy are necessarily entangled, especially in the context of rights and justice. *The Daily*

Star and *The Prothom Alo* are categorized as independent civil society media run by moral ideals of rights and responsibilities (Rhaman 2010). Moreover, while celebrating the 12th anniversary, the editor of *The Prothom Alo*, Motiur Rahman says “*The Prothom Alo* is a bit more than a newspaper.” By this, he underlines other social roles undertaken by his newspaper. Recently, this newspaper has taken up some advocacy slogans for campaigning, such as “Bodle jao, Bodle din” (change [yourself], change [others]); “Ja kichu valo, tar sathe *Prothom Alo*” (*Prothom Alo* stands only for good endeavors). These general slogans are meant to bring changes in every sphere of life. In such an organizational culture it is not surprising that the journalism of these newspapers conveys moral values:

I think climate change might be the event that will represent an important shift in journalism as such, to move away from the idea of covering both sides, of objectivity and neutral perspectives. When it comes to the future of our earth we have to take sides, we have to be activists, so yes, we advocate (Interview with Anam, *The Daily Star*, May 2009).

In addition to this, a comprehensive qualitative reading of the items published in these newspapers may identify their positions as value-laden with regard to climate change journalism.

First, a unified stand on the anthropogenic contribution to climate change is voiced through different discourses in *DS* and *PA*. This is evident both in news reports and opinionated genres published during COP15 & COP17 as well as before and after the summits. There is hardly any debate on whether climate change is man-made or natural; rather it is taken as true scientific fact that climate change is anthropogenic in nature¹¹. The two newspapers are more interested in portraying who is responsible for this anthropogenic change. In identifying the responsible countries, they state that Western, industrialized nations are polluters and developing countries are victims; and that Bangladesh is the worst hit by climate change. Though *BASIC* (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) countries are also large green house gas emitters, this is not taken as seriously as Western nations’ pollution. Furthermore, by ignoring the skeptics (only 2 items in *DS* during each summit) these newspapers did not adhere to the journalistic mechanistic norm of ‘balanced reporting’¹².

Second, the pursuance of a slogan indicates a certain position of an institution; this is also perceived to be operating within the realm of party politics or NGO activism. The uses of slogans are usually enshrined in a Rawlsian framework of justice; however, it might not necessarily be equally beneficial for each and every citizen. Yet, for some consecutive days before the Copenhagen summit declaration, *The Prothom Alo* published a slogan “Bangladesh banchle banchbe

bishaw” (if Bangladesh survives, the world will survive) (Rhaman 2010). Bangladesh has here become a metaphor for climate change and survival for the world. This metaphorisation also influenced the later reporting style of the COP15 (& 17) stories, and thus embodied the advocacy focus on the issue from the Bangladeshi domestic angle.

Third, along with varied coverage during different summits, a shift in newspaper coverage and framing of climate change is revealed. This shift is equally evident in the quantity and quality of discourses. The number of *DS* and *PA* stories during Copenhagen was almost 6 times higher than during the Bali Summit, and although much lower, still comparatively high during Durban (see table 8.1). While the ‘blame frame’ (blaming the large developed nations) was prominent in the Bali coverage; climate change was increasingly framed through binaries during Copenhagen coverage: hope and despair, loss and opportunity, success and failure, helplessness and vulnerability, rights and responsibilities and so on (Rhaman 2010). COP17 in Durban is mostly framed through a frustrated future orientation (see chapter 7 on future) with regard to the reduction target, the Kyoto protocol extension and the potential availability of a green fund¹³. This coverage underscores that a more value-laden attempt has made the media tone stronger and more assertive than the previous relatively docile and non-assertive frame focus. It is understood from the appeal made in Bali (COP13) coverage: “Poor countries appeal for help in fighting climate change” (*DS*, December 5, 2007); in 2009, however, demands are made in the news headlines published during COP15 such as “Rich nations must give compensations” (*DS*, December 12, 2009) and “Realize compensation from developed countries” (*DS*, December 8, 2009). Moreover, during Durban demands have been translated into frustration: “Climate hope clouded: Rich nations reluctant to continue carbon cut legal binding”, “Rich are in conspiracy against poor” (*DS*, November 30; December 4, 2011). This change in reporting tone is inspired by the revealed fact that Bangladesh is worse hit by climate change than most other countries (*PA*, December 9, 2009; *DS*, November 30, 2011); and thus it is shown more clearly as an innocent victim of climate change (*PA*, December 8, 2009; *DS*, November 26, 2011). The need for national consensus is underlined by these headlines: “Call for national unity to tackle climate change” (*DS*, December 14, 2009); “Stand by the victims of Bangladesh” (*PA*, December 7, 2009). It here becomes evident that these media are fulfilling their commitment to advocacy as well as to expectations from the government and civil society.

What I would like to emphasize here is the values and ideologies underlying the published items: newspapers’ voices have gradually increased from appeal to demand; from searching paths to tackle climate change to an obligatory legally binding formula for emission cuts, from financial aid to an obligatory

financial compensation package; from articulations of hope to a disappointed frustration. Appeals both for fighting climate change and for unity to tackle climate consequences were emphasized during the media coverage of the Bali summit and this generated knowledge based on different dimensions of climate change consequences. But by the Copenhagen summit, specific actions at the global and local levels were being advocated. This process has been given a humanitarian gloss, a national and global ethos that is combined in the newspaper slogan: “We will live and make the world alive.” And in terms of actual headlines: “If Bangladesh survives, the world will survive” (*PA*, December 13, 2009). Subsequently during the Cancún summit, and later during Durban, along with other strategies, these newspapers started activism not only through discourse generation but also through taking positions, organizing and promoting actions. For example, *The Daily Star* introduced a climate award in cooperation with HSBC¹⁴ to encourage “...efforts in promoting green business and cutting environmental pollution” (*DS*, December 2, 3, 2011), an award that honours climate heroes from 2010. The award-giving event is organized and covered in *DS* as a huge gala with lots of stories, colourful visuals and awardees profiles (*DS*, December 3, 2011).

A Civil Society Model of Advocacy Journalism and Bangladeshi Press

The voices presented in the coverage are another way of emphasizing climate change importance. At the global level, *MediaClimate* network finds that out of 5,222¹⁵ quoted voices, 28 per cent have come from civil society groups and individual grassroots citizens. These civil society groups consist of national and international NGOs; national and international grassroots actors and think tanks. The activism of these groups is organized principally from a rights-based, idealist approach and it works for the betterment of civil society. Such activist bodies are perceived by Vakil as a “self governing, private, not-for profit organizations that are geared towards improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people” (Vakil 1997: 206). This ‘not for personal interest’ approach brings ethical strengths to NGO activities and gives them a mandate to raise voice in favor of a cause (Rhaman 2007). The values of environmental NGOs and civil society with regard to awareness building and campaigning seem to comply with the values of media about climate change in Bangladesh. When more voices from NGOs and grassroots people are quoted in newspapers, we may see this as an indication of increased advocacy journalism.

Table 8.2. Distribution of Voices in Principal Groups in Bangladeshi Newspapers During COP 15 & COP17

Voices	Copenhagen Summit (COP15)						Durban Summit (COP17)					
	Daily Star		Prothom Alo		Total		Daily Star		Prothom Alo		Total	
National Political System	134	35 %	127	40 %	261	37 %	42	38 %	23	46 %	65	41 %
Transnational Political System	49	13 %	20	6 %	69	10 %	7	6 %	3	6 %	10	6 %
Civil Society	95	25 %	100	32 %	195	28 %	15	14 %	8	16 %	23	14 %
Business	4	1 %	4	1 %	8	1 %	11	10 %	1	2 %	12	8 %
Science	59	15 %	37	12 %	96	14 %	27	25 %	14	28 %	41	26 %
Other	37	10 %	27	9 %	64	9 %	8	7 %	1	2 %	9	6 %
Total	387	100 %	315	101 %	702	99 %	110	100 %	50	100 %	160	100 %

In the Bangladeshi press during the Copenhagen summit, 195 voices are quoted from civil society groups (28 % of the total voices) which indicate how significantly civil society actors and their activism around the climate change issue are perceived by the media. Newspaper representation of civil society voices during the Durban summit was 21 per cent on the global scale, with 14 per cent in the Bangladeshi press¹⁶. Not only do newspapers uphold a position merely through discourse generation, they also multiplied the strength of their position by picking up on voices from actors who speak in the same manner.

Columns and Opinion Pieces

A total of 531 columns and opinion pieces were published in the newspapers investigated by the *MediaClimate* network. Out of them, 284 were written by the newspapers' own staff; the remaining 247 were by the non-staff writers. In Bangladeshi newspapers 48 items of this kind out of a total of 317 items were received from non-staff writers while only 4 were written by staff writers. All commentaries on the future in the *DS* and *PA* during the Durban summit were written by non-staff expert writers, civil society activists, intellectuals and members of think tanks. This indicates a willingness from Bangladeshi newspapers to highlight civil society's opinion. These opinion items mostly argued in favor of the anthropogenic contribution to climate change and described Western nations as the polluters; moreover, their publications demonstrate the indirect advocacy of the newspapers. An op-ed written by a university faculty member in *The DS* states:

We don't want any "politics of climate change," we simply want to live a healthy life. To get that environment, if we need to protest boldly against those who are responsible for this situation, we will do so or else we cannot protect ourselves. It's our headache, so we have to save ourselves or perish (*DS*, December 3, 2011).

Some headlines¹⁷ in *The DS and PA* also underscore the activities of NGOs and civil society members. They organize human chains to pressurize local and global leaders, and appeal to people not to be involved in activities that destroy nature and contribute to climate change. Public hearings are also organized to create awareness and identify the countries responsible for climate change. A climate reporter from *The Daily Star* confirmed this: “The NGOs operate campaign programmes, arrange seminars, symposiums and human chains and always try to ensure good coverage of their respective programmes in our newspapers” (Interview with Roy from *DS*, May 2011). An NGO activist in Durban added that:

We do understand the strength of media and use different media i.e. mainstream media, traditional folk media and new media to raise our voice. Journalists are also cooperative in publishing reports on our activities such as awareness building, campaigning and networking around climate change. Whatever we do in this field always gets well covered by the media. It may be due to the fact that we both think about climate change in the same manner (Interview with Jahangir, December 12, 2011).

This convergence of thoughts and activities helps advance the overall advocacy tone of the newspapers. What we see is that not only journalists, NGOs and civil society actors but also the policy-making authority of the newspapers attach high importance to the matters related to climate change and its impacts on the environment and thus to (advocacy) climate journalism as well.

A Bit Beyond the Model?

Does the level of advocacy get strengthened where media, government and political actors speak on the same wavelength? In the Bangladeshi newspapers 39 per cent of the total voices quoted were from within the national political system during the Copenhagen summit. During Durban, voices of the national political system increased even more, to 41 per cent. It means that climate change journalism in Bangladesh is mostly defined by national political actors and civil society actors. Here we see the connection between expectations and actions of different stakeholders.

The Bangladesh government, realizing the consequences of anthropogenic climate change, has taken the issue very seriously. The climate change branch of the Ministry of the Environment and Forests is trying hard to make people aware of climate change and to make Bangladesh a major case before the world leaders. The Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina herself flew to Copenhagen and played a very active role¹⁸. Sheikh Hasina was praised at home and abroad for her climate change diplomacy. She not only demanded an adaptation fund but also came up with her own initiative to raise the capacity to fight the fallout.

Though the negotiations became stranded in Copenhagen, the Bangladeshi initiatives at the summit were termed a success for the country and its leadership (Rhaman 2010). This is also covered in *The Prothom Alo* “Bangladesh climate diplomacy shows success; the fight should continue” (December 22, 2009); Everybody’s eyes on Bangladesh after climate summit” (December 21, 2009). The Prime Minister was also vocal during COP17 in Durban for a legally binding accord on greenhouse emission cuts (*DS*, December 29, 2011). Bangladesh now plays an important role in climate negotiations not only as member of G77 and the LDCs, but also as leader of MVCs¹⁹.

The Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action plan (*The Ministry of Environment and Forest, BCCSAP* 2008) considers climate change as an environmental as well as a developmental issue. This plan also perceives the critical importance of media in making people aware about the consequences and advocating for a climate fund.

It is perceived from the newspaper coverage that climate change is a unique issue for all actors in Bangladesh. One journalist from *The Daily Star* notes that: “As the government and its ministries and departments are themselves concerned over the climate change impacts on Bangladesh’s economy and human lives, they cooperate with me to make news reports on the issues of climate change” (Interview with Lotus from *DS*, May 2011).

A reporter from *The Prothom Alo* who mostly covers the environment says that, “Previously climate change issues were seen only as the agenda of the NGOs. But now after the government’s high level authorities started to attach importance to the issues and be present at the global forums, climate change has become an important issue for our newspaper as well” (Interview with Mahmud from *PA*, May 2011). It seems that the advocacy conducted by Bangladeshi newspapers in the context of climate change is also related to the governmental intervention into climate change issues. This is also evident while we see that the official delegation of Bangladesh (133 members) to the Durban summit (COP17) included civil society activists, scientists and 25 journalists from all kinds of media. The media seemed convinced that their role was to promote advocacy journalism. This was demonstrated by their coverage as well as by their ideological positioning towards climate change. In the case of climate summit journalism, it was most likely strengthened through the incorporation of civil society voices and government cooperation.

However, the media’s consensus with government on climate consequences does not mean that climate change journalists have been co-opted by the government and other powerful stakeholders in Bangladesh. The media seemed aware of their critical agency in reporting on the issues where ‘just cases’ are absent, such as spending irregularities, lack of transparency in selecting and implementing NGOs, nepotism in climate change project distribution etc. (i.e. *DS*, April 29, 2011).

Conclusion

Journalism and advocacy²⁰ may contradict each other, but journalism's ideals do not always run counter to advocacy. Advocating for a just cause in line with a human rights perspective can hardly be wrong. When an issue is presented in the media, journalists often take a side, guided by their own morals or influenced by the spirit of rights based demands. This happens frequently in spite of the fact it contradicts traditional journalistic principles which do not allow journalists to take sides and ignore the norm of fairness in reporting. The important thing is to understand when and whether taking sides is 'just', and in line with humanitarian principles. This chapter finds that Bangladeshi newspapers are influenced by the journalistic principle of siding with citizens and the survival of the nation; as it has been documented that one third of Bangladesh may be submerged if the sea level rises by one meter. Thus, 20 million people, having lost their homesteads, would become climate refugees. Towards this background, advocacy is understood as just and justified. Therefore, advocacy was meant to contribute to establishing justice in the context of climate change, and consequently, newspapers engaged in advocacy journalism not only implicitly but also explicitly. Climate change is understood as a case of global injustice (Hulme 2010), therefore climate journalists may advocate in favor of (potential) climate victims and thereby adhere to another journalistic ideal by siding with the subjects of an injustice. While making people aware is the local target, meeting climate justice is a global target. However, this explicit advocacy element in Bangladeshi journalism does not necessarily challenge all the existing occupational ideologies. It rather adds an important perspective.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Elisabeth Eide, Kristin Skare Orgeret, Risto Kunelius and Dag Elgesem for their comments, insights and inputs in finalizing this chapter.
2. According to Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary.
3. In the USA, this consists of publications or press run by anti-war, feminist, gay, environmental and ethnic rights activists.
4. 3,880 journalists from 119 countries were registered to attend the Copenhagen summit (Painter 2010)
5. Boykoff and Boykoff have done a study on American newspapers that includes *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* published between 1988 and 2002.
6. Telling both sides of the story.
7. The first study by the *MediaClimate* network consisted of scholars from 13 countries; they each examined two newspapers from their respective countries.
8. For example, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia.
9. This category includes editorials, columns by staff writers or externals, letters to the editor etc.
10. Process journalism: Instead of focusing on the event, the journalist digs out the relevant dimensions and takes a position in the struggle for rights and justice.

11. 70 % of people in Bangladesh believe that climate change is based on scientific consensus and it is factually true and therefore an urgent issue to act upon (World Bank Study 2011).
12. Balance reporting is sometimes useful to maintain objectivity in other avenues of journalism if used as a 'fairness check' yet, it may also be detrimental if the issue is considered to be a certainty, as these media consider climate change to be.
13. "Ball in climate culprits' court: Weather hit nations hope for just fund as meetings start in Durban today" (*DS*, 28.11.2011).
14. Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation.
15. Of 5,222 quoted voices, 38 % are from national political system, 28 % from civil society organizations and individuals, and 14 % from scientific and other experts, 10 % from transnational political system, 5% from business and the remaining 5 % from other voices.
16. Of 1,184 quoted voices, 37 % are from the national political system, 21 % from civil society organizations and individuals, 19 % from scientific and other experts, 10 % from the transnational political system, 7 % from business and the remaining 5 % from other voices. In the Bangladesh case it was 41 %, 6 %, 14 %, 8 %, 26 % & 6 % for the national political system, the transnational political system, civil society, business, science experts and others.
17. 'Public hearing on climate change: Reach consensus on reducing green house gas emission' on December 5, 2009; 'Human chain on sea beach' on December 13, 2009; 'Campaigners denounce the abject failure' on December 20, 2009; 'HSBC, Star honour climate heroes' on December 3, 2011; 'Protesters denied entry to talks' on December 4, 2011 in the *DS* and 'Human chain in Kuakatha chant slogan: We will alive and make world alive' on December 5, 2009; ' Procession in Kolkata to save Sundarban' on December 8, 2009; People emerge as vigil to fight disaster' on December 13, 2009; 'Promise not to destroy hills, forests and lakes: Human chain in coastal belt' on December 13, 2009; Copenhagen: A city of protest on December 14, 2009; The juveniles are in the procession for the world on December 14, 2009; 'PKSF is to select NGO projects under climate fund' on November 24, 2011; 'Durban shivers at processions' on December 4, 2011 in the *PA*.
18. Given the vulnerability of Bangladesh due to climate change, British PM Gordon Brown updates Hasina on climate fund. President Barack Obama phones Hasina and says USA to stand by Bangladesh.
19. Most Vulnerable countries.
20. When journalism is conducted for petty interests, corporate or business interests or the interests of a country that endanger the whole world and humanity such as the emphasis of Western media on the norm of balance reporting with respect to climate change coverage, such journalism might well be considered as another face of advocacy. However, this advocacy or "side-taking" in favor of skeptics contradicts journalistic high ideals and can never be considered as advocacy for an actual just cause as this partisanship ignores the consequences and vulnerability of climate change to Bangladesh and other small inland states.

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Chapter 9

Scientific Leaks

Uncertainties and Skepticism in Climate Change Journalism

Katherine Duarte & Dmitry Yagodin

In November 2009 thousands of documents, including private emails, were stolen from hacked servers of the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in England and made public on the web. The incident was labeled “Climategate” and occurred only a few weeks before the climate summit in Copenhagen (COP15). Though multiple inquiries and reviews of the incident found no fundamental flaws in the stolen documents ¹ the issue faced varying interpretations in global mass media and inspired a wave of skepticism towards climate science. The voices of those radically denying global warming increasingly reached mainstream media. Climate deniers called the publication of the documents the “final nail in the coffin for anthropogenic global warming” (Delingpole 2009). The reputation of climate science was tainted by allegations that climatologists had manipulated findings to support their cause.

A similar incident (“Climategate-2”) took place in 2011, just in time for COP17, but did not receive as much media attention as the previous leak of emails. This time, the scientific community quickly reacted with a series of public relations measures. The CRU’s director, Professor Phil Jones, was available for the media and traveled to London to participate in a press conference. As British science journalist Michael Hanlon wrote, the fuss died down after just a few days (2011). Obviously, the first Climategate had a stronger impact on climate change journalism. It may have reinforced some existing uncertainties among science journalists. The question, then, is how did the mass media tackle the increased controversy caused by Climategate? In some media (especially in developing countries) even the first incident was hardly mentioned. Was this a sign of journalistic retreat from traditions of balanced reporting and a sign of the rise of advocacy, ignoring the skeptics? Still a lot of media picked up the scandal and were faced with the decision as to how much space skeptics and global warming deniers deserved. The leaks became a challenge for climate change reporting.

In an attempt to address those questions, we present two empirical cases – coverage of the climate change controversy in Norway and Russia. We selected

coverage in these countries as they provide contrasting examples of the local contexts and specific roles played by science in journalism. Norway is a small, but important country in the negotiations, especially regarding rainforest preservation (Eide & Ytterstad 2010, see Chapter 5). The case of Russia is special, because Russian coverage during COP15 was minimal, though the country is one of the biggest CO₂ emitters in the world. In our analysis we draw on the data partly reflected in a previous volume (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010), but the specific uncertainty (lack of certainty) which is a regular challenge in science journalism requires a specific perspective. From previous research (for example, Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010) we know that journalists during summits do not take full advantage of scientists and that they bring other actors, mainly politicians into the limelight. Yet, we argue that the role of scientific argument in climate discourses remains notable.

We analyze media stories published before COP15; that is, the leaks that surfaced in media before the summit (November 2009), during the summit (7-19 December 2009), and after it (January-February 2010). These coverages provide us with three distinct periods for both countries. Norwegian data include articles from three dailies: *VG*, *Aftenposten*, and *Bergens Tidende* (*BT*), the first newspaper is a popular tabloid, the two others more elite-leaning. The Russian case is based on publications from elite *Kommersant* and popular *Moskovsky Komsomolets* (*MK*). Following this introduction we provide some general background information for the topic and continue with local contexts.

Uncertainty and Controversy in Science Coverage

In the wake of Climategate, climate scientists realized the importance of data transparency for the public, no matter what the public thought about the data. Some scientists tried to create closer links with so-called skeptics: "Ignoring skeptics from outside the field is inappropriate. Einstein did not start his career at Princeton, but rather at a patent office" (Judy Curry on the need to open up science to skeptics, cited in Pearce 2010: 223). Another scientist admitted that the incident with the leaked emails might stimulate a broader discussion of transparency issues, personal codes and exclusive rights (Schneider, cited in Pearce, 2010). Nonetheless, the media are often criticized by the scientists for "a climate of doubt" (Painter 2011), that makes room for skeptics and hence strengthens climate change deniers; for contributing to public confusion; for the creation of obstacles to negotiating more robust political decisions concerning the climate change.

Media can not only question but also support science. Gamson (1999) defined scientific institutions as primary "validators" of the reality, such as IPCC in the case of climate change, and media as secondary "validators" reporting

about the respective scientific claims. But media may also act at the level of “primary validators”. As Carvalho points out, in controversial issues, it is the journalistic gatekeeping role that defines which scientists will be given voice and, thus, recognized as “primary validators” (2007: 225). During the climate change summits, politicians, including the UN officials, and even journalists themselves, with their commentaries and editorials, got more space in media texts than scientists. In an investigation of Norwegian press coverage of climate change during 2007 and 2008, Duarte (2010) found that 19 per cent of the main voices were journalists, 18 per cent politicians and 16 per cent climate scientists (Duarte 2010: 53). In a report covering 18 countries by the *MediaClimate* network (Eide, Kunelius, & Kumpu 2010: 23) only 767, or 14 per cent of 5,522 actors who were quoted in newspapers globally, represented scientific expertise, while 38 per cent represented national politics and 10 per cent the transnational political system. The share of civil society and NGO actors was 28 per cent. Of course there were differences within the sample of 18 countries, but the total numbers illustrate that scientists were given less space than expected. A comparison of the data from Copenhagen in 2009 and from Durban in 2011 shows an increase of scientific voices in the media texts (see Appendix), but this change is not as impressive, due to the fact that there was a much lower amount of coverage of these meetings. In Russia, despite a very low coverage, the proportion of voices from science/expertise was substantially larger than the average, while the proportion in Norwegian coverage was near the average.

Pure numbers give only an impression of the coverage. More complex relations appear in journalistic choices made by particular voices and the details revealed. While some scientists criticize media reports about science and technology for inaccuracy and misinterpretations, they also admit it to be a problem of “omitting qualifications or details necessary to place information in a proper perspective” (Nelkin 1995: 145). Scientists are sensitive about scientific qualifications, about the official titles and definitions of those who are designated ‘climate expert.’ They are also worried that not all journalists are good at explaining what kind of scientific background their sources have. One of the respondents in Duarte (2010: 77) commented: “We are really talking about ethics here. Can you defend the use of a professor title or another [academic] title to discuss something that you really have no basis for? One should distinguish between an individual and a researcher’s voice when commenting about climate.” In other words, it is the journalist’s or the newspaper’s obligation to inform the readers what kind of background the sources have, and if he or she is commenting as an expert within a field or as an individual.

According to Stocking (1999), who reviewed several climate related media studies, science is often presented in the media as a triumphant quest for certainty, whereas uncertainties are often explained by complexities of both social and natural sciences, which “may be irreducible, and indeed may not be resolv-

able” (1999: 27). As a result of such a media-driven quest, journalistic accounts of science tend to contain fewer caveats than one finds in science itself; some popularized versions exaggerate the scientific claims or fail to communicate cautionary probabilities and other qualifications. A number of journalists limit themselves to single sources in reporting science stories. “Even in cases where controversy would seem to demand multiple sources, a sizeable proportions of journalists use very few”, writes Stocking (1999: 26). A widespread problem is that science reporting lacks context, historical background and information on whether a new study departs from or extends prior research. Additionally, journalists are more interested in the product, i.e. the crafted results, than the processes behind it (Stocking 1999).

On the other hand, however, journalists can make science appear more uncertain and baffling than most scientists with the relevant expertise believe it to be (Stocking 1999: 28). Sometimes journalists give more attention to the work of scientists, who are highly visible in the scientific community, rather than to the efforts of scientist who are in the minority or who operate on the fringes (Duarte 2010, Eide & Ytterstad 2010). Also journalists have been found to pit scientist against scientist, with little or no discussion of the reason for disagreements, and often without mention of the relative acceptance of the differing views (Stocking 1999: 29). The result is that the coverage of science gives equal, but “[u]nequally deserving, weight to ‘dueling experts’, thus making science appear more controversial” (Dearing, cited in Stocking 1999: *ibid*).

A similar argument had been put forward by Boykoff and Boykoff (2004), who concluded that the US press had been giving equal space to the IPCC results on human induced climate change, and to those who believed in a non-anthropogenic character of changes (see also Antilla 2005). Later Boykoff conducted a new research showing that the US coverage has changed considerably in time (Painter 2011). Boykoff (2007) argued that the false balance has literally disappeared from the US press and that we may now be “flogging a dead norm”. Nevertheless, there is still place for skeptics and even deniers of climate change in the media.

Representing Deniers and Skeptics

As Nelkin (1995) points out, media encourage a widely held belief that science is distinct from politics and stands above the clash of conflicting social values. Individual scientists may be biased, but science as an institution, Nelkin contends, is neutral, it promotes progress and solutions for public affairs (1995: 63). But is this still the case? Climate science and its limitations have now become the focus of a debate about scientific neutrality linked to the political interests regarding the IPCC. In the eyes of IPCC, climate science is meant to be the

basis of political decisions. As Carvalho puts it, “policy-makers often expect scientists to provide answers to problems that are debated in the media and other public arenas, and make a variety of public issues of science to legitimize action or inaction” (2007: 224). Precisely because science has become more public, it has also become more exposed to criticism and contestation. As a result, however, scientific argumentation in the media allows for more diversity.

There has been a heated debate within the journalistic field about the role and space given to the so-called “climate skeptics” and “climate deniers.” We distinguish them as follows. Deniers are the ones who explicitly oppose the IPCC’s main conclusions on anthropogenic causes for climate change. Put differently, they are denying that we are facing irreversible human induced climate change. James Painter (2011) writes that in the view of many climate scientists, some want to be called skeptics when they are really deniers. In other words they are accused of not accepting the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and thus are in denial. A person can be skeptical about the accuracy of IPCC’s reports, or about the scale of impact that climate change will have on our everyday lives. But a skeptic does not deny that climate change is happening. There are deniers without relevant background in climate research, but who still harbor a strong opinion about climate change. For example, in the USA some of the most recognized voices have been funded by fossil fuel industries (see Oreskes and Conway 2010).

The category ‘skeptics,’ however, is rather vague unless further explained. As far as all scientists are in a way skeptics because the scientific process demands continuous questioning, we conceptualize voices as skeptical when, using the words of Brown (cited in Antilla, 2005: 339) they have taken a prominent public position criticizing the existing consensus on climate change and addressing mostly media audiences rather than the scientific community. In Antilla’s study, many quoted skeptics were not from peer-reviewed journals, meaning that the skepticism mostly developed outside established scientific communities. In doing so, media failed to contextualize these views by reporting about international scientific consensus and hence increased public confusion.

The *Telegraph* journalist James Delingpole who wrote that this was “the final nail in the coffin for anthropogenic global warming,” also gave Climategate its name. On November 20, 2009 he wrote in his blog: “When you read those files – including 1,079 emails and 72 documents – you realize why the ‘boffins’² at CRU might have preferred to keep them confidential” (Delingpole 2009). Delingpole is a typical denier of global warming, and his blog has a huge number of followers and readers. This quoted entry received hundreds of comments. About the same time, the CRU’s director Phil Jones had to step aside from his position while the reviewing process was underway. Later, in an interview with *The Sunday Times* Jones told that he “was so traumatized by the global backlash against him that he contemplated suicide” (Girling 2010).³ As Jones admitted, being a scientist he

had no PR training to deal with the scandal: “I was shocked. People said I should go and kill myself. They said that they knew where I lived. They were coming from all over the world” (Girling 2010). The real threat came with Climategate when the newspapers started actively questioning Jones about the issue.

But why did Climategate fail to really turn the tide of the media, and why did the scandal mostly fade away by the time of COP17? Experienced climate journalist Fred Pearce argues (2010) that the stolen emails, though timed to get maximum publicity, did not directly influence the negotiations in Copenhagen, which were about raw politics and not climate science. Pearce refers to the example of Watergate and Richard Nixon to argue that it is often not the crime as such that “gets you in the end”, but the cover-up of the crime (2010: 64). In the case of Climategate the leaks raise questions about the ways the science is performed. Pearce also suggests that too much was taken on trust among colleagues in the cozy world of climate science (Pearce 2010). Thus, the leaked emails revealed researchers’ shared tactics of mutual encouragement and fierce disregard of climate skeptics.

Climate “Realists” in the Norwegian Press

In Norway, skeptics seemed to be more visible in media coverage of COP15 than they were regarding COP13, though they mainly appeared in the letters to the editor (Eide & Ytterstad 2010). One editorial in the tabloid *VG* emphasized that the skeptics should “be heard and taken more seriously,” even though the “vast majority of researchers do agree that climate change is ‘very likely’ due to our behavior and it would be irresponsible to act.”⁴ At least one Norwegian organization called “Klimarealistene” (Climate realists) publicly denies the conclusions of the IPCC about anthropogenic causes of climate change. As the realists position themselves, their organization represents those who “react negatively to the one-sized and massive unilateral message about human-made climate threat which is represented in newspapers, radio and TV, and on the media unwillingness to present the scientific facts telling another story than the one that is politically adopted” (klimarealistene.com, 2011). In our view, this attitude is essential for understanding the overall Norwegian media discourse on science and climate change.

Before the Summit

The first news about Climategate appeared in the regional *BT* (*Bergens Tidende*) under the heading “Scientists falsify and manipulate.”⁵ This claim belongs to Olav Kvalheim, the most cited “climate realist” and professor in chemistry from Bergen. The professor refers to the hacked emails as the *Watergate of Climate*,

and calls the people mentioned in the leaks a “climate mafia.” The newspaper quotes him saying: “This not only shows a lack of ethics and moral, but it is also clear falsification and manipulation of climate science.” Kvalheim argued these manipulations were due to enormous funding and the political motivations of the scientists. When a *BT* journalist replied that some climate skeptics who are politicized and receive money from the oil industry, Kvalheim denied it all. Moreover, he added: “We run our activity based purely on ideals, without any funding from outside. We only want to inform the public with other facts, so they can understand what is really happening with the climate.” In addition, Kvalheim accused Eystein Jansen, director of the Bjercknes Climate Research Center in Bergen, and called him one of the central figures in the climate network, as he negatively labeled it. In line with the principle of balanced reporting, Jansen was given the right to respond. He justified the content of the leaks, by emphasizing that it was based on colloquial exchanges between scientists who had known each other for years. He stressed in return that the hacking was outrageous and the words were taken completely out of context, and hence might be confusing for the public.

In a commentary “Hotter than Watergate” in the same issue of *BT*, journalist Frode Bjerkestrand noted that it is no coincidence that the hacking and the publication of the emails on the Internet happened just before the climate summit. He wrote that “such spicy news is bound to get a lot of attention in the media, and will then leave behind other, more urgent, issues, like the greatest challenge mankind will be facing in the coming centuries [climate change].” Bjerkestrand also criticized the method used: “Hacking can hardly be called a scientific method”.

Later, a small story in the broadsheet *Aftenposten* reported that the hacking would affect the climate summit in Copenhagen, the IPCC will start its own reviewing processes on the matter, and the head of the CRU Phil Jones was asked to step down during that time. The article quoted the head of the IPCC, Dr. Rajendra Pachauri: “We will certainly go into the whole lot and then we will take a position on it. We certainly do not want to brush anything under the carpet.” This statement was circulated by many media around the world. Mohammed al-Sabban, the head Saudi-Arabian negotiator at COP15, emphasized that the leaked information would have consequences for the outcome of the negotiations. The tabloid *VG* contributed to this pre-summit skeptical tone by suggesting in an editorial the necessity of the reviewing of the IPCC, and implying that this would be a reasonable investigation.⁶

During the Summit

During the summit, the three newspapers included in the analysis were more concerned with the summit itself, the negotiations and whether the big powers

would be able to reach a binding agreement. All in all, there was some pessimism in the coverage, since it was long uncertain whether the US president, Obama would attend the summit. There were several stories about the Nobel Peace Prize, which Obama received on December 10, in Oslo. On December 7, 2009, *Aftenposten* launched separate climate change pages with the heading: “Hot Globe.”

The tabloid *VG* reported very little on the leaks from CRU. There were many letters to the editors published during and after the summit, but these were not about Climategate in particular. Rather, the central theme was a dispute between Siri Kalvig, one of the most famous meteorologists in Norway, and the “climate realists.” Kalvig and some of her colleagues started a tour named “Climate Clever” in 2009. They traveled the length and breadth of Norway, gave speeches about climate change, and shared their knowledge with schoolteachers. At the same time, Kalvig actively disputed with the leaders of the organization “Climate realists” between November 28, 2009 and January 6, 2010. Some of the notable headlines of that period include “Climate defiance,”⁷ “Ignorant Kalvig,”⁸ “Moral corruption,”⁹ and “About moral armament.”¹⁰ Several of the letters to the editor featured quite critical remarks by “climate realists” towards Kalvig, who had to respond that the realists’ organization neither possessed the knowledge nor the background to undermine climate change science. Besides this dispute, *VG* wrote extensively about Obama and the Nobel Peace Prize.

After the Summit

After the summit, several analytical articles portrayed what happened in Copenhagen. Most editorials and comments signed by the journalists stated disappointment with the outcome of COP15 and the shortcomings of its final document – The Copenhagen Accord. One *BT* text headlined as “Re-start of the climate debate” concluded pessimistically: “After the Copenhagen summit the mistrust in the climate debate has become striking. Nobody is gaining from this, at least not our descendants.”¹¹ Also a story and a commentary in *Aftenposten* summarized a range of attitudes towards the leaked scientific scandal following the COP15.

Initially, a long *Aftenposten* feature story, from 25 February 2010 emphasized: “In just a couple of months the tone of the climate debate has changed, in Norway and abroad. What happened?” The text presented the Climategate along with the other gates: Glaciergate about the melting glaciers in Himalaya, Africagate about the dry crops in Africa, and Sea-level gate, also called Watergate, about whether the sea level will rise two meters by the year 2100. Several pictures of politicians were placed right above the headline, showing that the Climategate is as much a political as it is a scientific issue. Before the skeptics of the IPCC used to be called “reality deniers” or “corrupt,” and even the word

“saboteur” has been used as a synonym. This article, however, included a list of the arguments of the so-called climate skeptics.¹²

Later, in a letter to the editor in *Aftenposten*, Erik Solheim, the Minister of Environment and Development, responded to the story. He argued that the climate skeptics exaggerated singular mistakes and increased scientific uncertainty in an attempt to support their own position:

Skepticism and criticism is a natural part of the research. But the IPCC’s uncertainties mainly apply to how large and rapid the climate changes will be that we will have to face in the future and not whether climate changes are human-made or not. The errors in the IPCC reports do not undermine the main conclusions that climate changes are already happening and that they will have huge consequences for millions of people.¹³

This example demonstrates how the subject of climate change becomes increasingly politicized. In the Norwegian coverage, we can see how skepticism becomes more visible, and even deniers get their share of public attention. On the whole, the media avoided stimulating controversies via journalist-initiated stories, but they recognized the right of skeptics and deniers to speak on the subject in debates, through letters to the editors. Thus, “climate realists” continued their harsh attacks on meteorologist Siri Kalvig well into the spring of 2010.

Enhanced Skepticism of the Russian Press

The level of Russian coverage of the climate summits has been much lower than in most other countries (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu, 2010). Also, the scientific discourse about the causes of global warming has been continuously overshadowed by political and economic narratives (Yagodin 2010). These two factors somehow explain why the Russian press did not engage actively in the controversies of Climategate. The scandal was neither received as a sensation nor was it rejected as a misleading manipulation. Consequently, the hacking incident did not become a moment of revelation for skeptics and deniers. The press was already quite skeptical and at times open for deniers. Again, as in the Norwegian case, three distinct periods of coverage make up the case.

Before the Summit

The only story in two Russian newspapers before the summit was one in the elite *Kommersant*, entitled, “It is getting hot around global warming.”¹⁴ An intriguing subheading: “Hackers exposed deliberate manipulations of climatologists” set the tone for the whole article. No doubt it was a big news story, as it appeared at the first page of *Kommersant* and occupied more than a half of

the second page. In addition, the newspaper listed opinions of public officials and prominent scholars about the scandal. Although *Kommersant* published a number of opposing opinions, the skeptical attitudes about the seriousness of the climate issue prevailed. Two out of seven interviews clearly supported the idea of anthropogenic global warming. Both, representing the field of science, connected the possible skeptical opinions with business interests. Aleksey Yablokov from the Russian Academy of Science stressed as a consequence of climate change the fact of melting ice in the Arctic and a thirty per cent death rate among newborn seals. Another couple of experts showed less certainty, arguing neither for nor against the urgency of the issue. The remaining three experts were clearly skeptical.

It has been common for the Russian coverage to frame the climate stories as related mostly to economics and politics (Yagodin 2010). “It is getting hot around global warming” was also published in the newspaper’s section on “economic policy.” Journalist Dmitry Butrin described the details of the “obvious manipulation with data, public opinion and opinion of the scientific community,” demonstrating confidence in the revelatory effect of the leakage. The author uses the leaks to successively expose the “tricks” used by IPCC leaders to mold a certain theory of global warming. As journalistic principles require, the blamed side got its chance to reply. However, the IPCC response to the scandal appears to be rather weak. The voices of the climatologists seem to be downplayed as their defense is based on claims about the “campaign of skeptics” and that accusation of “unknown hackers” was an example of tentatiousness. The journalist readily shifts the scandal into the political field and the field of economic interests. Thus, the weak counter-arguments and avoidance of explaining scientific uncertainties guide the story into a sphere where controversies look more natural. In conclusion, Butrin emphasizes that Russian scientists were not involved in the scandalous “tricks.”

During the Summit

The theme of tricks continued in later publications. A *Kommersant* article “We will not let them trick us” showed a group of prominent scientists meeting President Medvedev just before the summit in Copenhagen.¹⁵ A subheading emphasizes the character of the event as “scientific training” for the president. Medvedev put forward the subject of scientific skepticism and quickly moved to the realm of economics: “Regardless of the accuracy of scientific predictions about warming, it is necessary to introduce modern technologies of energy-efficient economy.” Scientists agreed, “Overestimation of negative consequences is the commercialization of problems.” The forum, meant to be a scientific consultation, eventually turned into a debate on money. The article does not question the format of the event; it simply accepts the fact

of mutual agreement between the country's political leader and the scientific community. Shifts towards non-scientific discourses were also common for the popular press. A reporter for *MK* wrote ironically about scientific language and presented a group of leading scientists as allied with politicians rather than as independent experts.¹⁶

A strong argument against global warming, close to denial, appeared in the *Kommersant* article "British scientists underestimated the climate of Russia."¹⁷ Russia's Institute of Economic Analysis reported mistakes in the CRU measurements of global temperatures. Allegedly, climatologists manipulated the results by disregarding some of the colder places – the Russian-based meteorological stations. In that story the newspaper did not recur to the journalistic tradition of balanced reporting. Domestic analytical reporting was taken for granted as a legitimate criticism of the 'false' idea of global warming. Another attempt to deny global warming appeared in *MK*.¹⁸ The newspaper did not make its own story, but relied on the sources from the British press where the scandal with the hacked emails was used as an argument for deniers.

Finally, *Kommersant* described the summit with the title "No restraint for weather has been defined."¹⁹ The article was straightforward – the fact of global warming is undeniable and it has to be fought. However, in the text the phenomenon was referred to as "expected global warming" rather than something happening right now. Also the phrase "anthropogenic global warming" was used three times with quotation marks, as if the journalists (the article was co-authored) considered this saying belonging to someone else and was not integral to their personal belief. Alternatively, the use of quotation marks could mean irony or unusual usage of the phrase. The last piece of the article brought up two skeptical arguments, the first about the role of Climategate in discrediting the very fact of "anthropogenic global warming," and the other, the scandal's contribution to the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations.

While pre-summit coverage consisted of only one text that appeared in relation to Climategate, COP15 received more media attention with 19 stories from *Kommersant* and 13 from *MK*. However, this quantity of stories is still low in terms of the global scale of the summit and compared to results in other countries. The qualitative findings, though, suggest a proportionally larger role devoted to science in Russian journalistic texts, with 23 per cent of the total number of voices during COP15, and approximately 50 per cent during COP17, but as mentioned, the total numbers are small.

After the Summit

Two articles on the science of climate change appeared in *MK* and *Kommersant* respectively, shortly after the COP15. *Kommersant* took an abstract economic perspective on climate changes,²⁰ whereas the popular *MK* touched upon the

consequences for people's everyday life.²¹ An opinionated column in *Kommersant* summarized climate perspectives for the Russian business people who "had not seen reasons to prepare for the future hot weather." A new set of data from the Russian meteorological experts proved the IPCC conclusions to be correct. Although the newspaper reminded us about the Climategate manipulations, the topic was framed less critically than in the pre-summit article.

The popular *MK* touched upon the consequences of climate change for the everyday life of the people. The article manifests the logic of climate coverage in Russia – low interest and political perspective. Although the article initially states the facts of ongoing global warming, in the end we are warned against any hasty conclusions. Arkady Dvorkovich, an economic advisor of Russia's President says: "According to our scientists, whose opinion was reflected in the climate doctrine, the share of human impact on climate change remains uncertain and difficult to measure." Despite some opposing opinions in the article, this particular view, expressed by the state representative, conveys the dominant ideology of the Russian coverage.

Conclusions

Our overview of the Norwegian and Russian cases places the spotlight on those moments when national media either reinforced prevailing views of climate change by stressing the leaks of scientific correspondence, or, on the other hand, by increasing publicity for science and scientific evidence. Despite cultural and political differences (economically both Norway and Russia are close in a sense of major reliance on natural resources) the two journalistic systems share one similarity – skeptics are not excluded from media discourse on climate change; to the contrary, in both Norway and Russia, skeptics are endowed with sensible symbolic value. The differences, however, may be found in underlying principles of this non-exclusion. The three Norwegian newspapers seem to adhere to a modified model of balance by encouraging debate for and against the scientific consensus. Russian journalism, although it could also be driven by values of balancing opposing opinions, from our analysis appears more closely connected with the interests of economic and political elites. In both cases, climate science played a secondary role throughout the coverage, giving way to politics. In Russia we found state politics regulating national bargaining in climate negotiations, while in Norway, the debate was driven by the politics of the movement of "climate realists".

After Climategate, there seems to be an increase in skeptical voices in the climate coverage in the Norwegian press, compared to earlier studies (Duarte 2010, Eide & Ytterstad 2010). Still, natural scientists, both from Norway and abroad, are the most supportive group towards the IPCC. The largest genre re-

flecting skepticism in the climate coverage is not the news articles, but rather the letters to the editors, demonstrating public involvement in the debate. Climate skeptics or deniers write a large portion of the letters to the editors. In Russia, the Climategate affair received – in relative terms – more media attention than in other countries, partly because it was an issue directly related to Russia (the emails were leaked from a Russian server), but also because ultimately the scandal was of benefit to Russia's climate change skepticism (Yagodin 2010). Yet, even in Russia, Climategate was not represented as sensational, perhaps because there was no need to stimulate a skepticism that was already rooted in national politics.

The high percentage of scientists in the Russian materials may be misleading, given that there were few stories and the scientists were normally represented as allied with other actors. Indeed, the press has been continuously producing climate stories in which politicians appeared at the forefront. Thus, mass media simplified their analytical role by pushing the scientific debate behind the political scene. The claim by the Greenpeace representative that “science in Russia supports energy elites”²² in a way raises the same concern about the role of mass media.

In Russia skepticism seemed dominant even prior to the Climategate, and scientists were portrayed subject to official state policies; in Norway the openness for alternative views intensified the scientific debate. Here the “climate realists” moved into the foreground. The remaining question is whether the media, due to their professional approaches to controversies and scandals, have contributed to an increase in skepticism or uncertainty by the way in which they have covered this alleged scandal. We have seen how journalists simply avoided uncomfortable uncertainties of science by shifting focus to mainly national political interests. As the Russian case showed journalists tend to choose sides rather than present a balanced picture of diverse opinions that would supposedly be confusing for readers.

In 2011, Climategate-2 failed to maintain the pace of scientific criticism raised in 2009. The new attempt to undermine a more or less established consensus about global warming seems to have passed practically unnoticed by our selection of newspapers. Neither did we find any serious evidence of denial in the press. So, did Climategate just represent a temporary confusion? There is no doubt that the science of climate change will continue to be one of the crucial media subjects in the future. The scandal exposed the issue of scientific transparency and a threat of further politicization of the climate debate. In addition, leaks will in future be no less important to journalism. These factors combined, we might be envisaging a future of continuous turbulence in climate journalism in which the international scientific consensus will not necessarily be followed by a global media consensus.

Notes

1. See "The Independent Climate Change Review": <http://www.cce-review.org/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf>
2. Slang word for persons engaged in technical research.
3. *The Sunday Times*, Feb. 9, 2010.
4. *BT*, Nov. 24, 2009.
5. *BT*, Nov. 24, 2009.
6. *VG*, Dec. 06, 2009.
7. *VG*, Nov. 28, 2009.
8. *VG*, Dec. 02, 2009.
9. *VG*, Dec. 06, 2009.
10. *VG*, Dec. 11, 2009.
11. *BT*, Feb. 2, 2010.
12. In a nutshell, skepticism was shown to stem from one of the three possible explanations: 1) the allegation about global warming is the biggest conspiracy of our times that can be compared with a religious belief, there is no such thing as global warming; 2) there is global warming, but the changes in the climate are based on natural changes, and not human-induced; 3) there is global warming, but parts or everything related to it is human-made, and we do not have the means and economy to reverse these developments without having to reduce the welfare standards of the human beings. *Aftenposten* Feb. 25, 2010.
13. *Aftenposten*, March 3, 2010.
14. *Kommersant*, Nov. 24, 2009.
15. *Kommersant*, Dec. 16, 2009.
16. *MK*, Dec. 16, 2009.
17. *Kommersant*, Dec. 16, 2009.
18. *MK*, Dec. 8, 2009.
19. *Kommersant*, Dec. 21, 2009.
20. *Kommersant*, Jan. 18, 2010.
21. *MK*, Jan. 14, 2010.
22. *MK*, Jan. 14, 2010.

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Appendix

Voices: Durban (COP17) and Copenhagen (COP15) Compared (%)

		National political system	Trans- national political system	Civil society	Business	Science, expertise	Other
Australia	COP17	57	19	5	0	14	5
	COP15	57	7	9	6	20	2
Bangladesh	COP17	41	6	14	8	26	6
	COP15	38	13	28	1	14	6
Brazil	COP17	50	27	12	2	8	2
	COP15	53	18	11	1	10	6
Canada	COP17	40	4	31	1	19	5
	COP15	39	9	28	6	14	4
Chile	COP17	53	12	24	0	6	6
	COP15	47	9	17	0	23	4
China	COP17	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	COP15	38	18	16	2	25	1
Denmark	COP17	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	COP15	21	3	53	9	7	7
Egypt	COP17	29	29	14	14	0	14
	COP15	33	18	22	2	16	10
Finland	COP17	37	1	33	13	15	0
	COP15	39	7	31	3	16	4
Germany	COP17	52	9	15	4	20	0
	COP15	47	12	18	2	17	4
Indonesia	COP17	36	30	27	0	2	4
	COP15	42	7	26	5	17	4
Israel	COP17	13	27	13	0	33	14
	COP15	44	14	8	8	11	14
Norway	COP17	57	2	24	2	13	2
	COP15	39	3	33	7	14	4
Pakistan	COP17	33	13	31	2	19	2
	COP15	57	16	7	1	7	11
Russia	COP17	0	0	25	25	50	0
	COP15	53	9	9	4	26	0
South Africa	COP17	31	13	20	23	13	0
	COP15	41	23	15	9	12	1
Sweden	COP17	20	6	16	2	36	20
	COP15	27	9	43	6	12	3
USA	COP17	34	9	20	4	22	10
	COP15	43	8	17	6	19	7
TOTAL	COP17	37	10	21	7	19	5
	COP15	38	10	28	5	14	5

Chapter 10

“Really, Fundamentally Wrong” *Media Coverage of the Business Campaign against the Australian Carbon Tax*

Philip Chubb

Studies of the coverage of Copenhagen and Durban show clearly that Australia has been a special case in that the summit coverage has been driven very powerfully by domestic voices (see Chubb & Bacon, 2010). These voices show the highly politicized nature of climate change as an issue in the Australian public sphere. In Copenhagen, the average number of domestic voices around the global sample was 55 per cent of all quoted news actors, but in Australia, the figure was much higher, 64 per cent, which reflected the centrality and the divisive nature of the issue in domestic political struggles. Australia’s summit coverage is a special case and as such deserves a closer look. When examined in greater detail, the Australian voices pitched to the domestic audience differed drastically from Copenhagen meetings to Durban (Table 10.1). In 2009, political actors dominated the coverage but other sectors of Australian public life were included and activated.

Table 10.1. Distribution of Domestic Voices from Durban and Copenhagen Coverage

	COP 15		COP 17	
Domestic national political actor	124	66 %	19	90 %
Domestic NGO	6	3 %	0	0 %
Domestic grassroots actor	5	3 %	0	0 %
Domestic industry/business	12	6 %	0	0 %
Domestic scientist or expert (natural science)	20	11 %	0	0 %
Domestic scientist or expert (social science and humanities)	5	3 %	0	0 %
Domestic scientist or expert (economics)	3	2 %	0	0 %
Domestic scientist or expert (other than mentioned)	13	7 %	2	10 %
Total	188	100 %	21	100 %

Considering the central position of climate change in Australian politics since 2007, the drastic decline in the amount of coverage from Copenhagen to Durban seems at first surprising. The number of stories dropped to a mere 8

per cent in Durban compared to Copenhagen (cf. table 4.1), and along with the drop in coverage both the number and diversity of voices in the Durban coverage shrank markedly.

The Durban figures should *not*, however, be interpreted as evidence of a less intensive carbon debate in 2011, for the facts show the opposite to be true. In Australia in 2011 there was a fierce battle and an extremely politicized landscape that centred around one of the world's first carbon tax proposals. In light of this, the present chapter's analysis of this debate, which took place in the immediate run-up to Durban, helps to explain the slender coverage. The reasons for the media's scant attention to Durban revolve mainly around the hot lobbying about the proposed carbon tax in Australia and the ideological role that many of the key newspapers took on the issue. Durban was seen as irrelevant to the main game, which was the carbon tax proposal. Two years earlier, by contrast, the Copenhagen coverage was notably extensive because it was seen as likely to have a bearing on how the intense domestic debate of that time played out. One of the outcomes of the empty rhetoric, squabbling and grandstanding of the world's leaders at Copenhagen, which broke up amid angry scenes after being dramatically unsuccessful in achieving a legally binding international commitment to limit emissions, was to reduce faith in international decision-making on climate change.

By contrast, Durban in December 2011 ended well for the Australian government. A relieved Prime Minister Julia Gillard embraced the unexpected international agreement to move to a single, global, legally binding replacement for the dying Kyoto Protocol. She hailed the development as a "remarkable step forward" that showed the world was "acting on climate change" (Cubby 2011: 1). It had been a long journey for the government, whose plans were thrown into disarray and then suspended for nearly a year after Copenhagen.¹

Having revived its sense of purpose, the government had spent 2011 battling a ferocious political, business and media campaign designed to destroy its proposed legislation to impose a carbon tax, which nevertheless eventually became a reality on 8 November, after barely scraping through a deeply divided Parliament. The anti-tax campaign that dominated the media in 2011 was shaped by the disappointment of Copenhagen. The spectacle of abject failure in the Danish capital, communicated through saturation media coverage (Chubb & Bacon 2010), was a turning point in Australia. It added enormously to the momentum of opponents of climate change mitigation. The Copenhagen shambles created golden opportunities for political, business and media opponents to claim with deadly force, if not accuracy, that action in Australia was jeopardising the nation's international competitiveness and future prosperity, that the government was disadvantaging the country in the face of international inertia (Arup 2011). This post-Copenhagen argument achieved great currency in

a media that often seemed to have lost sight of the distinction between vested interest and the national interest.

The campaign against the tax represented a change in the way lobbying, as conducted by the fossil fuel industry, is done in Australia. In August 2011, the chief executive of the Minerals Council of Australia was trying to raise more money for the council's media campaign against the carbon tax, and in doing so, appeared to redefine the business of making public policy. Mitch Hooke, a career lobbyist, wrote to members of the Minerals Council saying, "The board recognises that over the period of the past four years, there has been a profound shift in the manner of public policy development and implementation. The new paradigm is one of public contest through the popular media more so than rational, considered, effective consultation and debate" (Editorial *Canberra Times* 2011). The "new paradigm" is the creation of cashed-up lobby groups such as Hooke's using the media to advance their interests in the knowledge that they will be treated uncritically by some outlets. The government's adviser on climate change, Professor Ross Garnaut, also noted a transformation in the tone of the "public contest". He addressed the National Press Club on 17 March 2011, saying, "I think ... the current discourse is less civilised than that in the old political culture. It's noisier, more ignorant . . . people are more comfortable with shouting ignorant slogans" (Garnaut 2011).

In 2011 many business groups ran a campaign to seize control of the agenda. This depended for its success on the media overlooking the fundamental motivation of corporations – profit – and treating corporate views as having a claim to truth. Australia is not alone in grappling with the issues raised by corporations claiming to have moral standing and media enthusiastically backing them. Writing in the *New York Times* in October 2011, Gary Gutting observed that in debates over public policy the immense financial resources of corporations give them a privileged position – especially through lobbying – to argue not for what they think is the truth but for what promises to promote their profits. "It's a sign of corporations' power that their views are often treated on a par with those of advocacy groups (from the American Civil Liberties Union to the National Rifle Association) that are, at least to some serious extent, arguing for what their members actually believe. In debates on any issue affecting them, the arguments that corporations advance receive extraordinary consideration, even though we know full well that corporate views express not convictions but self-interest" (Gutting 2011).

Durban lent support to the Australian government claim of acting in the national interest in line with international decisions. The Australian scheme is intended to provide a transition into an emissions trading scheme by 2015 and the Durban outcome seems likely to improve the prospects of the carbon market and carbon prices. One online newsletter quoted Abyd Karmali, the head of carbon trading at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch, saying the

accelerated timetable of reaching a new global deal by 2015, with emission reduction targets covering a much broader set of countries, was like a “Viagra shot” (Parkinson 2011). The Australian carbon tax was based on the assumption that carbon credits would be available on international markets, and the Durban outcome made this appear certain (Morton 2011). Yet another welcome benefit to Australian politicians desperate for good news was that in South Africa there was plenty of goodwill and PR kudos for them. There was perhaps even a sense that Australia could “put pressure on other countries to commit to binding targets,” according to one online commentator (Armstrong 2011). But this was barely covered in the mainstream media and did not diminish their resistance to the carbon tax.

The Australian experience in 2011 followed instances elsewhere of government action against climate change being wrecked by industry lobbying. Newell and Paterson (1998), for example, have drawn attention to the case of attempts by the Dutch government to introduce a unilateral levy in the early 1990s. Heavy industry (as well as some oil companies, such as Shell) threatened to relocate and transfer new investments abroad. In another example from the 1990s, European Union proposals for a community-wide carbon tax “spurred the mass ranks” of industrialists to mount their most powerful offensive against an EC proposal. The EC Environment Commissioner described the campaign as a “violent assault”. The *Economist* claimed that the tax was subject to the “most ferocious lobbying” ever seen in Brussels (Newell & Paterson 1998). The Australian case is distinguished from these earlier episodes by two important facts: one is that another 20 years of scientific warnings of the dangers of climate change had accumulated; but two is that the growing weight of the science had been accompanied by a rise in the level of scepticism.

Between 24 February 2011, when Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced the government intended to introduce a carbon tax, and 10 July 2011, when the details of the new tax arrangements were made clear, the parliamentary opposition and elements of the business community and media found unity in a campaign that was designed to ensure that when people thought about carbon tax – and the saturation media coverage made it impossible to ignore – their thinking would be influenced by dire predictions of economic doom. A study of the Australian media in 2011 throws up some compelling observations regarding the forces unleashed in society when a government decides to influence energy choices through striking directly against polluting industries. There are lessons to be learned from this experience, especially as other nations are struggling to sharpen their focus in order to better deal with climate change, and in particular with funding the massive requirements of the International Green Climate Fund for supporting developing nations.

As Boykoff and Smith (2010) have noted, actors seek to access and utilize mass media sources in order to shape, or frame perceptions of environmental

issues contingent on their perspectives and interests. These "framings" are intended to contextualize as well as fix interpretive categories. The frames are intended to assemble and privilege certain understandings and interpretations over others and the processes play a role in setting agendas for climate governance. This chapter examines the ways in which three influential daily newspapers, one tabloid and two prestige publications, framed the carbon tax proposal during the height of the business campaign to destroy it. The publications are *The Australian*, *The Age* and *The Herald Sun* (see details below). Data show that those sections of industry campaigning against the tax successfully seized the agenda. Some newspapers failed to report the views of a number of major companies that supported the tax and they sometimes mentioned pro-tax advocacy groups just to attack them. Those chosen to speak were provided with legitimacy and they became "primary definers" of the campaign's stance and tone (Young and Dugas 2011).

Carbon Sunday

On Sunday 10 July 2011 Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced a reform designed to transform Australia's economy and reposition the country as a leader among those nations seriously committed to taking action against climate change. Within a year, she announced, big polluting companies would pay a carbon tax starting at \$23 per tonne of carbon emissions and rising to \$29 by the time plans for an emissions trading scheme came to fruition in 2015 (Grattan et al 2011). The new tax was variously described in the media as a "revolution", a "massive gamble", "politically risky" and "a mindboggling combination of insanity and stupidity".

Before we examine in detail the business campaign against the government's carbon tax as covered by three major newspapers, it is necessary to describe the political context in which the debate took place. The politics of climate change in Australia are deeply partisan, played out as they are against the background of Australia as one of the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gases and the biggest per capita emitter among the most populous 130 nations (Tiffen 2010). Australia gets 80 per cent of its electricity from coal fired power stations and coal is the nation's largest export. The reliance on coal has translated into deep divisions in politics and business that have led to some striking political dramas. Climate change was an issue when Prime Minister Howard was defeated at the 2007 poll and then became a big factor in his successor, Kevin Rudd, losing his job in 2010. Two opposition Liberal Party leaders (Messrs, Nelson and Turnbull) were overthrown primarily because of their views on climate change. Current Prime Minister Julia Gillard and opposition leader Tony Abbott are locked in a colossal battle over carbon pricing which makes it very

likely it will be the major issue at the next election, due in 2013. This means that climate change will probably end the career of one of them. Governing Labor Party MPs swept Gillard to power as Prime Minister on 24 June 2010. Rudd's and the government's popularity in the electorate had plunged when, in the preceding April, he had announced that plans for an emissions trading scheme would be shelved in the face of fierce political opposition from the conservative parties and global inaction at Copenhagen. Gillard rapidly called an election for 21 August and during the campaign she told Channel 10 – in words that have subsequently been used repeatedly to taunt and abuse her as a liar – that, “There will be no carbon tax under the government I lead. What we will do is we will tackle the challenge of climate change” (Morton & Arup 2010: 1). She repeated this commitment two days before the election.

The election was a fierce contest that ended in the first parliament without a clear majority since 1940. Negotiations with Greens and then six crossbenchers who held the balance of power continued for 17 days. Eventually Gillard successfully concluded agreements resulting in a 76-74 margin. Then on 24 February 2011, six months after Labor's brush with defeat at the August election, the government and the Greens developed a firm policy to pursue a carbon tax in 2012 as an interim measure to evolve into emissions trading in 2015-2017. The scheme announced by Gillard and Greens leader Bob Brown was ultimately supported by the four independents. It would force major polluters to buy a permit for each tonne of carbon dioxide emitted from 1 July 2012. The announcement sparked heated debate in Parliament, with Julia Gillard declaring, “I do not believe that Australia needs to lead the world on climate change, but I also don't believe that we can afford to be left behind.” Few details were released and the most contentious decisions – the tax starting price, how much it would increase each year, the amount of compensation for coal power plants and whether to include transport emissions were yet to be discussed. Opposition leader Tony Abbott saw a big opportunity to advance his political fortunes. His call for a people's revolt was followed by ugly demonstrations opposing the tax, with protesters carrying placards reading “Ju-liar” and “Brown's Bitch”. The campaign against the tax was mounted in the highly charged context of a hung parliament, a broken promise and an opposition leader committed to relentless negativity. The media coverage soon became enmeshed in the intensity of the broader political and business debate, helping to craft and fuel the opposition.

The Role of the Media

The media played an important role in influencing public perceptions of the impact of the carbon tax on industry and employment. First, most citizens'

knowledge of big business is gained through the media. Second, the media set the agenda, insofar as the prominence of an issue in the media influences the significance the public attaches to it. Third, the way the media frame information is important because it enables them to suggest whether and why an issue is important, who is responsible and what might be the consequences. Fourth, the media play an important role in the public perception of risk, particularly risks that are unknown, unobservable and that have a high catastrophic potential (Dirikx & Gelders 2008). One such risk is that of major economic damage as predicted during the campaign against the carbon tax. This chapter examines the carbon tax content in the *Australian*, the *Age* and the *Herald Sun* between 24 February 2011 and 11 July 2011, which is the period during which the campaign against the carbon tax was at its height. It seeks to find out how the debate was framed, including, for example, whether the coverage was weighted in support of the position of some elements of the business community as opposed to others. The analysis also considers whether different ideological standpoints were reflected in the reporting (Dirikx & Gelders, 2008). A feature of the Australian media is the concentration of its newspaper ownership. The largest company by far is Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd, which owns seven of 11 national and capital city dailies, with four of these papers being the only daily in its city. The News Ltd papers include the *Australian* (a national daily) and the *Herald Sun* (a Melbourne daily). A second company, Fairfax Media, owns all but one of the other newspapers, including the *Age* (Melbourne). These are the three newspapers chosen for analysis². The *Age* targets affluent readers mostly in Melbourne's eastern and southern suburbs and is generally liberal on political and social issues. The *Herald Sun* is a tabloid that demographically targets the less affluent working class readership, mostly in Melbourne's western and northern suburbs, and tends to be conservative on political and social issues. The *Australian* is a national broadsheet that targets an affluent readership, primarily in the major cities along Australia's eastern seaboard. All are influential, although political scientist Robert Manne's view of the *Australian* has widespread support: "... the *Australian* is...the only newspaper that is read by virtually all members of the political class, a group that includes politicians, leading public servants, business people and the most politically engaged citizens. Even those who loathe the paper understand that they cannot afford to ignore it" (Manne 2011: 5). The focus on the two broadsheet newspapers is because they are strong agenda setters, providing the research framework for other media, including television, radio, Internet and tabloid newspapers. They are indicators of media trends (Rick 2011). The *Herald Sun*, meanwhile, is the country's biggest selling newspaper.

The Study

The three newspapers were searched, in the period between 24 February, 2011 and 11 July, 2011, in the Newsbank database for the words ‘carbon tax’, or ‘carbon price’ and ‘climate’. The articles retrieved in that search were then evaluated to determine whether they were predominantly about the views of Australian business regarding the government’s carbon tax plans. A total of 410 articles met this criterion. The *Australian* had 219 articles, the *Age* 132 and the *Herald Sun* 59. The articles were characterised as being in favour of the government’s carbon tax proposal, opposed or neutral (the application of these criteria was checked continuously). The results are shown in table 10.2.

Table 10.2. Attitudes of Stories about Carbon Tax in the Three Australian Newspapers (24 February, 2011 – 11 July, 2011)

	For	Against	Neutral	Total
Australian	29	152	38	219
Age	37	52	43	132
Herald Sun	4	48	7	59
Total	70	252	88	410

In the two broadsheets the majority of these articles were in the news sections (147 in the *Australian* and 78 in the *Age*) while almost half of the *Herald Sun*’s articles (26) were in the business pages. Of the *Australian* stories, 60 appeared in the business pages and of the *Age*, 42. The stories that appeared in the news pages were often extremely visible, with 42 of the stories in the *Australian* and 18 of the *Age* stories appearing on page 1. Only 4 *Herald Sun* stories enjoyed page one treatment. In the broadsheets in particular the stories were also very prominent, with almost half of them being longer than 600 words. It is through their selection of sources and how they position them within their stories that journalists partly determine the visibility and political influence of individuals and groups in the public sphere (Schlesinger 1990, Erikson 1989). The voices quoted first in the stories under study were predominantly business people, with a total of 187, plus 14 union voices, which were almost always on the same side as the businesses. The companies, industry associations and unions quoted as the first voice represented mining and manufacturing and were overwhelmingly opposed to the government’s plan to introduce a carbon tax. The disparity was especially evident in the News Ltd papers, with the first voices in the *Australian* being opposed in 102 cases and in favour in eight. In the *Herald Sun* these figures were 23 and two and in the *Age* 32 and nine. The same pattern is evident in the general news pages where the companies, industry associations and unions are quoted as the first voice in stories. Furthermore, in virtually all of the stories where a business or union

voice was first, and the story involved a mention on page 1, the voices were opposed to the government's plans. This is particularly so in the *Australian*, where the figures were 17 against and one for. It is clear that the industries opposed to the carbon tax thoroughly dominated the news coverage. What is not yet clear from the above analysis is the breadth and threatening tone of their antagonism. This is perhaps captured through a selection of *Herald Sun* and *Australian* headlines:

Ruin looms on tax (Herald Sun, March 23, 2011)

Industry warns tax will hit your food bill (Herald Sun, April 19, 2011)

Carbon slug on housing – Industry compo call (Herald Sun, April 21, 2011)

Power chief's warning: YOU'LL PAY FOR THIS MESS (Herald Sun, May 23, 2011)

Tax attack widens – Building chiefs warn carbon costs will sting (Herald Sun, May 30, 2011)

Plan will damage our industry, say farmers (Herald Sun, May 31, 2011)

Carbon tax 'to hit carmakers' (Herald Sun, June 9, 2011)

Tax could double price of power (Australian, February 26, 2011)

Full cost would cripple companies – CLIMATE GAMBLE (Australian, February 26, 2011)

Doom the only carbon tax certainty (Australian March 12, 2011)

Corporate leaders warn of sovereign risk and breakdown in trust (Australian, March 16, 2011)

The Invisible Debate

A reading of non-mainstream media, mostly blogs and climate change newsletters, along with a small number of articles in the newspapers included in this study, provided the names of many big companies that supported the government's plans. Despite the size and influence wielded by many of them their views received very little coverage and, in one case, a major bank complained of being seriously misrepresented by the *Australian*. Companies that supported the carbon tax proposal included two of Australia's biggest banks – Westpac and NAB – the national carrier, Qantas, energy companies AGL and Origin, BP, GE, transport giant Linfox and many others. Despite their national and international importance, the carbon tax position of none of these companies received more than a small handful of mentions. Some did not appear in the period under review at all. These major companies also were used only extremely rarely to "balance" the oppositional claims of the more prominently featured industries, companies and groups criticising the government proposal.

The debate was conducted as though the opponents of the government were speaking on behalf of all of business. When some of the wilder claims were made by, for example, the coal industry, balance was hard to find (ABC Media Watch, 2011a).

One of the companies most active in the campaign in support of the government was global energy giant GE. On 24 February GE issued a media release welcoming the government's announcement as being necessary to tackle carbon emissions and the threat of climate change. Then on 13 April 2011, the company was joined by a number of others from a range of industries to issue a clear statement backing the government. The organisations, including AGL, Linfox, Fujitsu, BP and IKEA, represented a diverse range of industries including infrastructure, IT, energy, capital, construction and resources. On 16 May, GE released the results of a survey it commissioned showing that Australian business was ready to move to a low-carbon economy but that an unclear regulatory environment was hampering progress. The survey, of 131 senior executives across a broad mix of industries, found that more than half (54 %) felt their organisation was ready for a low-carbon future, with the vast majority (70 %) already implementing strategies to reduce their own carbon emissions. Then on 26 May, GE issued the results of a report it commissioned that revealed it was possible for economies to reduce carbon emissions while maintaining economic growth and prosperity and that Australia was lagging behind its trading partners in achieving this.

GE's campaign to balance coal and manufacturing achieved little coverage in the main news, business or opinion pages of the newspapers under study and virtually none in the *Australian*. The *Age* ran inside stories on 14 and 16 April and again on 16 May. The *Herald Sun* ran two short news articles in the business section on 11 April and 16 May. But this was more than balanced soon after by an opinion piece from staff columnist Terry McCrann abusing GE for being "just another part of the great anti-carbon dioxide main-chancing hands-in-your pockets caravan" (McCrann 2011: 29). GE set out on a deliberate course of action to provide the Australian public with a different view from that which was dominating the media; but the media, in particular the *Australian*, were not interested in having the prevailing view challenged. The three newspapers, but particularly the *Australian*, were not just covering campaigns by polluting industries and the leader of the political opposition; they were enmeshed within the actions and point of view of this social force. The extent of the bias represented by the coverage leaves no other possible conclusion than that it was ideological. Bias is one thing, but distortion is another, as we shall see.

On 5 May 2011, the lead banner headline of the *Australian* was "CEO GAIL KELLY ATTACKS LABOR TAX PLAN AND POLICY 'UNCERTAINTY' – Westpac joins carbon revolt." Westpac is Australia's second biggest bank. The first paragraph of the story read: "Westpac chief executive Gail Kelly has joined

the growing criticism of Labor's carbon tax, declaring an emissions trading scheme better for business and warning the 'uncertainty' caused by the lack of policy detail is affecting her customers." The story then moved away from Westpac for 10 paragraphs. When it returned it quoted Ms. Kelly saying that a "market-based mechanism is the best way to drive the innovation to new technology and new methodologies – that has been the best approach. A carbon price is one step towards an Emissions Trading Scheme and I think we need to remember it is only one of the solutions that you should be putting in place." Ms. Kelly was unhappy with the way her statements were framed by the Australian. She featured on ABC *Radio National Breakfast* the same morning, where she expressed her frustration. She said, "that headline is just straight out wrong, really fundamentally wrong and quite annoying, actually." But the *Australian* refused to acknowledge her view (ABC Media Watch, 2011b). The following day, on page 2, under a headline, "Kelly welcomes promise on details", the newspaper reported in a confrontational tone that, "Mrs Kelly yesterday criticised the *Australian's* headline 'Westpac joins carbon revolt,' saying it was 'fundamentally wrong and annoying.' However, she did not back down from the story. She said the bank's position on carbon has been consistent and long-held, as the *Australian* reported" (Murdoch 2011).

If Westpac emerged bruised, one of the most vigorous opponents of the government's proposal, the Australian Coal Association, was able to achieve significant uncritical prominence, particularly in the *Australian*, for its extreme attacks on the tax. For example, on 14 June, a page one headline shouted "Carbon tax 'will cost 4000 coal jobs'" (Maher 2011). The story read in part that "explosive economic modelling warns that the carbon tax could force eight black coalmines to close" costing more than 4,000 jobs in its first three years. But this analysis was highly contestable. On 17 June, under the headline 'Carbon analysis rebuffs miners' the *Australian* ran a story that Citigroup analysts had disputed the earlier report, arguing that "even a \$50-a-tonne carbon tax would have minimal impact on the country's biggest miners." But the *Australian* treated the views of Citigroup with contempt. While the claims of mine closures led page 1, the coverage of the Citi analysis appeared on page 25, on an inside page of the Business Section (ABC, *Media Watch*, 20 June 2011).

The Assistance Package

After the fierce campaign Australians tuned in to live television coverage of the carbon tax announcements on Carbon Sunday, 10 July. It was a major day in the recent history of Australia which, when it comes to climate change, has had quite a few of them. Throughout the barrage of criticism the government held to its central mission but often demonstrated concern that the media was

shaping public opinion on both the desirability of a carbon tax and on the government's performance. In the face of the media's agenda-setting function politicians may *think* the public is influenced and may act on this premise even if there is no evidence of such impacts (Gavin 2009). This could account for the fact that, when it came, government compensation, particularly to coal and steel, was extremely generous. Furthermore, in this case, public opinion poll evidence suggests that the campaign hit its target in that the government's popularity dropped to a record low – the lowest score in the history of Australian polling (Shanahan 2011).

The coal industry received an assistance package of \$1.264 billion for what the government believed would be the worst-affected coal mines. A further \$70 million would be available to help coalmines find or develop new technologies to mitigate emissions. This was attacked by the Coal Association as inadequate and badly targeted. The *Age* story said, "The coal industry expects its carbon bill to climb close to \$18 billion over the next nine years, and many within the sector believe they deserve the sort of protection — up to 94.5 per cent of carbon costs — afforded to other emissions intensive industries. Anglo American coal spokesman Seamus French said the tax was "simply a revenue raising measure which risked both existing jobs and future investment in Australian mines" (Ker 2011). This story from mining industry representatives was not balanced by any other voices.

The momentum of the doomsayers did not appear to be affected by the news that the coal industry was engaged in very robust stock market activity. Soon after Carbon Sunday there was a \$5 billion bid for Macarthur Coal by the world's biggest coal group, Peabody, and its Indian ally, Arcelor Mittal. Later in the year, Anglo American, one of the harshest critics of the carbon tax, gave the go-ahead for a \$US1.7 billion development of its Grosvenor coking coal mine in Queensland (Fitzgerald 2011). In December 2011 The Deloitte Access Economics Investment Monitor (Wood & Edis 2011) reported the value of definite projects had jumped by 51.3 per cent to \$406.8 billion in the year to September. Possible projects rose 31.8 per cent to \$256.9 billion. Record investment is at odds with dire warnings about the impacts of the carbon and mining taxes.

Conclusion

Entman argues that, "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Frames emphasise certain aspects of a broad or complex issue and in doing so they make it possible for the public to make rapid decisions about complex issues" (Entman 1993:

51-52). Numerous studies have shown that the media tend to frame coverage by emphasising drama (Dirikx & Gelders 2008). The carbon tax coverage was certainly dramatic, and would have been less so had the corporate support for the government been emphasised. The coverage also emphasised uncertainty. It could be argued that the negative approach to the carbon tax was simply the result of conventional news values. But this would not explain the difference between the Fairfax and News Ltd papers (Bacon 2011). The News Ltd newspapers overwhelmingly represented the views of companies and industries opposed to the carbon tax proposal. The devastating sense that emerged from the coverage was that an incompetent government was dragging a successful nation to the edge of chaos. The *Age* was more measured.

The evidence from the preceding analysis is conclusive: The coverage of the argument about a climate tax was profoundly partisan, particularly in the *Australian*, which framed the tax as an imminent disaster. This coverage raises questions about balance and fairness, but it is necessary to look beyond them to find reasons for the breadth and depth of the partisanship. Ideology plays an important role in coverage of climate change. The carbon tax coverage occurred in the context of a ferocious attack led by the conservative opposition leader Tony Abbott on the Labor Party-led government's climate change plans. The News Ltd newspapers in particular identified wholly with the conservative political actors.

The media coverage of carbon pricing was used by the *Australian* in particular to advance a larger set of interests linking the political, economic and cultural fields. Given this situation, the carbon tax events and subsequent news coverage created a new terrain for engagement between well-established contesting forces. Abbott's assault was wide-ranging, encompassing other unrelated issues where he could see political advantage in the frenzy of a permanent election campaign driven by his conviction that government was, for him, literally just a heartbeat away. His campaign was directed to destroying the credibility and legitimacy of a government that came very close to losing the election of 2010. There were many examples since 2010 of the *Australian* framing particular issues in such a way as to provide Abbott with weapons or defences. The frenzy of opposition to the Gillard government was driven in large measure by the fact that it negotiated a coalition agreement with the environmental party – The Greens – after the 2010 election. The Greens became one of the building blocks that helped Labor form a minority government. This was anathema to the conservative forces in Australian political and business life. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the pages of the *Australian*. For example, in an editorial on 7 September 2010 the *Australian* said this: "Greens leader Bob Brown has accused the *Australian* of trying to wreck the alliance between the Greens and Labor. We wear Senator Brown's criticism with pride. We believe that he and his colleagues are hypocrites; that they are bad for the

nation and that they should be destroyed at the ballot box.” This was the point at which the interests of the *Australian* intersected most clearly with those of Tony Abbott and the mining and manufacturing industries. The fruits of this alliance were seen in the campaign the following year against the carbon tax and with the costly and unjustified handouts that the coal industry managed to wring from a battered government (Wood & Edis 2011).

The Australian government representatives at Durban watched keenly as the debate about how to generate funding for the Green Climate Fund – a \$100 billion a year pool to help developing countries reduce emissions and adapt to climate change – assumed centre stage. International leaders were speculating that a price on carbon in western countries would generate the sums required to meet the commitment. The co-chair of the advisory group on climate change financing, Norway’s Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, said in Durban that a price on carbon emissions had three key benefits: it encouraged industry to reduce harmful emissions, it contributed to the development of clean technologies and it generated revenue that could be used to take climate action. He noted that Australia had just introduced a carbon tax and that other states, countries and regions also had pricing schemes, or soon would (Palitza 2011). The voices from Durban promoting the use of carbon pricing funds for support for developing countries were not covered by Australian mainstream media, but climate sceptics were quick to identify the possibility. News Ltd columnist Piers Akerman observed that, “The Australian government is the only one in the world which has committed itself to throwing money at this fund [the GCF] with money raised by slugging its own people with an economy-sabotaging tax. In Canberra, they call this sort of suicidal move leadership” (Akerman 2011). This was wrong. The Australian government was alive to the trap and while strongly supporting the GCF has given no indication at any time of how its commitment will be funded.

Climate change scepticism in Australia has been fed and legitimised by Tony Abbott. For example, just prior to him assuming his party’s leadership in December 2009, he described climate change as “absolute crap” (Grattan 2009). Around the same time he announced that he was “hugely unconvinced by the so-called settled science on climate change” (Carney 2011). In a controversial move in 2010 he agreed to meet extreme UK climate sceptic Christopher Monckton. While he seems since to have retreated from these positions, he is always unenthusiastic enough about dealing with climate change to nourish the doubts of his sceptical followers (Carney 2011). The *Australian* plays a similar game. It pronounces in its editorials that it accepts the science and supports market mechanisms to combat climate change while at the same time framing the news coverage to reflect its opposition to supporters of climate change action and its scepticism about climate science (Manne 2011). Oreskes and Conway (2010) identify a struggle between market fundamentalism and environmentalism in

the disputes between climate scientists and the "merchants of doubt." They said, "The issue was ... free markets. It was the appropriate role of government in monitoring the marketplace. It was regulation" [emphasis in the original]. This issue reverberated throughout the carbon tax debate in Australia. Expressions of out and out climate change scepticism by opponents of the tax were rare. Many corporations and industry groups, such as the Australian Coal Association, were on record as accepting the findings of science. But ultimately those powerful elements of the business community whose leaders battled the carbon tax so bitterly fought side by side with the anti-science forces in the nation's political leadership and media. And they did it while trying to obscure the difference between their own self interest and the interest of the nation. International leaders who took hope from Australia's carbon tax, such as the Norwegian Prime Minister, have reason to study the Australian experience closely and fear a repetition in their own countries.

Notes

1. The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Sofia Levin, Jacqueline Hanafie and Chloe Ross in the preparation of this chapter.
2. In the three months to 31 March 2011, the circulation of the *Australian*, considered by some commentators to be the most influential of Australia's newspapers (Neighbour 2011), was 129,985 during the week and 292,649 on Saturdays. Circulation of the *Herald Sun* Monday to Friday was 484,000, while Saturday was 489,000 and Sunday 571,900. The corresponding figures for *The Age* were 190,000, 275,000 and 225,400.

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Chapter 11

Digital Networks and Shifting Climate News Agendas and Practices

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The Mingling of Journalisms

Independent and commercial media outlets, activists and NGOs rolled out a vast array of innovative online platforms, content, and collaborations for both COP15 and COP17, underscoring the stark difference between the traditional models of journalism still largely practiced around the world, and emergent forms of journalism. There is a complicated geometry of news developing: professional and social news content increasingly mingle and the lines that formerly separated sources, audiences, and reporters blur; at the same time, competition within the field has waned in the face of economic necessity and of a growing demand to engage the public. For the most part, during COP 15 and COP 17 traditional newspaper coverage around the world still followed predictable patterns, in other areas the newsrooms innovated, shifting both their practices and their products.

It is by now largely acknowledged that in many areas of the world traditional journalism is declining, business models are failing, and public trust is diminishing (Pew 2010, Schudson & Downie 2009). While some worry that this is leading to a decline in accountability journalism (McChesney & Nichols 2010), others celebrate the new forms of horizontal watchdog journalism that are emerging. These forms include everyday voices, eschew the appearance of objectivity, and treat journalism as a collaborative endeavor rather than one based on competition among journalists and among media outlets (Benson 2010, Shirky 2009). As the authority of traditional journalism erodes, new forms of authority emerge. For years, scholars have argued that this mass entry of so-called amateurs into the realm of production introduces a new variable into the mediascape – and into journalism in particular (Benkler 2006, Benson 2010, Jenkins 2006). We are beginning to also see how the amateur variable may be influencing the field. For instance, during the initial uprising in Egypt in January and February of 2011, decentralized amateur reporters reshaped coverage by doing the work of traditional journalism. They provided reports

from the ground, background for analysis and real-time fact-checking of state assertions (Russell 2011). These activities highlight the kind of influence Internet users can now exert on the engineering and architecture of the global news environment. New style activist journalists/technologists partnered with corporate behemoths and technology start-ups tweaked communication infrastructure on the fly to meet their needs. Professional journalists, in turn, used Twitter to provide for their respective publics dispatches direct from the action as well as reports from newsrooms. Re-tweets of amateur material taken from hash-tag aggregation feeds became a part of their reporting. Global news organizations such as *CNN*, *Al Jazeera*, *BBC*, and *The Guardian* curated Egypt Twitter feeds, cherry-picking what they saw as the most credible and relevant tweets and pushing those out to the world on their own platforms. Journalists working the story did the same with video- and photo-sharing sites like *Twitpic*, *Flickr*, *Demoxi*, and *YouTube*. Indeed, *YouTube* became a sort of anchorless news site, advertising news of the protests by placing banners on every page, pointing to the growing collection of Egyptian protest videos, highlighting those videos on the front page of the site, and streaming *Al Jazeera*'s coverage in English and Arabic.

The reconfiguration of technological tools and networks and the remediation of content are both essential to the process by which institutional and participatory media engage with one another. Leah Lievrouw argues that this differentiates new and old systems. As she explains, "The ongoing process of innovation, adaptation and reinvention of new media and information technologies distinguishes them from older mass media systems, which are heavily capitalized, infrastructurally embedded, more likely to have a stake in the existing technological base, and thus less likely to innovate" (Lievrouw 2006). This new mingling of the margins and the center facilitates what Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg call *connective action* (Bennett & Segerberg 2009). They suggest that the underlying social and political dynamics of social protest have significantly changed because of the ways in which politics, social institutions and identity formation have been altered by economic globalization: ideology, party loyalties, and elections are being replaced by issue networks that offer more personal and often activist solutions for problems. Current configurations of activism are also linked to new emerging spaces of public discourse that exist beyond national borders. For Castells, for example, we now exist within an electronically constructed *space of flows*. This alters how we live and the ways social change is carried out.

Because social relations are structured now in a global network and played out in the realm of socialized communication, social movements also act on this global network structure and enter the battle over the minds by intervening in the global communication process. They think local, rooted in their

society, and act global, confronting the power where the power holders are, in the global networks of power and in the communication sphere (Castells 2007: 249).

For Silverstone (2006) this new space forms a *mediapolis*, a set of relations between self and other conducted in a global public sphere. In this new space, networked publics (Varnelis 2008) are forging a new type of public sphere that exceeds the limits of locality and nationality, which is a contributing factor in shifting power relations.

The issues of climate change in general and climate summits in particular offer rich but somewhat atypical cases to study the changing media environment and the role of new actors, tools and practices in shaping related coverage. On the ground at these events we find two general trends; on one hand, a cross-section of professional journalists who tend to adhere to those norms of professionalism that privilege the status quo, national-political perspectives and frames that reinforce traditional power relations (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010); and on the other hand, we find climate justice movement activists producing material that questions the status quo and the very nature of these entrenched power structures. In Durban (and in Copenhagen) the summit coverage created an exceptional opportunity to examine to what extent media activists and traditional journalists (both present at these events) were influencing one another – both in terms of practices and content. This can also be seen as a case study on how climate change as a political issue has the potential to disrupt these traditional power relations, in part because of the transnational networks of activists mobilized around this issue (Castells 2009: 303-339; Kunelius & Eide 2012: 267).

This chapter maps and analyzes the overlap and separation between traditional and emergent forms of activist journalism in the context of COP 17. We highlight first some of the most innovative and high profile examples of networked news products and practices at play during COP17. How do groups and individuals use digital tools to achieve tactical political goals, in part to challenge traditional media power? We also look at how social media were taken up in different national contexts. We do this by using IssueCrawler to map links among websites in Bangladesh, Finland, Russia, Canada and the United States and by offering further elaboration in terms of current articulation of the journalism-activism-web relations in each case. How does the coverage of COP17 reflect the emerging complex model of new media? Our central question is: What is the dialectical relationship between media activists and institutional media – each side wielding influence over the other in terms of agenda, style and form?

The COP17 New Media Landscape

COP17 coverage reflected a more complex model of new media than had been seen during other recent global news events. While on one hand traditional national print and broadcast journalists from around the world worked in cordoned off sections of Durban's ICC as they created news content, sometimes informed by the larger networked news environment, on the other hand, the news of the summit that unfolded was more significantly shaped by those on the other side of the ropes. Raw material – audio, visual, and textual documentation of the event – was generated and distributed by activists, including NGO representatives, independent journalists, politicians and delegates who made these forms of documentation into stories, reports and feeds for a variety of contexts and publics. These different streams of media were brought together on the web on platforms such as *OneClimate*; a project of *One World*, the UK-based online and mobile communication activist media hub founded by former journalists Anuradha Vittachi and Peter Armstrong in 2007. During COP13, they offered coverage of the summit in Bali by streaming live in Secondlife. During COP15, two million people tuned in over 4 million times during the summit, posting thousands of questions and comments on *OneClimate* and via Twitter. During COP17, *OneClimate* live-streaming was set in the context of a larger narrative by combining it with round-the-clock news, analysis and audio/video interactions. According to Adam Groves, “If you are just dropping into live video it's hard to get the larger narrative of the event. So we mixed videos with audioboo files, which we can get online much faster, and Twitter feeds. So it was a mix of live coverage, webstreams of plenaries taken and edited by a UK team”.¹

Groves and his team are not only at the forefront of participatory web-based coverage. They are also highly self-reflective about how to build and develop this new environment. Just after the Durban summit Groves said: “When we debrief in a few weeks we'll be talking about the emphasis on live and interactive versus 10 minutes ago. The more you commit yourself to live the more you are constrained in some ways – you are tied to one spot, you are subject to the chaos of what's going on around you”.² Other groups have similarly sophisticated strategies for amplifying the voices and perspectives of civil society. *Avaaz*, the activist organization that heads up worldwide campaigns on a variety of social justice issues, for example, was hard at work during COP15 and COP17. It mobilized actions and protests via email and Twitter campaigns. Similarly, *350.org*, an international climate justice organization reports extensively on events on their websites and via Twitter. As co-founder Jaimie Henn put it “The opportunities to influence the process are very limited so we work to create crisis moments where negotiators and other officials are forced to respond”³ For example, they worked with other organizations to orchestrate

and cover the protests inside the conference center on the final day of negotiations. These extra-national activist organizations and networks generated and distributed some of the most comprehensive and innovative coverage of both COP15 and COP17 from the distinct perspective of the climate justice movement. As James Fahn noted: “The environmental, advocacy and lobby groups that attend the summits have always served as important sources of information and analysis, but now they can distribute it much more easily themselves... rather than having to work through the mainstream media” (Fahn 2012). These examples begin to provide answers to our first question.

National Variation of Issue Networks and the Role of Social Media

IssueCrawler is a web mapping tool that maps connections among sites on the web in order to visualize issue networks. The “crawl” begins from a list of URLs that serve as starting points or seeds in a search to define the issue to be mapped. The crawler then identifies links present in the seeds, searches the pages which these links point to, and repeats the process of finding and gathering links up to 3 times, depending on the crawl depth set by the researcher. To narrow down the results to a core network related to the crawl, the crawler also performs an analysis to find “co-links” identifying sites linked to by at least two of the starting points.

For the purposes of this chapter, our issue mapping consisted of two parts. First, we mapped five separate national online networks – Bangladesh, Finland, Russia, Canada and United States.⁴ These are illustrated below with short case studies. The second part combines data from the above-mentioned countries with international web sites to provide a global view of the digital issue network.⁵ On the maps, each circle represents a site on the web, the size of each circle is determined by the number of links that site receives from other sites: the more links, the larger the circle and the more “authority” the site is considered to have. The distance between circles is determined by the strength of the links among sites, so if one site is far from another there are few links between the two sites. The sites positioned at the center of the map are considered the “core” and are central to the actual issue network.

Bangladesh

It is not surprising to find an active online network in Bangladesh, a highly vulnerable nation within an expanding Internet penetration where there are currently approximately 25 million Internet users, up from four million in 2008 (Halim 2012: 8). In recent years, traditional news organizations have created

digital online versions and the number of online magazines and newspapers in general continues to rise. Niaz Mahmud, for example, a journalist with the online newspaper *news4.com*, was on site in Durban and filed 8 stories for *news4.com*, sharing several with *Manab Jameen* the only traditional print tabloid in Bangladesh.

During COP17 one hub of information was the online newspaper *Banglanelnews24.com*, a multi-media news portal launched in 2010, using the slogan “new ideas, cutting edge outlook and a futuristic vision for info-savvy new generations, we provide the most credible information.” It considers its audience as participants in the news production process. Just before COP17, The Bangladesh Youth Movement for Climate and *Banglanelnews24.com* joined forces in organizing a round table discussion (*Road to Durban: Thoughts of Youth*). Rezwan Nabin, a British Council climate advocate encouraged participants to contribute suggestions through *Banglanelnews24.com* and other media. Over 500

Figure 11.1. The Bangladesh Issue Map



Note: The Bangladesh issue map shows Twitter at the center of a highly concentrated core consisting mostly of administrative sites, such as the World Bank, the UN and donor organizations such as USAid, AUSaid, dfid and Oxfam.

participants contributed to *Banglanew24.com* and online radio while hundreds more commented via text messaging. Nabin was also sent to Durban by *Banglanews24.com*. He filed 14 stories focusing on climate justice advocates. Activists also used social media platforms to connect with one another and circulate news and information about COP 17. The Facebook page of the Bangladesh Youth Movement for Climate (<http://www.facebook.com/BDYOMOCI>) uploaded stories from different media, combining material from traditional print media like *The Daily Star* and *Prothom Alo* with links to social media sites such as *Flickr*, *YouTube*, Google groups, and other sites.

Several of the most central sites in the network are either international financial institutions and aid organizations like the *World Bank*, *USAid* or *AUSaid*. In Bangladesh, assessments of climate change consequences, as well as adaptation and mitigation projects are mostly financed and managed by INGOs and UN bodies. On the map, local initiatives are often linked to international financial institutions and non-profit organizations because of their well-organized websites. These large organizations link to one another more often than to locally generated Bangla-language sites, such as *Banglanews24.com*. *Twitter* appears in the center of the map, despite the fact that it is seldom used by Bangladeshi journalists and activists, suggesting that *Twitter* was used by people involved in projects in Bangladesh undertaken by different multinational organizations, banks, INGOs and UN bodies. Surprisingly, none of the mainstream newspaper websites or online news media sites appear in the issue network map even though their coverage of COP17 was reasonably high.


Finland

Finnish mainstream news media have covered climate summits in a relatively traditional manner. Larger news organizations have centered their effort on the work of their correspondents, while less affluent organizations have relied on freelancers (who sometimes attend summits as activists), home desk journalists or news agencies. The lack of blogs, special web pages or twitter feeds set up by professional news outlets was notable. Blogs and special sections are common in Finnish online news while *Twitter* remains less established. In the case of summit coverage, most Finnish news organizations simply posted content that ran in the paper on their website where readers could access it free of charge and discuss and comment on stories of interest. In 2011 there were only a few active blogs specifically related to climate change. The most active ones were either “skeptical” or more focused on the science than political implications. The blogs set up by Finnish NGOs (such as Greenpeace Finland and World Wildlife Fund), featuring reports from activists and public relations officers on the scene, were the most prominent content providers in the web.

The issue network map for Finland shows a rather loose issue network

around COP17. The nodes in the map are dispersed and interconnection between nodes is weak. The lack of a significant online presence by professional news media is notable: only one mainstream news outlet (*Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE*, yle.fi) appears in the map. Domestic NGO-sites are highly visible (*luontoliitto.fi*, *kepa.fi*, *globbarit.fi*, *maanystavat.fi*, *sll.fi*, *wwf.fi*, *dodo.org*, *reilukauppa.fi*) and domestic governmental institutions also appear on the map (*Finnish Meteorological Institute* [fmi.fi], *Finland's Environmental Administration* [ymparisto.fi], *Finnish government* [vn.fi], *Finnish National Forest Research Institute* [metla.fi], the official databank of Finnish laws and statutes [finlex.fi]) National Housing Finance and Development Centre[ara.fi], the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [mmm.fi] and Statistics Office of Finland [tilastokeskus.fi]). Given the lack of domestic debate on the issue, compared to the extent of the international debate, the number of connections outside the Finnish language sphere is surprisingly limited.

Figure 11.2. The Finnish Issue Map



Note: Domestic and international professional news media are almost non-existent in the Finnish issue map, while domestic NGOs and governmental institutions are highly visible.

Judging by the map, the issue networks seem to exist in parallel but not in connection to professional journalism, thus creating separate spheres which rely on similar knowledge resources. NGOs have enjoyed a prominent role in Finnish newspaper coverage (see introduction to this volume; Kumpu & Kunelius 2010) and they play a strong role in the issue networks as well. Domestic governmental institutions thrive in the issue networks. In parallel to professional journalism, the issue network seems to center on domestic sources. The weak connection between professional journalism and other digital networks is based on the prominent role of NGOs in both. Discursively speaking, the journalists *Helsingin Sanomat* (the only national daily) sent to the scene of the summit and the public relations officers of NGOs were very close to each other: both capitalized on an abstract transnational political space to put pressure on nation-states unwilling to participate in creating a binding deal. Virtually no arguments presented in the summit coverage of *Helsingin Sanomat* or in the NGO blogs were directed to Finnish politicians or crafted from a distinctly Finnish perspective.

One key in understanding the functioning of both professional journalism and the issue networks in Finland lies in the well-established position of climate change in the field of domestic politics. This, in turn, is grounded on a high (but in recent years declining) public concern over the issue. In Finnish professional journalism this translated into coverage that mostly operated on the axis between transnational demand for a binding deal (activism) and the lack of commitment of individual nation states. The map suggests that on the web the event was largely translated in a similar manner. There are two apparent differences though. The role of climate skeptics seems to be more pronounced in issue networks than in professional journalism. Also specific governmental institutions were prominent in the issue networks but not in the newspaper coverage of Durban. This suggests that some issues were investigated in more detail in the digital networks than in professional journalism.

This undynamic relationship between the news media and the web is not likely to change as long as climate change remains an uncontroversial issue in Finland. But there is likely to be evolution in the ways in which journalism engages with digital networks as new digital tools become better established. The role of *Twitter* is a case in point here. *Helsingin Sanomat* has a feed, but only a few journalists working for the paper extend their work to tweeting. The paper has institutional guidelines on the use of social media, warning journalists, for example, not to put the paper's appearance of neutrality at risk by linking to activist groups. A reporter for *HS* in Durban said she did not follow or use "social media" much while covering the summits. Asked about *Twitter* she responded: "I'd like to follow *Twitter* but I haven't had the time. One should know who to follow there."⁶ After the conference, however, she e-mailed a follow up: "I must add to the interview that yes, *Twitter* is a very important tool for me. Especially in negotiations where there is no other way of getting

information. I have been hanging around on Twitter for two days now. This is new for me, but it seems that in situations like this it works well.”⁷ Increasing adoption of *Twitter* by Finnish journalists both as a source of information but also as a form distribution might create more connections between professional journalism and digital networks.

Russia

Russia’s public debate on climate change is mostly fueled by NGOs. The role of the state seems limited to foreign policy maneuvering. Traditional mass media are either supportive of the state or generally passive about climate issues. As the state is also suspicious of any independent civil initiatives and sees them as threats of oppositional political mobilization, NGOs can only rely on alternative ways to reach their publics. Journalists who want to say more about climate change tend to join climate activists on online forums.

The Russian issue map shows an isolated network with *Twitter* and a well-connected blog network at the center and a few sites on the margins. Many of the connections are generated by *Livejournal*, a popular social networking site in Russia. Very few links are generated from .org sites, suggesting that the network is not influenced by the English-language sites of NGOs and other organizations. Since there was little information about the summit in the media, the network is limited to individual blogs. The map corresponds with the low media profile of the climate issue during December 2011.

Russian parliamentary elections in December 2011 overlapped with the summit. This, combined with Durban’s location far from Russia, may account for sparse coverage of the summit. But in September 2011 Russians became the largest Internet audience in Europe, reaching about 60 million (43 percent of the population, (NewMedia TrendWatch, 2011)). The growing influence of social media developed into powerful activism and mass street protests against rigged elections. Protesters were mobilized mainly via the Internet in spite of the silence emanating from official media. It is clear that many environmental activists were busy at that time with internal political issues.

In the network, news agencies were the main sources of information for blog entries and mass media publications in Russia. There were three reporters on the scene in Durban: Pavel Maltsev from the South African office of *ITAR-TASS*, Olga Dobrovidova from *RIA Novosti*’s office in Moscow, and Angelina Davydova, working for the Russian-German Ecological Information Bureau, contributed to several media, the elite daily *Kommersant* among others. *RIA Novosti* had the most visible presence, covering the national climate change agenda in traditional media and online blogging networks.

Blogs and social networking platforms such as *Twitter* were important but burdensome communicative tools for Russian journalists in Durban.

Figure 11.3. The Russia Issue Map

Note: Livejournal appears at the core of the Russia issue map, and English-language news and NGO sites and mainstream news sites in Russia appear to have little influence over the issue network.

Dobrovidova explained, for example, that blogging and tweeting are time consuming but necessary extra work for a professional journalist.⁸ Before the summit she announced on her *LiveJournal* blog the intention to regularly post updates from Durban. But later she admitted not having time to post. She also invited readers to follow her *Twitter* feed (*LiveJournal*, Dobrovidova, 2011). This was not part of any work assignment but rather something she felt would be an asset to her work. During the summit *Twitter* helped her avoid becoming bored with dry facts that the “robot-secretary” agency work required. It allowed her to tweet funny or quirky first person observations about the summit, and to communicate with foreign colleagues in English.⁹ During the summit, she had a modest list of 14 followers and was subscribing to 48 sources. All her subscriptions were English-language science news resources such as *BBCEarth*, *NYTimes Science*, *Reuters Science News*, or other scientific organizations participating in the negotiations. This shows that *Twit-*

ter was neither employed to reach large audiences, nor to connect to Russian domestic online news networks.

Even though her connections were limited, Dobrovidova described *Twitter* as a handy tool to quickly access relevant documents, to “trace the moods of summit participants” and to share information and links with activists and bloggers. She referred to Russian representatives from WWF as ecological activists and used the international Greenpeace website as a source of information for some news.¹⁰ She also quoted Greenpeace Executive Director Kumi Naidoo in a story on a Greenpeace activist deported from the country. She used NGO websites for her official reports for *RIA Novosti*, but there were no references to these sources in her tweets. Despite these glimpses of activist sources, most stories Dobrovidova wrote from Durban dealt with the negotiations and relied on official delegates as sources.

The Russian blogosphere mostly discussed and commented on mainstream news about the summit. There were few signs of alternative sources from climate activists or grassroots reporters. Most blog entries about Durban referred either to *RIA Novosti* or to the blog-like pages of NGOs. During COP17 and COP15, the overlap of traditional and alternative social media seemed to have taken place on the level of individual journalists. Journalists did not turn to activists for information but rather activists turned into journalists, sending their information to NGO portals and sometimes to the mainstream media. Take Angelina Davydova, for example, a freelance journalist who teaches journalism in Saint-Petersburg and is active in several environmental organizations. Davydova takes an activist-oriented approach, using her professional skills to draw attention to the alternative agenda of the ecological organizations she works for. This enables her to contribute to both spaces, writing for *Bellona* (the website of an environmental NGO) (cf. *Bellona.ru*, Dec 4, 2011) and an elite newspaper (*Kommersant*, Dec 12, 2011). The environmental movement thus seems to influence the mainstream agenda but only in a very limited way. Journalists like Dobrovidova supply routine information for a news agency but do not participate in an alternative digital public sphere. Davydova, on the other hand, works mainly for environmental organizations and uses her professional skills to set an alternative agenda, while also contributing to the mainstream dialogue.


Canada and the United States

In Canada and the United States, mainstream press coverage of climate change has been on the decline since 2007 due, in part, to aggressive efforts to discredit climate science (Andrew Weaver, *Toronto Star*, January 15, 2012). *Star* columnist Antonia Zerbisias recently pointed out that while the traditional media’s interest in climate change has waned, the Internet has kept the issue

on the radar in Canada and the U.S. (Antonia Zerbisias, *Toronto Star*, January 15, 2012). Environmental studies scholar Max Boykoff (2011) confirms this, showing that online news coverage has been rising steadily. The Canada and U.S. issue maps attest to this. They display lots of overlapping traffic between mainstream media, government websites, NGOs and online social networks.

In 2011, nearly 8 out of 10 households in Canada (79.2 %) and the US (78.1 %) had access to the internet (Internet World Stats, 2011). Half of all Canadian connected households use more than one type of device to go online and over one third accessed the internet from home using some type of wireless, handheld device (Statistics Canada, 2011). This widespread influence of mobile devices may partly explain the steady decline in offline media coverage of climate change at the same time that online coverage has rapidly risen.

Figure 11.4. The Canada Issue Map



Note: The Canada issue map shows a core that includes Twitter and other social networking sites such as Tumblr and Flickr, as well as Canadian and International NGO sites.

The Canadian issue map shows *Twitter* as the largest node, positioned close to the center of a highly concentrated core of interconnected sites. The network is fairly evenly distributed with links to a variety of science, NGO, activist, news, and government sites. We can also see examples of the dialectical relationship between activist media and journalism. Geoffrey York from *The Globe and Mail* incorporated many alternative voices via social media into his coverage. Reporting from Durban he filed eight stories for *The Globe and Mail*. At the same time, he tweeted over 200 times, updating his followers on the summit proceedings. Several tweets included hyperlinks to York's reports for *The Globe and Mail*, as well as to international press coverage of Canada's performance at the talks. He was on location as six members of the *Canadian Youth Delegation* (CYD) turned their backs on Environment Minister Peter Kent during his speech. As the event unfolded, he tweeted that the protesters "were very Canadian: very polite and obedient as guards whisked them away" (*The Globe and Mail*, December 7, 2011). He also frequently re-tweeted remarks from members of the CYD, who were also active on *Twitter* and other social media platforms. For instance this reaction by a CYD member after her colleagues were evicted from the summit: "viewpoint of Canadian youth: @amarapossian UNFCCC secretariat should be revoking Canadian gov't badges for disrupting progress, not ours" (*Twitter*, York, 2011). The next morning, York's report for *The Globe and Mail* featured a large image depicting the Canadian activists with their backs to Kent (*The Globe and Mail*, Dec 8, 2011). In this case, the dialectic between *Twitter* and print modes was distinct: none of the CYD members were cited in the print article.


The CYD was also one of the more active groups in the Canadian blogosphere during COP17. Members of the CYD posted several times daily. These posts consisted of updates on the latest developments at COP17, poignant criticism of Canada's official stance at the climate talks and provocative images of the group in action. Mainstream Canadian news blogs offered limited coverage of COP17. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (*CBC*) news blog "Your Community" had seven posts on the climate talks and considerable discussion on comments pages. Large NGOs such as *Pembina Institute* and *Equiterre* also had a presence in the blogosphere. However, overlap between the activity on these blogs and offline media was less explicit. A noteworthy exception was an Op-Ed column in *The Globe and Mail* by Matt Horne, Director of Climate Change at the Pembina Institute (*The Globe and Mail*, December 5, 2011). The article included a link to *Pembina's* website where staff bloggers made several relevant posts during the summit.

In another report, York mentioned two Inuit youth who attended the summit to raise awareness of how climate change is affecting Canada's Arctic peoples (*The Globe and Mail*, Dec 5, 2011). The article refers to a project the youth were showcasing which uses blogs and films to document the perspectives of Inuit elders on climate change. The *Nanisivik Arviat Project Twitter* feed provided

followers with regular updates during the summit and links to press coverage of the Inuit youth in Durban. Links to *YouTube* videos, and the personal blogs of team members could also be found on the Nanisiniq Project website. This team of Inuit youth generated considerable attention in press coverage of COP17.

The United States issue map similarly shows *Facebook* and *Twitter* at the center of a dense core made up of NGOs, including *350.org*, *Sierra Club*, and *SustainUS*; online blogs and magazines such as *Worldchanging*, *Treebugger*, *Desmogblog*, and *New York Times Dotearth blog*; and the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* site. Main climate blogs, *Dotearth* and *Desmoblog*, generated many of the links to diverse sources, including governmental sites and UN institutions. Another large node, *350.org*, also generated many links, the majority of which are to other NGOs and activist sites. The role of UN institutions (upper right sector of the map) is more visible than the role of US government (lower left side).

Figure 11.5. The US Issue Map



Note: Twitter, Facebook and 350.org are at the core of the US issue map, surrounded by a dense network of activist and NGO sites, blogs, and some governmental and UN sites.

The New York Times coverage of COP17 was clearly informed by activist media networks and actors that were hard at work trying to influence both the actual events and the media framing of COP17. For example, John Broder, the *New York Times* reporter on the ground, filed a story (December 8) that highlighted voices critical of the US role in negotiations, including that of activist Abigail Borah, a 21-year-old Middlebury College junior expelled from the summit for speaking out against US tactics. The story also described US negotiator Todd Stern's language as "convoluted," and his endorsement of the EU plan as "ambiguous." Broder tweeted only twice from Durban, one of his tweets read: "I think I got my point across,"¹¹ linking to the 8 December story. The text is a quote by Abigail Borah, but also seems to be referring to the point Broder made in his story criticizing the US. Two days earlier (December 6) *The New York Times* ran a glowing portrait (also by Broder) of Greenpeace International Executive director Kumi Naidoo, who has been at the center of large-scale climate justice protests since he assumed his current post. Naidoo's views on the climate crisis, controversial even among movement activists, were given considerable space, for instance, saying: "Traditional Western-led environmentalism has failed to make the right connections between environmental, social and economic justice...I came to the environmental movement because the poor are paying [for] the first and most brutal impacts of climate change." The story went on to quote Bill McKibben, activist and founder of *350.org*, as saying of Naidoo: "He's completely remarkable, bringing all the skills of the social justice and anti-apartheid movements to the environmental arena, where they're badly needed...above all, he understands that mass mobilization of people is our only hope in the climate fight." (*The New York Times*, Dec 6, 2011). In addition to quoting these high-profile climate justice activists, online versions of these stories linked to various activist and alternative sites including *Greenpeace*, an *YouTube* video of the speech that got Borah thrown out of the summit. Clearly *The New York Times* coverage of COP17 eschewed the typical practice of including the points of view of the political elite and focused instead on alternative points of views and sources.


This is even more the case in the widely read *Dotearth* blog which appears on the map as a cornerstone of the US issue network. For example, on December 7, a long interview with Naomi Klein, Canadian activist and author of the recent book *Capitalism vs the Climate*, was posted. In it Klein states that: "I think we need to admit that climate change does really demand a profound interrogation of the ideology that currently governs our economy. And that's not bad news, since our current economic model is failing millions of people on multiple fronts" (*Dotearth*, Revkin, December 7, 2012). The post also included links to several of Klein's recent books and articles, as well as various activist and scientific initiatives and movements. Two *Dotearth* posts focused on student activists disrupting sessions at the summit, casting a heroic light on

these youth activists and elaborating on their criticism of the proceedings with video clips and links. In one post, Revkin quotes Anjali Appadurai much lauded speech: “You’ve been negotiating all my life,” and writes, “That was the core line in a remarkable speech delivered on behalf of youth in the final stretch of two weeks of contentious, largely indeterminate climate treaty talks” (*Dotearth*, December 10, 2011). All of these stories uncharacteristically give space to the complex and contentious issues, highlight the voices and perspectives of climate justice activists and cast a positive light on various protests. Unlike typical news coverage of activists that often treats them as forces of violence and conflict (Atton & Hamilton 2008, Gitlin 2003, Kellner 1992), such sympathetic coverage of actors outside the political elites suggests that the scope of journalism field is expanding among professional journalists as well.

The Global Issue Network

We also created a global map by combining all of the starting points from the country maps. On this map, the largest node, the site generating most connections between our starting points, was predictably *Twitter*, followed by *IPCC.org* and the official COP site (*UNFCCC.int*). In the global network, institutional media are positioned more prominently than in the national networks. For example, British newspapers *The Daily Mail* and *The Guardian*, *Forbes* magazine, and

Figure 11.6. The Global Issue Network



Note: The Global issue network combines the starting points of all of the above maps. At its core is Twitter, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change site (IPCC.org), and the Official COP site (UNFCCC.int).

NYT Dotearth Blog all feature prominently. Sites in the .org domain outnumber all the others, while .com(s) appear closer to one another and concentrated in the center, indicating that they are better connected to one another. The nodes and connections from global NGOs appeared to dominate the map (*350.org*, *Climate Progress* and *Greenpeace*) together with administrative sites such as the US environmental protection agency site and several United Nations sites (www.undp.org/). Not surprisingly, language significantly influences global networking. With the exception of 3 Finnish-language sites, the global map consists exclusively of English-language sources. Even originally U.S. based blog service *LiveJournal*, the leading platform for Russian-speaking bloggers, did not appear on the map, nor did any Russian-, or Bengali-language sites. There seems to be a division based on language but not necessarily national affiliation. Several of the more prominent organizations in the English-dominant networks (US, Canada, and Global) such as *Greenpeace* and *350.org* have an international or extra-national organizational structure and support base. And the social networking platforms central to the networks are not confined to a national base of users.

The global map suggests that social networking sites influence global issue networks differently than they do nationally. In national issue networks, social media play a greater role in constructing the emergent issue network, whereas the architecture of this global issue network features a map that is diverse, but largely made up of institutional media and extra-national organizations.

New Landscape, New Relations

We observed the increasing overlap between traditional and online fields of journalistic production that dominate the contemporary global media landscape in COP17 coverage. In the journalistic fields of Canada and the United States, which have remained quite exclusive, there is a trend toward more malleable coverage, frequently oscillating between traditional and grassroots sources. Yet we also observed that these overlapping forms of journalism depended to a large extent on online access, and English language content. Crucially, they depended on an interest in emerging forms of journalism among traditional media outlets that still continue to dominate domestic media landscapes in many nations. On the one hand, if people are not online it makes little sense for those vying for public opinion to be conducting their campaigns online. And, on the other hand, when they are, a complex and multifaceted journalism can emerge as traditional and online fields of journalistic production begin to commingle.

All of the maps clearly indicate that *Twitter*, *Facebook* and *LiveJournal* in Russia, played a significant role in the issue networks of COP17. *Twitter* and to a lesser extent *Facebook* have in some cases become a bridge between the

traditional and activist coverage. The fact that in the case of Finland and Russia journalists acknowledge the importance of adopting social media tools like *Twitter* may foreshadow an emergent integrated landscape as journalists begin to use such tools. We can see evidence already of overlap between activist and more traditional news media coverage. There were and are instances of activist media permeating traditional media coverage in each country, albeit to varying degrees. With the exception of the Russian network, the .org domain wields a great deal of influence, suggesting strong involvement by various institutions in the online climate issue network.

At least two different kinds of overlap seem to be occurring. First, in the cases of Bangladesh and Finland, we see overlaps in terms of the *agendas* of journalists and activist organizations. In each case, examples reveal a strategy of moving between offline traditional media and online social media with messages emphasizing that advocacy be replicated in each of these formats. Thus the perspectives of mainstream offline media in Finland and Bangladesh are often mirrored in online coverage of COP17. In Russia, Canada, and the United States the overlap occurs more in terms of *journalistic practices*. The cases provide various examples of how journalists, in each of these countries, publish both offline and online, using different tactics in each domain. These journalists access and disseminate different types of information in each format and take advantage of this versatility to engage different kinds of audiences as they move back and forth. In some cases, the outcome is a news product that combines material and practices that were previously relegated exclusively to either professional or activist, offline or online communication.

Emergent media tools and practices are changing how events like COP17 are being covered. There are various types of media at play. Alternative and traditional journalists moved beyond the pattern of a superficial relationship with mainstream media, typical of previous global news events such as the French Riots (Russell 2007) and the 2004 Republican National Convention (Gillies 2010). In these and other past global events alternative and mainstream media acted, to a certain extent, in two separate spheres, occasionally overlapping to critique or challenge each other's content. But they rarely collaborated, shared content, or crossed back and forth from traditional to online and mobile platforms. In the case of COP17, they were more than just responding to one another. The speed, proliferation and variety of digital tools heightened the exchange and further blurred the earlier conventional boundaries. Journalists can now cover media events by simultaneously tapping into multiple information feeds. They can easily access raw material created and distributed by activists, NGOs, politicians and delegates, among others. At COP17 journalists followed diverse content streams circulating in social media while reporting on live events transpiring in Durban. The capacity to draw on this array of sources, written from diverse perspectives, creates the potential for rich, multi-layered and robust journalistic

narratives that contrast with those of traditional reporting. The role of journalists is changing in this shifting media landscape, albeit the change being manifested in different ways in different contexts. In some cases, we even find journalists and politicians collaborating with climate activists, using independent media to deliver a message to act urgently on climate change and to get this collective message to wider audiences. This offers one example of fundamental changes in the way media activism works. One of the central goals of climate justice activists involved in events in Durban was to shape the communication about the summit. They were creating strong internal networks but also working to influence mainstream media and political networks. In both cases their freedom from the constraints of the norms of professional journalism allowed them to innovate in ways that far surpass what traditional journalists and institutions are capable of.

Notes

1. Adam Groves, research interview, January 10, 2012 (A. Russell).
2. Adam Groves, research interview, January 10, 2012 (A. Russell).
3. Jamie Henn, research interview, January 19, 2012 (A. Russell).
4. Analysis of the local networks starts with fifteen URLs subjectively representing the most relevant sources of media content related to COP15. Blog entries, as examples of new media production, constitute the core of the samples for each country. Thus, the starting points included five blogs and ten other web pages depending on national specificities (NGOs, mass media, and government sector). Links were selected based on Google search services limited to exact COP15 dates and key words. However, to select more valid resources we also chose links based on relevance, using our own judgments.
5. The key IssueCrawler settings – a crawl depth (from 1 to 3), a number of iterations (from 1 to 3), and a mode of co-link analysis (by page or by site) – seriously affect the resulting maps. The settings simply indicate how many levels from a starting point will be searched, how many times the search will be done at each level, and whether each page or the whole site is viewed as the search unit. To study a social network one iteration and a depth of two levels may be enough. In the case of issue networking the instructions to the crawler service recommend choosing at least 2 iterations. In our analysis the maximum settings for depth and iterations (3 for each) produced the best visualizations of issue networks. We also used an analysis by page, because it provides more specific results. Since we wanted to study networking around particular stories, those web sites that we selected in each case were privileged starting points in the IssueCrawler settings. This resulted in a more focused analysis.
6. Jenni Virtanen, research interview, Dec 8, 2011, Durban (Risto Kunelius).
7. Jenni Virtanen, personal correspondence, Dec 10, 2011 (Risto Kunelius).
8. Olga Dobrovidova, research interview, Jan. 18, 2012 (Dmitry Yagodin).
9. Olga Dobrovidova, research interview, Jan. 18, 2012 (Dmitry Yagodin).
10. Olga Dobrovidova, research interview, Jan. 18, 2012 (Dmitry Yagodin).
11. <http://nyti.ms/viX0Pa>

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https://publications.theseus.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/4967/Laine_Johanna.pdf?sequence=1
<http://www.hs.fi/kulttuuri/artikkeli/HS-toimittajat+ja+sosiaalinen+media/1135261407567>
<http://o-dobrovidova.livejournal.com/5919.html> retrieved Jan 15, 2012
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm>, retrieved Feb 10, 2012
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/110525/dq110525b-eng.htm>, retrieved Feb 10, 2012
<https://twitter.com/#!/geoffreyork> retrieved Jan 28, 2012
<http://nyti.ms/viX0Pa> retrieved Jan 30 2012
<http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/naomi-kleins-inconvenient-climate-conclusions/>
retrieved Jan. 5 2012
<http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/young-voices-at-deadlocked-durban-climate-talks/>
retrieved, Jan. 5, 2011

Appendix

Crawl Starting Points

Bangladesh

<http://cdpbld.org>
<http://www.banglanews24.com>
<http://www.bapa.info>
<http://www.bcas.net>
<http://www.nccbd.org>
<http://www.prothom-aloblog.com>

Finland

<http://ilmasto.org/durban>
<http://ilmastohuijaus.blogspot.com/2011/12/eroa-ville-niinisto.html>
<http://www.ekofokus.com/2011/12/durbanin-ilmastokokouksen-lopputulokset.html>
<http://www.greenpeace.org/finland/fi/media/blogi/aktivistina-durbanin-ilmastokokouksessa-osav/blog/38452>
<http://www.ilmastofoorumi.fi/2011/12/15/ilmastonmuokaus-puheenaiheena-durbanin-kokouksessa/#more-105164>

Russia

<http://clcr.livejournal.com/tag/durban>
<http://gp-russia.livejournal.com>
<http://green-ru.livejournal.com>
http://ria.ru/trend/climat_un_durban_28112011
<http://www.bellona.ru/subjects/cop17>

Canada

<http://nanisiniq.tumblr.com>
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/yourcommunity>
<http://www.davidsuzuki.org/blogs/climate-blog>
<http://www.equiterre.org/en>
<http://www.pembina.org/blogs>

USA

<http://cop17insouthafrica.wordpress.com>
<http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/young-voices-at-deadlocked-durban-climate-talks>
<http://oneworldgroup.org/durban>
<http://www.350.org/en/about/blogs/citizen-pressure-making-impact-durban>
<http://www.treehugger.com/climate-change/cop17-long-live-process-if-not-climate-or-future.html>

Part III

Actor-relations/Representations

Chapter 12

The Evidence of Things Unseen

Visualizing Global Warming

Oliver Hahn, Elisabeth Eide & Zarqa S. Ali

The Challenge of the Unseen

Although Thomas the Doubter, one of Jesus Christ's apostles, is (unlike Saint Francis de Sales) not the patron saint of practicing (Roman Catholic) journalists, St. Thomas's incredulity regarding Jesus Christ's resurrection might be considered a metaphor for the scepticism expressed – overtly or indirectly – by lay people, and at times journalists, towards possible impacts of global climate change. Despite adhering to a traditional 'credo' of not believing what they have not witnessed with their own eyes, most reporters when it comes to global warming, try to visualize 'the evidence of things unseen'. Doyle for instance, writing in *Science as Culture*, states:

[...] in the case of climate change predictions, the lack of visible evidence of this problem made it difficult for the issue to be linked to an established set of symbolic imagery. This lack of visual evidence, related to the temporal aspect of climate change as a risk that develops over time, has also contributed to the lack of firm policy measures on the issue, as well as low public perception (Doyle 2007: 133).

In a similar way, Grittmann coins the phrase of "[t]he iconography of climate change" and concedes that "[p]hoto work is very demanding [(w)hile pictures play a crucial role in coverage, picturing the topic is difficult], because the actual cause – the greenhouse effect – in itself [(or) the impact and consequences of climate change] is [are] not [always directly] visible." (Cited in Deutsche Welle 2010b: 90-91 and Deutsche Welle 2010a: 97.) According to her, we are instead offered emotional images of polar bears on ice flows and receding glaciers: or apocalyptic visual scenarios which become facts.

Photography with its ability to connect ideas and images is seen as evidence; yet the major challenge is to find ways to visualize climate change. Grittmann observed six different visual frames: polluters and causes, consequences for nature, animals, wildlife and mankind and people affected, victims as well

as endangered nature. Moreover, since the major changes caused by global warming today occur in the Global South, the North-South divide tends to be reinforced, if not deepened.

And if the effects are not directly observable, creative governmental spin doctors can construct ‘future scenarios’ by staging events. Hence, publishing images of what may be the consequences of climate change has become a transnational pattern. In contrast to natural catastrophes and disasters that have already happened, future phenomena and their possible consequences are in general hard to predict, and indeed to visualize, and this holds especially true for global warming or climate change. The ‘unseen future’ thus represents a special challenge to journalism and its ability to inform people, also in a visual way, about which changes (and imminent dangers) may occur. Running in tandem with other (modern) risks and crises such as the most recent bank crashes and scandals, debt, financial and economic crisis, the issue of global warming exemplifies yet another instance of inferred journalistic and scientific epistemological uncertainty (e.g. Bund 2008, Weischenberg cited in Winterbauer 2008).

Reinforcing this uncertainty, the media thus at times tend to challenge art directors or illustrators to create and ‘*construct*’ different dramatic and alarmist illustrations and graphs, although sometimes they simply reproduce the original graphs of the researchers, such as the ‘hockey stick’ (illustrating the steep rise in global temperature in recent years)¹ to showcase future scenarios. And ample illustrations from natural disasters in various parts of the world, helped by media representation, may (by textual anchoring) be *connected* to global climate change and thus give a more universal and future-linked context, as well as speaking directly to common people experiencing such disasters in their everyday lives. Moreover, media publish cartoons and caricatures on climate issues that may be dystopic scenarios including threatened species, or sharp, at times vitriolic attacks on politicians in charge of environmental issues.

The aim of this chapter is to identify patterns of visual representation in the reporting of global warming / climate change. The patterns being less bound by language and local contexts such as ‘domestication’ and ‘nationalization’ (except for the explicitly national political cartoons) may be seen as indicators or moments of ‘global journalism’ or ‘journalism with a global reach’ (see Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010 Berglez, Höijer & Olaussen 2009). Berglez et.al indicate that there “are some ‘openings’ for cross-national identifications, such as the constant use of the globe (as logo or in other ways) – a symbol of the worldwide impact of climate change” (2009: 218-219).

Examining different approaches depicted by global climate change images to stimulate public engagement can help to inform future communication about climate change and encourage public participation to address the climate change issue. This chapter presents some theories around visualization and metaphors, some quantitative results from the *MediaClimate* project, and some examples

of visual materials in particular from print media in various countries during the climate summits, particularly COP15 – the UN climate summit in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009. Some images from transnational media published outside of these time frames are added to the analysis.

Risks, Polysemy and Emotions

Mass media are the most significant channel for the general public to get information about global climate change; and thus have a great influence on the perception of people regarding the issue (Boyce & Lewis 2009, Carvalho & Burgess 2005).

Visual Communication of Risks

Media images and stories (where images often tell their own stories) of global climate change are particularly potent for directing people's perceptions. Public opinion often depends on how news media choose to frame climatic issues and how they, e.g., either represent or fail to represent extreme weather as a result of global warming.

Hulme, for instance, quotes Stuart Allan et al. who have

[...] remarked about a whole genre of technologically induced risks, including climate change: 'They operate outside the capacity of (unaided) human perception. This im/materiality gives [such] risks an air of unreality until the moment they materialise as symptoms. In other words, without visual presences, the hazards associated with these technologies are difficult to represent as risks' (2009: 236).

Hulme specifically mentions how predictions of global climate change are "the globally averaged near-surface air temperature" or what he calls "a disembodied global temperature" (ibid.) that can neither be seen nor photographed.

On the other hand, there is no shortage of examples trying to communicate global climate change visually. Environmental NGOs have been particularly active, as Doyle demonstrates in her study of Greenpeace's "visual iconography" (2007: 133). She suggests that news media have an "event-based tactics" in their coverage of the environment, as for example in their aesthetic framing of the threatened landscape.

Polysemy and Iconic Ambivalence of Pictures

Given the inherent transnational communicative potential, media publish internationally 'travelling' pictures, images, photos(montages) or cartoons and caricatures, while – in many, if not all cases – the originally accompanying

discourses, or the discursive situations in which these visuals occur, do not follow them on their global journeys (Hahn 2008). Thus, interpretations tend to vary with context, the images being read with different lenses.

Sontag stresses that “a photograph is not only an image (as a painting is an image), an interpretation of the real; it is also a trace, something directly stencilled off the real, like a footprint or a death mask, while a painting, even one that meets photographic standards of resemblance, is never more than the stating of an interpretation” (Sontag 1999 [1980], 80-81). Cartoons remain interpretations, while photographs are also ‘traces’ of something that actually happened or ‘was there’ in the real world.

But, as Barthes maintains in his “Rhetoric of the Image”, “all images are polysemous, they imply, underlying their signifiers, a ‘floating chain’ of signifieds, the reader able to choose some and ignore others” (1999 [1964]: 37-38). He is equally concerned with the way in which text and images work together. The technique of language is developed to “*fix* the ‘floating chain’ of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of uncertain signs; the linguistic message is one of these techniques”. He points at two relationships between linguistic messages and images, and identifies two ways: *anchoring* and *relay*. Anchoring he relates mostly to (press) photo captions, while relay is more often connected to cartoons and comic strips. While captions linked to photographic images may have a more direct role as *directing* the reader to what s/he is supposed to see, the textual interplay in cartoons is more complicated, as the text is – as we shall see below – more integrated in the image itself. At times, though, the subtlety of the image may be undermined by an all-too-obvious textual guidance given by the integrated wording, thus making for “lazier” information. Here, in cartoons and comic strips, text and image stand in a complementary relationship; the words, in the same way as the images, are fragments of a more general syntagm and the unity of the message is realized at a higher level, that of the story, the anecdote, the diegesis² (which is ample confirmation that the diegesis must be treated as an autonomous system). In both cases, the text “*directs* the reader through the signifieds of the image, causing him to avoid some and receive others; by means of an often subtle *dispatching*, it remote-controls him towards a meaning chosen in advance”.

Also Lobinger, referring to Knieper (2005: 37f.) and Nöth (2000: 484f.), reiterates that “pictures in general are polysemous to a high extent. They [pictures] consist of ‘blank positions’ that are open for different interpretations, and pictures oftentimes gain their intended meaning only in a context or by ‘verbal anchors’ that determine the ‘reading’” (2009: 114)³.

In the case of global warming ‘travelling’ images may consist of ‘symbolic motives’ of changes taking place: i.e. endangered animals such as the polar bear, endangered indigenous people, flood victims, or indeed whole people – with their governments consciously used as their metonyms.

Emotions and Risks

Visuals help to communicate and present information in simplified ways, making messages memorable, condensing or reducing the complex information, presenting concepts instantly and providing a basis for personal thoughts and social interaction that influence the memories, creating awareness and building opinions about particular issues (Farr 1993, Graber 1990). The most obvious difference between the relative effects of words and visuals are their emotive impact. Visuals are considered to move people along *emotive pathways* whereas other textual materials leave them in a more rational, logical and linear manner of thinking. Salience given to visuals may make media communication of global climate change more forceful and persuasive, and this persuasion may in its turn bring the audience into a state of emotion that collectively can play an important role in the social ‘*construction*’ of risk messages as well as in mitigation and adaptation of global climate change. Furthermore, visuals confirm the ‘truth value’ of an event, since visuals are considered to better verify the authenticity of the story of being told (Graber 1996), as iterated some 2,000 years ago by Saint Thomas, the doubting disciple.

Visual Stereotypes, “Visiotypes” and Visual ‘Constructions’

This theory of emotive effect has its challengers, but on the other hand, throughout modern press history, some powerful press icons may be seen as having generated a change of opinion, as is obvious from the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan, as well as images from the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo prisons. Another observable trend is the way in which certain ‘*constructed*’ (or even ‘*staged*’) images have been used as part of *psyops*-operations in war and conflict situations (Ottosen 2011).

In contrast to natural catastrophes and disasters, human-related war and terror, future (and current) risks like global climate change or bank crashes, debt, financial and economic crisis, such events and situations do not usually leave visual ruins or debris as testament to the degree of damage of a crisis. Thus, the media need visual ‘*constructions*’.⁴

The originally notion of ‘stereotype’ that U.S. journalist Walter Lippmann employed in the first chapter of his book *Public Opinion* (1961 [1922]): “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads” was borrowed from printing technology and used as an analogue in the social sciences. Citing Lippmann’s use of stereotypes, Petersen and Schwender (2009: 11) plead for more research in the field of “visual stereotype” or “stereotyped visual communication” in order to better understand the “interplay between the mass media and the opinion making” as well as the significance of “the pictures in our heads”, as Lippmann (1961 [1922]) paraphrased it. Lippmann appreciated a stereotype

for its “suggestive power of the metaphor” as a “fixed pattern” underlining “the process of simplification of information, without which one would not be able to structure reality in its whole complexity” – and would be incapable of reducing complexity – as well as “the element of generalization of information”. This understanding implies that a stereotype *per se* may not have a positive or negative connotation, but can be neutral and free of normative assessment – in contrast to a prejudice that in most cases is connotatively negative as well as in contrast to a cliché, also an originally typographic term in printing technology, that is a “banal pattern of behaviour and of standardized characteristics or features” (Petersen and Schwender 2009: 7-10). Bleuel (2009: 96-97) and Lobinger (2009: 110-111) remind us that Pörksen (1997) has coined the notion of “visiotype”, a linguistic contraction of the words *vision* and *stereotype*, in order to deal with visual stereotype(s). Pörksen (1997) uses both terms in parallel or analogously, (verbal) stereotype and “visiotype”, meaning a “globally effective sign” or a “rapidly standardized visualization” (Pörksen 1997: 27, 257). His definition is challenged by Müller (2003: 158) who criticizes it as to be too hermeneutical because associative effects and the meaning of the context were not sufficiently taken into consideration. What may be needed here is a new definition of “visiotype” in order to analyze “emotional visiotypes.” Their potential effects may be needed to analyse images of climate change. “Emotional visiotypes” are media images or media representations that show emotions in a prototypical or stereotypical way (Hoffmann 2002: 74). They can be defined as material, reproducible visions or images that create immaterial, partly stereotypical images of thoughts, outlooks or conceptualizations, and that are targeted, for means of communication, via a carrier medium at a mass audience (Knieper and Müller 2003, Müller 2003). The front cover picture of this volume is an example of such a ‘constructed’ illustration related to global climate change.

A volume of photographs entitled *The Human Face of Climate Change* or, in German, *Schicksale des Klimawandels* and published by two Swiss photographers, Mathias Braschler and Monika Fischer, is interesting in this context. They photographed and interviewed people in 16 countries around the world, “whose existence is threatened by the consequences of climate change” (2011, back cover). This photojournalistic approach is accompanied by texts written by Jonathan Watts, *The Guardian*’s Asia environment correspondent. Another attempt at showing visual change linked to global warming is made by Fred Pearce (2010). Pearce’s examples, as well as those of Braschler and Fischer are global warming images that have been published in books. But to what degree and how do (mass) media attempt to visualize the gradual degradation, future scenarios or even imminent dangers? In this chapter, we can only give a few brief suggestions of answers to this potentially huge question.

Research Questions and Methodology

In order to explore aspects of visualization of global climate change, this chapter is guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the variety of images of global climate change in international (print) media? What genres of illustrations of global climate change can be found through the coverage of UN Climate Summits – with particular focus on COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark and on COP17 in Durban, South Africa?
2. To what extent do quality/elite and popular newspapers differ in their visual framing of global climate change?
3. What patterns in visual coverage of global climate change can be detected? If any, can these patterns be considered to be cross-cultural, not bound to ‘domestication’ of national, regional, or local ‘journalisms’, and thus be seen as indicators or moments of ‘global journalism’?

Research questions under (1) and (2) have been treated to quantitative content analysis so as to provide an overview of visuals, primarily with regard to COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, with some reference to COP17 in Durban, South Africa. The quantitative material includes a mapping of each image published in two newspapers (one more elite-leaning, one more popular) in each country, and also registering the category to which it belongs⁵. This material allows us to see not only the degree to which each country’s newspapers relied on pictures relative to the number of stories, but also to see to what extent images not directly related to the summit were published. The latter could be an indication of some of the media viewing the COPs as an opportunity to expand their coverage of this global issue.


Research question under point (3) is dealt with in a more qualitative-explorative approach, describing and analyzing in-depth and in a more suggestive manner a smaller selection of visuals. These visual case examples are mostly connected to the UN Climate Summits.

Quantitative Findings: Talking Heads and Threatened Nature

The quantitative overview of visuals is provided by the international and collaborative research project and network “*MediaClimate*”. It has used content analysis and framing theory to map the media coverage of three COPs (2007, 2009, 2011). Below, as shown in table 12.1, there is an overview of the proportion of visuals related to COP15 in two newspapers (elite and popular) in each participant country. It does not include all the countries in the network, but

may give an indication of differences (see also Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010). As may be seen from table 12.1, there is, of course, a correlation between the number of stories and pictures. Russia and Chile are among the countries with the lowest coverage, while Norway and Bangladesh were among those with the largest number of stories. That Denmark, as the host country has by far the largest proportion of images from/around COP15, comes as no surprise. (It is more surprising that they are still leading when it comes to the Durban COP17, see table 12.3 below).

Table 12.1. Stories and Images, COP15 in Copenhagen, 15 Countries, MediaClimate



There are, however, countries which have substantially more illustrations than stories (Denmark and Norway⁶) and others who (presumably for lack of resources or due to newspaper conventions) have substantially fewer images than stories (Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, and South Africa).


What Kind of Images/Copenhagen?

The largest category of images is by far pictures (often small) of persons (see table 12.2). This is, however, a broad category which may contain both political leaders and celebrities – as well as singular victims of global climate change, although the latter more often are represented in groups and reproduced not in articles on the summit itself, but in related stories, where they are situated in their (threatened) natural environment. Quantitatively speaking, the German newspapers are the leading publishers of persons/talking heads, followed by Australia and Norway; while Bangladesh has the largest number of images related to nature/natural symbols, maybe due to the fear of large proportions

of their arable land being threatened by the rising sea level. China too has a considerable proportion of images from nature, but also a larger-than average proportion of urban or industrial symbols, as does Canada and Indonesia.

Worth noting is that the Indonesian newspapers (especially elite *Kompas*) carry by far the largest proportion of cartoons, having a strong newspaper tradition for this genre. They are followed by Australia and Russia, but the Russian numbers are very small. German popular *Bild Zeitung* has the largest proportion of portraits (photos of individuals) followed by Australian elite *Sydney Morning Herald*. Popular *Prothom Alo* in Bangladesh has the largest proportion of pictures from (threatened) nature.

Table 12.2. Categories of Images Related to COP15, 15 Countries, "MediaClimate" Network



Three countries from the 'Global South' have the largest proportions of images from 'protests or demonstrations at Copenhagen' (Brazil, South Africa, and Egypt). Knowing that many protests were directed against the politics of leading countries in the 'Global North', this may not be a surprise, but another reason may be that these photos were easily available from the news agencies. When it comes to the category 'protest elsewhere' Chile, Bangladesh, and Egypt have the highest proportion.

Elite newspapers seem to be slightly more concerned with graphs/ maps, etc., which may be due to their larger emphasis on enlightenment and factual information, while the popular ones have a higher proportion of photos of individuals, and we may presume, among them celebrities. There seems also to be a difference in emphasis when it comes to urban vs. nature images, the popular newspapers focus more on degradation of nature, while the elite ones seem more concerned with urban problems related to global climate change.

A front page example from the *Toronto Star* (Picture 1, from the day when they published the global editorial initiated by *The Guardian*, see chapter 7, is illustrative of the “industrial threat” genre of climate change pictures. Here one single chimney releasing lots of smoke is placed as a metonym for the world’s polluting industries. The same page also prints the logo of the editorial, shaped as a globe.



Picture 12.1. *Toronto Star*, December 7, 2009⁷

One cannot draw too many conclusions from these statistics, but somewhat more when it comes to national variety than the difference between elite and popular. It seems, though that the popular newspapers prioritize individuals more than the elite ones. The focus on individuals is in line with the tabloid perspective and its higher focus on consumer journalism. This climate journalism either concentrates on ‘what you can do’ or on the celebrities engaged in the issue. The high proportion of ‘person photos’ (excluding ‘by-line pictures’) in both categories of newspapers also speaks to the fact that climate conferences are covered as a political game between important leaders who are available for interviews and comments to their respective national media (Eide, Kunelius, & Kumpu 2010).

Durban COP17 – A Comparison

Before the COP17 in Durban, expectations were lowered. Few prominent heads of state or other leaders of importance were expected to visit. In the coverage of this summit, as may be seen from table 12.3, the number of images dropped

considerably from the “all time high” in Copenhagen. The proportion between the varieties of pictures remained roughly the same as Copenhagen, except that some countries have few or no pictures, thus making it meaningless to sort them into categories.

Table 12.3. Images and Stories Related to COP15 and COP 17 in 12 Countries, “MediaClimate” Network

Country	COP 15 Copenhagen		COP 17 Durban	
	Pictures	Stories	Pictures	Stories
Finland	172	216	39	58
Canada	180	262	52	36
Israel	78	85	6	8
Germany	115	114	10	30
Indonesia	50	95	1	18
Russia	14	32	0	4
Norway	352	264	32	64
Bangladesh	104	317	39	90
Chile	52	48	26	15
South-Africa	35	84	50	116
Brazil	82	171	1	35
Denmark	940	710	127	159
Total	2174	2408	383	633

With a few exceptions, it seems as if the number of images in elite newspapers dropped less from Copenhagen to Durban than it did in the popular newspapers. The ‘rationale’ behind this difference may be the popular papers being more inclined to decrease coverage when important leaders lose interest.

Front Pages, News, PR Pictures and Cartoons

A more qualitative approach to visuals now follows, and focuses on four particular genres of visuals: front cover page illustrations, news photos, political PR pictures, and cartoons. Some of these visual case examples have been published in the newspapers in the sample of the quantitative content analysis (connected to UN COPs), while others have been additionally identified in other (print) media, more generally related to global climate change.

Front Cover Page Illustrations: ‘The Art Director’s Cut’

The first genre challenges art directors or illustrators to create and ‘construct’ different (often) dystopic and dramatic views of the future to showcase the scientific prognoses. The following screenshot of a front cover page illustration

of the U.S. *TIME*, on which soldiers erect a broken tree, is accompanied by a headline “How to Win The War On Global Warming” (28 April 2008). This image alludes to the historic photograph “Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima”, taken by Joe Rosenthal on 23 February 1945, showing U.S. troops raising the stars-and-stripes-flag on Mount Suribachi during the battle of Iwo Jima, a Japanese island, at the end of World War II. This historic photograph is considered to be, probably, the most important symbolic image of U.S. victory.

Picture 12.2. *TIME* Magazine (front cover page), April 28, 2008⁸



In a more artificial way, art directors of the British weekly news and international affairs magazine *The Economist* created front cover page illustrations (published on 27 November 2010 and on 5 December 2009; European edition respectively) related to global climate change (see screenshots in Pictures 12.3a and 12.3b). The 12.3a version hints at a future where the farmer – astronaut-looking – as a metonym for people in general – faces risks that compel him to take dramatic protective measures, while the other one, being published during the COP15 in Copenhagen, is influenced by the sentiments of expectations to that particular forum (see chapter 7) to provide durable solutions to the problems created by global warming.

Picture 12.3a. *The Economist* (front cover page; European edition), November 27, 2010⁹



Picture 12.3b. *The Economist* (front cover page; European edition), December 5, 2009¹⁰



Sometimes as element(s) of those visual ‘constructions’ of front cover pages (and in other genres discussed here¹¹), there are recurring images. Particularly in the media of some countries of the ‘Global North’, animals that are endangered by anthropogenic global climate change, such as polar bears, seem to have become a special and partly universal metaphor – or ‘visiotype’ – for global climate change.

It may be argued that especially the polar bear can be seen as an icon – an ‘icon-ization’ or ‘icon-otype’ (here, the latter term not in its zoological/medical sense) – of the perils of global climate change.¹² In media saturated societies ‘visiotypes’ – or clichés – may work in a counter-productive manner, much like the ‘cry wolf syndrome’ known from fairy tales, or they may cause exhaustion, as when the polar bear becomes the ‘pin-up’ of global climate change (Nuttall 2009)¹³.

The polar bear causes compassion with the species, which may be explained by a ‘kid’s teddy-bear effect’ (remembering childhood needs of a cuddly toy for bedtime). Sometimes, the polar bear made it to the front page(s) of newspapers or news magazines such as e.g. *La Libre Belgique* on 3-4 February 2007 (see Picture 12.4).

Picture 12.4. *La Libre Belgique*, February 3-4, 2007¹⁴



News Photos

In the media of some countries of the 'Global South', images of human beings endangered by anthropogenic global climate change occur as 'visiotypes' for global warming, including images of citizens wading through flooded areas. This is also true for photographs from vulnerable nature indicating slow changes (e.g. gradually melting glaciers), or from 'nature's fury', sudden catastrophes and natural disasters. Oftentimes, human tragedies and destinies in the shape of local expertise on consequences of global climate change, such as farmers on arid desert-like (agricultural) landscapes, are portrayed. Or, particularly threatened nations, such as the Maldives or Tuvalu and other Pacific Ocean island states, as well as Bangladesh, and some of the worst drought-ridden countries in the Sahel area in Africa are depicted.

For instance on 24 August 2010, *Dawn*, the most important and most widely circulated Pakistani English-language daily newspaper published a colour wire-service news photo by the global British news agency Reuters, showing (particularly female) victims of the flood in Pakistan in July 2010 after heavy monsoon rains (see screenshot in Picture 12.5).

Picture 12.5. Reuters published in *Dawn*, August 9, 2010



Due to two years of heavy flooding in Pakistan, a whole genre of such pictures was generated; at times these were directly connected to climate change.

Political PR Pictures

Equivalent to spin campaigns of ‘greenwashing’ (e.g. Jackisch 2009) run by some multinational corporate groups within their activities of corporate communication (called ‘corporate social/environmental responsibility’, CS/ER), such as e.g. sponsoring COP15 (Hahn and Hermann 2010: 199), there seem to be state PR strategies that may be labelled *Southwashing*, as when Northern politicians pose hugging trees in the Amazon (Eide and Orgeret 2010).

Images of this character may be also observed in some countries of the ‘Global South’ initiated by those in political power. One example is the self-‘staged’ government conference under water as a ‘pseudo-event’ (Boorstin 1987 [1961]), from the Maldives, an island state vulnerable to rising sea levels, some weeks prior to COP15 (see screenshot in Picture 12.6a). This underwater government conference became a particular brand of “travelling” images (Hahn 2008) together with a photo of the Nepalese government situated 5320m above sea level among melting glaciers in the Himalayas (see Picture 12.6b); or the Mongolian government meeting in an arid zone of their vast country.

Picture 12.6a. Cabinet under Water



Source: Press office of the government of the Maldives/dpa in die tageszeitung (taz) online, October 19, 2009, <http://www.taz.de/142476> [December 15, 2011].

Picture 12.6b. The Nepalese Government Conference in the Himalayas




Source: Screenshot from Xinhua news: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/04/content_12588821.htm

Cartoons / Caricatures

Cartoonists base their works on visual metaphors and cultural allusions and jokes (against the backdrop that humour is often not intercultural), and they rely on caricature, which in its turn uses exaggeration and individualization (Kenney et al. 1996). Many of the cartoons in the *MediaClimate* material are “editorial cartoons” commenting by means of drawings what the editors do by means of words, but also at times making independent statements. In our material in general, an obvious ‘cartoonic’ discourse found in several countries, e.g. Bangladesh, Chile, and Indonesia is the ‘blame the rich’ message, where the rich part of the world is seen as being responsible for today’s threatening situation.

Picture 12.7. Africa at the Rich Man's Table



Source: Kompas, December 9, 2009. Reprinted courtesy of the artist: Thomdean.

This Indonesian cartoon published in the early phase of the COP15 may inspire a series of interpretations and connotations within the 'blame the rich' discourse, depending on context and the way in which the reader is situated: thus demonstrating its transnational and indeed polysemic potential. Why does the skinny African mother have a larger plate than the others? Does the map allude to the colonial 'scramble for Africa'?

Norwegian Political Cartoons

Other cartoons, especially from the Copenhagen summit, illustrated the move towards non-progress, and would thus represent either a gloomy present or dystopic future scenarios. In the following we will present a small selection of Norwegian editorial cartoons that have to do with the COPs. In the case of the Norwegian editorial cartoons, two trends may be identified: one that treats Norway as a country of double standards, and another that signifies a gloomy future. A cartoon published in *VG* during the Bali summit (see Picture 12.8a) relies on the complementary relationship between text and image; what Roland Barthes calls the relay (Barthes 1999 [1964]: 37-38), contributing to a larger

whole, a story, as do the other cartoons in this section. It was published during COP13 at Bali, Indonesia in 2007, on the occasion of the Norwegian political leadership presenting their package for saving rain forest around the world.

Picture 12.8a. VG, December 11, 2007



Reprinted courtesy of the artist: Roar Hagen.

The cartoon shows a fat man in what – at least at home – is perceived as traditional clothing, topped by a Norwegian flag-like headgear. The man pukes oil (*Statfjord* is the largest state-owned oil company) and farts CO₂ gas (*Melkøya* being the largest gas plant in northern Norway). The natural surroundings are not Norwegian though, as indicated by palm trees and by “Bali” (in the upper left hand corner). In the lower right part of the cartoon, the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and the then-Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen are offering three billions (of some currency), and the Prime Minister is stating: “When it comes to environment, we are leading the world!”¹⁵. Norway, a country positioning itself as a major player in global climate negotiations due to its commitment to saving rainforests around the world, obviously follows a state PR strategy of what we dubbed earlier as *Southwashing*.

The effect of contrasting is not to be missed: here is a suit-clad man (and a correspondingly managerial woman), while the fat man may be seen as more

vulgar and brutal, signified by his farting and puking in public and thus polluting the tropical landscape. The cartoon refers to the Norwegian oil industry being a major source of CO₂ emissions in Norway, but could also be interpreted as having a more global impact, as Norway is one of the world's major oil exporters, and thus the emissions from its exports could be associated with Norwegian pollution as well (see also Eide & Ytterstad 2011).

Double standard critique by cartoons and caricatures may also take the shape of individual critique directed towards prominent persons, especially when such individuals act in counterproductive ways, as when the Norwegian Prime Minister hired a private jet plane to go to Copenhagen, in spite of there being ample opportunities for travelling by ordinary airliners. This was the only time that a COP15-related story reached the front page of the popular newspaper *VG* (see Picture 12.8b).

Picture 12.8b. *VG*, December 14, 2009.



Text bubble: Prime Minister says: "If we did not manage to land on the moon, at least we made it here in Copenhagen!"

Reprinted courtesy of the artist: Roar Hagen.

This political caricature frames the Prime Minister for what we can label 'negative symbolic action'. Symbolic individual action may be more associated with Indian tradition, but at a general level most societies recognize the role of a

politician to be one of setting a good example by exemplary behaviour, at least in whatever walk of life he or she is engaged in. The red carpet rolled out for the Prime Minister with his heavy bags, underlines the irony in the critique of his priorities. The Prime Minister is drawn with his hands up, as a gesture of excuse. But his line is highly ironic, since the ‘moon landing’ referred to two years earlier, has been repeatedly postponed.

But the executive airplane, by which the Prime Minister arrives, is not the only one. The caricature depicts two others, one on the ground, and one in the air, the latter emitting CO₂. The connotation here is the contradiction between a conference that is supposed to save the world from the effects of greenhouse gases, and the actual practices of the delegates whose ecological footprints are substantial. These two images are typical politician caricatures, but not ‘visual stereotypes’, since they relate to special factual processes and/or events. Caricatures can differ from ‘visual stereotypes’ not only because they concern individuals rather than groups, but also because caricatures represent the specifics rather than unfair, musty, clichés. The caricature may be unpleasant, but it is based on particular actions or words of a particular politician (Kenney et al. 1996). But while the first one – depicting Norwegian double standards – is by its nature criticizing a larger political priority, or a political flaw, the latter talks to the individual double standard through symbolic action. What is shared is the way in which both cartoon and caricature may undermine public trust in political leadership when it comes to climate mitigation.

Another Norwegian cartoon about COP15 and published in *VG*, has a somewhat more transnational character, at least for those who know the landmarks of Copenhagen (see Picture 12.9a). The Little Mermaid, a famous statue sitting in the water near the shore in the Danish capital and one of the city’s major tourist attractions, is here accompanied by a polar bear, and they both share a sad facial expression in the starry, lightly cloudy night, signifying worries about the unknown (threatening) future.


It may be argued that images of the polar bear as well as those of the Little Mermaid seemed to be used as icons, frequently in both cartoons and caricatures as well as in front cover page illustrations and news photos (montages). This is just one example out of many from the press using the Little Mermaid as a symbol for fears related to global climate change. In some cartoons the Little Mermaid is swallowed by a tidal wave, in others she is half submerged by the rising waters; and in yet another cartoon by the same Norwegian artist (picture 12.9b), she is substituted by U.S. President Barack Obama, looking destitute and naked, and threatened by his other self, a warrior in Afghanistan.

Picture 12.9a. VG, December 4, 2009



Reprinted courtesy of the artist: Roar Hagen.

Picture 12.9b. VG, December 8, 2009



Reprinted courtesy of the artist: Roar Hagen.

Conclusions and Perspectives

As the findings clearly show, there is a huge variety of images and very different genres of illustrations on global climate change to be found throughout the coverage by international (print) media of UN Climate Summits – and indeed, in other coverage.

Quality/elite and popular newspapers differ to some extent in their visual framing of global warming. Furthermore, different patterns in visual covering of global climate can be detected across different nations. Some of these patterns are distinctly domesticated, others have a transnational potential, being less linked to local ‘journalisms’. Thus, they may be seen as indicators or moments of ‘global journalism’¹⁶. It is fair to say that climate change visuals speak ‘their own language’, and from our material it seems that they may play the role of enhancing the drama (even) more than the texts they accompany – or planting gloomy images of the future when they are printed without any obvious relation to a written text. As such, they are successfully adhering to journalistic doxa, emphasizing conflict, disaster, and crisis; but for the same reason they may be part of a ‘cry wolf’ – or alarmist – series of future scenarios communicated – even if the future is indeed alarming.

Follow-up research on motion pictures and ‘factional’ documentary drama movies or the documentary genre about global warming would be desirable, as would future cross-disciplinary media and psychology studies of media effects on recipients in order to find out whether or not (visual) journalism covering global climate change, serves or fails as an early warning system or an enhancement of the precautionary principle advocated by the UN/IPCC. More in-depth studies of the variety of genres visited here will no doubt continue to occur, and enrich a subfield of studies within media and climate change.

Notes

1. See for example Michael Mann on the hockey stick: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/mar/05/climate-change-hockey-stick-michael-mann> Accessed 23.5.2012.
2. Diegesis: the *narrative*, what is *told*, as a contrast to what is *shown*.
3. All non-English quotes have been translated by the authors.
4. Here, the notion of visual ‘*construction(s)*’ does not explicitly refer to the school of thought in communication science theory of a ‘(radical) constructivism and the mass media’, as this paradigm has been described from research carried out for instance at the University of Münster/Germany (German: Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, WWU) (e.g. Merten, Schmidt, and Weischenberg 1994).
5. The material was gathered for three weeks, thus including some days before and some days after the summit. The image categories were: summit negotiations; protest/demonstrations in Copenhagen; protests elsewhere; security arrangements; general pictures of Copenhagen; nature, natural symbols of global climate change; urban/industrial symbols of climate change; by-line pictures; graphs/maps, etc.; cartoons/caricatures; person photos/portraits; and other.

6. The explanation for Norway and Denmark having a larger proportion of images than articles could be that they have the highest number of by-line pictures (Norway and Denmark: both 20% of the total), and thus the explanation seems to be specific newspaper conventions. China, for example, has no by-line pictures at all, the same holds for Bangladesh and South Africa.
7. Source: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/gallery/2009/dec/07/copenhagen-climate-change-newspapers?intcmp=239#/?picture=356512038&index=4>
8. <http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20080428,00.html>. Accessed 29 January 2012]
9. <http://www.economist.com/node/21521759>. Accessed 9 February 2012]
10. <http://www.economist.com/node/21521508>. Accessed 9 February 2012]
11. Interestingly, some news photos seem to visually 're-stereotype' or 're-visiotype' by looking for 'visual 'stereotypes' or 'visiotypes' in reality and depicting them as motifs in atmospheric settings. See, for instance, this photo essay: http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/2006/global_warming/ Accessed 3 November 2010].
12. An icon may be seen as a word (or image) making a difference; it calls for resonance and meaning in an individual or collective.
13. Seminar report: Canada's and Europe's Northern Dimensions, University of Alberta. <http://www.cci.ualberta.ca/en/People/ForFaculty/~media/cci/Documents/CanadasandEuropesNorthernDimensions.pdf#page=96>. Accessed 1 June 2012
14. The authors thank Antigoni Vokou (Free University of Brussels/Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) for having provided this photomontage from her country's media.
15. The inscription on his bag is "moon landing", the label associated with a plan to make the Norwegian gas plants almost emission free, the end result of which has been postponed several times.
16. It is interesting to note, though, that it seems as if the government-staged pictures – not being a result of planned journalism – seem to have a larger transnational appeal than many other images.

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Chapter 13

Pessimism of the Intellect and Optimism of the Will

A Gramscian Analysis of Climate Justice in Summit Coverage

Andreas Ytterstad & Adrienne Russell

As the 100,000 strong demonstration started to march towards the Bella Centre, I saw a familiar face. It was the Norwegian veteran television journalist of NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation), Lars Sigurd Sunnanå, rising up on his toes trying to catch a sight of the full length of the demonstration. He was smiling. Sunnanå has been a Middle East correspondent for many years. His smile was not only one of pleasant surprise. It was the smile of someone who had witnessed a lot of injustice. It was full of sympathy, perhaps even hope. (A quote for field notes, Copenhagen, 12 December, Ytterstad 2009)

This passing glimpse of a smiling journalist, at the high point of global media coverage of climate change politics, is an entry point into what we take to be a crucial question in climate reporting: the role of journalism in mediating the political goals and arguments of climate activists. In addition to one of the present authors, Ytterstad, observing the summit in Copenhagen, both of us worked on site in Durban, observing the civil society meetings which took place at the 'People's Space', KwaZulu Natal University. There we witnessed the launch of the 'South African One Million Jobs!' While the lower participant numbers in the South African civil society meeting reflected both the distant location and the overall decline of global interest in climate change from COP 15 to 17, the intensity and inspiration remained strong. International Secretary of the Campaign Against Climate Change (UK) Jonathan Neale, cheering for the South-African initiative, told an enthusiastic crowd that if 'we' win in just one country, a climate change politics from below can win everywhere. Nobody in Durban could miss the displays of a new book by Patrick Bond, Director of the Centre for Civil Society at KwaZulu, whose title neatly condensed the mood and message: *Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below* (Bond 2011).

In this chapter, drawing particularly on examples from Norwegian and US media coverage, we focus on the relationship between journalists and the

climate movement ‘from below’. How have journalists represented the civic activism that has become part of the summits and the whole landscape of global politics? To what extent, and how, have the interpretations of the climate movement(s) been conveyed and taken seriously by mainstream media?

Analyzing the Media with Gramsci

Our analysis here is informed by a perspective drawn from Antonio Gramsci, whose outlook has inspired generations of critical thinkers and activists. Among other things he was a key theorist for early cultural studies (Hall 1977, 1986; Williams 1973, 1977), albeit an influence that tended to fade as cultural studies grew and became more diffuse. Lately, Gramscian influences have fared much better in the field of social movements and political action (cf. Nilsen 2009), as media tactics and publicity have increasingly become a crucial aspect of activism. The Gramscian perspective has offered activists neat conceptualizations that can help to develop political tactics in the mediatized environment. One can speak of a convergence between the philosophy of praxis developed by the social movements and the knowledge they have acquired from the work of Gramsci – often transmitted via media scholarship. The most obvious case is Todd Gitlin, whose seminal *The Whole World is Watching* (1980), is a classic study of how the media frame protests and affect activists. Meeting activists in Durban and Copenhagen, it was easy to hear echoes of Gitlin in the analyses promoted by the activists.

When we work with Gramscian notions, we are encouraged to pay attention to the context. His key concepts (as drawn upon in this chapter) are *hegemony*, *common sense*, and perhaps more particularly here, *good sense*, but they are not and were not meant to be ready-made, universally applicable analytical categories. They are thick general concepts that need to be *deployed* in a specific context if they are to be useful (Thomas 2009: 134). Hegemony is *a far ranging exercise of leadership*, aiming to articulate the world in a way that incorporates and co-opts resistance. Hegemony works best when it manages to make its representations of reality *commonsensical*, that is, by naturalizing its way of framing problems, participants and solutions. *Good sense* is a much less frequently used concept both within media studies and contemporary Gramscian analysis. Gramsci himself defined it as “a *conception of necessity* which gives a conscious direction to one’s activity. This is the healthy nucleus that exists in ‘common sense’, the part of it which can be called ‘good sense’” (Gramsci et al. 1971: 327–328, our emphasis).


Necessity exists when there exists an effective and active *premiss*, consciousness of which in people’s mind has become operative, proposing concrete

goals to the collective consciousness and constituting a complex of convictions and beliefs which act powerfully in the form of ‘popular beliefs’ (Ibid, pp. 412-413).

Arguably, some kind of ‘good sense’, a shared sense of necessity, was the active premise that brought together state leaders and protesters alike to Copenhagen and Durban. After all, the COPs take place because science tells us we need to do something radical to avert climate catastrophe. But clearly, this necessity was neither equally specified, nor equally operative among the different actors present at the summits.

One useful way of looking at the three key concepts is to think that hegemony and good sense impact upon common sense, viewpoints which are shared by many and/or appear self-evident. Building on the work of Diana Coben (2002), Ytterstad has developed a spatial description for the battle over common sense.

Figure 13.1. Hegemony, Good Sense and Common Sense



Tracking hegemony in media analysis has a strong pedigree (Lewis 1992) but good sense is usually only briefly alluded to (Wayne 2003). Yet a full Gramscian analysis of the contradictory nature of the media also requires an investigation of good sense, placing it explicitly within the analytical framework. Roughly speaking, good sense has methodological implications for our analysis here. We arrive at this position by means of the following trajectory. Hegemony accounts for the first half of Gramsci’s life motto: the *pessimism of the intellect*. Through a hermeneutics of suspicion, generations of hegemony theorists have followed this line, tracking the effects of dominant power on the media and thereby leading to our common sense. Good sense, by contrast, points to the second

half of Gramsci's motto (borrowed from Romain Rolland): *the optimism of the will*. Following this, a *hermeneutics of faith*, or hope, may be necessary for the detection of good sense in the media.¹ Good sense, Gramsci wrote, manifests itself only "occasionally, and in flashes" (Gramsci et al.1971: 327). In order to detect and appreciate good sense, a researcher may have to be highly attuned to or even immersed in the perspective of the activists themselves. This is the attitude we take in the following analysis.

Climate Activists in Summit Coverage

Civil society actors have played, and continue to play an important role in summit coverage (see Eide & Kunelius 2010, Kunelius & Eide 2012). In Copenhagen more than every fourth voice (28 %) quoted in the news stories originated from the civil society sector (see also chapter 17). The percentage fell a little for Durban (22 %), but was still significant. There are considerable differences between countries and summits. A single overall explanation is not to be found, (table 13.1 shows a selection of countries) but clearly professional journalistic cultures and political systems play a role. For instance the Nordic journalists (Norway, Sweden, Finland) and newsrooms offer a lot of space for civic actors, possibly reflecting a culture where civil society actors in general are seen as more legitimate and often working closely with official, political actors.

Table 13.1. Number and Overall Ratio of Civil Society Voices in the Coverage of Selected Countries

	Bali (COP 13)		Copenhagen (COP 15)		Durban (COP 17)		Average (3 summits)	
Israel	13	20 %	13	8 %	4	27 %	30	12 %
Russia	5	17 %	5	9 %	1	25 %	11	12 %
Germany	47	18 %	33	18 %	8	15 %	88	18 %
USA	14	25 %	55	17 %	18	20 %	87	18 %
Bangladesh	20	16 %	196	28 %	23	14 %	239	24 %
Indonesia	95	26 %	61	26 %	12	27 %	168	26 %
Finland	23	22 %	77	31 %	26	33 %	126	29 %
Canada	70	35 %	160	28 %	52	31 %	282	30 %
Sweden	29	26 %	94	43 %	17	16 %	140	32 %
Norway	69	32 %	144	33 %	11	24 %	224	32 %

Civic activism has become a routine part of the 'script' of climate summits viewed as media events. Activists provide a symbolic counter-balance to the official part of the summits and their negotiations. They also offer much needed visual material for journalists, often by organizing protests and demonstrations (about 11 % of summit coverage pictures are from demonstrations) with real or

potential tensions with the police. Although the summit news in the popular press sometimes reports demonstrations within a ‘law and order’ frame, the general sense of news coverage around the globe has been pretty ‘activism-friendly’. Thus, for the most part, climate activists have *not* been victims of the most clichéd reflexes of hegemonic mainstream media. International NGOs are also often provided with a legitimate role in commenting upon the negotiations. In some cases an alliance between NGOs and journalism (and journalists) seems to have been planned and almost celebratory (cf. Kumpu & Kunelius 2010, Russell 2010). This can be seen both as a sign of activism that is partly co-opted by the hegemonic process of (paralyzed) international political bargaining: colorful civic activism decorates the ineffectual nature of the summits. But the noteworthy role of activism in coverage is also a concrete recognition by journalists that this activism indeed articulates *good sense*, a necessity that the hegemonic actors have failed to take seriously enough.

We now delve more deeply into analysis of media content that appeared in Norway and the USA in relation to the summits. For Norway we analysed reports from a mainstream television news outlet, NRK *Dagsrevyen* and one alternative newspaper, *Klassekampen* (Class Struggle), focusing mainly on the coverage of 12 December 2009, the day of the biggest demonstrations in Copenhagen.² In the USA we look both at *The New York Times* (print and online content), and the alternative news outlet Copenhagen News Collaborative (CNC), which was organized by the politically liberal investigative magazines *Mother Jones* and *The Nation*, and the environmental advocacy online outlet *TreeHugger*, among other environmental and media activist groups (cf. Russell 2010). CNC allowed news outlets lacking equipment and reporters, especially for international and investigative reporting, to use NGO networks as a resource to spread information quickly.³ CNC later transformed into a new entity, “The Climate Desk,” which produced little coverage of COP17 (see also chapter 14).

Journalists on Demonstrators and Activists: Recognizing Good Sense

For Gramsci, it is the *convergence of movements* that brings good sense into the open: “the social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally, and in flashes – when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality” (1971: 327). The most visible flash of such global good sense in climate politics must have been the 100,000 strong demonstration on the 12 December 2012. Both of the Norwegian media outlets examined here displayed a particularly high degree of sympathy and understanding of the protests.

NRK could of course, through a live broadcast, cover the demonstration itself, but due to a technical mishap in reporting by Lars Sigurd Sunnanå (the tip-toeing, smiling Middle East veteran), their broadcast was aired only in the evening edition of *Dagsrevyen* (Molde 2011). In the report, Sunnanå walks among demonstrators, talking about the “inventiveness, humor, irony and deep gravity” of the manifestation. Some of the sympathy comes in the shape of registering an appreciation of the “drama of carnival” (Vinthagen 2002): a man dressed up as Santa Claus complains about the disappearing snow leaving the children without Christmas presents. But the report is also informative and serious: a German demonstrator speaks for 24 seconds (an exceptionally long sound-bite by today’s standards) on the reasons behind the protests. The legitimacy of the protesters’ claims is reinforced further when Sunnanå himself says, “there was no mistaking the message” while the pictures show placards saying, “There is no Planet B!” and “Planet, not profit!” In the next insert, global peoples’ power is reinforced further by showing Desmond Tutu addressing demonstrators and comparing their march to the tearing down of the Berlin wall.

Klassekampen dedicated its front page to global activist Naomi Klein. She must be seen as one of the key organic intellectuals of the kind described by Gramsci as the “social group in question” (Gramsci 1971: 327) that converged at the summit in Copenhagen. Klein underscores the *global* nature of the protests themselves. This is crucial because good sense must overcome the key dividing line between North and South, a no-man’s land that troubled previous large environmental summits like the Earth Summit in 1992 (Guha 1999). Naomi Klein developed her arguments on climate justice in her opening speech at *Klimaforum09*, the Peoples Summit in Copenhagen. Here she referred to Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration and the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of states: the developed world had caused the problem, now they had to fix it, anything else would be a profound case of injustice. In her book *No Logo* (2001) Klein saw that the crucial importance of the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999 was the presence of mass resistance in the Global North, in ‘the heart of the beast’ (George et al. 2001). Thus, by giving voice to Klein on its front page *Klassekampen* echoed a larger, global, anti-capitalist sentiment, “System Change, not climate change” (cf Bergfeld 2010, Carroll 2010, Neale 2010).

This onus on a global, explicitly anti-capitalist stance could be considered predictable in the case of *Klassekampen*, which, throughout Copenhagen, demonstrated in both editorials and news sections, much explicit resistance to the power of the market, and challenged the carbon trading logic of the Norwegian Prime Minister. However, most of this opposition took the form of an (expert) critique of social economics, not a wholesale rejection of the capitalist system. As an editorial underlines, time is ripe for solutions to climate change put forward by economists; now is the time for ‘engineers’ (*Klassekampen*, Dec. 9, 2012). Thus, the critical angle here arose *not* simply from a recognition

of popular good sense (*sensing* that market solutions are irrational or wrong) but mostly from a more legitimate discourse claiming that such logic does not function well enough.

In the Norwegian Durban coverage, the global movement of climate justice was less salient. The coverage reverts more to the dichotomy between North and South. The stronger sense of people's power *and* people's perspectives in Copenhagen may be due to practical and immediate differences between COP 15 and COP 17. Denmark is much closer to Norway than South Africa; hence, the political and editorial investment in Copenhagen was much larger. But the size of the demonstration also probably mattered. Whereas over 100,000 demonstrated in Copenhagen, only some 8,000 did so in Durban. The higher visibility and brighter color of good sense in Copenhagen gave more space for the hope of Lars Sigurd Sunnanå at NRK and the anti-capitalist message in *Klassekampen*.

No such general conclusion on the difference between Copenhagen and Durban can be drawn from the US material. The coverage of the climate justice movement in *The New York Times* was sparse but sympathetic in both cases. Particularly positive was *The New York Times*' *DotEarth* blog, which had extensive coverage of the 12 December Copenhagen demonstrations and addressed the issues more directly. High-profile climate reporter Andrew Revkin, wrote in a 12 December (2009) post:

The demonstrators were largely focused on economic injustice and inequity, with a central concern being climate change driven mainly by emissions from rich countries and mostly harming poor nations that have not had an industrial revolution (...)

"It's incredibly good to see people in these streets here and better to know that for every one of them there's hundreds more in every part of world, marching, holding vigils today," said Bill McKibben, the American environmental writer who now leads 350.org, an international group promoting a low threshold for carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (*DotEarth*, Revkin, 2009).

The climate justice perspective and the North-South divide, the global nature of anti-capitalism and the sense of a movement with some degree of power, are all reflected sympathetically here. Moreover, by spelling out the goals of the 350.org, a movement with its origin in the US (with no presence in Norway, for instance), Revkin conveys good sense, as a 'conception of necessity'. We need to move from the current 387 parts per million to 350 p.p.m.

Despite the lower turnout of demonstrators in Durban, *The New York Times* continued to make some good sense. A 7 December story in the print version of the paper with the headline "Greenpeace Leader Visits the Boardroom, Without Forsaking Social Activism," delivers a positive portrait of Kumi Naidoo, who has been at the center of large-scale climate justice protests since he assumed his

current post as Executive Director of Greenpeace International. (John Broder, *The New York Times*, Dec. 7, 2011). *The New York Times DotEarth* blog on the same day published a 3,200-word interview with Naomi Klein, saying: “I think we need to admit that climate change does really demand a profound interrogation of the ideology that currently governs our economy. And that’s not bad news, since our current economic model is failing millions of people on multiple fronts.” (Revkin 2011a)

In the Durban coverage of *The New York Times*, there were also two blog posts about student activists disrupting sessions at the summit, both of which cast a heroic light on youth activists and elaborated on their criticism of the proceedings. In one, Revkin quotes Anjali Appadurai’s much lauded speech: “You’ve been negotiating all my life.” And then writes, “That was the core line in a remarkable speech delivered on behalf of youth in the final stretch of two weeks of contentious, largely indeterminate climate treaty talks” (*The New York Times Dot Earth* – blog, Dec. 10, 2011; Revkin 2011b). All of these stories gave space to the complex and contentious issues that these various climate justice activists are working to address. But not unlike Lars Sigurd Sunnanå at NRK, Revkin seems to convey a bit of hope in the stories and perspectives emerging from below the radar of official climate treaty talks.

The Lingering Presence of Hegemony

Notwithstanding sympathies and occasional flashes of good sense, there were many moments and aspects of hegemonic common sense in the coverage. We should note the *national orientation* of the media in both countries. In Copenhagen, *The New York Times* focused on the need for the leading role of the US to break the logjam of world politics (Russell 2010). President Barack Obama and Al Gore were treated like celebrities and their whereabouts and comments were the topics and source material for most news stories. *Economic and technological* progress was offered repeatedly by journalists and their sources as solutions to problems associated with climate change, a familiar cultural narrative that ultimately underscores the power of the market (Russell 2010; 336). *NRK* (and in part *Klassekampen* as well), similarly tended towards nationalistic coverage, although less at Copenhagen and Durban than during the Bali Summit in 2007, where the storyline of Norway as a force for global good (particularly in delivering an initiative on rainforest protection) was given prominence (Eide & Ytterstad 2010, 2011).

News coverage of protests also used the *distinction between moderate and militant forms of protest*, applying a tool of hegemonic inclusion and exclusion. As Gitlin (2003: 231) suggests in his brief analysis of the coverage of the WTO demonstrations in 1999 (noting the permanence of forms of media coverage

since the 1960s), demonstrators were presented with “a simple opposition of moderate versus militant – as if these were timeless categories with little content and less history”. We find examples of this in both *The New York Times* and NRK *Dagsrevyen*. One article dedicated to the 12 December protests in Copenhagen distinguished the ‘good’ protesters from the riffraff):

The main demonstration – which brought together a broad coalition of hundreds of environmental groups, human rights campaigners, climate activists, anticapitalists and freelance protesters from dozens of countries – was mostly peaceful. But in other parts of the city, spontaneous demonstrations by bands of radical protesters resulted in at least 950 arrests, the police said...We saved the demonstration from being totally disturbed,” said Per Larsen, chief coordinator of the Danish police. “There were some hard-core protesters that we have neutralized.” (*The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 2009)

This mass arrest was later ruled illegal by the Danish Court, resulting in compensations from the police to hundreds of demonstrators.⁴ But in *The New York Times* report from Copenhagen there was little indication that the 950 arrests were of *peaceful* demonstrators. Instead it suggested that police responded to violent behavior, taking the claims by the police at face value. Unwarranted and sometimes obsessive focus on violence can also be found in *Dagsrevyen*, with the news anchor speaking of the ‘tense mood’ in Copenhagen, describing demonstrators attacking the police, and police attempts to separate out so-called violent elements. An even more rigid separation between violence and the 1,200 ‘Norwegian’ protesters was made in a story featuring Norwegian bishops, who were repeatedly asked to distance themselves from violence. The reporter even asks one of the bishops: “Tor B. Jørgensen, are you going to throw rocks?” (cf. Ytterstad 2010).

Civic actors not only explicitly recognize this classic feature of hegemony; they also react to it in an active manner. Activists, including Jamie Henn of *350.org*, Christian Teriete of *Tck, Tck, Tck*, and Adam Groves of *OneClimate*, all described sophisticated and theoretically informed strategies to counteract such blatant features of mainstream media coverage (unpublished interviews with Russell, 2012). Civic activists saw themselves also as media activists, suggesting that communication is best when it is in the hands of the people, a finding that may also carry an element of good sense in its own right (cf. Silverstone 2006). For instance *Copenhagen News Collaborative* (CNC) coverage included a stream of news, opinion, and footage from the streets and demonstrations. And one of the most prominent forms of CNC coverage was meta-coverage – that is, coverage of the coverage. Some stories were critical of mainstream news coverage. For example, a story with a headline that read “On the message – not the arrests – at Copenhagen’s mass rally,” criticized traditional news outlets for ignoring the issues by focusing on conflict instead. The reporter

of *Klassekampen*, present at the 12 December demonstration himself, wrote a stinging commentary on the expectations of violence from mainstream media journalists, entitled “The smell of blood”. In it, he describes an informal meeting of Norwegian journalists at the *Bella Centre* (the civil forum in Copenhagen) quoting one journalist who asked another, “Have you brought a gas mask?” He also contrasted the war metaphors of tabloid headlines to his own experience of an entirely peaceful demonstration. By misrepresenting the reality of the demonstration, mainstream media marginalize “people who feel climate change on their bodies, people who are in Copenhagen to speak their mind.” (Martiniussen, *Klassekampen*, Dec. 12, 2009).

An additional form of hegemonic presence was *incorporation* (cf. Williams 2005: 38). This is illustrated by a detail in the protest coverage of *Dagsrevyen*, where Norwegian protesters and Norwegian state leaders appeared to be united. A small solidarity demonstration in Oslo on 12 December (2009) is introduced by the news anchor as a “support for those trying to get a deal in Copenhagen”. Taken together with the 1,200 Norwegians led by the Bishops, this wording of ‘support’ suggests that Norwegian demonstrators are somehow different from a global movement *against* the official COP15 proceedings. More specifically, demonstrators are portrayed as exerting pressure on Norwegian state leaders, *to facilitate their leadership pretensions*. The next day, when a boat carrying Norwegian activists arrives in Copenhagen, the Norwegian Environmental Minister receives them on deck with an American judge’s gavel in his hand, smilingly, and asking the audience: “Who shall I hammer with this? Is it Obama?” The reply from Atle Sommerfeldt of the Church Aid Group was, “No, you should hammer the decision.”

This apparent harmony between civil society and state leaders in Norway was also articulated in two other NRK stories on 12 December. First, there was a story on how Norway – together with Mexico – was going to ‘save the negotiations’ through the establishment of a Green Fund to finance climate adaptation in the global South. Here, the perspective of Climate Justice seems to be taken care of by heads of state. In another story (“Optimistic Heirs to the Throne”) from the *Bella Centre*, the dichotomy between benign Norwegian solution-makers and (global) naysayers appear as the news anchor declares: “And while some in Copenhagen demonstrate, others are more preoccupied by alternative solutions.” The story presents the Norwegian Crown Prince visiting the Bright Green Exhibition of corporate sponsors of “Hopenhagen”, saying “many consumers will do things a little differently in order to take care of the future of our children.” This is hardly an example of alternative solutions, but a royal stamp of approval for neo-liberalist hegemony.

Contradictions of Common Sense in the Media

A contradictory picture of journalism emerges from this analysis. The mainstream media both display sympathy for the protests *and* see them as a law and order problem. They simultaneously salute the non-violence *and* incorporate the voices of civic activists into the nationalist framework. We have also seen how *Klassekampen*, for instance, consciously attempts to ‘stay on the message’ of climate justice and its anti-capitalist critique. A Gramscian take on the media must include *both* hegemony and good sense, and thus contradictions are to be expected. Unlike many other critical approaches, that tend to see media merely as a hegemonic institution (Artz 2006; Thomas 2009: 226), our approach has closer affinities to the dominance/resistance model proposed by Deepa Kumar (2006: 84): “Media texts are contradictory, as all reality is contradictory.” It is not just that some texts are full of sympathies for the demonstrators, whereas other texts unilaterally demonize them. For instance, reporter Eivind Molde in *Dagsrevyen* had a couple of stories on the more militant and smaller demonstrations in Copenhagen, where law and order frames co-exist with the anti-capitalist element of good sense within the same text (cf. Ytterstad, 2010). In his work routine, Andrew Revkin veered between hegemony and good sense in a similar manner, stating explicitly in his 12 December post that “I split my day between the meeting and the street”.

In the alternative media the configuration between dimensions of hegemony and good sense look different – and the key message even much more so. If Copenhagen 2009 was the birth of the climate justice movement (Bergfeld 2010), that birth was shown live in CNC coverage, conveyed directly through unedited videos shot by either the *Uptake* or *Grist TV*, which allowed people to speak directly with less influence or ‘framing’ by the journalist. Climate justice is also a very consistent feature of coverage in *Klassekampen*. In our interview with *Klassekampen* journalist Åse Brandvold, she answered the question: “What do you want to achieve with your climate change journalism?” by stating without hesitation: “Climate justice”. Just as Naomi Klein had done, Brandvold referred to the Rio Convention of 1992. She describes herself as part of the ‘Seattle generation’ also as a professional journalist who wants *Klassekampen* to be an arena for social movements. In the interview she expressed skepticism to ‘gimmicks’ by the media to portray themselves as green actors in their own right. But, when it came to climate justice, she had no qualms about *Klassekampen* being an actor as well as a reporter of action. And indeed, in an article about the solidarity demonstration in Oslo on 12 December 2009, we learn in passing that *Klassekampen* was officially behind the protests as a convener. This suggests a possible convergence of social movements and journalism. But before discussing that, we want to take up one further operationalization of hegemony and good sense, namely

the contradiction between political and natural realism (Ytterstad 2011, 2012: 107-108) in the final summing up of COP15 and COP 17.

Andrew Robinson has highlighted a dimension of good sense, which he calls “hostility to signores or bosses” (Robinson 2005: 479). This amorphous hostility to officialdom represents an important ‘spirit of cleavage’ (Thomas 2009: 438), without which any good sense might not be put in motion. This is what James Hansen was articulating when he stated before COP 15 that no deal was better than a shoddy deal, because then something new could be built from the bottom up (*Aftenposten*, Dec. 5, 2009). The same aspect of good sense could be heard in Naomi Klein’s (*Klimaforum*, Dec. 3, 2009) criticism of the corporate ‘Hopenhagen’ branding of the city of Copenhagen (by Coca Cola and Siemens), in her appeal for “the response to be angry” and in her final insistence that “life may be coming to an end, because of too much obedience”. This is what Gramsci meant when he wrote: “feeling the elementary passions of the people, understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the particular historical situation” (Gramsci 1971: 418).

Fundamentally, this anger and impatience with the hegemonic political process grows from the contradiction between natural and political realism. Natural realism in this context basically flows from the sciences. Whether the limit for runaway climate change is at 450 parts per million as the IPCC suggest with its 2 degree target, or at 350 p.p.m. as James Hansen and 350.org believe, is part of the scientific uncertainty, but it is an uncertainty about tipping points in nature, not politics. Whether China or the US is to blame for the collapse in Copenhagen, by contrast, is a question of ‘realpolitik’. As Ytterstad has shown elsewhere (2011), this contrast between political and natural realism is a real quandary for climate change journalists in Norway. This contrast was also noted, in a rather muted way, in *The New York Times* after COP15. They ran a story acknowledging their disappointments with the agreement, but commended Obama’s effort at the same time:

Thousands of environmental policy makers and advocates left Copenhagen with ample grounds for disappointment. The agreement the United States reached with Brazil, China, India and South Africa lacked commitments to achieve its stated goals, was nonbinding and was not formally affirmed by participants, in any case.

Yet the result fares better when, as in Olympic gymnastics, its scores are adjusted for degree of difficulty. (*The New York Times*, Dec. 20, 2009)

In NRK, interestingly, it was Frederic Hauge, the leader of the Bellona Foundation, a business-friendly NGO in Norway who was least disappointed by the Copenhagen Accord. The main political commentator of NRK echoed Hauge, saying that it could be an advantage for Obama to bring home a weak deal from Copenhagen, as it would be easier “to get majority support in the US” (cf Ytterstad 2010: 60-61).

If good sense is about a conception of *necessity*, we clearly face two sorts of necessities here. On the one hand there are the realities of our political and economic system, on the other hand we have laws of nature and the urgent demand to keep emissions under 350 p.p.m. Norwegian climate change journalist Frode Frøyland (Frøyland & Ellingsvåg 2008: 8) puts this tension aptly: “Nature will show no understanding for the fact that international climate negotiations are a complicated, long-term business”.

After the further failures in Copenhagen and Durban, one would expect truth-seeking journalists to be increasingly impatient with scenarios of the politically possible. Without a sense of people’s power though, with the capacity to raise the bar on what is politically possible through a perspective of radical change, even alternative media can be tempted to applaud the ‘lesser evilism’ of international climate politics: by declaring it could have been even worse. Although there were clear marks of climate justice and anti-capitalism in *Klassekampen*, after the Durban summit, their main climate change journalist Erik Martiniussen highlighted the positive negotiation results, seeing the very survival of a UN negotiation process as a victory for ‘the poor countries’ as preferable to merely “leaving the task to a few powerful countries” (*Klassekampen*, Dec. 13, 2011). This is being critical of ‘political realism’, but only from the perspective of ‘the poor countries’ who wanted to hang on to the threads of the Kyoto Protocol; it is not addressing a global movement voicing the need for “system change, not climate change”. Again we cannot talk of a simple ‘binary opposition’ (Atton 2002) between alternative and mainstream media: even radical journalists will let hegemony temper their good sense. However, it seems that in journalism, size does matter. It is easier for journalists to make good sense in media coverage when social movements mobilize in force. Had only 8,000 demonstrated in Copenhagen, it would have been more difficult for Lars Sigurd Sunnanå to conclude his reportage as follows: “Copenhagen was to be historical, but not as state leaders had imagined. The Climate Summit will be remembered for its demonstrators. And the robust treatment metered out by the Danish police, against activists from all over Europe who refused to follow orders.” Assuming the responsibility to be angry he called the Copenhagen Accord “a little school essay, two and a half pages long.” As he speaks to the camera we see him in front of a plastic planet outside the Bella Centre (cf Ytterstad 2010: 61-62).

Conclusion

Covering protests, journalists rarely suggest that there might be actual *solutions* to global warming that emanate from below. A notable absence, for instance, not just from the *The New York Times* and *Dagsrevyen* but largely also from *Klassekampen*, was the Final Declaration of the Peoples’ Summit, from the

Klimaforum 09 in Copenhagen. The principled opposition to carbon sequestration, the REDD Agreement, the cap-and trade system, nuclear power or technical fixes, the demand for a rapid, concrete phasing out of fossil energy use, as the beginnings of a bottom up approach to climate change, were not taken seriously anywhere in the mainstream coverage. Analyzing Norwegian and US media from Durban, we find, for instance, there is virtually no sense of the important role played by the Cochabamba Declaration of April 2010, which figures prominently in Patrick Bond's (2012) book. The emergence of this alternative hegemony, noted with appreciation of several of the US authors upon which we have drawn here (Carroll 2010; Foster, Clark & York 2011; Magdoff & Foster, 2010) is loudly absent in the coverage.

Such strategic omissions take us back to Gramsci. Peter Thomas' recent (2009) re-reading of the *Prison Notebooks* spells out what both Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall also knew. It was Gramsci's whole purpose to identify and organize a new hegemony, of a proletarian kind which would be capable of challenging the bourgeois hegemony (Williams 2005: 42). Despite later interpretations of Gramsci as a theorist of 'counter-hegemony' (cf. Carroll 2010), Gramsci himself never saw global politics as one power bloc of the world, however progressive, such as in the case of Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales, pitted against another. The question for him was set between bourgeois hegemony and the proletarian, international one: everything else was fiddling while Rome burned. We have shown, however, that the media are not uniformly and inevitably the defenders of bourgeois hegemony. In flashes, they also make good sense.

From the perspective of a global movement aiming for system change the summits are walls that need to be brought down. The real logjam at the COPs is to be found between political and natural realism. To see the emergence and the importance of something new, whether in the burning need for climate justice or in the number 350 p.p.m., requires some optimism of the will. But perhaps neither journalists nor researchers, in their professional capacities, are the best actors for registering this emergence. Objectivity, for US journalism as well as for Norwegian broadcasters, still implies detachment, a bias against bias. As the reader of this chapter will have discovered, we as media researchers have highlighted examples of journalists who seem to make good sense on a par with demonstrators in Copenhagen and Durban. Both groups then must face up to the charge that we are advocating climate justice and anti-capitalism, not merely reporting on it.

The Gramscian response to this charge is to insist that we have striven to make objective judgments in the sense that they are caused by their objects, not subjectively willed into existence (cf. Collier (2003: 135). The climate justice movement, with its anti-capitalist sentiments, really exists. The launching of the *South African Climate Jobs* Campaign really happened. Patrick Bond calls it "the most portentous" (2012: 207) development of Climate Justice in his

country. It is not only legitimate to analyze the media with the knowledge of what the Peoples' Assemblies were about. It also provides a larger and truer picture of what the battle for the common sense of climate change policies is about. A modicum of optimism of the will therefore seems appropriate for researchers and journalists alike.

Notes

1. This double hermeneutics, different from Anthony Giddens', is elaborated in the methodology chapter of Ytterstad (2012).
2. NRK *Dagsrevyen*, the biggest broadcast television program in Norway, had several reporters in Copenhagen (Eide & Ytterstad 2011). *Klassekampen* is a left-leaning daily paper. Although its journalism is professionalized, the paper routinely employs activists of the left.
3. In addition to analyzing media contents, Ytterstad conducted qualitative interviews with the journalist responsible for climate change coverage in *Dagsrevyen*, and with the two journalists assigned the topic in *Klassekampen*. He also followed Copenhagen summit activities on the ground, at the *Klimaforum09* and on the Norwegian "boat" where most of the Norwegian journalists lived during COP15. For analysis of the source-journalist relation in the Norwegian coverage see (Jakobsen 2009).
4. See <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/klima/1.7428642>

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Chapter 14

From COP15 to COP17

Popular Versus Quality Newspapers Comparing Brazil and South Africa A Question of Social Responsibility?

Kristin Skare Orgeret & Caroline d'Essen

There is no other newspaper I would rather work for. I reach people with little access to news with small stories about climate change, a phenomenon they know very little about. You can write a complex story that a hundred people read or a simple one that several millions will read. (Dikgang Dube alias David Durbach, journalist, The Daily Sun, Durban December 2011).

Whereas cover prices for most 'quality' newspapers have increased beyond reach for many, the tabloid press has witnessed impressive growth in several countries where large portions of the population are poor. Tabloid newspapers have a potential to reach ordinary people, who are barely served by the rest of the newspaper market. When *The Daily Sun* was launched in South Africa in 2002, as the country's first tabloid newspaper, the goal of the publisher was to be "an alternative to the boring, serious, expensive, elitist, formal, difficult-to-read newspapers in South Africa" according to the words of the newspaper's head person in 2005, Leon Du Plessis (Jones et al 2007). At the same time tabloids are often met with disapproval from critics who argue that they are sensationalist and pander to the lowest common denominator of public taste and simplify complex issues (Wasserman 2009).

This chapter focuses on the challenges and possibilities that exist in informing ordinary people about climate change. As Patrick Bond reminds us, global warming "will produce dramatically unequal impacts across regions and social classes," inflicting the greatest damage upon those with the fewest resources for meaningful adaptation (2012: 7). From such a perspective, reaching out to less fortunate citizens with information needed to make informed judgements, becomes an action of social responsibility.

Taking the printed press and the division between elite/ quality papers and tabloid/ popular papers as its starting point, this chapter explores the printed press coverage of climate change during the Durban summit (COP17) in 2011 and the Copenhagen summit (COP15) in 2009. The media interest in COP17 in

Durban was considerably less than for the COP15 two years earlier. A total of 1,500 national and international journalists were present in Durban, according to the Durban press office (interview, December 3, 2011). At the Copenhagen summit, approximately 5,000 journalists attended.¹ Indeed, expectations for a decisive outcome in Durban were so low that many international journalists decided not to attend. In this chapter we aim to take a closer look at the situation in two countries of the so-called global South, namely Brazil and South Africa. In both countries popular/tabloid newspapers have increased their popularity among ordinary people significantly the last few years.

The core question is how issues linked to climate change are covered in the popular newspapers that cater to the most vulnerable groups. Others are: How are issues of climate change presented? Who gets to talk? Do the newspapers provide their readers with relevant information for their daily lives? Content analysis of the printed press coverage of climate change will be combined with excerpts from interviews with South African and Brazilian journalists.²

'Tabloid' and 'Elite' Newspapers

The British newspaper *The Daily Mirror* is often referred to as the world's first tabloid newspaper. In 1934 the paper shifted its readership emphasis from middle class readers toward a more popular mass audience of working class readers, striving to fill its pages "with items of maximum interest to the maximum of people" (Baistow 1985: 42). According to Richard Rooney, "the look of the news became more important than the news itself, content was over-simplified, 'news' relied more on the trivial, the sordid and the sensational" (Rooney 1999: 1).

The word 'tabloid' (from French *tablette*) means something small, and in the technical sense tabloid for a long time referred to the size of newspaper that would measure 28 x 40 cm, or half that of a broadsheet paper. Increasingly 'tabloid' went from signifying format to content. Tabloid has come to refer to sensationalist content often featuring stories of violence, celebrity, crime and scandal. The term is used also about content in television or on the Internet. On the other hand, the concept 'elite press,' according to Jostein Gripsrud, tends to emphasize government and politics, reports more foreign correspondents' stories, strives to delve into issues, and indulges in investigative journalism. Its news stories include background and explanations, often containing more than one perspective and source. It treats the news with relative sobriety, downplays flamboyant material, and eschews hyperbolic (but not evocative) language (Gripsrud 2000: 292).

As it emerges from the 19 countries included in the analyses of this book, the distinction between elite and popular newspapers works quite differently across the countries sampled. This is related to the diverse definitions the

various countries attach to the labels, and the miscellany of media systems. Another dimension in the discussion of the challenges to global categorisation of newspapers is that in many countries in the so-called global South and even in countries with a high adult literacy rate, newspapers are still considered an elite medium. There might also be developments within the concepts of elite and tabloid/‘world life’ newspapers within a given context over time. According to the National Newspaper Association (ANJ) in Brazil there was a change in the tabloid newspaper concept from the 1990s onwards (Seligman 2008). ANJ argues that current tabloid papers, now referred to as ‘Popular Newspapers of Quality’ have become more concerned about their content and are less sensationalist than they used to be. At the same time they still address the lower classes in Brazil, are sold for a relatively low price (0.30 to 0.90 USD), and are rather spectacular both in terms of design and language.

Arguably, it only makes sense to use the distinction popular versus elite in 11 countries out of the 19 countries’ newspapers included in this book. And even in these 11 the distinction works in ways that vary considerably. The figure below shows the distribution of climate material among elite papers, and tabloid papers in the coverage of the COP15 and COP17 in these countries (table 14.1).

The overview shows some interesting trends. With regard to the coverage of the Copenhagen summit, among the 22 newspapers analysed, the elite papers published 64 % of all the stories, while the tabloid newspapers published 36 %. These numbers only count for the items as such and do not take the length or type of article into consideration. In all countries except Norway, Bangladesh and Australia covering the COP15, the elite papers had considerably more coverage of climate stories than the tabloid newspapers. Two years later, the elite papers published 78 % of all the stories from Durban, and the tabloid newspapers 22 %, and in all countries’ except Australia the elite papers would have considerably more coverage than the popular papers. This indicates both how the general interest in covering the climate summit dropped significantly from COP15 to COP17, and how less attention to the climate challenges in the newspapers had more effect, in terms of less coverage, on the popular press than on the elite newspapers. In some countries this tendency was striking: Regarding COP17, in Brazil, Finland, Germany and Chile there was either no coverage or almost none in the popular press.

The numbers from South Africa show that in comparison with *Business Day* the tabloid *Daily Sun* has decreased the proportional coverage from 20 to 17 % from COP 15 to COP17. At the same time however, The Daily Sun almost tripled its coverage from COP15 to COP17, and was the only newspaper in the selection here that showed such a propensity. *Business Day* also increased the coverage from 75 to 95 stories, due to particular focus and special ‘summit pages’ as COP17 was organised ‘at home’ in South Africa.

Table 14.1. Distribution of Climate Material among Elite Papers, and Tabloid Papers, COP15 & COP17

Country	COP15		COP17	
	Elite Number/%	Tabloid Number/%	Elite Number/%	Tabloid Number/%
Denmark	Jyllandsposten 420/59	B.T 290/41	Jyllandspost 108/68	B.T 51/32
Bangladesh	The Daily Star 160/50	Prothom Alo 157/50	The Daily Star 65/72	Prothom Alo 25/28
Norway	Aftenposten 131/50	Verdens Gang 133/50	Aftenposten 42/66	Verdens Gang 22/34
Australia	Sydney Morning Herald 168/68	The Daily Telegraph 79/32	Sydney Morning Herald 9/47	The Daily Telegraph 10/53
Finland	Helsingin Sanomat 168/78	Ilta-Sanomat 48/22	Helsingin Sanomat 56/97	Ilta-Sanomat 2/3
Brazil	O Estado de Sao Paulo 143/84	Agora 28/26	O Estado de Sao Paulo 34/97	Agora 1/3
Sweden	Dagens Nyheter 113/72	Aftonbladet 45/28	Dagens Nyheter 71/67	Aftonbladet 35/33
Germany	Suddeutsche Zeitung 79/69	BILD Zeitung 35/31	Suddeutsche Zeitung 26/87	BILD Zeitung 4/13
South Africa	Business Day 77/92	Daily Sun 7/8	Business Day 95/83	Daily Sun 20/17
Chile	La Tercera 39/81	Las Ultimas Noticias 9/ 19	La Tercera 15/10	Las Ultimas Noticias 0/0
Russia	Kommersant 19/59	Moskovsky Komso. 13/41	Kommersant 3/75	Moskovsky Komso. 1/25
Total	1517/64	844/36	524/75	171/25

Brazil and South Africa – Newspaper Topology

Brazil and South Africa share several important similarities: they are both important emerging economies of the South, and, together with India and China, are members of the geopolitical alliance BASIC. In the very last phase of the Copenhagen summit, the BASIC countries committed themselves to act jointly

and brokered the final Copenhagen accord with the United States. Both South Africa and Brazil represent their respective continents' largest economies, and have the largest differences between rich and poor. There are also good reasons to believe that both countries will be hit considerably by climate change, endangering food security, increasing poverty and destabilising society. In Brazil, the first daily popular newspaper, *Última Hora*, was created in the 1960s, with the intention to diffuse the ideas of President Getúlio Vargas among the working class. In the 1970s and 1980s, the popular newspaper *Notícias Populares* (NP), was the largest and most well-known popular paper with its sensationalistic approach and dramatic and bizarre stories. It resumed publishing in 2001. In 2007, four of the ten newspapers with the highest circulation and sales in Brazil were popular newspapers: *Extra*, *Diário Gaúcho*, *O Dia* and *Agora São Paulo*.

Since 1999 *Agora São Paulo* has been published by the group Folha da Manhã SA. It has a circulation of 88,000 copies per day and a profile characterized by its simple and dynamic language. It costs about 0.90 USD. In Brazil, according to the ANJ, popular journalism has become a social inclusion tool by providing news to groups that previously were not targeted by the press.

In South Africa the phenomenon of popular newspapers is much newer. The very first tabloid, *The Daily Sun*, started in 2002, and has a circulation of 301,800 copies per day and an average number of daily readers of 2.29 million.³ It is recognized by a sensationalist approach and has been heavily debated since its arrival. The debate has been dominated by two clusters: The first group sees the tabloids as constituting a "crisis for democracy" (Sparks 2000). As Wallace Chuma shows, some argue that they indirectly "revive colonial practices of feeding trash to black 'natives' as a way of lulling them into forgetting about the pressing political issues of the day" (Chuma 2009: 120). The second group argues that the tabloids have brought in new readers, and that they provide alternative public spheres for marginalised people. *The Daily Sun* has been successful in creating a mass readership among the black majority of the country, whose needs had hitherto been largely ignored by the post-apartheid mainstream press (see Wasserman 2007). *The Daily Sun* has also received a lot of criticism for being cruelly sensationalist, not least due to the front pages referring to zombies and people being possessed or cursed. Furthermore *The Daily Sun* has been criticised for not covering important matters, including HIV/Aids.

The elite papers in this analysis are *O Estado de S. Paulo* from Brazil and South African *Business Day*. *O Estado de S. Paulo* has existed since 1875, and is the oldest newspaper in Brazil. It has a daily circulation of 212,000 copies and is known for being associated with right-wing ideas (d'Essen 2010). *Business Day* was South Africa's first business daily when launched in 1986. Unlike the popular newspapers its influence does not correspond to the circulation numbers. With a daily circulation of 113,000 it reaches the country's decision makers and reflects the concerns of the elite.

Both papers put efforts and money into their climate coverage and had two journalists each present in Copenhagen in 2009. During the COP17, *Business Day* had six journalists on the spot in Durban, whereas *O Estado de S. Paulo* had one. Jocelyn Newmarch from *Business Day* was both in Copenhagen and Durban and emphasised the importance of being the host country in relation to the journalistic coverage of the summit:

As we are in Durban and in South Africa, that makes the situation very different from the Copenhagen one too of course. (...) We are one of the biggest news teams here. We are six people altogether only from Business Day, that includes a photographer (interview, Durban 2011).

Agora had no reporters on the spot in Durban in 2011, *The Daily Sun* had no journalists present in Copenhagen in 2009 and had not planned to send anyone from Johannesburg to cover the COP17 in Durban either. However, journalist Dikgang Dube alias David Durbach, felt that his newspaper *The Daily Sun* should be present at the summit and convinced the Climate Change Media Partnership (CCMP)⁴, originally intended for journalists from developing countries outside South Africa, to include him too. Without Durbach's determination and the support from CCMP, the 'South African summit' most probably would hardly have been covered in *The Daily Sun*. According to Durbach, the editor-in-chief was rather sceptical to the whole idea of climate change and global warming, and even when Durbach received funding, his boss was not enthusiastic about the plan:

When I left Johannesburg my boss told me, "don't send too much stuff." However when I sent four stories over the weekend, all of them went in the paper on Monday. So I just had to continue working. Two more stories were published the next day (Tuesday). So far all I have sent has been published; it has been a real positive surprise. (interview, Durban, December 2011).

Durban versus Copenhagen

In the coverage of COP15, *The Daily Sun* and *Business Day* seemed to belong to two different worlds. One of the very few examples in which climate change was mentioned in *The Daily Sun* was a caption to a "page 3 picture" of a woman in a bikini: "Carol Sithole was born in Umlazi Township, Durban. And now she helps stop global warming as all the guys want to chill out with cool Carol!" Based on the tabloid's coverage of COP15, Örnebring and Jönsson's argument that tabloids are generally seen to "lower the standards of public discourse" (2004: 283) was quite understandable. The contrast with COP17 is striking. Owing to Dube's presence in Durban, 20 stories were published, most of them with pictures. Although the stories followed the ordinary short format of *The Daily Sun* they were informative and accessible.

Dube's real name is David Durbach, but he uses the pseudonym Dikgang Dube. Dikgang means 'news' in Tshwane.⁵ but is also an ordinary first name. Dube/Durbach explained that using a pseudonym was a very conscious choice:

My choice of using a pseudonym is linked to the fact that I am very careful about not alienating the readers in any way. You know an English name just wouldn't come out right in this context (interview, COP 17, Durban, Dec. 2011).

This touches upon an important point related to how to address readers of different backgrounds with information about climate change in a country with a still racially segregated media scene.

Decreasing Coverage in Brazilian Newspapers

The Brazilian material shows a drastic decline in the number of newspaper articles from COP15 to COP 17. Brazilian *Agora* only published one story from the COP17: (Nov. 20, 2011), featuring four trees with faces, holding placards saying "Brazil, stop the chainsaws" and referring to the new disputed forest code in Brazil, which was being voted on during the COP17. The Brazilian angle is probably the reason why the editor of *Agora* decided to include this picture from the COP17. The creative image of trees with faces might also have been appealing for a popular newspaper and the picture was in fact used to a large extent by media all over the world.

Picture 14.1.



As in most countries, the decrease of interest in the climate summit had a harsher effect on the Brazilian popular newspaper than on the elite paper. Claudio Agnelo, a Brazilian journalist who has covered the COPs since 1999 and who was in Durban for the Brazilian newspaper *Folha de S. Paulo*⁶ was asked whether climate change should be seen as an elite topic. He answered:

No, I think that per definition climate change is a topic for everybody, including poor people, because the most affected ones are the poor. The problem is that because they are poor and more vulnerable, they don't have many alternatives to deal with the problem. [...] And then we have that old story that the poor people have more important needs than going out and protesting. So, the poorest, which are the more vulnerable are the ones that can do less to change the situation (interview, Durban, December 2011).

Covering Climate Change

Herman Wasserman shows how South African tabloid readers largely "trust the tabloids to give them reliable information and up-to-date news that enables them to negotiate the sometimes harsh and precarious conditions of everyday life" (Wasserman 2010: 138). On a similar note, Amaral argues that the current Brazilian readership of popular newspapers does not only demand incredible and sensationalistic stories, they are also buying newspapers for information and entertainment (Amaral 2006: 2). At the same time she argues that those papers do not feel that they have to "educate" the people, especially because they are defined by a commercial logic (Amaral 2006: 11). Antonio da Rocha, the editor of *Agora São Paulo*, argues that the editors tried to cover COP15 in an educational way. An analysis of *Agora* reveals however that there was no specific language or format used to cover COP15. Most of the articles came from news agencies (23 out of 28).

During COP15 only two of the news items in *The Daily Sun* can be said to have contributed substantial information. It is interesting to see how these two articles apparently made an effort to make the topic accessible to the readers by using appealing wordplay headlines: "Climate Talks Get Hot and Hectic" (13 December 2009) and "Bad Weather in Copenhagen" (20 December 2009). The content source for the remainder of the articles was the South African news agency SAPA, and except for shortening the stories not much was done to adjust the content to the interests of the 'intended reader.' There is a striking contrast when we look at *The Daily Sun*'s coverage of COP17 two years later. Here the majority of the stories nail the complex issues of climate change to ordinary peoples' daily experiences:

I think the stories that work the best are the individual ones. Such as the ones about growing vegetables in the townships. Combining huge, complex challenges with close to life stories and examples. People may talk about how it is difficult to know when the rain will come; you can always tie it in. I don't use the term climate change at all times either, people may be put off if you make too much out of it. I try to make stories that are interesting to people. To link the facts to a story people can relate to. Preferably positive stories (Durbach, interview, Durban 2011).

To link the topic of climate change to ordinary people's lives was very much in the line of thought of one of the Brazilian journalists met in Durban too:

[The newspapers could be] relating the increasingly frequent and intense occurrence of extreme weather events (storms, floods, drought) with climate change and its impacts on people's lives (Blogger Juliana Russar in e-mail interview, December 2011).

Several of the journalists interviewed explained how they perceived difficulties in covering a complicated issue such as climate change in a simple way. South Africa's *Daily Sun*'s David Durbach said:

It is a challenge to tell about climate change to our readers. Many South Africans are sceptical to the whole thing, including the people I am working for. They are sceptical to the science behind it and believe that it is spreading fear to gain money. It is very hard to explain to our readers how to save electricity when they might not even have access to it, or when they have very little of it. And you have to be very careful not to frighten people unnecessarily (interview, Durban, December 2011).

A journalist from the South African elite paper *Business Day* also expressed what she saw as the most challenging issues in covering the climate change topic:

Language issues are a challenge. And South African newspapers need to do more science issues. Me as well, I don't feel so confident about interviewing scientific experts. We have such a poor understanding of these topics as a country. Many people ignore the relationship between poverty, health and environment (interview, Durban 2011).

Angles Used

When it came to the angles used by the popular press on the one hand and the elite newspapers on the other, there were some clear differences in the data from the study.

[illegible]

Journalist David Durbach's presence and work in Durban during the summit made a substantial difference in the tabloid's climate coverage. The large majority of *The Daily Sun's* COP17 material took the angle of local unprivileged people, and very often women. Such as in a story entitled 'Dancing for Change' (12 December 2011), where the goal of the group 'Drama for Life' according to the report "not only is to spread awareness about climate change, but also to get people thinking about what they are hearing and seeing – to look through the [sic] promises of the so-called experts." Furthermore, this is a highly contrastive angle to the business and political elite world of *Business News*.

Picture 14.3. *Daily Sun*, December 12, 2011



When it comes to the visual side, the popular press' news style is often dominated by visual images over analysis and rational description (Bird 2000: 215). The photographs made for the major part of the *Daily Sun's* material during

COP15 were printed at a page called “The world in pics.” Although the captions were short and rather superficial, the images made a significant contribution in changing the focus from many of the other pictures’ gory and bizarre frames, and did perhaps provide the readers with glimpses of worldwide attempts to get the severity of the issue on the global top agenda. In Durban, most of the *Daily Sun* pictures were taken by journalist David Durbach himself and were direct illustrations to the written story. The *Business News*’ pictures during Copenhagen and Durban were often of the ‘talking heads’ of the actors involved in the negotiations.

During the COP15 most of the Brazilian popular newspaper stories (28) were Copenhagen-summit stories. In the South African material (7) all but two news items were directly attached to the COP15. This could reflect that the popular papers were covering COP15 just because of the event itself, and increasingly so that the event became more dramatic. This would hence feed into the idea of the popular papers’ particular urge for “actuality and dramatic appeal” (Bird 2000: 215).

Most of the stories in the two popular newspapers were small, 300 words or less. Journalist David Durbach explained:

My stories are short – 2-300 words mostly, it is a bit challenging to frame a story in so little space and around such a complex and tough question as climate change. I need to be very focused and keep it simple. And if I give a longer quote my editor will cut it anyway.

However, together with the photographs, several of the stories covered half or 2/3 of the page and hence gave the visual impression of being larger. Language is also a central issue for the South African popular newspaper as very few of the *Daily Sun*’s readers have English as their first language. Durbach showed apprehension for how he addressed his readers on the climate issue:

I am always very careful not to talk down to my readers. Then you alienate them. I try giving my readers the stories they want to read, while at the same time trying to educate them a bit too. We need quotes. Direct quotes. It does not matter who that person is. It could very well be a local woman involved in one such project. You know something that could grasp ordinary people’s attention. Most South African people are very alienated from the whole COP17 negotiation process.

It goes without saying that with maximum 300 words, a straightforward language and ordinary people’s perspectives, there is little space for the broader political discussions, including questions linked to the responsibility of different actors and more profound analysis.

The potential for more in depth analysis is much larger in the elite newspapers. The *Business Day* had 95 stories related to the COP17, most between

300-600 words and some were even more than 600 words long. Jocelyn Newmarch from *Business Day* expressed the profile of her paper as one of concern for business aspect of the COP, thus focusing on elite sources from the fields of business and politics. It becomes quite clear that this angle also implied a general faith in the market if we take a closer look on how the business perspectives were framed in *Business Day*. Central South African business actors, such as Sasol⁷ got extensive space to voice their views without too many critical questions, not least in the supplement the *BD Dialogues* during COP17. South Africa's carbon market participation was for instance an issue barely touched upon in *Business Day's* extensive coverage. However, *Business Day* also made a headline out of the fact that the CEO of another important South African company Eskom, Brian Dames was listed among Greenpeace's list of the 'Dirty Dozen in Durban,' as a company "actively campaigning against solutions to climate change" (December 6, 2011). The large number (31 %) of the business/industry voices in *Business Day* underlines the importance given to these perspectives.

Interest and Proximity

Similarly to other scholars writing on news values, Amaral emphasizes that an event will be more prone to become news in the popular press if it 1) can entertain, 2) is close geographically and culturally to the reader, 3) can be simplified, 4) can be narrated with drama or 4) has characters that the readership can identify with (Amaral 2006: 4). The number of articles in *Agora* (28) during the COP15 is small compared to the elite newspaper's 145 articles. However, it is a significant number for a popular newspaper, which has less space dedicated to global events than elite newspapers. Amaral notes that in the popular newspaper, the local gets more attention than the national, and the national more than the international (Amaral 2006: 6). The surprising lack of domestication in the COP15 material – due to the huge use of news agencies articles – probably made the audience feel more estranged from the topic. The number of articles found in the *Daily Sun* during COP15 was surprisingly low, but domestication was carried out to a certain degree through focusing on Johannesburg protesters (December 14, 2009) and Jacob Zuma's attendance and role in Copenhagen (December 20, 2009). In the Durban material domestication was present in both South African newspapers with stories mentioning how special this climate summit was for South Africa and Africa.

During COP15, one article treating domestic affairs was published in *Agora* ("Brazilians Would Pay More Taxes to Stop Global Warming", December 6, 2009) describing a study done by a Brazilian research institute on the world topics of concern to Brazilians. It uses the Amazonian forest as an example to talk about

global warming and carbon reduction, making the topic more understandable to a general readership. There was also a small news item in *Agora* ("Protest," 7 Dec 2009) about a demonstration in São Paulo against climate change. This might have been an attempt to bring the issue closer to the readership, as the demonstration took place in the city where most of the paper's readers live.

Voices

A core difference between the *Business Day* and the *Daily Sun*'s coverage of the COP17 was the voices that appeared in the news stories. *Business Day* deliberately focused on business and political aspects of the climate change topic and hardly ever brought this down to the level of ordinary South African citizens. Domestic grass root actors only made up three percent of the voices in *Business Day*, and almost all (83 %) were male. In the total coverage 78 % of the voices were men and 22 % were women. Women were mainly covered as South African political actors (57 % of this category), and this was largely due to the female COP17 president – Maite Nkoane-Mashabane, and the Water and Environmental Minister Edna Molewa. The most typical voice in the *Business Day* material was by far a male, domestic industry/ business voice (22 % of all voices). Beyond identifying their gender and title or role in the text, this analysis does not leave much room for looking into who the voices were. However, it seems that several of the voices were central, either on behalf of the big business companies or the government, to promote South Africa moving towards the endorsement of market-based strategies and were unequivocally positive about carbon markets.

Despite *Daily Sun*'s limited space, many grass root stories, and particularly ordinary women's voices were included. They made up for 24 % of all voices in the *Daily Sun*, a striking contrast to *Business Day*'s 0.55 % of female grass root voices and to the COP15 material where 88 % of the voices in the South African popular paper were elite voices. The change was a conscious choice from the *Daily Sun* journalist: "I feel proud to cover voices that are not covered elsewhere. That is why this job is important. I focus on rural people and on women" (interview, Durban, 2011). Furthermore, the women were portrayed as active and powerful. Here we see a change from the Gender Links study, on gender and tabloids in South Africa in 2007 (Lowe 2007). That study concluded that tabloids did little to bridge the gender gap, and that women's views and voices were just as underrepresented in the tabloids as in the mainstream press.

The large majority of voices in the South African newspapers during COP17 were from the so-called Global South. All of the *Daily Sun*'s voices had such a perspective, whereas 85 percent of *Business Day*'s voices were also from the Global South.

In the Brazilian material from Durban, the majority of voices mentioned in the coverage were the same as in Copenhagen. The national political voices were definitely the biggest source used in the reports: 101 of 173 in Copenhagen and 13 of 35 in the Durban material. In COP15 the main one was the then Brazilian president, Luís Inácio “Lula” da Silva, followed by the presidential candidates present: Silva, Rousseff and Serra. In Durban, the elite consisted of Brazilian delegates, who had daily press conferences.

Regarding voices, the Brazilian popular paper was considerably different from the elite paper – where most of the voices quoted were national politicians. In the material from COP15, nine of the voices were from the Global South, and nine from the Global North. But the way the topic was covered, was still remote from the audiences’ own lived reality. At the same time if we look at the headlines we would perhaps have another impression. Through them we could imagine that there were two major groups fighting for their rights, and that Brazil was portrayed as part of the developing countries that did not want to “pay the bill” for climate change. Some headlines hint at this: “Dilma criticized the U.S. Proposal,” “African Protest in Climate Summit”, and “Lula Charges Rich Countries and Supports Kyoto”.

When it comes to the *Daily Sun* during the COP15, it mostly reflects the strategic exclusion of the nation its intended readers belong to. The argument that there is an information gap between the first and the third world when it comes to media coverage of climate issues, seems to echo the differences between the ‘first world’ *Business Day* and the ‘third world’ *Daily Sun* in the South African material, where the low coverage of the popular paper implies this exclusion (Orgeret 2009). However when we analyse the material from the COP17 we see that this gap becomes significantly narrower. In the COP17 coverage there is more a difference in form and target of communication between the two analysed South African newspapers, than an information gap.

The findings from COP15 showed large differences between the popular press in Brazil and South Africa in covering climate change both in frequency and in format. Brazilian *Agora* did a certain effort in covering COP15 in an educational way, whereas the *Daily Sun* had very little relevant coverage. The COP17 findings show how the *Daily Sun*’s coverage increased significantly in terms of numbers, and also adapted to its audience in the ways of presenting the material, following a more educational and informative example. The Brazilian popular newspaper however, did not cover the Durban summit at all. Hence it seems clear that whereas COP15 in Copenhagen was covered due to a general global importance, COP 17 in Durban was covered extensively by the South African papers, mostly due to the geographical, and hence political, social and cultural, proximity.

Conclusion

Thomas Hanitzsch stresses how comparative research not only yields “valuable insights beyond a mere description of similarities and differences,” but also contributes to “our understanding of specific countries” (2009: 413). The comparative analysis of Brazil and South Africa has highlighted similarities and differences between two large countries’ media coverage of the climate change at two different occasions. The chapter has attempted to answer the call from scholars (i.e. Wasserman 2010) to take a global view and to provide more comparative research to the field of tabloid newspapers. Instead of focusing on the often-repeated limitations of the popular press, this chapter did also set out to explore tabloid newspapers’ potential in terms of giving people relevant information about issues of importance to them and their everyday lives.

Even though grassroots people might be the ones (to be) most hit by effects of climate change, the topic is still grossly under-represented in the popular newspapers aiming at ‘ordinary’ people. Within the South African context, Justin Sylvester, in the think tank IDASA described it this way:

I think the uneven distribution of wealth is a very relevant dimension in the (lacking) coverage of climate change given the context of South African media. The voice of the poor is generally marginalized in South African media and most private media are dominated by elite interest and gives voice to the wealthy (Sylvester, interview April 2011).

Interestingly, the defining lines of class are going through changes in South Africa. This has implications for the different readership structures too, as *Daily Sun* journalist David Durbach put it:

There are sharp class divisions in this country, but they do not follow the racial lines to such a large degree anymore. We get more and more coloured and white readers too. The short and direct news about ordinary people is such a winning formula.

Popular media have a particular ability to open communicative spaces for a broader range of voices. The findings from *Agora*’s coverage of the COP15 as well as *Daily Sun*’s coverage of COP17, illustrate that there may be a potential for popular newspapers to cover serious and complex issues, in countries with a large underprivileged population. This chapter has shown that one or a few journalists can make a difference. Individual focus and simplification are not necessarily opposed to serving the public good. The popular newspapers have a potential to help readers to find their place as citizens in a democratic society both in Brazil and South Africa. There is still room for improvement when it comes to *Agora São Paulo* in simplifying and adjusting agency texts and increasing the use of graphic illustrations. The *Daily Sun* would definitely

need to create a strategy of covering issues of political and democratic importance to its readers more embedded in its structure if the newspaper should be able to forward the momentum from the COP17. However, the way in which the two tabloid newspapers, in covering COP15 (*Agora*) and COP17 (*Daily Sun*), to a large extent avoid the use of a sensationalistic approach to attract readers, employ a clear and simple language, and a good mix of pictures and text are promising elements. These elements could ideally be taken further in an attempt to voice the concerns of ordinary people and communicate about important issues such as climate change.

Notes

1. <http://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/article853513.ece>
2. Dikgang Dube alias David Durbach from South African tabloid The Daily Sun, and Jocelyn Newmarch from the 'elite' newspaper Business Day, were both interviewed during the COP17 in December 2011. Afra Balazina from the elite newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo (OESP) was present in Copenhagen and Durban, and was interviewed during COP17. We have included some comments from two other Brazilian journalists who were at the COP17: Claudio Agnelo from Folha de S. Paulo, another major elite newspaper in Brazil was interviewed in Durban, and Juliana Russar, a blogger who was met in Durban during the COP17, and interviewed later via email.
3. <http://www.southafrica.info/about/media/news.htm#trends>
4. Organized by Internews, Panos and International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
5. One of South Africa's eleven official national languages.
6. Folha de S. Paulo is a Brazilian daily newspaper founded in 1921 and it has had Brazil's largest circulation since 1986. Alongside O Globo and O Estado de S. Paulo, Folha is considered one of the most influential newspapers in the country
7. Sasol is one of the African continent's largest "CO" emitters and the operator of the world's biggest single point emission source at Secunda in Mpumalanga.

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- Justin Sylvester, IDASA, Cape Town, April 2011
- Jocelyn Newmarch, *Business Day* Durban, December 6, 2011
- David Durbach, *The Daily Sun*, Durban, December 7, 2011
- Claudio Agnelo Folha, Durban, December 2011
- Afra Balazina, *Estado*, Durban, December 2011
- Juliana Russar, email interview, December 2011
- Durban Press Office, COP17, 3 December 2011

Chapter 15

Ignored Voices

The Victims, The Virtuous, The Agents

Women and Climate Change Coverage

Billy Sarwono, Zarqa S. Ali & Elisabeth Eide

Women and the environment are interrelated in many ways on a daily basis. As women interact with their environment, the environment in turn has a profound effect on the workload of most women, on their health and the health of their families (Moscoso 2003: 34). Mosse (1996: 180) and Warren (2000: 4) have described the impact of climate change on women in various low income countries. Due to deforestation in such countries, women living in remote areas have to walk farther to obtain firewood. In some areas, environmental degradation has also caused water sources to be polluted by industrial waste, and thus women have to walk longer distances to obtain, and then carry home, drinking water and/or to provide their family or their cattle with clean water during periods of long drought.

Poor women in particular are at risk and have less capacity to overcome the increasingly frequent disasters and climatic changes. Bangladeshi, Egyptian, Indonesian and Pakistani women are no exception to this bitter fact. The most vulnerable suffer more when, like themselves, the planet's air, water and land are exploited. When global temperatures and sea levels rise, and when there are periods of flooding, it is the women who cannot easily escape because they are in *Purdah*¹, or are caring for children and the elderly. It is the women who may be less mobile, have less access to technology, to resources, to contacts outside the family, and they have a lesser degree of information and decision-making powers.

Cannon (2002) compares the effect of climate change on men and women in a developing country like Bangladesh. He categorically states that Bangladeshi women are more prone than men to increasing disaster and extreme climate events due to climate change. He claims that they are more vulnerable not only by being poor but also by being subject to the influence of gender-specific attributes such as honour, shame, observing privacy and separation from strangers, discriminatory prescriptions that are applied even in severe environmental catastrophes. Similarly, a study by Islam (2009) also asserts

the miserable condition of women in Bangladesh. It alleges that in terms of exercising their human rights, women are more liable to suffer from gender inequalities before, during and after climate change-induced disasters. Women are particularly at risk in terms of their political and economic status, land ownership, housing conditions, exposure to violence, education, health and particularly reproductive and sexual health.

As Arora-Jonsson sees it, when climate change and gender are studied together, women seem to appear in two ways: as both vulnerable and virtuous in relation to the environment. "If the discourse of gender is reduced to one only of vulnerability and virtue, one doesn't see what actually happens in specific contexts. One can't see the openings and opportunities for change", she argues. (Arora-Jonsson 2011). She sees this trend as linked to enhancing a gender perspective in international politics, and proposes a broader perspective where class, nationality and ethnicity are also taken into consideration (see also Westlund 2011). Furthermore the "victim and virtuous" positioning may underestimate women's role as agents for change.

Thus, there are several reasons why the role of women's active participation on reducing the negative impact of climate change needs to be addressed. First, many rural women perceive trees and plants as sources of food for cattle, medicine and as raw material for handicrafts, while men are less concerned with these livelihood issues (Warren 2000: 5). Women also depend more on natural resources for work, their homes and their communities, and live more in harmony with nature (Moscoso 2003: 38-42). At the local level, women are sometimes better equipped with information about different social groups facing losses in a post-cyclone or earthquake period, people in the community who are more at risk, and what is needed to meet challenges and which native trees should be protected (Enarson & Fordham 2001). They acquire wider knowledge and experiences of their environment (Ariyabandu 2004), which is constantly appraised and updated when the environmental and social conditions of their associated environment change. This knowledge is a result of their responsibilities in their families and communities. This local knowledge is quite useful in the developing countries (Harding 1998) and should be considered in the adaptation strategies of vulnerable communities to climate change.

Some environmental hazards are spontaneous, and adaptation to them might be based on limited knowledge, but with the help of alternative forms of adaptation, strategies can be managed (Bryant et al. 2000). Where women's knowledge, experiences and skills are not used for adaptation and mitigation, sustainability may be threatened.

Women's empowerment can be related to climate change in the rural areas of developing countries. For instance, an emission reduction purchase agreement for the reforestation of two mountainous areas of Kenya was endorsed between Kenya's Greenbelt Movement, founded by Nobel Peace Laureate,

Wangari Maathai, and the World Bank's Community Development Carbon Fund in November 2006. Women's groups were assigned to plant thousands of trees. That initiative not only empowered the women, but also bagged 350,000 tons of carbon dioxide, restricted soil erosion and bolstered regular rainfall, which was required by the Kenyan farmers and hydro-electric power plants. Similarly, in Nepal, communities often control forests. They use them for firewood, fodder and flood barriers. In some areas of Nepal, women's groups manage community forests, and in Afghanistan widows in the Northern province of Badakhshan take care of seedlings for reforestation.

Women Are Marginalized

According to Cox (2006: 182-191) the amount of news coverage related to the role of women in anticipating and reducing the impact of climate change correlates with the trends in the awareness and participation of the community. Ironically, their participation in reducing the impact of global warming has often been ignored by the media because of the gender bias in the newsroom. Examination directed toward the news coverage of the COP15, in Copenhagen 2009 (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010) shows that female voices in the Copenhagen summit were only 12 per cent of the voices quoted in the media.

In the Durban coverage, where the overall numbers were much smaller (and thus the results somewhat less indicative), the proportion of women's voices had increased to 23 per cent. One explanation may be that the South African host of the conference (Minister of Environment Edna Molewa) is a woman, and in addition both the UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres and the EU commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, played a very active role during the COP17. The data we have from the two conferences suggest that this is the case, since the percentage of transnational women voices rose sharply from Copenhagen to Durban (from appr. 10 to more than 40 %).

The total number of stories where the *headline* signals a concern for women and climate change in the *MediaClimate* material, is twelve; one single story in the Bali coverage (COP13; 13 countries included); seven stories from Copenhagen (COP15, 2,500 stories, 18 countries included), two from the Cancún coverage (COP16: 311 stories, 6 countries included); and two from COP17: 17 countries included, and both stories are from a South African newspaper). About half the stories represent women in an active way, as in *The Daily Star*, South Africa ("Rural Women Lead the Change", 5.12.2011; "Women Turn Waste into Art", 5.12.2011), some are neutral, and four explicitly mention women as victims of climate change.

The data indicate that further studies should be undertaken to determine why, in the news coverage of the COPs, the numbers of gender related stories and women news sources remain small. Who were the women? What state-

ments did they make? Hall (in Lester 2010: 89) states that examining how news sources are selected constitutes a powerful interpretation on the importance an issue has and it indicates how public views and opinions have been influenced by the quality, position and direction provided by the selected actors.

To answer the above questions, a study was done in two large Asian countries: Indonesia and Pakistan, since the two countries share a similar background, insofar as the majority of their people are Muslims. Similarly, the two countries also share a similar cultural-patriarchal background. The patriarchal concept is defined as a system where men dominate the women and where men's considerations are deemed to be of greater value than those of women. Consequently, these patriarchal values often lead to women's gendered inferiority and passivity. At the household level, male power is used to refer to a type of family where control is exercised by men; however, currently the term patriarchy is also used to refer to a state system which sustains the control of women by men in many ways (Renzetti & Curran 1999: 3).

Strong patriarchal cultures in Indonesia and Pakistan have shaped a tradition that views women who are independent and have a career in the public sector as unacceptable and unwanted. Even a woman's ambition to work in politics is deemed non-feminine, unacceptable and dangerous. However, each of these countries has had a woman as prime minister or president, but their appearances on the political scene have been related to their family status.²

Gender Bias in Media Institutions

Patriarchal culture does not only exert its influence over politics, but also over the mass media. In this condition, the whole journalistic process, including assigning the journalists, collecting, selecting, grouping and editing of news – all those steps have traditionally been undertaken by a male-dominant group. Whether we are aware of it or not, patriarchal performance implies gender bias. For example, media often focus more in their coverage of women politicians on their physical appearance than on their competence in politics.

A feminist expert of media studies explains that the media industry's news production process constitutes a rather complicated negotiation process. She adopts the cultural approach in trying to understand the relation between gender, power and media and suggests that even if more women enter the news room, changes may be slow, since they enter a newsroom with a strong male dominated tradition. Thus, media may keep alive the gender bias and a representation often reflecting stereotypes and myths of the reality of women's life (van Zoonen 1997: 1-28).

Poindexter, Meraz & Weiss (2008: 175-266) explain that in the last few years the number of women journalists and media workers has increased, and in

some countries women comprise almost half the total number of news media workers. Although the data are still low in many countries, this development signifies a considerable improvement for professional women in some developing countries. This phenomenon is linked to a change of power and political regimes as well as economic progress and modernization taking place in those countries. However, this progress has not been reflected in the adoption of a sincere gender perspective in the media coverage across the world. In general, gender gaps can be found in newsroom management, as only few women are in the high positions. Most decision-making is still done by men. Other data suggest that women journalists in general oftentimes have been assigned to cover “more feminine areas” such as issues which are “closer to home” in nature, home affairs pages, society, etc. It turns out that these assignments are often aligned with the media preferences and expectations of news consumers.

Poindexter et al. also explain that in Egypt and other Muslim countries, a patriarchal tradition still prevails, among other factors, due to the lower level of education and literacy among women. This is both a result of and worsens the discrimination suffered by the women. In these countries, women journalists are often considered incapable of and inflexible toward adjusting themselves to the rigors of their work schedule. Their mobility is also limited. In terms of representation, it can be said that women are un- or underrepresented in media coverage both quantitatively and qualitatively. If any coverage is made on women related issues, the news does not usually include the legal and political aspects related to gender inequality and violence. Women in Muslim countries are mostly represented as mothers, wives and children in need of protection, or as sexual objects. Whenever media present information about women politicians, for example, they tend to describe them according to prevailing stereotypes picturing them as honest, positively behaving persons, but lacking in leadership and competence.

Method and Research Materials

The data of this study was collected from two newspapers in Indonesia and Pakistan respectively, between December 1 and December 22, 2009, when COP 15 was conducted in Copenhagen, and from the period between November 23 and December 14, 2011, when COP 17 was conducted in Durban. Therefore, the material selected is about COP 15 and COP17, or stories related to climate change in the same periods. The Indonesian elite newspaper selected here is *Kompas*, the most influential national newspaper; and the popular newspaper chosen is *Warta Kota (WK)*, the local newspaper in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. The Pakistani media selected were *The Dawn*, the country's most

widely circulated English language newspapers; and *The News*, another English language newspaper that is less elite-leaning.

The data were studied using content analysis (Hansen 2010: 187) to get the proportion of women's voices and determine their professions in their respective societies. As well, qualitative methods have been applied by using a framing analysis (Entman 2003, 2007).

Table 15.1. Gender and Voices: COP15, Copenhagen, COP17, Durban, per cent

Country	COP15		COP17	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Australia	86	14	86	14
Bangladesh	97	3	87	13
Brazil	89	11	63	37
Canada	90	10	83	17
Chile	85	15	82	18
China	100	0	n/a	n/a
Denmark	n/a	n/a	80	20
Egypt	100	0	57	43
Finland	71	29	64	36
Germany	85	15	69	31
Indonesia	83	17	77	23
Israel	95	5	87	13
Norway	81	19	98	2
Pakistan	92	8	85	15
Russia	96	4	100	0
South Africa	81	19	74	26
Sweden	74	26	57	43
USA	87	13	81	19
TOTAL	88	12	77	23

Table 15.1 indicates that more women voices were heard and recorded in the *MediaClimate* newspaper material around Durban than Copenhagen. However, the total material is much smaller, and thus the quantitative results are rather uncertain. Special factors may influence the result, as is the case of Norway, where the delegation leader at COP15 was a woman (Hanne Bjurstrøm), while in Durban it was a man. Furthermore, being one of the few western state leaders present in Durban, Norway's male PM received coverage, as did the largely male NGO leaders present in Durban. In the Copenhagen coverage there was a wider array of voices, and thus a healthier proportion of women.

On the other hand, South Africa, having both a female COP17 president (Maite Nkoane-Mashabane) and a female Minister of Environment (Edna Molewa), improved its representation of women voices to one fourth of the total.

Indonesian Media: Closer to Home

During COP 15 in Copenhagen, *Kompas* presented 78 articles, and 18 stories on COP17 in Durban. On the other hand, *Warta Kota (WK)* presented 17 stories on related issues on Copenhagen and none on Durban. The issues appearing in *WK* (during COP15) included flooding caused by heavy rains, the need for planting trees, green lifestyle, bad weather in the ports, and waste management. This popular newspaper focused more on the environmental impacts directly affecting the city population, though actually these are often the material effects of climate change.

The findings of the quantitative research indicate that only 17 per cent (40 out of 235 voices) of the quotes made in *Kompas* on Copenhagen conference are those of women, while at the Durban conference it constituted 22 per cent (10 out of 45 voices). In *WK* 24 per cent (10 out of 42 voices) of the news sources were female. Moreover, the data in the two papers show that during COP 15 in Copenhagen, female voices of NGOs or civil society were higher (35) than those of national leaders (23 %) and business women (23 %). However, it should be noted here that the majority of women quoted did not talk about the Copenhagen conference; they talked in climate related stories about the local activities implemented under the “Go Green” theme in order to anticipate the effects of climate change.

The person who was most often quoted, during the COP 15 coverage, was Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor. Ms. Merkel was described by *Kompas*³ as having responded to the Copenhagen Agreement in a non-enthusiastic manner, stating that it constituted only the preliminary step toward a real agreement that was still far ahead. Meanwhile, *WK* preferred common people and national political figures, i.e. the Indonesian First Lady, Ani Herrawati Yudoyono; and Miranda Gultom, former Governor of the Indonesian Central Bank. Other national news sources appearing mostly in *WK* included several women who were interviewed in their job positions as Public Relations Officers (PRO) during the Green Program, which was held for a week in Jakarta towards the end of the year. Journalists framed the coverage of a green festival as a promotional event to shape corporate images with a brush of social responsibility in terms of the impacts of climate change; and the majority of PROs, who happened to be women, became the most appropriate sources.

During the 17th COP, the executive secretary of UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, and then Connie Hedegaard, the representative for the Umbrella Group, and simultaneously the European Union Commissioner, were the most quoted persons; but none of the quotes referred to in the Indonesian newspaper addressed gender issues in particular.

In the Indonesian coverage we were looking for stories where journalism represented women’s participation in climate change issues, but found only

three stories related to COP 15; and none on COP 17. The first⁴ article frames the disappointment registered against the COP agreement, while the climatic threats are getting ever more real and Indonesia has to minimize its negative impacts. In this news article, *Kompas* advocates that poor women have to be empowered to earn additional income for the family. The background is that due to the impact of global warming, their husbands can no longer rely only on income derived from agriculture or fishery. The second article⁵ describes the expectation of developing countries not to be trapped in negotiations about money, since climate change impacts are related to livelihood and daily life issues. In this article, *Kompas* pictures women as victims of global warming since they have to walk a long distance to collect water when many springs dry out. The last article treats the importance of the discussions on water issues, since water has attracted only minimum attention from the participants of the conference. This issue was put forward by Ania Grobicki, Executive Secretary of the Global Water Partnership. In this news, *Kompas*⁶ described women in Africa, for example in Mali, as victims because they have to walk farther into the desert to collect water. It is important to note that the first article is written by a female reporter while the others are written by male reporters. The three articles may indicate that female and male reporters represent women differently in the climate change issue, although we cannot draw any conclusions based on such a small number of stories. If male reporters represent women mainly as victims, their female counterparts may see a possibility to empower women by calling for the strengthening of their household's financial situation, since many household finances have worsened due to the impacts of climate change.

Pakistani Media: European Leaders

In the chosen Pakistani newspapers, there were very few voices of local women during the Copenhagen Summit. There was only one gender-related story in *Dawn* titled "Climate Change and Women" and none in *The News*. There could be many reasons for the absence of Pakistani women's voices addressing the climate change issues in the media. As in many other countries, the very issue of climate change itself is struggling hard to get space and time in the Pakistani media. The coverage in the almost one month study revealed that there were 22 stories in *The News* and were 40 stories in *Dawn*. Climate change is a pressing issue of today; however, Pakistani media is heavily dependent on the foreign news agencies, and this was clearly the case with *The News* as most of the coverage came from foreign agencies or syndicated stories from other foreign newspapers (20 out of 22 stories were from foreign news agencies, AFP and AP). To some extent, *Dawn* was also dependent on international news agencies, but here less than half (19 of 40 stories) came from these sources.

In the Pakistani coverage, the European leaders and foreign voices were mentioned more than the local voices. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the then Danish Minister for Environment, Connie Hedegaard were quoted two times in both *The News* and *Dawn*. In *The News*, there was no voice of grassroot Pakistani women. However, *Dawn* gave coverage to the women from Pakistan and from other developing countries present in the COP 15. Leah Wickham, a 24-year-old woman from Fiji broke out in tears as she handed over a petition from ten million people asking the negotiators at Copenhagen to come up with a big hand to save islands like hers.⁷ She said, "I am on the front lines of climate change."⁸ Similarly, Venezuela's representative before opening the red-stained palm of her hand said, "Those of us who wish to speak have to make a point of order by cutting our hands and drawing blood." She also criticized the Danish Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen, predicting that he was "going to endorse this coup d'état against the United Nations"⁹. Women from Tuvalu said, "It looks like we are being offered 30 pieces of silver to betray our people and our future."¹⁰

Dawn included three female Pakistani voices in its coverage from Copenhagen, one representing an NGO; another being a climate expert in the Pakistani delegation; and the third the Deputy Secretary for Climate Change.

The national as well the international media coverage about Pakistan was affected by Pakistan being linked to the unstable international politics of the "War on Terror." Consequently the world community was not very interested in Pakistan's vulnerability to climate change. One of the three Pakistani women, Asimah, who was from an NGO and represented youth in the conference, said: "the first thing they ask us about is the political situation in Pakistan, not about climate change."¹¹ This shows the international community's priorities and concerns regarding Pakistan, views that may impact on Pakistan's participation in the forging of global climate change policies. One of the male Pakistani delegates pointed out in the conference that adaption funding was urgently needed in Pakistan. This money should be emerging from the negotiations under way at the conference. The female deputy secretary for climate change, Nilofer Hafeez, did not have high expectations for the outcome of the Copenhagen conference; she said, "The talks are more or less in a deadlock right now. We are not moving forward. The Kyoto Protocol is the most crucial issue for developing countries. Unless the emission numbers (promised by the developed countries in Kyoto) are done there should not be further actions".¹² The coverage from foreign agencies or syndicated stories from other foreign newspapers in Pakistani media highlights the global concerns within their own media agenda and policy, so, the majority of the voices covered by them were foreign, which may sometimes give the impression that climate change is not a Pakistani issue at all, but rather it is a problem of 'others'. Climate change is a global as well as a local issue but the absence of local

climate problems in Pakistani media gives the impression that it is not a core problem of Pakistan.

Dawn gave more coverage to women representing international governments or international organisations than to local Pakistani women. There were 14 foreign women's voices in the Pakistani media and 3 Pakistani women voices during Copenhagen coverage of the one month surveyed. One thing to be noted is that whether women were from developed nations or developing nations, they were talking about the climate change issue and the concerns in general. The problems of women due to climate induced disasters, in particular, were absent from the discourses of women represented at the Copenhagen conference; or at least the women voices covered by the media were not discussing the gender-centred issues and climate change event.

An interesting aspect of this situation is the fact that the environmental reporting was done by a female reporter in Copenhagen, Rina Saeed Khan. This does not seem coincidental. Could it be that the environment is currently not a very attractive beat in the eyes of Pakistani male reporters? This needs to be further explored.¹³ Apart from the presence of a female environmental journalist at summit meetings, the voice of Pakistani women in climate change issues was not evident in the COP15 coverage, especially those really affected, the women at the grassroots level in Pakistan. However, this is not to say that they may be present in non-COP coverage throughout the year.

Conclusions: A Women's Perspective

First, the findings indicate that the media have been more concerned with the interests of the male-dominated news sources. This domination of male voices indicates the pro-male media stance tends to perceive climate change issues more from masculine points of view. This kind of news coverage can result in the negligence toward the interests of women who are actually the main victims of climate change; something that is particularly evident in the clean water crisis suffered by many areas in the developing countries. Water crisis has had an impact on the living conditions in the households, as children are deprived of sanitation and health facilities and women must devote hours every day to obtain potable water.

Second, proper attention was not sufficiently given to women in general in the news coverage on the COPs. It is not climate change as such that affects the women. It is actually the ravaged system, which has created conditions in which climate change not only provokes vulnerabilities, rather increases the risks in the life of affected women. There is thus a need to recognize women's role in working for the betterment of the planet and in conserving the environment.

Third, elite political women are frequently quoted in the media even though these are not the strata most affected by climate change. Thus it can be said that news from the COPs constituted elite issues which did not reach out to the grass roots and the public in general and they were little concerned with the groups that are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts.

To understand the problem related to women's representation in the media, it is not sufficient to focus only on news content. How the structures of business production affect the encoding process will depend on the ideology and the culture of a company. Of course encoding is also affected by the culture of the community and the role the government plays to sustain the patriarchal ideology. Gramsci (Bocock 1986, Ross & Byerly 2004: 3) explains that gender construction, as mentioned above, constitutes hegemony because it results in a view that a particularly undemocratic phenomenon can be seen as normal, representing common sense and everyday experience. This is achieved through a dissemination process carried out by dominant and powerful groups mediated through education, religion and family, as well as media, resulting in the immersion of those views in the community, a community usually unaware of how its consciousness is being socially manipulated by a persistent hegemonic system.

Although the number of women journalists has increased, this does not guarantee that news coverage will become free of gender bias; the views of women and the interpretations they make are shaped by values and beliefs that they hold as members of the community. The patriarchal culture has obviously been internalized, making it difficult to change the values that have been deemed acceptable by the society. People tend to just follow deeply rooted traditions, although some of these have negative impact on whole societies. This demonstrates a trend of professionalism where journalists focus more on meeting deadlines than on developing gender sensitive reporting (Corbett 2006: 223-230). The effect of the absence of gender sensitivity shows how the interests of dominant groups in the media institutions tend to reflect the way a social problem is constructed, pictured and presented to the public, thus often sacrificing the interests of those without power. By contrast, ecofeminist views try to show the relations between all forms of oppression regarding the relationship between people and the natural (nonhuman) world.

Ecofeminism (Mies and Shiva in Sandilands 1996: 96-99) emphasized the importance of feminist values, such as caring for the lives of others (both human and natural), for a movement to release nature and women from patriarchal bondage and capitalist domination. More feminine values need to be acknowledged for humankind's continuity, relying more on harmony with nature, aiming to eliminate every single destructive trait, from either side in this relationship. According to ecofeminist theories, the ecological crisis is not merely caused by an anthropocentric view and behavior, but also from capitalist expansion, domination, manipulation and exploitation of nature. This approach leads us

to see the domination of elite industrials or Western countries that aim to solve global warming problems only in relation to political and economic interests and points of view. This has long been called a masculine approach to the issue. It tends to ignore the interests of women and other oppressed people, especially in the global South. In addition, Warren (2000: 23-37) explains that since women have been conceptually related to the nature, the conceptual, symbolic and linguistic relations between women and global warming issues become salient. The construction of nature-as-object and the metaphors such as the earth/ nature being called Mother Nature, virgin timber, fertile soil, show a relational network among all forms of oppression with non-human world or nature.

Related to the role of media in informing on climate change issues and saving the world from environmental destruction, the journalistic norms of taking on a watchdog role and thus siding with the oppressed or weaker sections of society, may imply taking sides for nature, indigeneous people, marginalized groups; and not least to give voice to women and their interests. Whether done intentionally or not, editorial policies, political interests, capitalism and patriarchy have a combined influence that colors the media coverage significantly. One of the proofs for this condition is the tiny number of women news sources in the coverage of COPs and climate change issues in mass media.

When discussing the motivation of the agents, Giddens (Littlejohn & Foss 2008: 236-239) explains that it is the existence of discursive and practical awareness that underlines the actions taken by agents. In the context of the media industry, the agents, i.e. journalists, still seem to lack discursive and practical awareness in viewing women both as victims of climate change and as agents for mitigation and adaptation. There is little indication that the agents of the profession possess the necessary awareness to make global warming issues an entry point for media advocacy that might lead in the direction of egalitarian gender relations.

The production of the feminine values as the basis of the movement to preserve nature can be further justified by structuration theory; this corroborates the position that production and reproduction of social systems depend on the use of "an actor structure". In structuration theory, gender, production and reproduction of dominative features of social systems are determined by the dynamics of the usage of gender structure, of actors or media workers engaged in social interaction. This means that the dominant gender structure will occur when the resources of female actors used in the interaction have not been able to enable or empower them to destroy or disrupt the dominant structure preserved by male actors. Currently, it is clear that the gender structure of actors and journalists still places constraints on its agents to produce an egalitarian social system.

How could this gross negligence both of gender perspectives and women's voices happen? According to structuration theory, dominant structures are

preserved by dominant groups through structures of signification and legitimation, which are able to hide their dominant faces from being recognized by their victims (misrecognition). Such an ideological mechanism works through a naturalization process of ongoing social practices, for example with a vast majority of men negotiating climate agreements. Through this process, the social dominative-repressive practices that use violence toward nature and women can be deemed socially acceptable practices. Therefore, what is missing is the representation of feminine values such as caring and nurturing (human and nature), as a basis for movements to release nature and women from male bondage and capitalist domination. An increasing emphasis on such values and perspectives needs to be acknowledged; for such values are essential to the continuity of the human species in harmony with its natural environment. This relationship has to be advanced without destructive traits emanating from either side.

The role of the media in empowering women to face, and work with, climate changes cannot be expected to improve in the near future. This is to say that global engagement with the threats of climate change and impending disasters can only be effective if the real concerned parts of human societies like women, the poor and vulnerable, as well as the inhabitants of the climatic disaster zones are made party to the conferences and seminars and overall campaigns of awareness of climate change and disaster management. Grassroots women need to be educated and provided with awareness of climate change and climate related disasters and they should be given due and proper space and voice in the media to raise their concerns and offer their practical suggestions in the local set up of adaptation to climate change and disaster management. Women who interact in society and with nature, need to be better equipped and empowered with knowledge, resources and technical aids to transcend their past vulnerability and actively participate in climate change management.

Notes

1. Purdah: Literally means "curtain", a tradition by which women are separated from men and a men's gaze.
2. Megawati Soekarno Putri, Vice-President of Indonesia in 1999 to 2001 and President between 2001-2004, was a daughter of the first Indonesian President, Soekarno, while Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, who served between 1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996, was the daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
3. "Copenhagen results: Indonesia should be more serious". *Kompas*, December 21, 2009.
4. "Copenhagen results: Indonesia should be more Serious". *Kompas*, December 21, 2009.
5. "Agreement Forced to Empower Human Rights", *Kompas*, December 12, 2009.
6. "Climate Change: Less Attention to Water Issues". *Kompas*, December 10, 2009.
7. *The News*, December 20, 2009.
8. *The News*, December 20, 2009.
9. *The News*, December 20, 2009.

10. *The News*, December 19, 2009.
11. *Dawn*, December 12, 2009.
12. *Dawn*, December 15, 2009.
13. Currently, Pakistani print media started initiating the positive step of taking the environmental issues coverage in media more seriously and a forum of journalists covering the environment has been founded at the request of the media professionals. The Prime Minister of Pakistan is patron in chief of this forum.

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Chapter 16

Misframing the Messenger

*Scales of Justice, Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Media Coverage of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change*¹

Anna Roosvall & Matthew Tegelberg

We're here to talk about our elders' perspective on climate change and hope that the government or the higher powers will listen to our elders' perspective.... they've been out on the land for so long and they see the changes and they know the changes and that is what the government should look at and study.... [the elders'] perspective on climate change [is important] because they know more than the scientists... they have seen the changes and know the changes (Curtis Konek, Inuit Youth Delegation, interview at COP 17, December 6, 2011)².

The COP summits connect in complex ways both to scales of geography and justice (Fraser 2008). On one hand, albeit defined as a *global* issue, climate change is often witnessed in *local* environments. Summit negotiations, on the other hand, take place between *nations* and are organized as *international* events. In this setting, *transnational* or *intra-national* groups such as indigenous peoples occupy ambiguous positions (see also Roosvall & Tegelberg forthcoming 2013). Indigenous groups are sometimes recognized as nations with partial independence, but seldom have the right to negotiate on parity with nation-states in the international political arena. Given this situation, indigenous groups and their environmental interests are also linked to the scales of justice (Fraser 2008) in interesting ways. Indigenous peoples often occupy a distinct position when it comes to the issue of climate change. Many Arctic communities, where indigenous groups live, are located close to eroding coastlines, melting ice caps and thawing permafrost. This is emphasized in mainstream media discourses where indigenous peoples are represented as specifically connected to nature (Roosvall 2010). In this chapter, we examine how Arctic indigenous peoples are represented in mainstream Swedish and Canadian news coverage of the UN climate summits in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP15) and Durban in 2011 (COP17).

Indigenous peoples have been actively present at UN climate summits, producing content for alternative media networks while seeking to generate atten-

tion in the often less-welcoming mainstream media. The aim of this chapter is to explore how Arctic indigenous peoples are represented in relation to *scales of geography and justice* in mainstream coverage of UN climate summits. The analysis focuses on a nature-culture-politics nexus. The main research question is: Where and how are Arctic indigenous peoples, their voices and perspectives, represented in media coverage of UN summits, and in media coverage of climate change more broadly?

Preferences as to what is the most appropriate terminology when making reference to indigenous peoples vary across disciplines and geographies (Alia 1999, Retzlaff 2006). “Indigenous” and “aboriginal” are terms which refer to the original people to inhabit a particular region and their descendants. In Canada, “Aboriginal” is an umbrella term for three groups of people: First Nations, Métis and Inuit. The term is generally employed to make reference to indigenous peoples of North America. The government ministry with jurisdiction over such matters, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, defines “indigenous” more broadly as “native to the area”, allowing for wider geographical use (2002). Linda Smith adds that “indigenous peoples” is a term that internationalizes the experiences and struggles of the world’s colonized peoples, enabling them to work together transnationally. The plural “s” in “indigenous peoples” points to recognized differences between various groups of indigenous peoples (1999: 7).³ We prefer the terminology “indigenous” or “indigenous peoples” because of its inclusive, transnational scope. Moreover, it is crucial that in many countries, including Canada and Sweden, a group is ascribed particular status if recognized as “indigenous”.

Voices and perspectives of indigenous peoples are underrepresented in mainstream media discourses. Instead, problematic representations often inform current opinions and practices pertaining to indigenous peoples (Said 1978, Smith 1999, Pratt 2008). Despite a long history of self-produced Aboriginal⁴ print media in Canada and Australia, “Aboriginal peoples’ voices remain suppressed in news coverage of events in which they are deeply implicated” (Meadows & Avison 2000: 348). Likewise, Pietikäinen (2003) demonstrates that the Sami are often portrayed as marginalized and voiceless in news media.

According to the most recent Canadian census, there were 1,172,790 indigenous people in Canada, with 50,485 persons who identified themselves as Inuit (Statistics Canada, 2006). The Canadian Constitution recognizes First Nations, Métis and Inuit as groups with unique heritages, languages, cultural practices and spiritual beliefs. It also acknowledges the rights of some groups to hunt, trap and fish on ancestral lands (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2002). However, many of these communities are situated in remote areas where climate change is having a direct impact on traditional ways of life.

In Sweden, the Sami population encompasses an estimated 20,000 individuals. Together with approximately 2,000 Sami in Russia, 8,000 in Finland, and

between 50,000 and 65,000 in Norway they constitute a transnational community located in “Sami land” (Sápmi – Sameland 2011). The Swedish Sami have had their own *leat* since 1993. The members of this “parliament” are elected by popular vote among the Sami. It is however not a self governing body, but serves as an administrative authority which advises the Swedish government on matters connected to Sami rights. Sweden failed to ratify the United Nation’s ILO Convention Nr. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1991) and was criticized by the UN in 2011 for violating Sami human rights. Climate change is an issue that has particular impact on those Sami who live in Sami land and depend upon the Arctic climate for their livelihood. Reindeer husbandry is a traditional form of sustenance for the Sami that is specifically endangered by climate change (Anaya 2011).

Representing Nature, Culture and Politics

Three overlapping theoretical trajectories inform this chapter. One involves a continuing effort, by researchers, to identify differences between indigenous and non-indigenous conceptions of the relationship between nature and culture. Another examines the role indigenous or traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) plays in mainstream scientific and environmental discourses on climate change. These trajectories are accounted for as nature-culture trajectories below. Albeit sparse and superficial, coverage of indigenous peoples in summit journalism does make allusions to these theoretical developments. Finally, identity politics theory, accounted for as culture-politics trajectories below, relates to the study of media discourses on the identity and status of indigenous peoples.

Nature-culture trajectories. Scholars have identified significant differences in indigenous and non-indigenous understandings of nature and culture. The differences can be traced to ancient Greek philosophy where a preoccupation with a division between man and nature originated (Smith 1999). Unlike naturalistic explanations that viewed nature and life as constitutive features of an intrinsic whole, humanistic explanations began to “...separate people out from the world around them, and place humanity on a higher plane (than animals and plants) because of such characteristics as language and reason” (Smith 1999: 47). This binary dualism has been one of the premises on which scientific methodology has been based, and which has dominated western discourses on nature-culture (Apffel-Marglin 1998). By contrast, in Arctic indigenous world views man and nature overlap and are generally viewed as intrinsically connected. The Sami for instance traditionally see themselves as part of nature and act accordingly (Guttorm 2011: 70). This attitude includes a spiritual aspect, which differentiates traditional indigenous knowledge from traditional local knowledge (Ibid, p. 69).

Scholars and activists have recently suggested that one method of responding to climate change is to pay more attention to indigenous understandings of the natural environment (Hulme 2009). These efforts relate to a second theoretical trajectory which considers to what extent traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) has taken hold in western scientific and environmental discourses. From non-indigenous perspectives, TEK is generally viewed as a “body of knowledge” separate from the people who possess it. By contrast, indigenous peoples consider it to be “...rooted in the spiritual health, culture, and language of the people and handed down from generation to generation. It is based on intimate knowledge of the land, water, snow and ice, weather and wildlife, and the relationships between all aspects of the environment” (McGregor 2004: 78). From this standpoint, TEK encompasses aspects of nature, culture and spirituality and has a direct impact on people’s life choices.

Culture-politics trajectories. Identity politics can be defined as struggles for equality, often employed by minority groups (Fraser & Honneth 2003, Woodward 1997). Following World War II, the focus was on *redistribution* of formerly mal-distributed means, as part of a process of de-colonization. In the 1990s, this redistribution approach was complemented by *recognition* of exclusive cultural traits and rights that pertained, for instance, to language use in schools and to the cultural rights of ethnic minority groups. Recognition was considered important for understanding racism, sexism and colonialism. However it has gradually come to displace redistribution, causing misrecognition and the reification of group identities which in turn may cause mal-distribution (Fraser 2000, 2008). This type of recognition has been termed ‘the identity model’ (Fraser 2000). The identity of social actors is here understood as a process of constructing meaning on the basis of cultural attributes which are given priority over other sources of meaning (Castells 1997: 6).

Fraser stresses that recently the importance of recognizing not only *identity* but also *status* has been underscored. This borders on the question of redistribution since what then acquires recognition is the “...status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction...capable of participating on a par with the rest” (Fraser 2000: 113). Based on this, Fraser identifies “misframing” (2008: 114) as a major source of injustice in the global era. This occurs, for instance, when transnational sources of injustice are handled within and through state-territorial frames. Misframing can be remedied by granting the groups in question political representation. It is thus, according to Fraser, only together with political representation that recognition and redistribution approaches can work. In a globalizing world, this redistribution-recognition-representation nexus only functions when adjusted to transnational settings. Hence, moral scales of justice, which can be handled through recognition, redistribution and/or representation, are intrinsically connected to geographic scales of justice. In representations of

Arctic indigenous peoples, geographical scales can be understood both in terms of how different extensions of space matter (e.g. local-national-global), and in terms of how different conceptions of nature (dis)regard the limits of such spaces. Our analysis considers to what extent these different types of identity politics are represented in the media coverage.

Method and Research Materials

We examined coverage of Arctic indigenous peoples in Canadian and Swedish reporting on the climate summits in Copenhagen and Durban. The Swedish material includes 113 articles from *Dagens Nyheter* (elite) and 45 articles from *Aftonbladet* (popular) from 2009, and 71 articles from *Dagens Nyheter* and 35 articles from *AB* from 2011.⁵ The Canadian material consists of 129 articles from *The Globe and Mail* (elite) and 132 articles from the *Toronto Star* (popular) from 2009, as well as 37 articles from *The Globe and Mail* and 36 articles from the *Toronto Star* from 2011. Combined, the data sample consists of 598 Swedish and Canadian articles. In this sample, articles that make *explicit* reference to Arctic indigenous peoples, using the word indigenous or terms that refer to specific groups such as Inuit or Sami, were selected for analysis.

We focus in particular on the roles Arctic indigenous peoples play in the sample articles. Following the analytics of mediation (Chouliaraki 2006), pictures are studied in conjunction with texts, and related to discourse analysis of relationships between the articles and their geopolitical contexts. Hence the analysis looks at the interplay of geographical scales and scales of justice. Analytically, we looked at:

1. Nature-culture discourses: identified through the appearance of binary oppositions (Allan 1999) and presuppositions (Fairclough 1995). Presuppositions refer to what is not explicitly stated in the articles but forms the logical basis they rely upon.
2. Politics-culture discourses: identified through textual and visual connections to redistribution, recognition (of status/identity) and political representation (Fraser 2008). The analysis focused particularly on headlines, pictures and other conspicuous aspects of the examined articles.

Mapping Representations of Indigenous Peoples

The perspectives of Arctic indigenous peoples were largely lacking in media coverage of both COP summits. A keyword search of 3,210 headlines from 19 countries in 2009 and 736 headlines from 18 countries in 2011 revealed only 4

titles which made explicit reference to indigenous peoples during COP15 and 3 titles during COP17.⁶ Table 1 maps media representations of Arctic indigenous peoples from Canadian and Swedish research material by domestic/foreign distinction and by media outlet. “Foreign” is here understood in relation to the reporting medium.

Table 16.1. Representations of Arctic Indigenous Peoples in Geographical and Journalistic Contexts in the Materials

Media	Context							Total articles
	Domestic Arctic indigenous peoples at COP	Foreign Arctic indigenous peoples at COP	Domestic and foreign Arctic indigenous peoples at COP	Domestic Arctic indigenous peoples in home nation	Foreign Arctic indigenous peoples in home nation	Domestic and foreign Arctic indigenous peoples in home nation	No indigenous peoples represented	
Aftonbladet, Sweden				1	3		113	116
Dagens Nyheter, Sweden						2	146	148
Toronto Star, Canada	1		1	2			164	168
The Globe and Mail, Canada	1						165	166
Total COP stories	2		1	3	2	2	588	598

N = 598 Swedish and Canadian press articles (419 from 2009, 179 from 2011)

Table 1 is characterized by the *absence* of what we study here. Invisibility and thus silence are terms that describe Arctic indigenous peoples in relation to climate change coverage from both summits. In Canada, only four *Toronto Star* stories featured Arctic indigenous peoples in 2009. *The Globe and Mail* did not publish any stories on Arctic indigenous peoples during COP15; a significant absence for a newspaper that claims national scope. In 2011, the only story featuring Arctic indigenous peoples appeared in *The Globe and Mail*. The low frequency of news items reflects a broader tendency in Canadian media to provide inadequate coverage of indigenous perspectives on issues and events that affect these communities (Alia 1999). In Swedish material from 2009, *Aftonbladet* featured two stories on Arctic indigenous peoples, included in a series about affected peoples and places around the world. In the same series, an article on indigenous peoples in South America was also included (see Roosvall & Tegelberg forthcoming 2013). This was the only story on non-Arctic indigenous peoples in Swedish and Canadian media during the periods researched (non-Arctic peoples are not included in the analysis here). *Dagens Nyheter* (elite), Sweden’s main arena for political agenda-setting, did not feature any stories about Arctic indigenous peoples during COP15 despite having published twice as many articles as *Aftonbladet*. In 2011, *Dagens Nyheter* featured two articles on Arctic indigenous peoples, but these lacked indigenous voices. *Aftonbladet*

referred to Arctic indigenous peoples in one article in 2011. The article included indigenous voices, but only in quotes recycled from a 2009 article.

On the few occasions where indigenous peoples appear in the material it is predominantly as crucial messengers. These stories are often accompanied by dramatic imagery. This paradoxical tendency of symbolic centrality despite quantitative insignificance is elaborated in the next section.

Canadian Coverage

In Canadian coverage of COP15, three stories in the *Toronto Star* represented indigenous perspectives on climate change and the negotiations underway in Copenhagen.⁷ These stories featured the voices of prominent indigenous leaders and activists, some speaking from demonstrations outside the summit while others commented from their communities. The stories followed similar patterns, representing Arctic indigenous peoples and cultures as those most threatened by climatic changes or by emphasizing the actions many communities are taking to address this threat.

Rising waters slowly swallowing Tuktoyaktuk

(*Toronto Star*, December 7, 2009)

This story describes how an Inuit community is responding to rapid environmental changes caused by rising temperatures and melting ice. It explains that these developments are forcing Tuktoyaktuk locals to move further inland, abandoning traditional hunting grounds which have served the community for centuries. The story also conveys Tuktoyaktuk Mayor Mevin Gruben's frustration that no "hands-on people", directly affected by climate change, were part of Canada's official delegation in Copenhagen. Mayor Gruben thereby challenges what Fraser (2008) would term misframing. The article does not include explicit political representations but the actor cited demands it. The story posits Mayor Gruben and Tuktoyaktuk residents as victims of climate change but at the same time – through the inclusion of Gruben's speech acts – as those actively struggling to have their voices heard.

Inuit seek financial aid (*Toronto Star*, December 9, 2009)

This short news item is consistent with the pattern of portraying indigenous actors struggling to make their voices heard. It features Inuit leader Mary Simon who demands that Inuit communities receive a portion of a global fund dedicated to helping developing countries adapt to global warming. In terms of identity politics, the story represents a desire for the redistribution of means. Both this story and the previous one also emphasize victimization with Inuit represented as those who must bear the burden of climate change in Canada.

Making climate change personal (*Toronto Star*, December 11, 2009)

Indigenous peoples remain victims in this story, but they are once again positioned as those making urgent calls for action. Hence a *victim-witness role* emerges (Peters 2001: 714). The story accounts for how indigenous leaders, like Sheila Watt-Cloutier, an Inuit activist and Noble Peace Prize nominee, are pressuring nations to acknowledge that climate change is a human rights issue. Watt-Cloutier claims:

It isn't just about ice and snow...It's about people, and it's not just about the furry animals that the people want to focus on saving. It's about the sustainability of communities in the Arctic and other places that really rely upon the well-being of their environment to be able to continue to practice an ancient culture that is extremely respectful to all things around us (*Toronto Star*, December 11, 2009).

These remarks resonate with conceptions of traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) and with a related struggle over diverse understandings of nature. Climate change is viewed as a human rights issue since it deprives indigenous communities of their right to continue practicing a sustainable way of life that has balanced elements of nature, culture and spirituality for centuries. Watt-Cloutier politicizes the issue of climate change in Arctic communities by conceptualizing it as a question of human rights. Next to the story, the image of an Inuit demonstrator contains a caption that reads: "Inuit, who say their way of life is threatened by climate change, demonstrate in Copenhagen on Thursday" (*Toronto Star*, December 11, 2009). This layering of text and visual suggests that experiencing the direct impact of climate change (witnessing as experience) has been an impetus for action (witnessing as speech act) in many indigenous communities. The representation of an indigenous leader contributes to an identity politics where indigenous voices are heard. Yet the headline posits the issue as personal (not structural/political) and connects to identity rather than the status of indigenous peoples.

In the land of surfers arrives a cold Inuit message: Climate change is real
(*The Globe and Mail*, December 5, 2011)

Canadian media coverage of the climate talks in Durban (COP17) was quite sparse, with only one story that made reference to indigenous peoples. The report, by *The Globe and Mail* correspondent Geoffrey York, featured two Inuit youth who travelled over 30 hours to inform world leaders of the impact global warming is having on Canada's Arctic populations. The voice of Inuit hunter Jordan Konek emphasizes that this is a matter of concern for indigenous peoples in the Arctic. He stresses that ignoring the testimony of Inuit who are witnessing climate change is "...like putting a shotgun in our mouth and pull-

ing the trigger.” Konek adds that “It’s obvious that our climate is changing. The snow is coming a lot later now. We’ll be losing our hunting culture” (*The Globe and Mail*, December 8, 2011). Although the political agency of these Inuit youth is recognized, they remain marginal in relation to the international politics of the climate summit where they had no official status or recognition. References to cultural traits (identity) feature prominently while the status of indigenous peoples and corresponding calls for a redistribution of means to help cope with climate change continued to be ignored.

In each of the articles, Inuit voices portray indigenous peoples simultaneously as victims and heroes of the climate negotiations. Inuit are represented as those directly affected by climate change, or as actors engaged in frontline efforts to reduce carbon emissions and mitigate the devastating impacts of global warming. The reporting in these news items is informed by an alleged intimacy or closeness to nature. Changes to local environments and cultures are identified as the main reason why indigenous groups are advocating for global leaders to take urgent action. It is also noteworthy that stories featuring indigenous peoples have a tendency to represent climate change as a domestic and/or global issue rather than as a negotiation process playing out between political actors with competing national interests. Hence, in the few cases where they appear in Canadian summit journalism, indigenous peoples are portrayed having difficulty making connections between nature and politics and thereby to connect with mainstream media logics.

Swedish Coverage

During COP15, *Aftonbladet* ran “The World’s Chance”, a series that covered affected peoples from around the world. It included reportage from all continents. Online it also featured interactive conversations between affected people and politicians. Three articles in the series explicitly deal with indigenous peoples (see Roosvall & Tegelberg forthcoming 2013) Two of these deal with Arctic indigenous peoples. These are detailed and analyzed below.

Village collapsing into the sea (*Aftonbladet*, December 16, 2009)

The story tells of Ardit Weyioanna, a 62 year-old from the Inuit village of Sishmaref, Alaska who longs for the past. She grew up in a dug-out with a roof window on the tundra and led a nomadic life of reindeer husbandry on good hunting grounds. It is reported that today she can no longer trust nature. Her village will drown if the sea continues to rise. A picture of a church yard with gravestones in the form of crosses and the caption “Do they want us to become extinct” underline this fatal message, along with the dominating im-

age (spread across two pages) of a house falling into the sea. Its caption reads “Now the Eskimos [sic] are forced to move their houses – to a cost of over one million.” The older, pejorative term “Eskimo” is generally eschewed by the people in question and in official language (even though it is sometimes still used in Alaska). These dramatic pictures and captions are combined with a scientific graph explaining coastal erosion. Science and technological solutions also appear in a fact box about the building of walls to protect the village from waves, rising water and erosion. While scientific and technological takes on nature appear in graphs and fact boxes, spiritual views appear in the text. Thus different takes on nature co-exist, but are disconnected and presupposed to be in opposition to each other.

Spirituality is evoked in a section on a deceased local person called Norman, who fell through the ice and died because climate change has affected ice thickness. The article goes on to recount the case of a toddler named Norman with the same characteristics as the older Norman, whose spirit allegedly lives on in the young child. The Inuit are generally described as having a special bond to nature, and aspects of TEK are distinguishable, even though the term is not mentioned. Regarding identity politics, the identity version of the recognition approach dominates here since Inuit status is not recognized, while cultural attributes are focused. A redistributive approach appears only in comments on how it has *not* been employed (regarding support for moving the village).

The ice does not hold anymore: How climate change is affecting Sweden (*Aftonbladet*, December 19, 2009)

The final article in *Aftonbladet*'s series focuses on domestic conditions for the indigenous Sami in northern Sweden. It shows a large picture of dead reindeer. According to the caption, they died because the ice did not hold as it once had. *Aftonbladet*'s portrayal of the death of animals connects to broader narratives in climate change reporting that focus on suffering polar bears (Doyle 2007, Boykoff and Goodman 2009). It is however different from these narratives in that it includes indigenous peoples living in the exposed regions.

TEK is not alluded to in the article on “domestic” Swedish Sami, unlike the article on the “foreign” indigenous Inuit in Alaska which does allude to it. Instead pictures of Sami people using both modern and traditional equipment for reindeer husbandry display an intersection of technological and traditional knowledge. Likewise, visualizations represent Sami people alongside non-indigenous Swedish cartographers. The Sami role is in this sense both general and specific. Sweden is affected, and it is the Sami who represent this by appearing as victim-witnesses and drawing on their specific knowledge.

Concerning identity politics, this article goes further than the previous one. It not only implies that help with infrastructure is needed, but actually represents

specific Sami opinions on exactly what infrastructure would be suitable and where it should be implemented (redistribution). The article alludes to political representation and status in a fact box that briefly mentions the Sami leet.

Storms Devastating the Eskimo Village (*Aftonbladet*, November 29, 2011)

During COP17, *Aftonbladet* featured an article that made reference to an earlier visit to the Alaskan village of Shishmaref in 2009. The story includes quotes from “the Eskimo” Ardith Weyiouanna that seems to be drawn from the previous article. It comprises a picture capturing Ardith and Johnny Weyiouanna pulling a fish net out of a hole in the ice. The article is about poverty and climate change, and while segments about “the Eskimo” constitute prominent parts of it they do not dominate the text. The article does not refer to TEK, nor does it mention spirituality. There is a quote that mentions the villager who died because he went through the ice, but no references to him living on in other people this time. Regarding identity politics, there is recognition of a specific way of living, of group identity, and an implicit connection to redistribution in the over-arching idea that world energy demands and lifestyles must change.

Why must indigenous peoples pay for climate change

(*Dagens Nyheter*, November 26, 2011)

In 2011, the elite newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* featured an op-ed piece by a group of researchers. Indigenous peoples are mentioned in three of 12 paragraphs in the article, and implied in a few more. It states for instance that several indigenous peoples “live their lives in closer contact with nature than other people and have valuable insights about what is happening in nature” (*Dagens Nyheter*, November 26, 2011). It also mentions their longstanding experience of leading a nomadic life, claiming that indigenous peoples have knowledge that can be of use to more urbanized peoples. Here TEK is alluded to through the witnessing of indigenous peoples. The effects that are mentioned and partly ascribed to climate change are lower life expectancy in Alaska, and stress among Sami people due to thinner ice on lakes and the unpredictable weather patterns that pose a fatal threat to reindeer husbandry. The article concludes: “The rest of the world should question whether it is reasonable that some peoples and their culture should pay such a high price for climate change inducing actions that are made by people in other parts of the world. Indigenous peoples are the most vulnerable people in this context” (*Dagens Nyheter*, November 26, 2011). Indigenous peoples are hence again positioned as victims. There is recognition of a certain cultural way of life, connecting to recognition of identity in terms of identity politics. The need for redistribution is also implied by a larger discourse that questions urbanized ways of life, but that does not call for more/better resources for indigenous peoples.

Ethnic minorities should not be used in calls for more research funding (*Dagens Nyheter*, November 28, 2011)

In a reply to the opinion piece discussed above, “artist, author” Lars Jonsson from “Stockholmsinitiativet”, a climate skeptic group, argues that it is an unsubstantiated conclusion to blame climate change for health problems among Arctic indigenous groups, and as the title of the piece implies, indigenous peoples and other minorities are being used by researchers in order to get more research funding. The article mostly points to alleged misinformation in the opinion piece by the researchers, and presents counter arguments (that statements about rising temperatures are “wrong” and statements that relate global warming to Western diet and connected diseases are “wrong” and “far-fetched”). The article argues that (mental) health problems are instead caused by marginalization and identity crises in the wake of colonization. The use of alcohol, tobacco and marijuana is also put forward as a cause of health problems in Nunavut, Alaska, and large parts of Russia. The article applies a reverse version of the witness role compared to previously analyzed articles in that it represents indigenous peoples as witnesses of how weather and climate change are *not* a big problem (Jonsson actually refers to the conclusions in a report written by one of the authors of the previous article). The article reflects the identity model of identity politics by referring to health problems among indigenous peoples as caused by identity crises and, similar to many other analyzed articles, loosely alludes to the redistribution viewpoint by pointing out that indigenous peoples need “our” attention and support, without specifying it. It alludes to political aspects in its acknowledgement of colonization in the past, but does not include references to political action today, other than one very vague line regarding “attention and support.” While this article criticizes the authors of the previous op-ed for using indigenous peoples only in order to support their own research, it seems to repeat the same attitude itself, using indigenous peoples only to support its own arguments, which actually counter the arguments made by formal Arctic indigenous organizations (see Inuit Circumpolar Council, n.d.).

Conclusions

Arctic indigenous peoples are consistently cast on the margins of Swedish and Canadian news coverage of UN climate summits. This corresponds with coverage in other countries. In fact, in 2011 three articles in Canadian and Swedish newspapers were the only ones with headlines that mentioned indigenous peoples in sample material collected from 18 project countries. However, what is represented as socially peripheral sometimes has a tendency to be symbolically centered (Babcock 1978, Hall 1997). This occurs on a few occasions where

indigenous peoples are represented, and indigenous voices are heard, in in-depth reportage and prominent news images. This takes place predominantly in the popular press, where they appear as victims and as messengers, bearing witness to climate change as an urgent issue with spiritual implications. Overall, in the analysed articles we distinguished three levels of presence: *access*, with indigenous peoples represented but voiceless (this is the only way, for instance, that indigenous peoples appear in the Swedish elite paper); *dialogue*, being represented and allowed to voice opinions (predominantly in the popular press); and *deliberation*, being included as political actors, including aspects of redistribution (this is only touched upon vaguely in some of the articles). As messengers Arctic indigenous peoples mainly function on the second level as part of the dialogue.

A message of necessity and concern is evident in *Aftonbladet's* "The World's Chance" series. The reports from affected communities feature the voices of indigenous peoples, combining them with powerful images of catastrophic effects. In Canadian coverage, indigenous peoples give first-hand accounts of how climate change is being experienced in their communities. The reports underline that there is a pressing need to find solutions. In each instance, indigenous peoples are represented as *victims* of climate change and, often simultaneously, as climate change *heroes*; due to their unique environmental knowledge and because of how they convey it to the world.

These messages of necessity and concern are combined with a message of spirituality. In Swedish reportage, connections between indigenous communities and their natural surroundings are especially clear regarding "foreign" indigenous peoples (see also Roosvall & Tegelberg forthcoming 2013). Nature is captured as spiritual and inseparable from the people who live within it. Generations are connected through the knowledge of ancestors and the spirits of ancestors who live on in contemporary residents. Images of indigenous victim-heroes are, at the same time, frequently juxtaposed with scientific perspectives. This co-presence responds to calls for further communication and collaboration between those with "scientific and indigenous ways of understanding the natural world and climate change" (Hulme 2009: 81-82). However, in the news coverage this relation is illustrated by binary oppositions between spirituality and science.

The roles of indigenous peoples as messengers of necessity, concern and spirituality connect to the recognition approach to identity politics, stressing culture, not status. A redistribution approach is sometimes implied as a wish or desire on the part of indigenous communities – or scientists – but seldom spelled out or specified. Similarly, political representation was called for on one occasion by one of several Inuit activists featured in the Canadian coverage, but discourses on actual representation in official political contexts were mostly absent.

When political representation appears briefly in *Aftonbladet's* report on the Sami, the implications of TEK are strikingly lacking. There is no explicit connection between political representation and TEK in the texts. Instead they seem to be exclusive categories. It might be that old western perceptions of incompatibility concerning religion and politics (Christi 2001) are stronger than the dichotomization of different views on nature. This, in turn, constitutes tough challenges for serious representation of indigenous political actions at the summits and elsewhere. The spiritual aspects that bring Arctic indigenous peoples to the fore as messengers seem to attract attention to indigenous groups, but they also seem to stand in the way of desired discourses with serious indigenous political representation.

Geographical and moral scales of justice intersect in the misframing of indigenous peoples who, by virtue of their lack of numbers and political influence, appear as peripheral when it comes to politics and geography. Nonetheless, indigenous peoples are represented as central through their assigned moral roles as messengers who understand climate change as an urgent issue with spiritual dimensions. Allusions to injustice are made in accounts of how Arctic indigenous peoples are victims of pollution, which has mainly been caused by others. However, this victim role alone is not enough to put indigenous peoples in focus. It is only as victim-witnesses, as messengers to other people that they become important. This attention to the message does not necessarily bring about care for the messenger that goes beyond the self-interests of majority cultures in Canada and Sweden; nor does it result in media coverage of the political representation of indigenous peoples. Ironically, the nation-state orientation of UN climate summits and associated media coverage has the adverse effect of “misframing the messenger,” by consistently relegating indigenous peoples to the political and geographical margins of these international negotiation processes.

We conducted interviews with indigenous and other activists in Durban. When asked how media reporting on indigenous peoples and climate change could be improved, a member of a group that works to protect natural heritage sites responded: “I think the wearing of your indigenous and your cultural clothing actually says much more than talking about it” (interview, December 5, 2011). This answer relates to a media logic that gives preference to “the spectacle of the other” (Hall 1997); i.e. an exoticizing discourse. The images used in the Swedish and Canadian material partly reinforce the interviewee's statement in that in many instances pictures and texts emphasize cultural traits. It seems however that this is something that stands in the way of political representation. So while wearing clothing that denotes traditionality may be good advice if you want any kind of attention, it may become counter-productive when you want just *political* representation. Another way of tackling the issue of improving media coverage and avoiding unjust misframing is by increasing

knowledge. Vibeke Larsen, a Sami politician from Norway, summarizes the problem: "...the media don't know the indigenous peoples...it seems like a lack of knowledge" (interview, Dec 6, 2011). Her advice for media researchers is to pay more attention to indigenous knowledge and share it with the public. We hope to have contributed somewhat to that endeavour with this chapter.

Notes

1. We are grateful to Sage Publications for permission to reuse parts of a forthcoming article in *The International Communication Gazette*: Roosvall, A. & Tegelberg, M. (2013) Framing Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: Intermediaries of Urgency, Spirituality and Denationalization, the *International Communication Gazette*, Vol. 75(4).
2. The authors of this chapter were in Durban for COP17 and conducted interviews with indigenous delegates from around the globe. Analysis of these interviews is not finalized yet. Here excerpts from interviews are used as context for our analysis of newspaper articles.
3. The authors are aware that "indigenous", particularly as it relates to colonization, is a hotly contested term in some parts of the former colonial world, such as across Africa where both major and minor populations were historically viewed as "indigenous".
4. It has become conventional in Australia and Canada to capitalize this word as a sign of respect for the first inhabitants of these countries.
5. For an account of the quantitative aspects of this research project see the chapter 17. The quantitative coding of the Swedish material was done by Maria Kabatanya (2009) and Markus Mattisson (2011).
6. "Indigenous", "Aboriginal", "Inuit", "Eskimo" and "Sami" were the keywords used in this search.
7. The fourth Canadian article from 2009 listed in the table has been excluded from the qualitative analysis since it only mentions climate and indigenous peoples and then goes on to discuss domestic energy politics.

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Chapter 17

Attention, Access and Dialogue in the Global Newspaper Sample

Notes on the Dependency, Complexity and Contingency of Climate Summit Journalism

Ville Kumpu & Risto Kunelius

This book draws on the work of a research network spread across the world. One key part of our work has been to conduct a content analysis on the coverage of climate summits across the globe. The purpose has been to provide the network with a shared starting point for its discussion and reflections. Many of the tasks tackled in the chapters above have been formulated with the help of the overall view that we have shared while preparing the content analysis, even if quantitative data itself is often inadequate for answering the questions that arise from climate coverage.

While the emphasis of our work has been on the diversity of local coverage (Eide, Kunelius & Kumpu 2010) and on the transnational thematic questions (this book) the content analysis itself produces some insights. In this appendix chapter we both present the general contours of the content analysis results and sketch some broad perspectives for its analysis. We introduce the monitored sample and present some overall figures, trends and tendencies by highlighting three themes: 1) the distribution of journalistic *attention* to the summits, 2) the distribution of *access* offered by journalism to different kinds of news actors and the 3) the distribution of *dialogue potential* in the sample (cf. Heikkilä & Kunelius 1998).

The Sample

Different media systems are not easily comparable, and it is virtually impossible to find “functionally equivalent” news media to compare. However, in order to have as solid ground as possible for comparisons between the overall taste of journalism in different countries, we have tried to look for newspapers which would articulate different kinds of relationships with their audiences (in each country).

In all countries the sample consists of one newspaper that has a rather *close relationship to the local power-elite*. This closeness can mean either a more or less explicit cooperative relationship with the state or it can refer to a culture of professional journalistic autonomy. In both cases the journalistic agenda is closely connected to the elite political agenda. To provide diversity, a second paper has been chosen to represent a perspective that is geared more towards a “life-world” perspective. In some cases, this meant selecting a “tabloid” paper or a consumer-oriented outlet of journalism (e.g. Finland, Sweden, Germany, USA, South-Africa, Brazil). In some cases, the “life-world” perspective is less clear, but a more “vernacular” perspective of journalism is dominant (e.g. in Bangladesh).

The basic material consists of all stories mentioning the summits or climate change published some days before, during and immediately after the summits¹. All combinations of a title and text were considered as separate coding units (e.g. news graphs with text and fact boxes were treated as independent stories). If only a small part of the story was related to the summits or climate change, only that part (and not the whole story) was considered as the coding unit (there are such cases in countries with very sparse coverage, for instance Russia in 2011). In the case of front page material, only a headline (with no accompanying text) was not considered as a separate coding unit but coded as a part of the story it referred to. If the front page headline was accompanied by text longer than two sentences, it was coded as a separate item. Table 17.1 lists the newspapers and summits covered and presents the volume of coverage in different countries.

Table 17.1. Total Sample by Countries and Newspapers, 2007, 2009, 2011

	Bali (COP 13)	Copenhagen (COP 15)	Durban (COP 17)	Total
Australia	n/a	247	19	266
Sydney Morning Herald	n/a	168	9	177
The Daily Telegraph	n/a	79	10	89
Bangladesh	52	317	90	459
The Daily Star	30	160	65	255
The Prothom Alo	22	157	25	204
Brazil	n/a	171	35	206
O Estado de São Paulo	n/a	143	34	177
Agora	n/a	28	1	29
Canada	91	262	73	426
The Globe and Mail	43	130	37	210
The Toronto Star	48	132	36	216
Chile	n/a	48	15	63
La Tercera	n/a	39	15	54
Las Últimas noticias	n/a	9	0	9


Table 17.1. Cont.

	Bali (COP 13)	Copenhagen (COP 15)	Durban (COP 17)	Total
China	80	116	n/a	196
Xinhua Daily Telegraph	70	71	n/a	141
Global Times	10	45	n/a	55
Denmark	n/a	710	159	869
B.T.	n/a	420	51	471
Jyllands-Posten	n/a	290	108	398
Egypt	n/a	76	5	81
Al-ahram	n/a	50	2	52
Al-Masry Al-Youm	n/a	26	3	29
El Salvador	75	55	n/a	130
El Diario de Hoy	18	30	n/a	48
La Prensa Gráfica	57	25	n/a	82
Finland	93	216	58	367
Helsingin Sanomat	69	168	56	293
Ilta-Sanomat	24	48	2	74
Germany	56	114	30	200
Sueddeutsche Zeitung	45	79	26	150
BILD Zeitung	11	35	4	50
Indonesia	176	95	18	289
Kompas	119	78	18	215
Warta Kota	n/a	17	0	17
Korantempo	57	n/a	n/a	57
Israel	30	85	8	123
Ha'aretz	23	52	6	81
Yedioth Aharonoth	7	33	2	42
Norway	121	264	64	449
Aftenposten	73	131	42	246
Verdens Gang	48	133	22	203
Pakistan	n/a	58	62	120
The Dawn	n/a	40	39	79
The News	n/a	18	23	41
Russia	13	32	4	49
Kommersant	6	19	3	28
Moskovsky Komsomolets	7	13	1	21
SouthAfrica	n/a	84	116	200
Business Day	n/a	77	96	173
The Daily Sun	n/a	7	20	27
Sweden	73	158	106	337
Dagens Nyheter	51	113	71	235
Aftonbladet	22	45	35	102
USA	15	102	31	148
New York Times	13	77	17	107
USA Today	2	25	14	41
Total	875	3,210	893	4,978

Attention


Perhaps the most primary form of symbolic power that journalism exercises is its focus of *attention*. Attention is classically a key part of the modern theorizing of the 'public' or public sphere (cf. Splichal 2006). In media studies and political communication, this translates often to the question of agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw 1972). It has also been conceptualized with the idea of attention cycles (Downs 1972).

Figure 17.1. Attention for Three Summits (10 countries) and Decline of Coverage (17 countries)



Attention and time. Figure 17.1 shows the overall amounts of attention the three summits studied had in newspaper coverage. They show clearly the peak of attention for Copenhagen. In the countries where *MediaClimate* gathered coverage, on all Bali (2007), Copenhagen (2009) and Durban (2011), Copenhagen was a clear high point. The only exception to the rule is Indonesia, where the “home ground” role of 2007 peaked the coverage, which has since then steadily declined in volume. Reasons and qualitative details for the Copenhagen peak have been discussed in various chapters in this book. As positive attention factors there was the steady buildup of climate coverage during the 2000s in general (Boykoff & Mansfield 2012), creating also political focus, which in turn increased the event-character and newsworthiness of the summit. Durban, in contrast, tells a story of declining attention, no doubt caused by other issues displacing climate from the agenda in general but also by the setbacks in the political process of global climate governance after Copenhagen. It seems fair to say that journalism has seemed to *lack either the power or the will* – or both – to independently *insist* that global climate politics should be on the agenda when other, competing pressures occur.

Figure 17.2. Story Size in Copenhagen and Durban




Inside the general attention curve, journalistic attention remains stable. The relative amounts of small, large and major stories are almost identical in Copenhagen and Durban materials.

Access

One classical manner of looking at journalism is to think of it as a gatekeeping institution that exercises control over who “gets in” to the realm of news (cf. Shoemaker 1994). Despite much valid criticism of the original metaphor, it

has been a fruitful way of making sense of one key role (or power resource) of journalism. In the era of mass media and professional news the question of access has been particularly crucial to other social actors and institutions, since being part of the debate on a particular news item has meant being identified as a legitimate stakeholder or expert on the issue (Hallin 1994). A rough look at the “primary definers” (Hall et al. 1987) of news also gives a preliminary (although not sufficient) take on the angles and perspectives dominating the news and the way they frame (Entman 1993, D’Angelo, & Kuypers 2010) the issue at hand.


Figure 17.3. Main Categories of Voices in Coverage of the Copenhagen and Durban Summit²



Dominant voices³. Figure 17.3 shows the distribution of all “voices” – i.e. news actors that were quoted either directly or indirectly, but mentioned as persons – in the coverage. It shows the clear domination of political actors representing national political systems (38 %), reflecting the fact that in summit coverage journalism focuses mostly on the political bargaining between nations (national actors here can, then, also be “foreign” actors, e.g. president of USA quoted in a German newspaper). This is a dominant category everywhere in the world, whereas the role of civil society varies a lot (see below, figure 17.4). Overall civil society actors represent 28 per cent of all voices, suggesting that broadly journalism identifies the tension between civil society and national political actors as a fundamental way of framing the summits (this is, not, however, the case in individual stories). Transnational political actors (9 %) are clearly a smaller category among the political actors than national ones. Science as news sources plays a significant role overall (14 %), which is not surprising, given the

nature of climate change as a topic. Business actors, on the other hand, play a somewhat startlingly small part (6 %), given the fact that they are abundant at the actual summit sites and the interests they carry in the outcome and debate. Compared to civil society actors this small share of business voices also suggest a different strategy towards political discussion (and less dependency on access): while public representation in the media is crucial to civil society actors and the summits are a major moment for gaining exposure in the news, in the business community there are other mechanisms to pressure decision makers (and the summit is more of a lobbying opportunity on site or a PR-moment). Absence from the public attention can also be partly conscious: a strong public role in an issue also suggests responsibility. Differences between the overall access profile of the two main summit foci (Copenhagen and Durban) of this project are small. As in the case of story sizes (formal language of newspaper coverage), in terms of actor profiles, journalism has not evolved or given more power to particular stakeholder groups.

Figure 17.4. Distribution of Actors in Copenhagen and Durban Coverage, Countries Ordered by Share of Civil Society Actors (left to right)



Primary definers in place (context). The power of different news actors to access summit news varies considerably in different countries. In Figure 17.4 countries are ordered from left to right according to the “power” of civil society actors to access the news. The overall picture points to at least two things. First, local journalistic traditions seem to play a role. The clustering of Nordic countries in the civil society “friendly” part of the comparison suggest that such voices are a “necessary” part of credible news coverage on an issue, and that this demand partly carries over to transnational events such as the summits.

Thus, one explanation here would be the nature of the local journalistic field itself, the ethos of “democratic-corporativism” (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Second, local circumstances – the political context of the journalistic field – also plays a significant part, exemplified here by the high amount of civil society voices in highly vulnerable Bangladesh or the extremely low amount of civil society actors in Australia, where the climate issue has become a major factor in domestic political struggles. A more detailed country distribution of voices is given in Table 17.2.

Table 17.2. Shares of Voices, Main Categories, all Countries with COP15 and COP17

		Number of voices	National political system	Transnational political system	Civil society	Business	Science, expertise	Other
Australia	COP 15	271	57 %	7 %	9 %	6 %	20 %	2 %
	COP 17	42	57 %	19 %	5 %	0 %	14 %	5 %
Bangladesh	COP 15	694	38 %	13 %	28 %	1 %	14 %	6 %
	COP 17	160	41 %	6 %	14 %	8 %	26 %	6 %
Brazil	COP 15	197	53 %	18 %	11 %	1 %	10 %	6 %
	COP 17	52	50 %	27 %	12 %	2 %	8 %	2 %
Canada	COP 15	576	39 %	9 %	28 %	6 %	14 %	4 %
	COP 17	166	40 %	4 %	31 %	1 %	19 %	5 %
Chile	COP 15	75	47 %	9 %	17 %	0 %	23 %	4 %
	COP 17	17	53 %	12 %	24 %	0 %	6 %	6 %
Denmark	COP 15	1014	21 %	3 %	53 %	9 %	7 %	7 %
	COP 17	183	27 %	12 %	27 %	19 %	13 %	2 %
Egypt	COP 15	153	33 %	18 %	22 %	2 %	16 %	10 %
	COP 17	7	29 %	29 %	14 %	14 %	0 %	14 %
Finland	COP 15	252	39 %	7 %	31 %	3 %	16 %	4 %
	COP 17	78	37 %	1 %	33 %	13 %	15 %	0 %
Germany	COP 15	181	47 %	12 %	18 %	2 %	17 %	4 %
	COP 17	54	52 %	9 %	15 %	4 %	20 %	0 %
Indonesia	COP 15	235	42 %	7 %	26 %	5 %	17 %	4 %
	COP 17	44	36 %	30 %	27 %	0 %	2 %	5 %
Israel	COP 15	166	44 %	14 %	8 %	8 %	11 %	14 %
	COP 17	15	13 %	27 %	13 %	0 %	33 %	13 %
Norway	COP 15	441	39 %	3 %	33 %	7 %	14 %	4 %
	COP 17	46	57 %	2 %	24 %	2 %	13 %	2 %
Pakistan	COP 15	176	57 %	16 %	7 %	1 %	7 %	11 %
	COP 17	94	33 %	13 %	31 %	2 %	19 %	2 %
Russia	COP 15	57	53 %	9 %	9 %	4 %	26 %	0 %
	COP 17	4	0 %	0 %	25 %	25 %	50 %	0 %
South Africa	COP 15	163	31 %	13 %	20 %	23 %	13 %	0 %
	COP 17	207	27 %	9 %	43 %	6 %	12 %	3 %
Sweden	COP 15	219	41 %	23 %	15 %	9 %	12 %	1 %
	COP 17	108	20 %	6 %	16 %	2 %	36 %	19 %
Usa	COP 15	326	43 %	8 %	17 %	6 %	19 %	7 %
	COP 17	90	34 %	9 %	20 %	4 %	22 %	10 %
Total	COP 15	5196	38 %	10 %	28 %	5 %	14 %	5 %
	COP 17	1367	36 %	10 %	22 %	9 %	18 %	5 %

Dominant voices: origin. Figure 17.5 shows the “origin” of voices in the coverage by distinguishing between domestic, foreign and transnational actors (all actor categories included). Overall, we can see the fairly dominant role of domestic voices, showing that even in the summit contexts, journalists tend to look at nationally recognizable, “our” voices, that help to translate the issue to their local public. In this regard, there is a striking difference between Copenhagen and Durban, the latter showing much more emphasis on domestic voices, suggesting a stronger, national domestication – and more nationalistic news frames (For more on the dynamics of *domestication*, see Kunelius & Eide 2012). This no doubt reflects the trends of climate politics in general. But bearing in mind the much diminished amount of coverage and attention, this also suggests that when there are less resources and less space to be used, the importance of national actors grows. On the other hand, the smaller share of “foreign” voices in Durban reflects the fact that the political ranking of foreign national voices in Durban was much lower than in Copenhagen where the *heads* of states were present and speaking⁴.

Figure 17.5. Distribution of Voices According to Domestic, Foreign and Transnational Voices in Copenhagen and Durban





Figure 17.6 presents all the countries studied in both Copenhagen and Durban in the order (left to right) of how dominant the domestic voices in the coverage were (percentages are to be read carefully here, see Table 17.1 for total numbers of country coverage which vary significantly). This is not the most coherent part of the coding (see the big changes in the coding of “unknown”, in particular), but worth presenting because it underlines the importance of studying – much more in detail than we have done so far – the complicated dynamics of local field conditions between journalism, politics and other stakeholders in the issues. So, for instance, the high level of domestic voices in Australia becomes understandable by looking at the local political climate debate and the way the issue has been a central part of the political agenda and become drawn into the local “cultural wars”. While the political discussion about the issue in the USA might be somewhat similarly structured (strong political polarization), the issue itself has not been *as central* in the local political agenda as in Australia (where it is linked to the national export economy very intensively). At the other end of the figure, the numbers hint at a paradox. A relatively high dependence on *news agency* material, that characterizes Pakistani coverage, for instance, exposes the local news audience to many more transnational foreign voices than the *independent*, self-produced content in countries with more affluent newsrooms. While this may have been a source for criticism in some of the earlier news flow studies, in relation to a news event like the summit, it *can* point to a more diverse set of perspectives.

Figure 17.6. Countries Ordered by Share of Domestic Voices (Copenhagen and Durban) from left to right



Potential Dialogue (interaction)

In addition to attention (what issues are highlighted) and access (who has a voice in the reported debate), journalism’s contribution can be evaluated in terms of the dialogue (what kind of actor-relations are formed) it organizes. Roughly, two principal “dramaturgical” aspects can be taken up. First, journalism suggests a dialogue between itself and the audience it addresses (dialogue *with* the audience). Second, journalism organizes voices into interaction with each other, thus representing a dialogue *for* the audience (interaction of actors *within* the text). In both terms, a nuanced understanding of journalism’s contribution calls for qualitative methodologies, since dialogic features of texts are difficult to turn into numbers. Suggestively, however, we can look at some data that is at least related to the *potential* dialogic qualities of journalism in these two aspects.

Dialogue with the audience. One rough factor in the dialogic potential of journalism is the amount of opinionated stories. While the distinction between reporting and opinionating is fluid (opinions and political stances can be built into news frames and source structures), the *explicit* volume opinionated stories at least points to how much journalism tries to address its audience in the matter with a decidedly *argumentative* mode.

Figure 17.7. Total Share of Opinionated Stories and Their Distribution Editorials, By-Lined Columns and Op-eds, Copenhagen and Durban




Figure 17.7 presents the share of opinionated stories of the whole coverage in countries studied in both Copenhagen and Durban. Overall (extreme right column) this represented about 12 per cent of the coverage, but local differ-

ences where big (Again, it is important to keep in mind difference in volumes of total coverage, see Table 1). Australia is worth underlining here since the high domestic politicization of climate change does not necessarily result in journalism characterized by argumentation and opinion writing. The case of Canada, on the other hand, suggests a different opinion climate, perhaps pointing to the fact that the issue is high on the agenda but not yet so viciously divisive in political terms as it is in Australia. Nordic countries, again show a very similar profile (the low column in Denmark is explained by the huge number of stories resulting from their hosting role in 2009). The relationship between editorials (institutional positions of newspapers) and columns (opinion pieces written by individual journalists) gives rise to some cautious comments. Russian data does not show a single editorial, a testimony of the relative invisibility of the item in the local, official political agenda (the 10 % consisting of columns also only refers to 4 articles, and often only parts of them). Outside this particular figure, we also note that in China (part of the Copenhagen monitoring) there are no editorials in newspapers. Canada (and perhaps Israel) are examples of countries where individual journalists seek a dialogue with the audience while institutionally, newspapers invest less in editorials. Germany, on the other hand, shows newspapers placing climate change high in the institutional agenda of the audience while individual journalists do not provoke such dialogue.

Dialogue for the audience. How journalism *organizes communication between news actors* has already been considered at the very abstract level of all actor-relations within the material. A more particular view offered in Table 17.4 and 17.5, which look at how various actors were situated *inside individual stories*, i.e. how potentially “dialogic” or “polyphonic” the stories were in terms of actor categories. Obviously, such criteria is partly mechanistic and can be somewhat narrow (polyphony can also be built *between stories* in a given page, for instance). These limits notwithstanding, it is still interesting to look at data.

The first thing to note about the Copenhagen data in this sense is how few stories actually carry even a reasonable diversity of voices. Looking at voice combinations, 52 % of all reports have one (32 %) or no explicit (20%) voice in them. Or to pick a more detailed number: from the 134 stories in the Finnish material from Copenhagen, only 23 stories (17 %) had three voices or more in them. In terms of placing different actors explicitly into a situation of potential dialogue, such stories are weak by definition. The overall numbers from Durban tell pretty much the same story (see Table 17.5).

Looking at the most often appearing *combinations* of actors in stories is also revealing. In Copenhagen, the multi-actor-stories (technically polyphonic) were most often playing two national political actors against one another (or supporting each other) (6 %) juxtaposing national and transnational actors (3 % of stories) or presenting three nationally grounded political actors. And,

Table 17.4. Voice Combinations in Reporting from Copenhagen (excluding Denmark). All Combinations over 1 %

No explicit voices	314	20 %
National political	259	16 %
National political + national political	95	6 %
Science, expertise	86	5 %
Civil society	71	4 %
Transnational political	57	4 %
National political + transnational political	40	3 %
Other	36	2 %
National political + civil society	30	2 %
National political + national political + national political	25	2 %
Civil society + civil society	25	2 %
National political + science, expertise	23	1 %
National political + national political + transnational political	22	1 %
Business	19	1 %
Transnational political + transnational political + transnational political	18	1 %
Science, expertise + science, expertise	16	1 %

Note: N=1598

Table 17.5. Voice Combination in Reporting, Durban (excluding Denmark). All Combinations over 1 %

No explicit voices	119	23 %
National political	53	10 %
Science, expertise	30	6 %
National political + national political	26	5 %
Civil society	24	5 %
Transnational political	17	3 %
Business	14	3 %
National political + transnational political	14	3 %
National political + civil society	12	2 %
National political + national political + national political	11	2 %
National political + science, expertise	11	2 %
Science, expertise + science, expertise	10	2 %
Media (journalists)	9	2 %
National political + national political + civil society	8	2 %
Transnational political + transnational political	7	1 %
Civil society + civil society	7	1 %
National political + national political + science, expertise	6	1 %
National political + national political + transnational political	6	1 %

Note: N=525.

perhaps in the most potentially dialogical mode, juxtaposing national actors with civil society actors (2 %). Here, then, we can speak of minimal attempts by journalism at the story-level to provide the basic ingredients for a dialogue.

But stories that would cut across sector limits (for instance, presenting civic actors and national/transnational politicians in the same story) seem remarkably rare. Again, an example from the Finnish material: of the 23 (out of 134) three-or-more-voices stories from Copenhagen, only 10 managed to cross the main actor category lines, and even then, only seven (0.5 %) crossed the line from political actors to other main categories.

In the Durban material, there is a bit more potential interaction over the sector-limits. National political actors are situated in the same stories as science actors, transnational actors or civil society actors (with the order national politician first, other actor second) in some 4 per cent of the stories. But also in the Durban material, one-source stories or one-sector-actor stories dominate the combinations that pass the 1 per cent share threshold.

Dialogic features of the texts are also somewhat related to the way journalism applies different genres in its summit reporting. Here, particularly interesting are the reportage and feature – genres, where the presence of the voice of the journalist is stronger than in news. In a sense, reportage journalism can (at its best) combine the two dimensions of potential dialogues suggested here. While we cannot look at stories in detail here, Table 17.6 suggests that these genres were applied very differently in different countries.

Table 17.6. Reportage and Feature Stories in Different Countries in Copenhagen and Durban Coverage

	Reportage and feature stories	% of coverage
Brazil	95	46 %
Egypt	18	33 %
Indonesia	36	32 %
Sweden	61	23 %
Germany	26	18 %
Canada	54	16 %
Russia	5	14 %
Bangladesh	43	11 %
Finland	27	10 %
Australia	22	8 %
Norway	24	7 %
Chile	4	6 %
Pakistan	6	5 %
Denmark	31	4 %
Israel	2	2 %
Usa	1	1 %
South-Africa	1	1 %
Total	456	12 %

Looking at the access of voices in the reportage-feature-genre shows a somewhat different profile of voices (actors). Table 17.7 shows how different news actors were quoted in individual reportage-feature stories in the Copenhagen material. Compared to the overall figures from all reporting genres (Table 17.4) it shows that some actors were more easily accessed in these more journalist-driven, on the spot – genres. For instance civil society actors seemed to be able to access these stories relatively easily. However, as in the case of all reporting genres (or “news” more generally), stories including multiple actors across main actor categories remained few. This suggests that features and reportages have an obvious potential to frame stories from perspectives that reach outside the realm of political actors. However, they do not seem to be able to produce particularly dialogic frames where different actor categories would be represented within the same textual space.

Table 17.7. Voice Combinations in Reportage-feature Stories from Copenhagen Coverage

No voices	46	13 %
National political	37	10 %
National political + national political	24	7 %
Civil society	20	6 %
Transnational political	13	4 %
Civil society + civil society	13	4 %
Civil society + civil society + civil society	11	3 %
Science, expertise	10	3 %
Other	10	3 %
National political + transnational political	10	3 %
National political + civil society	9	3 %
National political + national political + national political	6	2 %

Concluding Remarks

Evidently, all of the figures and numbers presented here have to be approached with a healthy dose of suspicion concerning how well we can meaningfully compare coverage in the countries and contexts represented by the material we have collected here. In other words, all the challenges of conducting comparative, transnational research apply here⁵. We offer these numbers here as a general description of the shared basic work that the *MediaClimate* network has done. It is from this basic monitoring that our long ongoing discussions, debates and reflections started – and ended up in some of the contributions to this book (and elsewhere).

The actual *methodology* of the network has been and continues to be a series of dialogues in joint workshops, collaborative writing projects on particular

themes, and thus, hopefully, a richer understanding of the diverse contexts in which global media realities unfold. Independently, the content analysis provides more of a list of questions than strong arguments about the actual nature of the coverage. It does, however, offer ground for three remarks to be made in conclusion.

Dependency. The general contours of summit coverage concerning the focus and volume of attention as well as the patterns of access illustrate how journalism as an institution is structurally dependent on other institutions, fields and their local and global power relations. This comes as no surprise, and can only partly be taken as a critical conclusion. There are imminent dangers with such dependency – ending up framing issues from the perspective of the powerful. However the “dependency” suggested by the numbers here is also a necessary consequence of focusing on the powerful. Thus, more qualitative takes on the material (in this book, for instance) are needed to appreciate the contribution and problems of journalism.

Complexity. The “contents” of the global sample outlined here is much more complex than the rough, often descriptive figures suggest. There is a need to develop a more nuanced research design that would be better fitted to both the peculiarities of covering transnational media events such as the summits while becoming more sensitive to the particularities of climate change as a subject matter. Studying and understanding the complexity – which also crucially extends beyond the boundaries of “traditional mass media” – is a key task in the near future. Another important task is to develop explanatory models in which the contextual factors of different journalistic outlets – the interplay of local field relations, transnational actor-networks – is understood in a nuanced manner. Comparisons between countries and local conditions in different dimensions (media freedom, climate opinion, political system, historical experience, media markets, carbon politics, vulnerability, state of development, etc.) provide a long list of factors that have an effect on local journalistic fields.

Contingency. For journalism researchers, understanding the interplay of dependency and complexity is a key issue in identifying the contingent elements in current global journalism. Pointing out, analyzing and of course celebrating the moments when journalism – by virtue of the opportunities provided by the complexity of its environment – shows local *independency* is also the task of media research. By engaging in this type of work, it is possible that for a crucial moment, attention, access and dialogue can become ingredients that contribute to the emergence of public spheres which are meaningful at both the local and global levels.

Notes

1. The specific dates vary according to the dates of the summit. In the case of the Bali and Copenhagen summits the time frame for collecting material was between December 1st to December 22nd, in the case of the Cancún summit between November 24th and December 15th and in the case of the Durban summit it was between November 23rd and December 14th.
2. Figure 17.3 includes data from coverage of the Copenhagen and Durban summits in Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden and USA. A total of 6563 voices were documented, including 5196 from the Copenhagen (COP 15) coverage, 1367 from Durban coverage (COP 17).
3. We defined voices as people who are quoted either directly or indirectly. If in a single story there were two different persons (voices) from one source (e.g. two members of parliament) both were coded as separate voices. If the same person was quoted several times, it was only coded as one voice. By national we refer to the level of representation (e.g. representative of a national party) and thus it is different from the separation between domestic and foreign (e.g. In Finnish newspapers Barack Obama is considered as a foreign national political actor and in US newspapers as domestic national political actor). The voice of staff writers and the journalistic 'institution' is not coded. Thus, in opinionated columns by staff writers, in editorials, reportages and features, regardless of how, 'visible' the narrator of the story is (and there is a temptation to see the journalist as a voice), we have only coded the 'voices' that the journalist quotes (which may of course be other journalists as well). In letters-to-the-editor or op-ed stories we have coded the author as the first 'voice', and voices quoted by the author as additional voices.
4. Norwegian PM Jens Stoltenberg, who attended the Durban conference for seven hours, was one of the rare exceptions when it came to Western leaders. However, there were quite a few heads of state present from the "non-Western world".
5. An initial code book was used for a study of the Bali-material. Coding problems and differences were discussed in a workshop (Istanbul, Turkey, March 2009). The Copenhagen coverage was coded with enhanced instructions. Coding problems were discussed again in a workshop (Tampere, Finland, February 2009) with reliability rehearsals with stories from *The New York Times*. After the Tampere workshop, all the material was re-coded to further enhance comparability. The same coding scheme was again used for the Durban coverage, with related workshops organized in Norway (Bergen, November 2010) and South Africa (Cape Town, November 2011). Despite these efforts, detailed comparisons between countries should be made cautiously. Due to differences in language, journalistic traditions and cultures, detailed numbers are more reliable inside countries than across them.

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Chapter 18

Epilogue

Challenges for Future Journalism

Elisabeth Eide & Risto Kunelius

Discussing the challenges of climate change for international politics, Anthony Giddens (2009) takes issue with Robert Kagan, a staunch realist, who uses the concept “mirage” in his characterization of “the international community”. He predicts a return to power politics and the conflict of great powers in the competition over energy and natural resources. Giddens however, elaborates on the notion of a “world community”. He persists that the UN still plays an important role in world politics, writing that although the nation-state has refused to go away:

[...] the world context in which nation states stake their claims to sovereignty has changed massively over the past two or three decades. It is simply not the case that there is a ‘return to normality’ – to patterns of the past. [...] Interdependence is a part of our lives in the twenty-first century, and states which act in denial of that situation will quickly be brought to heel in one way or another (Giddens 2011: 201-202).

Our reasons for taking on a global project such as *MediaClimate* are, of course, driven by a similar recognition of global interdependence in relation to climate change. In a world of conflicted interdependence, there is a particular need for *media researchers* to engage with issues and problems in communication. A much more nuanced level of mutual understanding of our differing media systems and journalistic approaches is needed. We also need to apprehend the variety of contexts faced in our everyday lives as concerned citizens – and through which we will face the diverse consequences of climate change. This comes close to what Gayatri Spivak calls “transnational literacy” (Spivak 2006). We should develop this further into a call for “transnational media literacy”: a process of learning, necessary for becoming aware of the “remote-controlled sufferings” related to climate change, a situation where decisions in board rooms in some countries may have disastrous effects in one or several others.

A remote control is a useful metaphor for today's global social and environmental realities. It is no longer a fiction that a military expert sits in Texas or Florida and via unmanned drones "takes out" lives in Yemen or North Waziristan, Pakistan. Similarly, decisions to invest in palm oil plantations in Indonesia or tar sand exploration in Canada are taken by people whose life worlds are distant, safe and fundamentally different from those who suffer the consequences of these decisions; particularly when their livelihoods are ruined due to anthropogenic environmental degradation related to such decisions. More often than not, the people using the remote control do not have to face the victims of their decisions. It is a paradox of the increasingly interdependent world that many of us are sheltered from the consequences of our own actions. This is particularly the case in relation to climate change, both in terms of place and time. Communicating across place and imagining processes and their consequences over time is crucial in climate change communication.

Prominent politicians responsible for the failure of climate summits to instigate curbs on CO₂, will most often not have to live with the consequences (even with the short term ones) of melting glaciers, rising sea levels or the thawing permafrost. On the other hand, the victims of extreme weather events (increasingly linked to climate change) and other consequences of climate change are no longer simply the already marginalized groups, such as indigenous people in Alaska or river delta people in South Asia. They are as well people living in the heartlands of the West. The future, increasingly, seems to be happening right now, and what look like extreme conditions must be considered as possibly the new normalcy. It remains to be seen how this will contribute to climate journalism and politics.

In this book we have looked at the coverage of climate summits in the context of this interdependence between nations and individuals. It is still evident today that most of the media provide a coverage "close to home", restricting their angles and frames to domestic interests and concerns. However, we also feel the urge to underline that other media approaches do exist. For example, one can look at Great Britain's *The Guardian*, who on their website offers ample space for environment and climate change, and have dedicated some of their best and most experienced journalists to this coverage. Journalism *can* also be more attuned to global interdependency and the need to look beyond the local horizon.

Really One World?

In spite of the interdependency being felt and recognized, the concepts of "one world" and "shared fate" will meet with varying degrees of recognition, depending on where people live. This is nothing new. A Norwegian writer,

travelling at length across the Indian subcontinent in the early 1960s, met with a social worker in Calcutta, who confronted his Universalist approach:

You have an expression, in the West, which I have never understood, she said. You say that the world is *one*. What does that mean? *My* world is a hundred, maybe one thousand. It is the number of beggars who enter here. I must try to look into the life of each of them. [...] Is the world one? That does not mean anything to me (Brekke 1962: 152, our translation).

This exchange fifty years ago may still resonate with people in today's world, who feel abandoned by the international community – as the early victims of climate change – combined with a long history of marginalization, vulnerability and poverty. The comment made the author reflect more deeply on his own position in the (rich part of the) world. The inspirations and experiences of transnational media research have made us – researchers in media and journalism – realize how difficult it is to make “sweeping generalizations” concerning the way in which people in various corners of the world perceive climate change and how the media cover its occurrence. Of course the social worker also makes a sweeping generalization of “the West” – simplifications travel in all directions.

The future will perhaps more clearly demonstrate how the western media, once linked to “cultural imperialism”, is losing their grasp on the transnational power that has allowed them to define global issues from their viewpoint. The diversity of experiences and viewpoints inherent in the world will necessarily become more visible through new and more effective modes of communication. As a counter-force to “remote-control” power, we will become – and must become – more exposed to what is going on “elsewhere”. As researchers, through transnational co-operation and the sharing of our findings, we have come to understand better that poor rural or urban people in Bangladesh and South Africa face other and more threatening realities linked to climate change than do people in the Nordic countries. Thus, the climate coverage differs and will differ, in emphasis and in volume, and the critical resources possessed by journalists working locally, at hand, are also crucial.

From Summits to Everyday Coverage?

In the pages above we have piled up our reasons as to why climate summits have represented a good starting point for monitoring global climate coverage. But it must be pointed out that this focus does not take much into account of the diversity and innovation of journalism, journalists and other media actors. Summit focus tilts our results towards emphasizing journalism's activity in terms of supporting the status quo, power bargaining and national interests – the

worldview that Robert Kagan sees as “realistic”. In order to support the growth of transnational media literacy there is a growing need in media research to work with other foci and levels. Studying the effects and potential of networked, quasi-professional communication structures, appreciating the diversity of journalism’s genres and the affordances of different media technologies – such activities can in the future offer rich evidence and inspiration. It is also crucial to look at the momentary opportunities of climate reporting: how will the media learn to (eventually) connect extreme weather events to climate change – how will journalists respond to and capitalize on the forthcoming launches of new results and consequences by the IPCC? The next IPCC report is due in 2013, and an analysis of the coverage given to the launching of this report may be able to show us how much attention that media around the world now pay to this issue, as compared to important reports /statements on the financial crisis and indeed in comparison to the publication of previous IPCC reports. Journalistically, the new IPCC round offers at least an opportunity to re-focus attention on the climate.

An important correction and supplement to our work so far would be to identify and map “everyday coverage” of climate change, independent of highlights such as summits and launches of the IPCC reports. What does such coverage contain, and what kind of editorial importance is given to the issue in-between special events? New scientific reports underlining the findings of the IPCC have occurred recently, initiated by individuals considered “climate skeptics”¹, and this may have an effect on the coverage of climate change denialists (or “skeptics”) in the years to come. We do not yet know how.

The *MediaClimate* project has so far – with a few exceptions – only been able to monitor newspaper coverage. The diversity of countries and researchers compelled us to be modest in our selection of media diversity. In most countries monitored newspapers remain important to the elite, but television and radio – and increasingly social media – reach a much wider audience. To study how both national and transnational TV stations/networks cover climate change issues, remains a challenge for researchers in the years to come.

Obviously, a question in need of interdisciplinary efforts – and transnational research – is how public opinion changes, what role media plays in this process, and how the action or inertia from politicians and other public leaders work to influence this opinion – often perhaps to a larger degree than the media. There is no lack of research on the role played by perception of risk (Beck 2009) and by human emotions in environmental risk perception (see for example Böhm & Pfister 2008), but there is a need for media researchers to engage more with other disciplines such as for example psychology to understand more of the roles media play and can play within the field of climate, environment and people’s perceptions and actions. For instance, recent findings in Norway demonstrate that the usage of media as a channel of information

about climate change only explains a small part of the variety in Norwegians' climate skepticism. On the other hand the findings suggest that respondents who use the media to find information about climate change are less skeptical when it comes to accepting the reality of anthropogenic climate change than respondents who do not use media (Stø & Austgulen 2012).

Although the media cannot be deemed unimportant, they may be more influential when it comes to what people *think* than when it comes to what people *do*. What may be seen as “negative symbolic action” by politicians (defending and retaining the status quo, refraining from restrictions on emissions and more individually based bad practices such as excessive private air travels etc.) may, when highlighted by the press driven by “practice what you preach” moral considerations, combined with those who are hunting for political scalps, have a substantial negative impact on grassroots people's daily practices and attitudes. But here, the politicians may be more to blame than the press itself.

Future Challenges

The realities of climate change pose enormous challenges to future journalism and journalists, in a situation where other issues threaten to divert the attention away from climate change, as seen by the decline in global press coverage of the issue. The European financial crisis is in its third year, and although “emerging nations” may still experience growth, this growth is slowing down, due to the global economic interdependence on markets in export driven economies. More nations across the world are and will be affected². Thus one of the challenges will be to maintain public attention to climate change, and eventually to find ways of linking the financial crisis to global warming. With decreased industrial production in some areas, carbon emissions may be reduced, while in other areas the desperate fight for “survival of the fittest businesses” may lead to a rejection of new (and in the first round) more expensive, but less polluting sources of energy.

Another challenge has to do with “repetition”. News media pursue what is *new*. And climate issues, like other long-lasting processes, need to meet specific news criteria to preserve a high level of media attention. It is a well-known fact that dramatic events attract more news coverage than slow processes, and that news coverage of such events “may accelerate social change when other factors are resisting it” (Neuzil & Kovarik 1996: 163). A “killer smog” hit Donora, Pennsylvania in 1948, killed 22 people and affected almost 5,000. Neuzil and Kovarik point to the fact that previous campaigns for clean air had succeeded in some cities, but “stalled without achieving national momentum” (ibid.). The events in the town of Donora marked a change and “came to be seen as a defining movement in the green crusade against air pollution” (Neuzil &

Kovarik 1996: 164), and one particular radio report about people dying seems to have alerted the US national media. One reason for the national attention is the sudden death, as compared to the “usual slow deaths” from air pollution. Another one was that the drama was “magnified by a scientific mystery”, since people in the surrounding towns that also possessed smoke-producing industries, seemed to be safe (Neuzil & Kovarik 1996: 168).

A few years ago, drama and controversy around the leaked files from CRU, University of East Anglia created much press coverage, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world (Painter 2011), with its potential for conflict and scandal. Likewise, political celebrities have the ability to draw media attention, as clearly demonstrated from the COP coverage. Journalists and editors may enter a stage of “climate fatigue” in their quest for fresh news, even if a problem such as global warming is aggravated. This also has to do with the field of interdependence between politics and journalism, where political inertia may affect the way in which journalists cover climate change.

At the same time, the news media – as an institution – is in trouble. While media may in some parts of the world experience a limited growth, in many localities they will suffer closures and downsizing of their newsroom staff. This will eventually leave less space for reporting on complicated issues, such as science journalism in general and global warming in particular. Thus the common man and woman’s “right to know” the forces working to change their habitat will be further undermined.

A more universal challenge has to do with the conflicting ideals of journalism. On the one hand journalism praises itself for practicing balance and objectivity, and for being non-biased, which is considered vital to the credibility of professional practitioners. On the other hand the balance ideal may be perverted to represent minority views as though they were equal in terms of support to views based on overwhelming consensus – such as the case of climate deniers vs. the research community being represented by the IPCC (Boykoff 2004). Some notions of objectivity may be used as arguments in opposition to the ideal of siding with the vulnerable sections of (global) society, which today should include future generations, in line with the precautionary principle (Stern 2006).

However, as the IPCC discusses, there is no single straightforward definition of this precautionary principle. In the IPCC’s 2007 report they refer to three *key points*: Precaution related to decision-making in situations of deep uncertainty; in the absence of sufficient data or conclusive or precise probabilistic descriptions of the risks; or in circumstances where the possibility of unforeseen contingencies or the possibility of irreversibility is suspected. Second, the principle recognizes that policy action should not always wait for scientific certainty. Third, the principle cuts both ways, because environmental choices may be trade-offs between competing risks, for example if one chooses expansion of

nuclear power to mitigate climate change³.

We have highlighted these points just to further demonstrate that there is no simple, straightforward solution for journalism when it comes to future coverage. And the conventions of journalism with its focus on drama and single events will have to be challenged if the professionals aim to get across the message of precaution.

Other Visions

Dryzek writes that discourses do not need continuous conscious articulations, they “can be so ingrained and taken-for-granted that it would never occur to anyone to mention them” (Dryzek 2005: 51). He uses the Greek myth of Prometheus to launch “the Promethean response” to environmental challenges: the “unlimited confidence in the ability of humans and their technologies to overcome any problems – including environmental problems” (ibid.). Thus, the blessings of economic growth are presupposed, and the “entire way in which economic news is reported assumes that growth is good”, while “economy” and “environment” are put in different boxes (Dryzek 2005: 52). Furthermore this discourse promotes an understanding “that ‘natural’ resources are created by humans transforming matter” (ibid. 57). Several researchers have criticized this “managerial” human relationship to the environment as well as the way in which natural resources are managed by large enterprises, by highlighting commercialized “gene piracy” vs. the rights of local people with inherent knowledge of their resources and environment (see for example Shiva 1993, 1995, 2009). Underlying the Promethean discourse is the vision of human beings acting in accordance with a “homo economicus” logic through which the self-interest driven actions of individuals also more or less automatically serve the interests of the community-at-large. The opposite view, “homo reciprocans”, sees human beings as motivated by a desire to cooperate and improve their environment.

The now-taken-for-granted cornerstones of national “realism” (of sovereign people) and the “economic” rationality of the human species are themselves historically emergent productions, key parts of what Charles Taylor (2004) has called “modern social imaginaries”. Climate change offers a chance to think of how “global interdependence” could be turned from a Kaganian “mirage” into a new “imaginary” that would open up the field of environmental thinking (also in journalism), transform values and enforce the necessary consequential global ethics needed for political action. The contrasting ideals of journalism which compel journalists to strike a balance in their coverage *but also* to defend the vulnerable, may serve in a productive way if they can be seen as building blocks to avoid unreflective advocacy and distanced cynicism.

Notes

1. *The Guardian*, July 29, 2012: Climate Change Study Forces Sceptical Scientists to Change Minds <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/jul/29/climate-change-sceptics-change-mind>. Accessed 12 August 2012.
2. See «Global Economy Hits the Wall» in *The Guardian Weekly* 17-23. August, p. 1-2.
3. See IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007 http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch2s2-2-6.html

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There is no way of not meeting the climate change. It reframes our public debates from shifting global power relations to political participation and individual lifestyle choices. It begs questions about our basic formulas economics, science and democracy. It becomes a key theme in thinking of identities and the human condition, making us ask not only “who are we” but also and who is the “we” in that question. Climate change forces states, societies and peoples to look critically at the political, cultural and material ingredients of which our world is made of. For media and journalism, climate change brings up new challenges of coverage. But it also sheds light on the assumptions and distinctions – about facts, representation, and participation – that media and journalism is built on. By meeting the climate, globalizing journalism also meets itself.

Media Meets Climate looks at these crucial 21st century questions through a prism opened up the global coverage of the United Nations climate change summits. Building on a global research of the MediaClimate Network, the book offers transnational analyses of how climate change is mediated.

The book looks into the broad structures of global climate coverage. Who or what dominates global news flows? How is future imagined? How is the global climate discourse structured? It tackles crucial professional issues facing climate journalists. What is the role of journalistic advocacy? How is science represented? Is social media redefining journalism-source-relations? It asks questions about the media’s role in global representation and misrepresentation of climate change and actors. How is climate change visualized? What role is played by gender? How are activists framed in media? How are indigenous people framed?

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MediaClimate Network is an ongoing transnational effort of media researchers from all continents to critically look at the global mediation of climate change.

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