

Yearbook 2002



Children, Young People *and* Media Globalisation

Editors:

Cecilia von Feilitzen and Ulla Carlsson

The UNESCO
International Clearinghouse on
Children, Youth and Media

NORDICOM
GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY

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**THE CLEARINGHOUSE
IS LOCATED AT NORDICOM**

Nordicom is an organ of co-operation between the Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The overriding goal and purpose is to make the media and communication efforts undertaken in the Nordic countries known, both throughout and far beyond our part of the world.

Nordicom uses a variety of channels – newsletters, journals, books, databases – to reach researchers, students, decision-makers, media practitioners, journalists, teachers and interested members of the general public.

Nordicom works to establish and strengthen links between the Nordic research community and colleagues in all parts of the world, both by means of unilateral flows and by linking individual researchers, research groups and institutions.

Nordicom also documents media trends in the Nordic countries. The joint Nordic information addresses users in Europe and further afield. The production of comparative media statistics forms the core of this service.

Nordicom is funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers.

The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media

In 1997, The Nordic Information Centre for Media and Communication Research (Nordicom), Göteborg University Sweden, began establishment of The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media (formerly The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen), financed by the Swedish government and UNESCO. The overall point of departure for the Clearinghouse's efforts with respect to children, youth and media is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The aim of the Clearinghouse is to increase awareness and knowledge about children, youth and media, thereby providing a basis for relevant policy-making, contributing to a constructive public debate, and enhancing children's and young people's media literacy and media competence. Moreover, it is hoped that the Clearinghouse's work will stimulate further research on children, youth and media.

The International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media informs various groups of users – researchers, policy-makers, media professionals, voluntary organisations, teachers, students and interested individuals – about

- research on children, young people and media, with special attention to media violence
- research and practices regarding media education and children's/young people's participation in the media
- measures, activities and research concerning children's and young people's media environment.

Fundamental to the work of the Clearinghouse is the creation of a global *network*. The Clearinghouse publishes a *yearbook* and a *newsletter*. Several *bibliographies* and a worldwide *register of organisations* concerned with children and media have been compiled. This and other information is available on the Clearinghouse's *web site*: www.nordicom.gu.se/unesco.html

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Foreword

The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a new world order. The highly polarized first and second worlds and the third world are no longer the pillars of the world order. A thoroughgoing restructuring of markets and marketplaces – ongoing processes of commercialization, deregulation and privatization – characterized the period. Globalization is the watchword of the day, the theme social scientists and cultural historians use when they seek to define the constitutive elements of the new order that has emerged after the cold war.

The processes summarized in the word 'globalization' can – given the will to do it – help realize hopes and ambitions to bring justice, peace and security to all the peoples of the world. Globalization can open new avenues for solving the problems of injustice and poverty through trade, technology transfer, knowledge, and a keener awareness regarding shared values like democracy and human rights.

But, the globalization we see today is not always truly global. The world today is more fragmented than perhaps ever before – between rich and poor, between the powerful and the powerless. Billions of people are excluded from the interaction made possible by globalization. Exclusion is not only a condition experienced in the poorest countries of the South; it is equally a problem among groups in the wealthier countries of the world. Problems and conflicts of a similar nature cut through just about every nation of the world: widening income gaps, poverty, environmental degradation, contagion and ill health, ethnic conflict, racism, inequality of men and women, discrimination and intolerance.

Exclusion is more than a matter of material possessions. It is also a question of access to knowledge and cultural resources, vital to social development. Unless the cultural diversity that is present in a society is respected, the outlook for political, economic and social development remains bleak.

For many people globalization has meant that the world has shrunk. We have gained access to cultures and knowledge that were once beyond reach. Cultural boundaries are being transcended, and many people from many walks of life take part in global public fora. But there is also a risk that globalization has a homogenizing effect, that totally foreign cultures may soon be a thing of

the past as dominant cultural patterns set global 'standards'. Clearly, the institutions and enterprises that control globalized mass culture do have such a standardizing effect. Commercial interests – in many cases patterns of market demand in wealthy countries – rule.

At the same time, in some respects the world seems more distant, as peoples of different cultures struggle to preserve their cultural identities. Thus, transcendence of boundaries and defense of boundaries seem to be two aspects of globalization. As a consequence, new 'front lines' have emerged – on both international and local levels.

Media play a central role in the processes we call globalization. Indeed, without mass media and modern information technology, globalization as we know it would not be possible. Access to media, telephones, and digital services of various kinds are increasingly held forth as being decisive factors for political, economic and cultural development. A large share of the world's population lack electricity; those who are excluded from electricity nets are doomed to be marginalized. The so-called 'digital divide' runs a jagged course between countries, but also within countries, often coinciding with other 'divides': income, ethnic, age and gender.

Globalization of the media has progressed at a rapid pace due to the rapid pace of innovation within information technologies, coupled with ongoing deregulation of the media and communications sectors and concentration of ownership. Of particular interest are communications satellites, digitalization and advances in computer technology. Together, these developments have made the enormous expansion of the global market for media products, e.g., television programmes, films, news, games and advertising, possible. These technological advances are *sine qua non* to the global and quasiglobal multimedia enterprises and to massive flows of information over national frontiers. Producers and distributors of media products are concentrated in few hands, nor is there a great diversity of content. We also observe a blurring of the boundaries between information and entertainment, between software and hardware, and between product and distribution.

Roughly half a dozen media companies dominate the distribution of media products. They have a palpable presence on virtually every continent. Most of them are based in the USA or Europe. Examples are AOL-Time Warner, Walt Disney Co., Viacom and Bertelsmann. Their dominance implies an increasing dominance of the English language worldwide – a dominance which the Internet and World Wide Web only confirm.

In the midst of the global development of mass media and the net are our young. Children and youth (under 18 years of age) represent more than one-third of the world population. The ratio varies, however, between regions; in the least developed countries young people account for half the population, whereas in the industrialized regions of the world the figure is 22 per cent. Of the two billion children in the world today, about 90 per cent live in what we call poor countries, and 10 per cent in what we term wealthy countries.

Viewed in the longer term, new media technology and the changes we note in the media order have a profound influence on the conditions and cultures of young people. For many children in the world today culture is something they partake of via electronic media. What is the nature of the content in this burgeoning media output? Whose values and judgements does it represent?

Young people in wealthy countries and middle-class young people in the other countries are an important target group for media companies, and particularly their advertisers. Nowadays, young people are exposed to a steady stream of commercial messages. Because of its powers of penetration, television has a unique position as an advertising medium, but advertising directed to youthful viewers is quite prevalent on the Internet, as well. Many cartoons, programmes and computer games are a form of advertising in themselves inasmuch as they are the vehicles for 'merchandising', i.e., the marketing of toys, dolls, clothing, accessories, etc., to youthful viewers. A nearly universal lingua franca today, the vocabulary shared by young of all classes in a good part of the world, are product trade-marks and logotypes.

Virtually all the children in the industrialized countries watch television each day. Somewhat fewer listen to the radio or read a book. Playing computer games is as common as reading a book. More and more young people use the Internet.

It is estimated that there is about 250 television sets per thousand inhabitants in the world – a considerably greater share than have a telephone. In less than a decade – from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s – the numbers of television channels, television sets in households and hours spent watching television have more than doubled. Satellite television reaches all continents, transnational satellite channels offer many times the previous numbers of channels, and numerous niche channels that target narrow segments of the population have been introduced – not least channels that target young viewers.

In the span of a couple of years in the latter part of the 1990s, some fifty television channels directed specifically to children were introduced. Those having international distribution, such as Cartoon Network, Disney Channel and Fox Kids Network, are often referred to as "global children's television channels". The popularity of international specialty children's channels has prompted national television services in many countries to cut back their production of programmes for children.

In many poor countries, however, media expansion has been sluggish, particularly in rural areas. In many countries of Asia and Africa television and the Internet are primarily urban phenomena. The fact that vast regions of the third world still lack electricity means that radio is the most important medium. The penetration of television in the least developed countries is estimated to be about 30 per thousand inhabitants. This is to be compared with about 650 per thousand in the wealthy countries of the world. Where the sector has been deregulated, many western-style radio and television channels have come on the air. Films, serial drama, talk shows and music predominate; air time is seldom devoted to children's programmes.

The Internet is generally considered the prime example of the 'digital revolution'. The net is in several respects a young people's medium. An estimated 10

per cent of the people of the world used the Internet on one or more occasions (during a three-month interval) in 2002. More than 75 per cent of today's Internet users live in the wealthiest OECD countries, which represent only 14 per cent of the world population. In Africa, only about 1-3 per cent of children and young people have access to the Internet. In other words, we find a markedly skew distribution of Internet use – the digital divide between countries in the South and North is as wide as it ever was. Most prognoses indicate that the new information society will open up new horizons to 30-40 per cent of the people of the world, leaving 60-70 per cent by the wayside. The absence of communications infrastructure in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America will deny many people Internet access for years to come.

Thus, whereas children and young people in wealthy countries are looked upon as "the multimedia generation", many children in the world still do not have television in their homes, and books are rarities.

The aim of this fifth Yearbook is to give examples of the role of media globalization in children's lives from different parts of the world. This theme is more or less virgin soil. Much has been written about, on the one hand, the globalization of media, and, on the other, young people and media, but seldom do these two discourses meet – strange as it may seem. The consequences of media globalization are especially palpable for the 36 per cent of the world population who are children. What does this mean for children's and young people's cultural identity and participation in society – and for digital and economic divides among young people (and adults) both within countries and between richer and poorer countries – in light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child?

This fundamental question is wide-reaching and cannot be answered at one sweep, since answers must cover both the production side of the media, the media contents, and the child audience in different contexts. Hopefully this book, by presenting case studies on young people and global media from different angles and from all continents, will stimulate discussion as a basis for further research and actions.

Let me conclude by thanking, on behalf of the Clearinghouse, all the contributors who have made this Yearbook possible and whose articles put the focus on these important areas of research. Thanks, also, to UNESCO and the Swedish Government without whose financial support the book would never have seen the light of day.

* * *

Finally some words about the Clearinghouse's activities and name change. The work of the Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen has more and more turned toward communicating scientific knowledge about children, young people and the media from a variety of perspectives, as a direct consequence of users' demand. 'Effects' and 'influences' cannot be seen in isolation; children's total media situation needs to be considered – and in this context media education and media literacy have come increasingly to the fore.

The concept of 'media literacy' has been given a great many definitions world-wide. What we have in view here is knowledge of children, youth and media, and efforts made to realize children's rights in this respect, not least their right to influence and participate in the media. The Clearinghouse should present reviews of recent and current international trends in media literacy, which includes references both to research and practices. This is how media education relates to the work of the Clearinghouse.

In the final analysis, it is a question of securing children's rights. Here we are guided by Article 13 – that the child shall have the right to freedom of expression – and Article 17 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which enjoins us to ensure children's access to information and material of social and cultural benefit to them, whilst protecting them from material that is injurious to their well-being. This calls for both innovative research and fostering media literacy.

We have to recognize that the name of the Clearinghouse used hitherto no longer accurately describes its work. The broad focus indicated by the new name – *The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media* – is more relevant.

Göteborg in October 2002

Ulla Carlsson
Director

Children, Young People and Media Globalisation

Introduction by Cecilia von Feilitzen, Scientific Co-ordinator
of The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on
Children, Youth and Media

Economic, political and cultural globalisation in various forms has developed during centuries. However, these processes have intensified rapidly during the last two decades due to the media and new communication technology. In the prevailing globalisation processes, the media are not only intermediaries of economy, politics and culture but are themselves central operators with their own commercial interests. Within globalisation, there is, thus, also media globalisation influencing other aspects of globalisation.

The intricately interrelated processes of globalisation and media globalisation are tightly interwoven with world economy and market forces, with political systems, and with relationships of dominance and dependence between countries and cultures as well as between rich and poor people within and between nations. This complexity gives rise to a great amount of questions about the nature and causes of globalisation and media globalisation – and also about the consequences or influences of these processes.

As regards media globalisation, the last decades have seen an abundance of literature on, for example, the concentration of ownership among media and media conglomerates; the economy of especially the commercial media; the tying together of media contents and other commodities; the relations between governments, (de)regulations and public service/private media; news and popular media culture around the world; the spread of information technology; the technological convergence of media, telecommunications and computers; the increasing “independence” of media communication of time and space; the increasing “interaction” between senders and receivers; modernisation and identity processes; global cultural homogenisation or heterogeneity; information gaps and digital divides; and democracy and human rights.

Much of this literature, particularly that on the influences of global media contents on individuals, cultures and the world, is of a theoretical (and at times

speculative) character, and many scholars emphasise the acute need for empirical evidence.

Little light is shed upon the role of media globalisation in the lives of a good third of the world population who are children and young people under 18 years of age, in spite of the fact that media culture produced for children, and media culture that children come into contact with, constitutes an essential – and perhaps the most rapidly growing – part of media globalisation. We are thinking here of popular music on radio, CDs and cassettes; globally distributed films and TV programmes directed at or watched by children and young people on national and satellite television, video, and in theatres; interactive games and the Internet; certain international print media; advertising and marketing of licensed merchandise worldwide, such as toys, clothes, foods, drinks and other products; as well as the intertextuality and direct convergence of much of these media, media contents and merchandise.

It is therefore of extraordinary importance to bring the two topics of, on one hand, media globalisation and, on the other, children, youth and media closer to each other. But how are we to scientifically approach the comprehensive question of children, young people and media globalisation, if it is to a great extent neglected by research? We must simultaneously take into account the fact that media globalisation embraces all media and all aspects of media – the production, the content and the audience sides – and affects all cultures of the world.

With a hope to stimulate debate, policy, and, not least, further research about children, young people and media globalisation, we have chosen to offer theory, empirical findings and statistics from different angles. Research is presented in the first section of the book, and statistics in the second.

By way of introduction three *research experts on media globalisation* analyse the relation between media globalisation and children, and present overall agendas. The articles elucidate – with said focus on children, young people and media – the relations of the prevailing media globalisation process to economy and market forces, political processes, technological development, dominance/dependence between countries and rich and poor people, cultural identity and human/children's rights. This elucidation is so much more clear, as the articles also take their starting points at opposite poles of the world – the North (exemplified by the U.S.A. and Europe), from which most of the media globalisation emanates, and the South (exemplified by Africa), which is largely excluded from media globalisation.

Two of the articles give policy recommendations of how to counteract the adverse trends in the prevailing media globalisation process. One of the articles suggests a research agenda for how to better understand the consequences of media globalisation – does it contribute to homogenisation, heterogeneity or even to reinforcing existing conflicts between peoples and in the world? This research agenda is formulated from an African perspective but is, in essence, applicable to other cultures, as well.

After that, ten *scholars active in the field of children, young people and the media* present research studies pertinent to media globalisation. These studies,

making up the most comprehensive part of the book, represent many different parts of the world, as well as many different aspects of the media, and are intended to function as illustrating case studies. The articles deal with, for example, computer games; advertising directed at children on the Internet; the strategies of global children's television channels – and their consequences for local children's TV production in smaller and less affluent countries; as well as the use and reception among Argentine, Danish, Indian, Israeli and Sierra Leonean children of global popular culture products and news. These articles theoretically and empirically amplify and concretise the relations of media globalisation to economy, politics, technology, inequality, and cultural homogenisation/heterogeneity.

We have to conclude, however, that despite the variety of approaches and findings, research results about the more long-term influences of media globalisation on children and young people (in contrast to how young users themselves give meaning to and experience global media contents) are generally lacking – as is the case for adults.

In the following, the above-mentioned articles are introduced more in detail:

Robert W. McChesney focuses in his article *Children, Globalization, and Media Policy* on two trends. One is the rapid rise of global commercial media, which – although facilitated by new technology – is driven mainly by a shift to neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism, the author says, is often misleadingly called “de-regulation”. There is still plenty of government regulation, but this is conducted increasingly to suit the needs of the largest businesses instead of the general public. The commercial media system is the necessary transmission belt for businesses to market their wares across the world. At the same time, a whopping three-quarters of global spending on advertising ends up in the pockets of a mere 20 media companies. The other trend is the massive expansion in the commercial media market directed at children. By the late 1990s, the U.S. children market for commercial media had grown to astronomical proportions. Statistics in the article prove that attracting children to commercial media and commercial messages is a major industry. Three sets of policy issues are raised in the article, addressing the overall political economy, the media, and children and children's media, respectively. The main question that must be asked is: What sort of media policies would produce positive externalities for children and all of society? The issue of externalities (the economic and social costs of market transactions that society as a whole must care and pay for, for example, non-desirable influences of advertising or media violence) makes this a mandatory public policy issue. It is therefore imperative, Robert McChesney says, that debates over media and media directed to children receive widespread public participation and deliberation. Without a new direction in media policy, the current trends point to dubious outcomes for democracy, culture and public health.

Cees J. Hamelink writes in his article *Media Globalisation: Consequences for the Rights of Children* that although the process of media globalisation is complex and broad, it can be reduced to three essential dimensions – the global spread of multimedia conglomerates, the spread of the Billboard Society, and the global regime for the protection of content (intellectual property rights).

Since there is at present only limited empirical evidence for a discussion on the consequences of media globalisation, the author reasons about probable consequences for children. Following these arguments, his conclusion is that the prevailing process of media globalisation – the neo-liberal market-centred globalisation-from-above – hampers implementation of children's information rights expressed in The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that is ratified by 191 of the 193 UN member states. Cees Hamelink points to the need of a different humanitarian form of globalisation – globalisation-from-below that is people-centred and prefers the protection of basic human rights to trading interests. Fundamental to the implementation and protection of human rights is an environment of empowerment. This is equally important for grown-ups and minors and maybe even more crucial for the latter as there is in most cultures a strong tendency to silence them and spend more energy on filtering messages for them rather than on producing materials specifically suited for them. Implementation of a humanitarian agenda is urgent, the author says, since the current globalisation process of the media contributes to limiting people's free space for expression and thought, violating their privacy, and undermining their citizenship by perceiving them primarily as consumers. Cees Hamelink also proposes what a humanitarian agenda would imply.

Francis B. Nyamnjoh, as well, underlines the lack of empirical research about the role of media globalisation. His article *Children, Media and Globalisation: A Research Agenda for Africa* seeks to draw attention to the sort of research questions that could meaningfully challenge simplistic assumptions. How true are, for example, assumptions about globalisation of media content as a process of cultural homogenisation? If globalisation is a process of accelerated flow of media content from the global media conglomerates, to most African cultures and children it is also a process of accelerated exclusion and marginalisation. Even elite African children, who can afford access to national and global media content, are often reduced to consuming media burgers conceived and produced without their particular interests in mind, as even their national media are forced to rely on cheap imports as alternatives to local production. The author puts forward the hypothesis that even if globalisation is homogenising consumer tastes, the cultural heterogeneity of children gets deeper. Creative responses by African children may well mean that the final outcome is, rather, a negotiated blend of 'African cultures' and 'Western consumer values'. Francis Nyamnjoh underlines, however, that globalisation also appears to accelerate the production of differences, heterogeneities or boundaries through the structures of inequalities inherent in global capitalism. Poverty accelerates conflict. It may well be that globalisation intensifies age-old boundaries and divisions.

We turn to the scholars active in the field of children, young people and the media. What does their hitherto-conducted research on children and media globalisation tell us?

Joseph Tobin analyses in his article *Pikachu's Global Adventure* the *Pokémon* phenomenon, which began life as a piece of software to be played on Nintendo's Game Boy (a hand-held gaming computer), and which quickly diversified into a

comic book, a television show, a movie, trading cards, stickers, small toys, and ancillary products such as backpacks and T-shirts that all swept across the globe. Entering into production and licensing agreements with Japanese companies and companies abroad Nintendo created a set of interrelated products that dominated children's consumption from approximately 1996 to 2000 and are still popular in many countries. *Pokémon* is the most successful computer game ever made, the top globally selling trading card game of all time, one of the most successful children's television programmes ever broadcast, the top grossing movie ever released in Japan, and among the five top earners in the history of films worldwide. Joseph Tobin's odyssey covers production, content, and children's reception of the game and interrelated products – over time and space. Why did this game succeed, how was it produced and distributed, and what makes children of different ages, genders, socio-cultural backgrounds and in different countries all create pleasures and meanings of *Pokémon*? The article also illustrates the fact that media globalisation does not only consist of U.S.-produced media contents – at the same time as the Japanese producers of *Pokémon* are dependent on collaboration with U.S. companies.

The next three articles deal with the production side of children's television. Tim Westcott describes in *Globalisation of Children's TV and Strategies of the "Big Three"* the globalisation of programme production, particularly the increasing production of animated programmes. He also treats the strategies of (what are, since the acquisition of Fox Family Worldwide by Disney in 2001) three U.S.-based companies – Cartoon Network, Disney and Nickelodeon – which are competing at a global level in the business of making and broadcasting programmes aimed at children. Since Nickelodeon started up in 1979, as the first child-oriented thematic channel, over 113 television services aiming at the same audience have sprung up over the world (2001). The big three have been responsible for almost half of these launches. Where it is not thought possible or viable to set up a local network in a country, the big three either make a local language feed available which is beamed in via satellite, or place a block of programming on a network which contains their programmes and is branded with their name. Although the big three are aiming to expand further, Tim Westcott questions if they will be able to dominate completely, and discusses possible hindrances for further globalisation. For example, Canada and several countries in Europe have started competing with the big three both with child thematic channels and with producing animated programmes, which, thus, today do not always originate from the U.S.A. and Japan.

However, Ruth Zanker points in her article *Tracking the Global in the Local: On Children's Culture in a Small National Media Market* to the fact that only second-level media players – a few big national broadcasters in Europe, Australia, etc. – are grappling to expand into these specialised global media niches for children (child thematic channels, big scale animation) in order to survive, and that the transnational power of the top tier entertainment corporations has been further consolidated by widespread national media deregulation, the collapse of regional and global trade barriers, and recent concerted international

efforts to defend free commercial speech based on American constitutional interpretations. From the production perspective Ruth Zanker analyses in detail how children's media culture in a small (although relatively wealthy) media market with limited public funding, like New Zealand, is shaped by the media outputs of affluent nations. The global audio-visual flows, especially animated global hits, have devastating implications for the viability of local production and the local cultural resources for children. In order to launch the global hits, advertising via television is combined with strategic branding using a range of communication tactics: public relations, media events, promotions, web sites, direct mail from shops and distributors, as well as contra and sponsorship deals. Global entertainment is, thus, used locally in complex cross-media, cross-promotional campaigns for snack foods and other products, and the national local television, partly also through misuse of audience ratings, becomes a powerful 'go-between' or intermediary for influencing the tastes and desires of the country's children.

Clive Barnett adopts in his article "*More Than Just TV*": *Educational Broadcasting and Popular Culture in South Africa* a different outlook on television production, discussing an innovative approach to educational broadcasting developed in post-apartheid South Africa. The author argues that the media globalisation requires a rethinking of established understandings of the relationships between media, children, and citizenship. Globalisation does not spell the end of national-level public policy, but it does require an adjustment in the objectives of media policies. And in certain respects contemporary developments open up opportunities for innovation. He illustrates this argument through a case study of the controversial South African 'edutainment' drama series *Yizo Yizo*, the only drama series on television that shows the lives of black South Africans living in townships. This series, with the aim of empowering ordinary people through revealing the depth and complexity of the crisis facing South African schools, has succeeded in establishing and maintaining a large youth audience for educational television by using popular television formats and a multimedia strategy to connect social issues to the everyday life-contexts. What *Yizo Yizo* illustrates is that in an era of media abundance, in which traditional forms of media regulation have been rendered problematic by the spatial restructuring of media markets and technologies, paternalist and protectionist models of children and media policy are likely to be increasingly anachronistic. The success of *Yizo Yizo* indicates the potential for public service broadcasters to reconceptualise children as active participants in mediated deliberation over public issues. Thus, *Yizo Yizo* embodies a distinctive approach to media citizenship that challenges the conceptualisations developed in the North.

From aspects of production we turn to children's reception, which is the topic of the following articles. In *Domesticating Disney: On Danish Children's Reception of a Global Media Giant*, the author, Kirsten Drotner, makes a note of the fact that several globalisation theorists have called for more empirical grounding of globalisation theories, including media globalisation. Her main contention is that a user, or reception, perspective is as central to the empirical development

of media globalisation as it is marginal to most contemporary theories on that topic. Furthermore, she argues that children are as visible to media conglomerates as they are invisible to the scholarly eye in most empirical reception studies made on media globalisation. Finally, she suggests that inconspicuous everyday routines are as focal to most media users as they are neglected in conceptualisations on media globalisation. Most studies on media globalisation harbour dichotomous views on these processes (for example, global/local, homogenisation/heterogenisation, or national/universal cultures) that she finds imminent to question and possibly revise. She substantiates this by presenting findings from a study on Danish children's reception of the Disney universe. In their accounts of Disney narratives, Danish children focus on animated films, take in what to them are foreign features and domesticate them so as to serve immediate ends.

Dafna Lemish says in her article *Between Here and There: Israeli Children Living Cultural Globalization* that the older the child, the more he or she relates to the wider world and position him/herself within it. Mastering the English language, playing computer games, surfing the Internet, preferring American movies and television series are all associated with children's exercising of a sense of social belonging and personal distinction. The author presents research findings on how Israeli children in their reception of global cultural products mediate the two forces of globalisation and localisation. Israeli children's readings of global media contents should be understood within the unique context of present Israeli culture, in which issues of war and security, militarisation of civil society, the concepts of "us" and the "others", etc., are central in children's construction of social life. In these circumstances, the Spice Girls, *Pokémon*, *The Teletubbies*, U.S. wrestling television series, soaps, comedies, and drama, the Japanese toy Tamagotchi, and even international news, can never be truly "global" products. In the popular global media contents, Israeli children often perceive and appreciate universal values – friendship, love, cooperation, harmony. They seem to be searching for relief from the social pressure in their everyday life. And while recognizing the foreignness in global and international media contents, a dual process takes place: appropriation of global values and attempts to endow the contents with local meanings, that is, to 'glocalise' them. A hybrid children's culture emerges.

Roxana Morduchowicz focuses on children in low-income families in Argentina, one of the most television globalised countries in the world. In her article *The Meanings of Television for Underprivileged Children in Argentina*, children are, as in the foregoing articles, seen as individual subjects constructed by, and constructing, their lives in their social context, which constitutes the universe of meaning from which they perceive reality and build their own world. Television plays a fundamental role in the life of low-income families in Argentina and is for children an essential part of their cultural identity. The families, often consisting of seven to eight members, usually live in only one room, in which the screen occupies an important place. As their favourite shows, the children choose cartoons from the U.S.A. and Japan on cable, and American action series on national TV. For these children, television means a sense of

community, a family reunion. Television also plays a compensating role for the children, firstly because it is one of the few entertaining activities in which these children participate, and, secondly, because it is perceived as a learning source and is often valued for its educational function. Since streets and avenues are dangerous places for children, and since they must often stay at home to take care of their younger brothers and sisters, television is the only bridge to that closed real world to which they have no access. Children say they 'learn a lot' – information, judgements, beliefs, attitudes, values, and behaviours – from the cartoons, action series and other television programmes they watch. Even more important: they learn ways to understand reality.

Keval J. Kumar analyses reception of media events in the form of news. The importance of the economic, political, social, cultural, linguistic, religious and personal context for interpreting media content is also central in his article *Remembering Violence: Media Events, Childhood and the Global*, based on in-depth interviews with three Indian adult generations' memories of media events in their childhood. The study indicates, among other things, that some national events from the childhood are more vividly and accurately remembered than events that are geographically and chronologically distant. For instance, memories of the Indian freedom movement, of the assassinations of Mahatma Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi are more sharply etched in Indian memory than so-called international events like the Vietnam War, Watergate, the 1968 Student Revolution, or the death of Princess Diana. And according to the interviewees themselves, some events that are considered global in other parts of the world do not qualify as such from their Indian perspective. This gives rise to the question as to what factors make a media event 'international' or 'global'. One major factor is the amount of attention given to such events in the mass media. Thus, the global character of an event or even a personality is dependent in particular on transnational media, which distribute their visual and textual content around the world. Minor events in the United States or in Britain are often reported as 'global'; in contrast, many major events in Asian or African nations are not reported at all by the transnational news agencies. Furthermore, the 'globalisation' of news, and its control by a handful of media conglomerates, has led to round-the-clock distribution of 'global images' of violence. The study shows that from the perspective of childhood these violent 'global images' are stark and real (and often disturbing and frightening), and some of them, more than others, remain buried in the memory long after the child has grown into a young adult. Media images of violence and conflict appear to have a much greater chance of remaining with the person than do other images.

What does media globalisation mean to children and youth in Sierra Leone, the least developed country in the world? *Mohamed Zubairu Wai* describes in *Globalisation and Children's Media Use in Sierra Leone* the situation in Freetown, the capital peninsula, where a third of the population lives. Here, radio is the most common medium. Even so, only about half of the children and young people listen to the radio most days of the week. Other media are used to a lesser extent, and such media as satellite or cable television, computers, elec-

tronic games and the Internet almost not at all. If taking the entire country into account, media use is considerably less. Nevertheless, when thinking of the role of media globalisation in Sierra Leone, one is faced with a complex paradoxical situation, the author says. Although media remain a great luxury for most children in Sierra Leone, the impact that media globalisation is having on them seems great. This is reflected, e.g., in the popular music culture and in advertising, which have implications for children's cultural identity and the way they look at themselves. At the same time, the excessive commercialism opened up by media globalisation is placing much more pressure on children than they can handle. Childhood has been under attack and ruined in Sierra Leone for a long time, and in ways inconceivable, by the civil war. Many children see themselves as grown-ups because of these experiences, and the media are exacerbating the situation. However, the author concludes, at present media globalisation, on the whole, still does not apply to Sierra Leone. Globalisation in its true sense should perhaps be seen as a process for only affluent nations, and for small affluent minorities of the populations in poorer countries.

It is sometimes maintained that if the Internet were accessible to all, it would be a short cut to overcome the media and information gaps in the world. How, then, are the prospects so far that the Internet will provide opportunities for democratic communication, creativity and quality education and entertainment? With the final article we close the circle, focusing again more on aspects of production and contents of the media.

Kathryn C. Montgomery outlines in *Digital Kids: The New On-Line Children's Consumer Culture* a sombre picture from the U.S. horizon. Powerful commercial forces are shaping the new interactive media culture. Advertising and marketing are quickly becoming a pervasive presence in the "kidspace" of the World Wide Web. And the forms of advertising, marketing, and selling to children on the net depart in significant ways from the more familiar commercial advertising and promotion in television. The interactive media are ushering in an entirely new set of relationships, breaking down the traditional barriers between "content and commerce" and creating unprecedented intimacies between children and marketers. Moreover, much points to the fact that online marketing is going to be more important for children and teens than for any previous groups, since the young generation spends more time in front of the computer than do older generations, and since U.S. children's spending power is rapidly increasing. Even if the World Wide Web has made possible a flowering of educational, cultural, and civic content for children, enabling them to create their own websites and form communities across geographic boundaries, Kathryn Montgomery's research shows that most of these are being overshadowed by the much more heavily promoted commercial sites, many of them tied to popular TV shows, films and other consumer products. The author finishes by emphasising, among other things, the urgent need for a multidisciplinary research agenda to guide the development of digital children's media. There is also need for a broad public debate. There is little doubt that this emerging new media system will play a significant role in helping children become consumers. But can the media also

be a positive force in helping raise the next generation to be more engaged as citizens?

In the second section of the book, where *statistics* are exhibited, we present recent statistics on *children in the world* and on *media in the world*, respectively.

The statistics on children in the world comprehend demographic indicators, education, and child labour and economy – for parts of the world and for separate countries. The figures show enormous differences and inequalities as regards the number of children, median age, life expectancy, school attendance, illiteracy rate, working children, and the percentage of rich and poor people in industrialised and developing countries.

The statistics on media in the world display the largest media and entertainment companies, the number of Internet users in different continents, linguistic dominance on the Internet, and the spread of telephones, cellular mobile phones, daily newspapers, radio and television sets, computers, Internet use and electricity consumption in all countries.

These cold figures, closely correlating with the statistics on children, evidence in black and white the immense information and digital divides in the world, their relation to inequalities in world economy, the lack of overall implementation of human and children's information rights, and the fact that media globalisation in certain respects is a deceptive concept: media globalisation covers different parts of the globe asymmetrically (at places, not at all). This media globalisation means different things depending on location in the global economy.

Children, Globalization, and Media Policy

Robert W. McChesney

One of the great developments of the past two decades has been the rapid rise of global commercial media all across the planet. The emergence of this new media paradigm is closely linked to neoliberal “deregulation” of corporate activity and the resulting process termed “globalization”. Another great development of recent times has been the massive expansion in the commercial media market directed at children. Both of these are highly controversial developments; together and separately they are the result of explicit policies that permit them to exist and prosper. In this brief article, I will make a few general points about each of these issues.¹ I argue that it is imperative that debates over media and media directed to children receive widespread public participation and deliberation. The current trends, without a new direction in media policy, point to dubious outcomes, for democracy, culture and public health.

The media system goes global

In the past, media systems were primarily national; but recently, a global commercial media market has emerged. To grasp media today and in the future, one must start with understanding the global system, and then factor in differences at the national and local levels. “What you are seeing”, says Christopher Dixon, media analyst for the investment firm PaineWebber, “is the creation of a global oligopoly. It happened to the oil and automotive industries earlier this century; now it is happening to the entertainment industry.”

The dominant companies – roughly one-half U.S.-based, but all with significant U.S. operations – are moving across the planet at breakneck speed. The point is to capitalize on the potential for growth abroad – and not get outflanked by competitors – since the U.S. market is well developed and only permits incremental expansion. As Viacom Chief Executive Officer Sumner Redstone has put it: “Companies are focusing on those markets promising the best return, which means overseas.” Frank Biondi, former chairman of Universal Studios,

asserts that “99 per cent of the success of these companies long-term is going to be successful execution offshore”.

The level of mergers and acquisitions is breathtaking. In the first half of 2000, the number of merger deals in global media, Internet, and telecommunications totalled \$300 billion, triple the figure for the first six months of 1999, and exponentially higher than the figure from ten years earlier. The logic guiding media firms in all of this is clear: get very big very quickly, or get swallowed up by someone else. In short order, the global media market has come to be dominated by nine or ten transnational corporations including: Disney, AOL-Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi, and Bertelsmann. The eight largest media firms in the world today all rank among the 300 largest firms in the world; three decades ago one would have been hard-pressed to find a single media firm on such a list. Indeed, in 2002, *Variety* calculated that the revenues of the eight largest media firms in the world exceeded the combined revenues of the firms it ranked from nine to 50.² Between them, these companies own: the major U.S. film studios; the U.S. television networks; 80-85 per cent of the global music market; the majority of satellite broadcasting world-wide; all or part of a majority of cable broadcasting systems; a significant percentage of book publishing and commercial magazine publishing; all or part of most of the commercial cable TV channels in the U.S. and world-wide; a significant portion of European terrestrial television; and on and on and on.

A second tier of less than 100 firms that are national or regional power-houses rounds out the global media market. Sometimes these second-tier firms control niche markets, like business or trade publishing. Between one-third and one-half of these second-tier firms come from North America; most of the rest are from Western Europe and Asia. This second tier has also crystallized rather quickly; across the globe there has been a shakeout in national and regional media markets with small firms getting eaten by medium firms and medium firms being swallowed by big firms.

Why has all of this taken place? The conventional explanation is technology or, in other words, radical improvements in communications technology that make global media empires feasible and lucrative in a manner unthinkable in the past. This is similar to the technological explanation for globalization writ large. However, this is only a partial explanation, at best. The real force has been a shift to neoliberalism, which means the relaxation or elimination of barriers to commercial exploitation of media, and concentrated media ownership. Neoliberalism is often called “deregulation”, but that is inaccurate and misleading. There is still plenty of government regulation – try broadcasting on a channel licensed to a commercial firm – but the regulation is now conducted increasingly to suit the needs of the largest businesses instead of the general public.

There is nothing inherent in communication technology that requires neoliberalism; new digital communications could have been used, for example, to simply enhance public service media had a society elected to do so. Indeed, the problem with neoliberalism from a democratic perspective is that policies are enacted in the public’s name, but increasingly without the public’s informed

consent. Under neoliberalism, television, which had been a noncommercial preserve in many nations, suddenly became subject to transnational commercial development and was thrust into the centre of the emerging global media system. While in rhetoric this meant control shifted from the government to the market, in reality it meant that private interests could increasingly do as they pleased with government protection rather than popular “interference”.

Perhaps the best way to understand how closely the global commercial media system is linked to the neoliberal global capitalist economy is to consider the role of advertising. Advertising is a business expense made preponderantly by the largest firms in the economy. The commercial media system is the necessary transmission belt for business to market their wares across the world; indeed globalization as we know it could not exist without it. A whopping three-quarters of global spending on advertising ends up in the pockets of a mere 20 media companies. Ad spending has grown by leaps and bounds in the past decade as TV has been opened to commercial exploitation and is growing at more than twice the rate of GDP growth. Latin American ad spending, for example, is expected to have increased by nearly eight per cent in both 2000 and 2001.

In some respects, the global media market more closely resembles a cartel than it does the competitive marketplace found in economics textbooks. This point cannot be overemphasized. In competitive markets, in theory, numerous producers work hard and are largely oblivious to each other as they sell what they produce at the market price, over which they have no control. This fairy tale, still regularly regurgitated as being an apt description of our economy, is ludicrous when applied to the global media system. The leading CEOs are all on a first name basis and they regularly converse. Even those on unfriendly terms, like Murdoch and AOL-Time Warner's Ted Turner, understand they have to work together for the “greater good”. Moreover, all the first and second tier media firms are connected through their reliance upon a few investment banks like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs that quarterback most of the huge media mergers. Those two banks alone put together 52 media and telecom deals valued at \$450 billion in the first quarter of 2000, and 138 deals worth \$433 billion in all of 1999. This conscious co-ordination does not simply affect economic behavior; it makes the media giants particularly effective political lobbyists at the national, regional, and global levels.

Together, these 100 or so first and second-tier giants control much of the world's media: book, magazine and newspaper publishing; music recording; TV production; TV stations and cable channels; satellite TV systems; film production; and motion picture theatres. But the system is still very much in formation. And how it develops, ultimately, will be determined by the nature of the policies that are implemented in the coming years.

Global corporate media and children

But what about media content? There is an implicit pro-corporate bias, but it is a good deal more complicated than that. Market demand and creative input can

lead to some outstanding fare, and a range of ideas far beyond those found among the Board of Directors of a major media conglomerate. Global media giants can at times have a progressive impact on culture, especially when they enter nations that had been tightly dominated by corrupt, crony-controlled media systems (as in much of Latin America) or nations that had significant state censorship over media (as in parts of Asia). The global commercial media system is radical in that it will respect no tradition or custom, on balance, if it stands in the way of profits. But the bottom line – figuratively and literally – is clear: the corporate media system is politically conservative, because the media giants are significant beneficiaries of the current social structure around the world, and any upheaval in property or social relations – particularly to the extent that it reduces the power of business – is not in their interest.

A crucial factor that influences media content is advertising. With the global advertising supergroups mentioned above, advertisers can negotiate eyeball-to-eyeball with the media giants. As a result, a flurry of enormous “cross-platform” deals were cemented between 2000 and 2002 by the likes of Pepsi, McDonald’s, Procter & Gamble, Philip Morris and Toyota with Disney, AOL-Time Warner and Viacom.³ In this way the concentration in one industry demands further concentration in the other. It also means that the interests of large advertisers are increasingly permeating media editorial content.

For a good part of the media, satisfying the needs of advertisers is job one. This can change the equation for media content dramatically, as the needs of the audience have to be filtered through the much more important needs of the advertiser. Advertisers, for example, as a rule do not wish to be associated with controversial social or political topics. Many in the audience may enjoy them, but some do not and their opposition is enough to send most advertisers for cover.⁴ Advertisers tend to prefer shows that reach their desired audience and do nothing to undermine the sales pitch. There is also strong pressure by advertisers to have their particular message incorporated into the editorial content, as much as possible, as this greatly enhances the likelihood that the commercial will succeed. To the extent this is the case, the integrity of the media content, from the perspective of the public and the artist, is compromised. And, perhaps most important, advertising accentuates the class bias in media. Advertising, on balance, tends to be more interested in affluent consumers with money to spend. Hence media firms find it far more rewarding to develop media fare for the upper-middle class than for the poor. One look at the magazine rack in any bookstore provides a crystal clear example of this bias. More broadly, advertising has a corrosive effect on the integrity of media messages; it tends to cast everything in its image. People say not what they believe to be true, but what they are paid to say in order to convince people to buy a product.

Advertising supports much of the media that is directed at children, with all that that says about its integrity and commitment to children’s welfare.

With hypercommercialism and growing corporate control comes an implicit political bias in media content. Consumerism, class inequality, and individualism tend to be taken as natural and even benevolent, whereas political activity, civic

values, and anti-market activities are marginalized. The best journalism is pitched to the business class and suited to its needs and prejudices; with a few notable exceptions, the journalism reserved for the masses tends to be the sort of drivel provided by the media giants on their U.S. television stations. In India, for example, influenced by the global media giants, “the revamped news media... now focus more on fashion designers and beauty queens than on the dark realities of a poor and violent country”.⁵ This slant is often quite subtle. Indeed, the genius of the commercial-media system is the general lack of overt censorship. As George Orwell noted in his unpublished introduction to *Animal Farm*, censorship in free societies is infinitely more sophisticated and thorough than in dictatorships, because “unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without any need for an official ban”.

Lacking any necessarily conspiratorial intent and acting in their own economic self-interest, media conglomerates exist simply to make money by selling light escapist entertainment. In the words of the late Emilio Azcarraga, the billionaire founder of Mexico’s Televisa: “Mexico is a country of a modest, very fucked class, which will never stop being fucked. Television has the obligation to bring diversion to these people and remove them from their sad reality and difficult future.” The combination of neoliberalism and corporate media culture tends to promote a deep and profound de-politicization. One need only look at the United States to see the logical endpoint. But de-politicization has its limits, as it invariably runs up against the fact that we live in a social world where politics have tremendous influence over the quality of our lives.

In turning directly to media and children, perhaps the best way to consider how commercial media markets address children is through the economic concept of “externalities”. Externalities refer to the economic and social costs of a market transaction that do not factor into the decision making of the buyer or seller of the product. Externalities are the Achilles Heel of capitalism; they are the unavoidable consequence of markets, whether the market is competitive or monopolistic. Industrial pollution is the classic case of an externality: neither the producer or consumer has to factor this in the market price, but society as a whole suffers and has a huge price to pay to clean it up. In media the externalities are huge. Advertising, for example, is a market activity that has significant negative externalities in the type of materialistic values it incessantly promotes. Another classic example of a media externality is violent programming. Media producers find this lucrative to make, and consumers provide a market for it. But if widespread exposure to exceptionally violent content produces a more violent society, which leads to increased violent crime, more criminals, the need for larger police forces, and a much less enjoyable society, this cost of violent media fare is not born by the media producer. It is paid for by society, whether it likes it or not. Indeed some, perhaps much, of the profit of the media producer comes because the media firm is able to pass part of the true costs of the programming on to the broader public.⁶ Likewise, to the extent media glorify the use of tobacco products, the costs associated with smoking related diseases constitute an externality.

If media externalities are widespread, perhaps the most striking and difficult to ignore are those affecting children.⁷ Consider the situation in the United States, which has the most developed commercial media market for children. By the late 1990s the U.S. children market for commercial media had grown to astronomical proportions. In 1983 there was about \$100 million in TV advertising aimed at children. By 1997 that figure had climbed to \$1 billion, and the total amount of advertising and marketing aimed at children reached \$12.7 billion.⁸ The total U.S. market for children's products was valued at \$166 billion in 2000, and another study estimates that children influence up to \$500 billion per year in purchases.⁹ The media markets have responded with a barrage of media aimed at children, from toddlers to young teens.¹⁰ Attracting children to commercial media and commercial messages is a major industry.¹¹ The social implications of this commercial media carpetbombing of children has been the subject of considerable research on what sort of effects are being generated.¹² The range of debate extends from "this is probably not a good thing we are doing to children" to "this is a massive crisis for our society."¹³ Often times, where one falls on that spectrum depends upon whether they benefit materially from the status quo. Britain's Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, does not, so he falls into the latter camp. In 2002 he blasted the "intrusion of consumerism into childhood", specifically attacking Disney for the "corruption and premature sexualization of children". The media system with its marketing culture "openly feeds and colludes with obsession".¹⁴ Nobody without a material interest in the status quo is arguing that this could possibly be beneficial to children or our society over the long haul. But because it is an externality, this only concerns the media producers to the extent unfavorable publicity might undermine their profits. Otherwise it is utterly irrelevant, and pressure to generate profit assures that it remains that way.

Externalities need not always be negative. If a society generates a high quality journalism or a provocative entertainment culture it will have the positive externality of producing a well-informed citizenry that will make wise public policy decisions. The entire society will benefit, not just those producing and purchasing the journalism or entertainment. But just as media firms can slough off the true social and economic costs of their negative externalities, they cannot capture the additional social and economic value of their positive externalities. Therefore, built within the marketplace, there is little incentive for a rational media firm to devote resources to generating them.

Policy

There are three sets of closely related policy issues raised in this article. The first set addresses the overall political economy, and the relationship of governments to the citizenry and both of them to corporations and capitalists. These debates take place in every nation, and globally concerning institutions like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO). The

second set addresses the media, and concern crucial debates over public broadcasting, public service regulations (and ownership restrictions) on commercial media, protection of viable journalism, and restrictions on advertising. Or they can address how to “deregulate” media to put more power in unaccountable corporate hands.

To reiterate a point made above, there is nothing “natural” about neoliberal globalization, or a commercial media system. They require extensive changes in government policies and an increased role for the state to encourage and protect certain types of activities. The massive and complex negotiations surrounding NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and the WTO provide some idea of how unnatural and constructed the global neoliberal economy is. Or consider copyright, and what has come to be considered intellectual property. There is nothing natural about this. It is a government granted and enforced monopoly that prevents competition. It leads to higher prices and a shrinking of the marketplace of ideas, but it serves powerful commercial interests tremendously. In the United States, the corporate media lobby has managed to distort copyright so the very notions of the public domain or fair use – so important historically – have been all but obliterated. The U.S. government leads the fight in global forums to see that the corporate friendly standards of copyright are extended across the planet and to cyberspace. The neoliberal commitment to copyright monopolies – now granted for 95 years to corporations – as the *sine qua non* of the global economy shows its true commitment is to existing corporate power rather than to a mythological free market.

The massive scandals resulting from neoliberal deregulation in the United States and worldwide have highlighted the contradictions in the claims about how markets would set us free. The Enron affair – where a huge corporation made billions by paying off politicians to “deregulate” utility markets and thereby fleece taxpayers, workers and consumers – revealed again how closely intertwined our government is with the largest private corporations. The widespread graft associated with neoliberal privatizations and deregulation, in telecommunication more than anywhere else – WorldCom anyone? – has augured in a wave of corruption of world historical proportions. Why should anyone have expected any other outcome? If the market is God and public service in bunk, why on earth would anyone enter government, except to feather their own nest, by any means necessary? For those at the receiving end of neoliberal globalization – the bulk of humanity – the idea that people need to accept neoliberal globalization as a given is untenable. For those committed to democracy above neoliberalism, the struggle is to require informed public participation in government policy making. Specifically, in view of the importance of media, the struggle is to democratize communication policy making.

The third set of policy issues concerns children, and specifically children’s media. Here the issue of externalities makes this a mandatory public policy issue, even for those otherwise enthralled with corporations, advertising and markets. There is no way around it: the government must act on behalf of children, because market competition and the pursuit of profit forces the com-

mercial system to neglect the long term well-being of children. The media corporations simply turn children upside down until all the money falls out of their pockets (and their parents!), and then they let go. And this has ramifications for every living thing on this planet. What sort of policies would best promote healthy children? Here the answers go far beyond media to issues of poverty, education, health care, and stable families. What sort of media policies would produce positive externalities for children and all of society? This is the media policy question that must be asked. By the logic of my argument, the direction we need to look to should be self-evident. We need to establish media that look out for children's best interests first and foremost. We must have media created and supported to do exactly that. We cannot expect a commercial system to do a satisfactory job. Indeed, the rational policy move is to require commercial media to exit the field of children's media as much as possible. Several nations in Europe currently ban or limit television advertising to children. To make this ban work, it requires that the nation subsidize ample noncommercial fare for children, and that costs money. It is a step in the right direction.

There are no simple solutions to the question of how best to organize media and communication to promote a healthy economy, democratic values and happy growing children, just like there is no simple answer to how best to structure the global political economy. Moreover, it is clear that the three debates are very closely related, in view of the significance of media and communication to both capitalism, democracy and childhood. That is why it is imperative that the debates on these topics be widespread and held under the light of day. If we know one thing from history it is this: if self-interested parties make decisions in relative secrecy, the resulting policies will serve the interests primarily of those who made them. As the old saw goes: "If you're not at the table, you not part of the deal." Our job, as scholars, as citizens, as democrats, is to knock down the door and draw some more chairs up to the table. And when we sit at that table we have to be armed with the most accurate understanding of what is taking place and what is possible that we can generate.

Notes

1. Citations can be found for most of the quotations and statistics cited herein in Robert W. McChesney, "Corporate Media, Global Capitalism", in Simon Cottle, editor, *Media Organisation and Production*. London: Sage, 2002.
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Media Globalisation: Consequences for the Rights of Children

Cees J. Hamelink

One of the most revolutionary developments of the 20th century has been the establishment of an international human rights regime. The core element of this regime is that fundamental rights and freedoms are considered universally valid for everyone. In short, the human rights regime that emerged after the Second World War represents the moral standard that “all people matter”. This inclusive conception of human rights is a novelty in the history of international law, since until 1945 there were always social groups excluded from the protection of the dignity and worth of the human person.

However significant this change was, for some time in the early stages of the new regime there remained a category that was not included in “all people”: children. This changed on 20 November 1989, when the United Nations Assembly (in its resolution 44/25) unanimously adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child. With this convention also children became in their own right subjects of international law! Article 2 of the Convention recognizes that “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind..”.

The Convention concluded a process which begun with the preparations for the International Year of the Child in 1979. Although there had been declarations on the rights of child by the League of Nations in 1924 and by the United Nations in 1959, it was felt by some Member States that these rights should be brought under the authority of binding international law. It is important to observe that the Convention is today ratified by 191 of the 193 member states of the United Nations.¹ The four basic principles of the Convention are non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and the views of the child.

The latter principle is evidently essential to the field of information and communication as it expresses the notion that children have the basic right to be listened to and to have their views taken seriously. In line with this principle, the Convention has the following important provisions in the field of information and communication:

- Article 12.1. "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child..".
- Article 13.1. "The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's choice."
- Article 14.1. "States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought..".
- Article 16.1. "No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation."
- Article 16.2. "The child has the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
- Article 17. "States parties recognize the important function performed by the mass media and shall ensure that he child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his of her social, spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health. To this end, States Parties shall:
 - (a) Encourage the mass media to disseminate information and material of social and cultural benefit to the child and in accordance with the spirit of article 29;
 - (b) Encourage international co-operation in the production, exchange and dissemination of such information and material from a diversity of cultural, national and international sources;
 - (c) Encourage the production and dissemination of children's books;
 - (d) Encourage the mass media to have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous;
 - (e) Encourage the development of appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information and material injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions of articles 13 and 18."
- Article 29.1. "States parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to:
 - (a) The development of the child's personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential;
 - (b) The development of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations;
 - (c) The development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the

country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she may originate and for civilizations from his or her own;

- (d) The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous groups.”

Implementation

As with all human rights, the key issue regarding children's rights is obviously their implementation. This continues to represent the weakest element in the international human rights regime. As with all human rights conventions, also for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the institutions and procedures for serious enforcement are largely ineffective.

In 1991, States parties to the Convention elected for the first time the monitoring body for the Convention: the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The Committee, which consists of ten experts, meets three times a year to examine the implementation reports that are submitted by States parties that have accepted the duty (Article 44 of the Convention) to regularly report about the steps they take to implement the Convention. However important the work of the Committee is, its power to enforce the standards of the Convention is severely limited. Moreover, the Convention does not provide for individual complaints about violations from children or their representatives.

When children's information rights – in so far they are pertinent to a discussion of consequences of media globalisation – are summarized, the following programme of action emerges:

The mass media should disseminate information and material of social and cultural benefit to the child. This implies that the mass media should have particular regard to the linguistic needs of the child who belongs to a minority group or who is indigenous; that the mass media should develop respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; and that the mass media should prepare the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous groups.

Although this chapter focuses on the above-mentioned provisions, this does not mean that the Convention's legal entitlements to the protection of privacy and free speech are less important. Actually, they are particularly relevant and challenging in a time of increasing concern about the contents of such advanced media as the Internet. However understandable such concerns are, they tend to be debated and acted upon without serious consideration of the child's right to freely seek and receive information and the right to respect for his or her privacy.

In the case of the information-related rights of children, implementation is especially hampered by the currently prevailing process of media globalisation.

Globalisation and its political agendas

There is something odd in the way in which the international mass media report about the recent outburst of civil society demonstrations at conferences of the WTO (World Trade Organization), the IMF (International Monetary Fund), or the EU (European Union). The protesters are often referred to as the anti-globalisation movement. As the *International Herald Tribune* reports on March 16, 2001, "Anti-Globalization Forces Gain Steam". Yet, the some 50,000 people who demonstrated in the streets of Seattle (late 1999) formed a global, cosmopolitan community, that came together through global communications on the global Internet and that was clearly motivated by sentiments of global solidarity. It may therefore be more adequate to refer to their protest as a denunciation of a specific type of globalisation: the neo-liberal globalisation-from-above that is market-centred. In fact the movement proposes a different humanitarian form of globalisation-from-below that is people-centred. This humanitarian agenda is primarily interested in the needs of citizens worldwide, wants the regulation of capital flows (through such tools as the so-called Tobin tax), the protection of labour (especially child labour) and the environment, and prefers the protection of basic human rights to trading interests.

Those who promote the neo-liberal agenda of globalisation, on the other hand, want the liberalisation of national markets around the world, the deregulation of capital flows, the lifting of environmental restrictions that hamper the freedom of operation of transnational corporations and the recognition of the rights of investors.

These agendas also affect the media globalisation process and shape conflicting perspectives on the world communication arena.

Dimensions of media globalisation

Although the process of media globalisation is complex and broad it can be reduced to three essential dimensions – the global spread of multimedia conglomerates, the spread of the Billboard Society, and the global regime for the protection of content.

• The global spread of multimedia conglomerates

First of all, media globalisation refers to the worldwide expansion of media production and distribution companies that trade on the emerging global media market. This expansion is evidently facilitated not only by technological developments but also largely through the pressures on countries to open their domestic markets to foreign suppliers and the concomitant neo-liberal claim that cultural products should not be exempt from trade rules.

The effective operating on the global market is possible only for large-scale, integrated companies: conglomerates that combine several sectors of the media industry. These conglomerates are presently involved in a process of global consolidation, which results in a strong degree of concentration.

Media globalisation is therefore primarily the global proliferation of a small number of media conglomerates. The neo-liberal globalisation agenda that is prevalent in world politics supports consolidation, concentration and conglomeration. This commercial agenda has a strong interest in creating business links (acquisitions, mergers, joint ventures) with partners in order to consolidate controlling positions on the world market, and wants to create a sufficiently large regulatory vacuum in order to act freely.

In an economic environment where mega mergers are almost natural and are loudly acclaimed by financiers and industrialists, the tendency towards public control is likely to be minimal.

• The spread of the Billboard Society

Secondly, the primary messages of the global conglomerates are of a commercial nature; they are the key vehicles in creating a Billboard Society in which people worldwide are better informed about consumer goods and where to fun-shop than about the environmental consequences of the global rate of consumption. As a result media globalisation is to a large degree the worldwide proliferation of messages that propagate global consumerism.

Worldwide advertising has become ubiquitous. In many countries there are hardly any advertising-free zones left. In spite of all political declarations on the Knowledge Society it seems more realistic to expect a global Billboard Society!

Whatever its local variation, advertising proclaims to the world a single cultural standard for its audiences: consumption fulfils people's basic aspirations; fun shopping is an essential cultural activity. It subjects the world's cultural differences to the dominance of a consumption-oriented life-style. People's fundamental cultural identity is to be a consumer. Advertising teaches children around the world the values of materialism and the practices of consumerism. The neo-liberal commercial agenda has strong interest in the expansion of global advertising. This implies, among other things, more commercial space in media (mass media and Internet), new target groups (especially children), more sponsorships (films, orchestras, exhibitions) and more places to advertise (the ubiquitous Billboards).

• The global regime for the protection of content

Thirdly, the core business of the media conglomerates is content; and several of the recent mergers are motivated by the desire to gain control over rights to contents such as are, for example, invested in film libraries or in collections of musical recordings. Recent developments in digital technology which open up unprecedented possibilities for free and easy access to and utilization of knowledge, have also rendered the professional production, reproduction and distribution of content vulnerable to grand scale piracy, and made the contents owners very concerned about their property rights, as well as interested in the creation of a global enforceable legal regime for their protection. Media globalisation represents the worldwide protection of proprietary content through the imposition of a global system of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.

With the increasing economic significance of intellectual property, the global system of governance in this domain has moved away from moral and public interest dimensions and emphasizes in its actual practice mainly the economic interests of the owners of intellectual property. Today, such owners are by and large no longer individual authors and composers who create cultural products, but transnational corporate cultural producers. The individual authors, composers, and performers are low on the list of trade figures and as a result there is a trend towards IPR arrangements that favour institutional investment interests over individual producers.

The recent tendency to include intellectual property rights in global trade negotiations demonstrates the commercial thrust of the major actors. Copyright problems have become trade issues and the protection of the author has conceded place to the interests of traders and investors. This emphasis on corporate ownership interests implies a threat to the common good utilization of intellectual property and seriously upsets the balance between the private ownership claims of the producer and the claims to public benefits of the users. The balance between the interests of producers and users has always been under threat in the development of the IPR governance system, but it would seem that the currently emerging arrangements provide benefits neither to the individual creators, nor to the public at large.

Consequences for children's rights

Since there is at present only limited empirical evidence for a discussion on the consequences of media globalisation the following brief notes are intended to suggest which consequences for children's information rights the author thinks are probable on the basis of current global processes.

• What are the consequences of market control by media conglomerates for the information rights of children?

The predominantly commercial control over the world's supply of information by a handful of media conglomerates implies that media contents will tend to be supportive of the socio-economic interests of these mega producers. Commercial imperatives do not likely cater to the linguistic needs of ethnic minorities or indigenous groups. As media become industrial conglomerates they move ever further away from service to the common good to the service to commercial imperatives. The essential mission is to produce material that attracts large audiences, which can be sold to advertisers. This sets limits to the independent creativity of producers to design materials that promote human rights issues.

• What are the consequences of the global Billboard Society for the information rights of children?

It is difficult to see how the expanding volumes of commercial messages directed at children contribute to their social and cultural well-being. By and large children

receive more material about life in the shopping mall than about life in a free and responsible society. To teach them the “pester power” they can use to get their parents to buy consumer goods for them, is a very different process indeed from teaching them tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous groups

• **What are the consequences of the emerging IPR (intellectual property rights) regime for the information rights of children?**

It seems sensible that holders of copyrights want to protect their interests against theft. Even the most active defenders of neo-liberalism (the protagonists for withdrawal of the state) will encourage states to act decisively against the piracy of their properties. Protecting intellectual property is, however, not without risks. The protection of intellectual property also restricts the access to knowledge since it defines knowledge as private property and tends to facilitate monopolistic practices. The granting of monopoly control over inventions may restrict their social utilization and reduce the potential public benefits. The principle of exclusive control over the exploitation of works someone has created can constitute an effective right to monopoly control, which restricts the free flow of ideas and knowledge.

Following the above argument the conclusion is that media globalisation is likely to hamper the production and dissemination of the kind of information and material for children that the Convention aspires towards.

A culture of empowerment

In addition to these consequences it should be noted that basic to the implementation and protection of human rights is the presence of a human rights culture. This is an environment of empowerment in which human beings – both adults and children – can be “beings for themselves”. In terms of information this means space to express themselves, to be left to themselves, to decide what information they need, to control what they want others to know about their personal lives, to speak their own language, and to be respected in their cultural identity. This is equally important for grown-ups and for minors and maybe even more crucial for the latter as there is in most cultures a strong tendency to patronize them, to silence them, to invade their privacies arbitrarily, and to spend more energy on filtering messages for them rather than on producing materials specifically suited for them.

Implementation is urgent in the light of the current globalisation process of the media. In the broad sense this process contributes to a culture of disempowerment in which human beings are “beings for others”. Media globalisation limits people’s free space for expression and thought, violates their privacy through data mining and related data collection techniques, and undermines their citizenship by perceiving them primarily as consumers.

The author's outline of a humanitarian agenda towards the implementation of children's information rights suggests the following

- **on media conglomerates:**

A humanitarian agenda proposes that there be effective measures to curb the present growth of media conglomerates. If knowledge indeed considered an essential public good, then "good governance" would require more public control (nationally and globally) over the conclusion of corporate "mega-deals". Strict rules should be applied to limit market control by conglomerates; in cases of possibly conflicting interests between independent knowledge production and conglomerate political or economic interests, divestiture of parts of the conglomerate should be governed by robust legislation.

Content producers should be well protected against possible intervention from owners or commercial management through such instruments as editorial statutes.

Using public funding, societies have provided substantial support for the development of a large diversity and plurality of knowledge producers and providers.

- **on advertising:**

A humanitarian agenda proposes to reclaim public space from commercial communications. It recommends that in all countries ad-free zones are created in local communities, in the media, and in public spaces. It suggests that the law adopted by the Swedish Parliament, which prohibits TV advertising that is directed at children, should be implemented worldwide.

It proposes that editorial policies in news media are effectively protected against "deals" between media owners and advertisers.

This agenda wants that current funds expended on the commercial efforts to teach children how to become global consumers are matched by public funding to teach them how to become world citizens.

- **on intellectual property rights:**

A humanitarian agenda has a strong interest in defending public spaces against their commercial exploitation and wants retain the public property of the human common heritage, so that public accountability and community requirements remain secured. This agenda implies that societies respect the non-commercial dimensions of copyright. Knowledge is seen as part of the common heritage of humankind and cannot be the exclusive property of a few members of the community.

A humanitarian agenda conceives of knowledge as an essential human resource and wants for its development and application to establish a proper balance between the ownership interests of knowledge-producers and the public good interests of knowledge-users.

This agenda proposes that property rights should be balanced against obligations of rights holders, for example through rules on liability. A right to know-

ledge implies that claims to ownership of immaterial products should be acknowledged and respected. These claims provide a right to control and exploit knowledge as property. The law of property commonly recognizes these claims as absolute; they are valid vis-à-vis all other legal subjects. A proper balance recognizes the claim to protection of products of the mind and as such provides incentives, rewards and recognition for individual producers of knowledge. However, it also demands that the control of knowledge is restricted by rules and norms adopted by the community in which ownership is practised. The liberty of ownership does not imply the right to damage others. Owners abuse their rights in case the disadvantage they cause to others (by withholding knowledge) is greater than the benefits that may accrue to them (by not working a patent, for example). Property rights should be restricted in the sense that their use may not damage someone else's property rights. This happens whenever intellectual property protection has monopolistic effects. Property implies liability for its use and a proper balance implies that the governance of intellectual property rights includes both property rules and liability rules.

A humanitarian agenda wants that the scope of "works in the public domain" should be extended and that present efforts to bring such works under copyright protection should be discouraged. It also proposes that as the corporate copyright holders extensively profit from the use of materials from the public domain, they should be taxed for this. Tax revenues could be used to promote the creation of artistic expression and scientific knowledge.

Concluding note

There is a need to mobilize all those who are concerned about an effective enforcement of children's rights. This is a monumental and essential task if we want a unique development in human history – the global recognition of children's rights – not to loose its momentum and whither away.

Note

1. United States and Somalia have not yet ratified the Convention. They have, however, signalled their intention to do so by formally signing the Convention.

Children, Media and Globalisation: A Research Agenda for Africa

Francis B. Nyamnjoh

If globalisation is a process of accelerated flow of media content, to most African cultures and children it is also a process of accelerated exclusion. While African cultures are marginalized by the streamlined information and entertainment menu served by global media conglomerates, the bulk of African children are only spared by the fact that global availability is not synonymous with global affordability. Given Africa's marginality in global economics, given the limited resources of most African states, and given the enormous costs of cultural production and dissemination, even elite African children who can afford access to national and global media content, are often reduced to consuming media burgers conceived and produced without their particular interests in mind, as even their national media are forced to rely on cheap imports as alternatives to local production. The children are often victims of second-hand consumption even as first-hand consumers, since the media content at their disposal seldom reflects their immediate cultural contexts. They may have qualified as global consumer citizens thanks to the purchasing power of their parents and guardians, but culturally, they remain consumer subjects, and must attune their palates to the dictates of undomesticated foreign media dishes. This is generally the case, despite national and regional broadcasting charters that stress the need for African children to 'hear, see and express themselves, their culture, their language and their life experiences, through the electronic media which affirm their sense of self, community and place' (cf. SADC 1996).

Given their tender ages and given the dearth of counter powerful local messages at their disposal in national media, African children are more vulnerable to uncritical internalisation of the explicit or implicit ideological content of the media they consume. The fact of the media not being about or for African children as primary consumers is in a way an implicit statement on the dispensability of their local cultures. An invitation for them to join the consumer bandwagon on its own terms can only entail an invitation to self-denial, self-evacuation, or self-devaluation, and the glorification of the creativities and mediocrities

of others. But whether or not these invitations are actually taken up by African children, and in what ways, is often more assumed than proven, even when research has been done. The tendency in research has been to mistake labels for contents and exposure for effects, as if the African children involved have lost all agency to the dominant structures of capital. While such assumptions may be commonsensical and understandable, only meaningful research can draw attention away from grand-narratives that either tend to celebrate the illusion of unregulated flows or the victimhood of those at the margins of global abundance. If our modest research in a related area among Cameroonian youths is anything to go by, the reality may be more nuanced than usually depicted. Not only do young Cameroonians appropriate media representations never intended for them; they use these representations to construct fantasies about whiteness, which in turn serve as a standard of measure in encounters with actual whites. The media reinforce ideas of western superiority and allure, thus buttressing fantasies that deny the reality of actual experiences with the modest circumstance of the white tourists, volunteers, researchers or clergy often encountered by the Cameroonian youth. Sometimes the latter would rather believe that the white he or she knows was pretending to be poor, than deny media representations of white opulence. Daily contact with whites can leave young Cameroonians baffled and disappointed. Real experience is dismissed in favour of mass-mediated fantasies. And any white who is reluctant or unable to live up to this representation has no business to be white (cf. Nyamnjoh and Page 2002).

Media globalisation

This article seeks to draw attention to the sort of research questions that could meaningfully challenge simplistic assumptions about children, media and globalisation in Africa. But first an understanding of changing mediascapes under globalisation is in order. Propelled by 'the incessant pursuit of profit', global media entrepreneurs appear to settle for little short of the total 'relaxation or elimination of barriers to commercial exploitation of media and to concentrated media ownership' (McChesney 2001:1-4).

This craving for profit has negatively affected the traditional emphasis on public service media that guarantee cultural pluralism and diversity regardless of the market. In Europe since the 1990s, market-driven ideas of public service broadcasting serving the interests and preferences of individuals as individuals have become more popular (Syvertsen 1999; Søndergaard 1999). Seen as individual consumers, even children are treated as autonomous agents glued together by a selfless market slaving away for their cultural freedom, development and enrichment as global citizens with power to arm-twist parents and guardians to service their consumer instincts. This development blurs the traditional distinction between public service and commercial broadcasting, and passes for public service even the greedy and aggressive pursuit of profit.

The shift makes a virtue of consumption, presenting it as the ultimate symbol of civilisation. If consumption is the supreme indicator of cultural sophistication, then the media could dispense of traditional ideas of quality educational programmes, and still be of tremendous service to children as budding consumers. Hence the sacrifice of conventional educational content in favour of a plethora of mass and often cheaply produced alternatives, aimed more at forging consumer zombies than developing rounded and critical citizens of the children they target. The profit motive dictates that various media content are conceived, produced, and disseminated with the primary objective of maintaining economic, political and cultural privileges and advantage, while thwarting any attempt at the social shaping or domestication of media technologies and content that could abolish or overturn such privileges. It is precisely in this way, Schiller (1977) perceptively argued way back in the 1970s, that America used the rhetoric of 'unregulated flows', as a 'highly effective ideological club' to promote its political, economic and cultural values by whipping 'alternative forms of social organization' into a ridiculous defensiveness.

However, far from leading to a presupposed convergence, globalisation appears to accelerate the production of differences, heterogeneities or boundaries through the structures of inequalities inherent in global capitalism (cf. Chomsky 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). As Bill Clinton has very aptly pointed out, the 'abject poverty' which is part of our globalised world, 'accelerates conflict', 'creates recruits for terrorists and those who incite ethnic and religious hatred', and 'fuels a violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our future depends' (Clinton 2001). Globalisation has only intensified age-old boundaries and divisions. 'It looks as if, in a world characterised by flows, a great deal of energy is devoted to controlling and freezing them: grasping the flux often actually entails a politics of 'fixing' – a politics which is, above all, operative in struggles about the construction of identities' (Geschiere and Meyer 1998:605).

Not only is the traditional idea of public service media fast becoming outmoded; calls for some ground rules to protect cultural diversity have simply been greeted with the rhetoric of free flows at worst or with token concessions to 'cultural minorities' at best. What is more, the corporate media are in a particularly powerful position, given their dual role as players and umpires (McChesney 2001:3-9). They 'enjoy an enormous leeway to negotiate and protect interests from the vantage of prior monopoly positions', and 'do not have to bend over backwards to strike deals' (Thomas and Lee 1998:2). Given their freehand and reluctance to invest in diversity, the global corporate media have tended to downplay creativity and variety in children's media in the interest of standardisation, routinisation and profitability.

With such premium on profit, the global media corporations that target children are hardly about the 'unregulated flows' of the world's cultural diversity. Relegated to the margins even in African countries, are what Fayemi (1999) has termed 'voices from within'. That is, 'the lives of ordinary children and their everyday life: how they are nurtured and reared, the games they play, their

adolescence and growing up years, their education and their role within their families and immediate environment’.

As Soyinka puts it, African children are thus lured and/or coerced ‘to develop an incurable dependency syndrome and consume themselves to death’, as feeding the global consumerist machine becomes a way of life for them. Caught in the global web of consumerism, ‘the self-respecting youth dare not be seen without a Walkman’, with often devastating consequences (Soyinka 1994:209-210). By focusing on more of the same, the global media tend to mistake plurality for diversity (Murdock 1994:5). The result is globalisation as a ‘deeply and starkly inequalitarian’ process (Golding and Harris 1997:7), a one-way flow in cultural products that favours a privileged minority as it compounds the impoverishment of the rest. As ‘empires of image and of the imagination’, the corporate media control global markets and global consciousness (Murdock 1994:3), mostly by denying access to creativity perceived to stand in the way of profit, power and privilege.

This literally leaves children and marginal cultures in Africa at the mercy of the McDonaldised, standardised or routinised information, education, games and other entertainment burgers served in the interest of profit by the global corporate media. Because the latter ‘advances corporate and commercial interests and values and denigrates or ignores that which cannot be incorporated into its mission’, content becomes uniform, regardless of the nationalities or cultural identities of shareholders. This is hardly surprising since wanted are passive, depoliticised, unthinking consumers more prone ‘to take orders than to make waves’ by questioning the ‘light escapist entertainment’ menu presented them (McChesney 1998:7). In this regard, it could be argued, as McChesney (1998:6; 2001:13) has done, that the basic differences are not between nation-states as such, but between the rich and the poor (whom I term ‘consumer citizens’ and ‘consumer subjects’ respectively), across national borders. However, the fact remains that the investors, advertisers and affluent consumers whose interests the global media represent, are more concentrated in and comprise a significant proportion of the children of the developed world, than is the case in Africa where only an elite minority are involved and hardly any local cultural products are competitive globally.

Research questions

This scenario invites some interesting research questions into assumptions about globalisation of media content as a process of cultural homogenisation. How true are such assumptions of children in Africa, where only an elite few qualify to consume global media first hand? To what extent, for example, is there cultural imperialism, in the sense of a systematic penetration and domination of cultural life on the continent by the globalised western children’s media content? How are the elite few among African children affected by global media content? Is it scientifically adequate to assume cultural homogenisation from such expo-

sure alone? If not, what other indicators are to be used? When is measurement to start and end for a final conclusion on homogenisation to be reached?

Is it possible that African children might desire and consume the same media content as Western children for example, yet read entirely different meanings into that content? If yes, how are we to explain such differences? How do the structurally excluded bulk of ordinary children in Africa react to their predicament? Do they simply celebrate victimhood? Or do they seek to manoeuvre and manipulate themselves into inclusion, even if only at the margins? How does this enrich understanding of the hierarchies of consumption made possible by globalisation? What creative strategies are employed by African children, both elite and marginalized, to appropriate, gatecrash, cushion, subvert or resist the effects of their cultural exclusion by the global structures of inequality evident in global media? How do African children reconcile otherwise conflicting cultural influences in their daily interactions with one another and with others? What accounts for refusal or reluctance to internalise and surrender to marginalisation? How, when, and why do Africans and their children draw from the sociality and conviviality of their cultural communities? In short, to what extent could it be claimed that African children 'may welcome, accept or collude in some cases, but in others they may ignore, select, reshape, redirect, adapt and, on occasions, even completely reject [media content]? Even when the same material is available to all and widely consumed, the eventual outcome, may vary considerably both within and between countries' (Halloran 1993:3).

Within the context of globalisation and postcoloniality, it is possible for children to assume multiple identifications that draw from different cultural repertoires, depending on the context (Warnier 1999). If cultures prescribe behaviour and beliefs, and if children are exposed to competing cultural codes or styles in this way, should we talk of identity in the singular in relation to those children – especially as every culture takes much time to be transmitted, assimilated or undone? What do we have to say about children's actions and identities inspired by drawing from multiple cultural repertoires? How do children come to terms with the fact that identity in the age of intensified globalisation is not determined solely by birth, or entirely by choices made by them? How well these questions are answered would depend on how sensitive one is to local predicaments methodologically, and also on what meaning one gives 'Africanness' in relation to children in Africa.

Methodology

First on methodology, if we recognise cultural diversity, we must be ready to question theories and methods built under the assumption of a universal culture; and we must be ready to question research on or about African children undertaken from the insensitive position of assumptions about an objective social science. For, every culture generates for itself its own 'thinkability' and 'unthinkability' (Surin 1995:1183). If arguments to the effect that only someone 'raised and nurtured in the cultural environment of a linguistic group' can 'capture all of a

culture's subtleties and complexities' (Grinker and Steiner 1997:684) are to be taken seriously, then the best way to go about researching any culture is to seek as much as possible to be an insider even as an outsider, to be predicament-oriented. Attitudes of arrogance and condescension towards the cultures in question can only result in knowledge pregnant with prejudice, stereotypes and dogma.

A 'predicament-oriented' approach should seek first 'a local understanding of the nature of given predicaments among those actually facing these predicaments in their everyday lives', and then an understanding of 'the broader historical, structural and/or ecological causes generating such predicaments', with the aim of feeding such understanding 'back to the local level to illuminate the understanding from below of the predicaments confronted there, and to provide guidelines for local actions and struggle' (Himmelstrand et al. 1994:4-8). This means that social research should not be divorced from its ethical and political implications. Although the debate on 'objective' social research is dated, not enough social researchers are assuming their ethical responsibilities for one to stop flogging a dead horse. Some still believe that social phenomena can be understood, controlled, manipulated and exploited, independent of human intention and expectation. This largely accounts for the tendency to celebrate impersonal and insensitive methodologies that only exacerbate the misrepresentation of the powerless. Such strict adherence to dominant research models has usually precluded the asking of the really important questions of why and how.

Halloran echoes this point with the example of comparative international research, which is quite common in the study of children and media. Such research is by nature very difficult to conduct, but certain assumptions in conventional research traditions have made it even more so. 'At the heart of the problem is the failure to recognize that social research is embedded in cultural values and that the fundamental differences... which obtain in different societies preclude the use of carbon copy survey or interview methods which assume that genuine comparability can be achieved only by administering the same questions in the same way in all participating countries. One has only to take note of the relationship between language and culture to realise that this approach is patently absurd' (Halloran 1981:9). Like media content, methods of data collection no matter how appropriate in the West are not always adapted to the realities of children in Africa, and a deliberate effort must be made to domesticate them. In certain cases, nothing short of a cocktail of theories, methods and approaches would suffice to take care of the many-sided-ness and particularities of real life in Africa.

Being African

This leads to the second point: the 'Africanness' of children in Africa. What does it mean to be an African child? Different people have different answers, but no research can yield adequate results, that have fails to problematise this issue. To some, being African is an attribute of birth, transmitted through the life essence of a black African father, and to be protected from contamination by the prod-

ucts of other life essences. Being African for them is a birthmark and a geography taken together. But others see the Africanity of children as a process. To these, although there is reason to lament the marginalisation of cultural identities from the African continent in today's McDonaldised content, it would be quite misleading to assume from this a counter notion of a geographically confined, patriarchal, essentialist and frozen understanding of being African. This idea of Africanity is rich, flexible and relevant to researching children and the media in Africa under the current context of accelerated flows of people and cultural products.

Identities, whether African or otherwise, 'are complex and multiple and grow out of a history of changing responses to economic, political, and cultural forces' (Appiah 1992:177-178). In other words, identity is not 'innate in consciousness at birth', but rather 'something formed through unconscious processes over time' (Hall 1994:122). Identity 'always remains incomplete, is always "in process", always "being formed"', and therefore, 'rather than speaking of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of *identification*, and see it as an on-going process' (Hall 1994:122). In cultural identity two phenomena complement each other: 'an inward sense of association or identification with a specific culture or subculture' on the one hand, and 'an outward tendency within a specific culture to share a sense of what it has in common with other cultures and of what distinguishes it from other cultures' on the other (Servaes 1997:81). There is therefore the need to treat children's identities in Africa as 'a dynamic reality... that moves forward daily but knows no end' (Mveng 1985:68).

For, although African identities have had a raw deal in relation to other identities, and there is certainly a need to create greater room in children's media for African philosophies of personhood and agency (cf. Nyamnjoh 2002), Africa has been subjected to certain influences through slavery, colonialism, and by interaction with other cultures, that have affected African identities in no small way, and that cannot simply be brushed away like one brushes dust off one's coat (cf. Appiah 1992). Abhorrence for Western colonialism and consumerism notwithstanding, marginalized Africans cannot afford to dismiss as non-Africans those children of the elite few who have found attraction in and can afford the current globalised Western media culture for purposes of prestige and power; not only because these are the children of those who preside over their destinies, but also because even the elite few often domesticate in most creative and original ways their consumption of foreign media. Nor should black Africans dismiss as non-Africans children of European and Asian descent, born and brought up in Africa, with some of who have never lived outside of the continent, nor are they interested in migrating from Africa. How can such children be denied their Africanity, simply because their ancestors can be traced back to Europe or Asia? As researchers, we must therefore be creative, negotiating, dynamic and realistic in attributing Africanity to the children we study.

As researchers, we must come to terms with Africa's negotiated identities in recognition of ongoing processes of 'sorting out, selection, choice, and finally *voluntary* adoption of some ideas, values, outlooks and institutions' that have resulted from encounters with other forms of identity (Gyekye 1997:25-26) ei-

ther directly or through media representations. Studies have evidenced that even in precolonial Africa the idea of a fixed *cultural identity* is more romantic than real (cf. Appiah 1992); rather, ethnic groups have tended to have 'a constant flux of identities' depending on political expediency and other factors (cf. MacGaffey 1995). The children, whose relationship with media is of interest to us, may well straddle multiple identity margins in most fascinating and creative ways, and seeking to pigeonhole them into single identity margins could subtract from rather than enrich understanding of the complexity of their life experiences.

We need therefore, as social scientists, to take seriously arguments against the temptation 'to celebrate and endorse those identities that seem at the moment to offer the best hope of advancing our other goals, and to keep silence about the lies and the myths' in such identities. Our duty as social scientists is to stay committed to the truth about children's identities in Africa. For, although 'We cannot change the world simply by evidence and reasoning, ...we surely cannot change it without them either' (Appiah 1992:173-180).

Homogenisation, conflicts or heterogeneity?

But to recognise the cosmopolitan nature of African children and their identities, does not necessarily imply to argue in favour of cultural homogenisation implicit in the rhetoric of globalisation. Although globalisation is homogenising consumer tastes, the same globalisation, through the unequal relations it generates, provides consumers (big and small) with the means to create individual and social identities, which are variant and diverse in a way that speaks less of a synthesis of cultures (Appadurai 1996; Warnier 1999). Not even in U.S.A., where much has been achieved in the area of the 'McDonaldization of Society' (Ritzer 2000), is that synthesis possible. It is more a type of unity in diversity, where the fact of children belonging to the same consumer club (wanting the same toys, computer games, television programmes, books, animated cartoons, films, music, fast foods and soft drinks) does not guarantee cultural synchronisation (Lapham 1992).

As Halloran puts it, quoting a cynic, in reference to warring Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians and Macedonians of the former Yugoslavia, all watching the same television for years did for them was that they could 'march to fight each other wearing the same T-shirts, whistling the same pop tune and with a can of coke and a mars bar in their packs'. They had little else in common 'other than a tribally based hate and a need to "cleanse"' (Halloran 1993:2). This is analogous to the situation between African and Western children, where there is generally very little else in common linking them, than the pool of media products and consumer items into which they read different meanings as first or second-hand consumers, depending on their cultural and social backgrounds. Thus, despite the increasing synchronisation of their tastes and habits, the cultural heterogeneity of children as consumers of similar media contents seems to get deeper instead.

Children everywhere may appear to be chasing after the same media products, but they bring along with them specific cultural traits that lead to diversity in their consumption of those products. It thus appears unrealistic to assume from mere exposure cultural synchronisation as if children had effectively become the consumer zombies intended in the standardised and routinised media content served them. Creative responses by African children may well mean that the final outcome is neither a victory for 'African cultures' nor for 'western consumer values' as such, but rather, a creatively negotiated blend of both to enrich their personal and collective cosmopolitanism. In this way, African children are active agents in ongoing processes of simultaneously modernising African traditions and Africanising their modernities. The outcome is neither triumph for 'culture' nor for 'globalisation' as distinct entities, but rather for the new creation to which a marriage of both has given rise: African children as repertoires, melting pots and negotiators of conviviality between multiple encounters or competing influences.

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Pikachu's Global Adventure

Joseph Tobin

In the last years of the last millennium, a new consumer phenomenon developed in Japan and swept across the globe. Pokémon, which began life as a piece of software to be played on Nintendo's Game Boy (a hand-held gaming computer), quickly diversified into a comic book, a television show, a movie, trading cards, stickers, small toys, and ancillary products such as backpacks and T-shirts. Entering into production and licensing agreements with Japanese companies including GameFreak, Creatures, Inc., Shogakukan Comics, and TV Tokyo, and with companies abroad including their wholly owned subsidiary, Nintendo of America, Wizards of the Coast (now a division of Hasbro), 4Kids Entertainment and the Warner Brothers Network, Nintendo created a set of inter-related products that dominated children's consumption from approximately 1996 to 2000. Pokémon is the most successful computer game ever made, the top globally selling trading card game of all time, one of the most successful children's television programs ever broadcast, the top grossing movie ever released in Japan, and among the five top earners in the history of films worldwide. At Pokémon's height of popularity, Nintendo executives were optimistic that they had a product, like Barbie and Lego, that would sell forever, and that, like Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, would become enduring icons worldwide.

But by the end of 2000, Pokémon fever had subsided in Japan and the United States, even as the products were still being launched in such countries as Brazil, Italy, and Israel. As I write this article, Pokémon's control of shelf-space and consumer consciousness seems to be declining, most dramatically in Japan and the United States. As the Pokémon phenomenon winds down we are left with the task of analyzing its significance and understanding the dynamics of its rise and, just as interesting, its fall. To analyze these phenomena, I hosted a Pokémon conference in Honolulu, U.S.A., in November 2000. Presenters came from Japan, Hong Kong, Australia, Israel, France, the U.K. and the U.S., from the fields of anthropology, communication, sociology, and media studies. The papers presented at the conference serve as the cornerstone for a forthcoming book,¹ which tells the story of Pokémon's global travels and discusses what the

Pokémon phenomenon can teach us about children's engagement with the new media, Japan's rise as a culture and software exporting nation, and the globalization of children's popular culture. I'll review each of these issues in this article.

Japan's mouse

Pokémon isn't just any globally circulating childhood craze; it's a globally circulating craze from Japan. This is a matter not just of profit to Nintendo, but also of national pride and even strategic economic importance to Japan. To the Japanese Pikachu, the little yellow electric mouse who is the most popular character in the Pokémon universe, is 'our mouse', Japan's long awaited answer to Mickey. In order to appreciate the cultural and economic significance of Pokémon in contemporary Japan, it is necessary to place the development and marketing of Pokémon in the context of Japanese history.

In 1854, when U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry led his fleet into Tokyo Bay, Japan's centuries-old strategy of barring Western people, ideas, and goods came to end. In response to the threat of Western military power, Japan's strategy changed to one of borrowing and domesticating foreign goods and concepts while retaining Japanese core values, as summed up by the mantra of that era: 'Japanese spirit, Western learning'. During the years leading up to and including World War II, Japan switched course and pursued a belligerent approach in relating to the West and to Asia. The postwar period was a second period of intense cultural borrowing, this time coupled with growing success in selling 'Western goods' to the West. Japan began rebuilding its postwar economy by exporting simple, inexpensive goods; but by the 1970s Japan was enjoying success as a producer of such high quality, high-tech goods as watches, cameras, and cars. In the 1980s, having established dominance in the global market in home electronic goods, Japan seemed well positioned to reign for many years to come as one of the world's most economically powerful nations. But while Americans fretted about how we would ever close the trade gap with Japan, many Japanese knew their success was fragile. Japan's postwar formula for economic success, based on exporting consumer goods and computer hardware to the West, proved to be difficult to maintain because as the Japanese standard of living and salaries rose, they became vulnerable to being undercut by other countries. In the 1990s, the 'New Economic Tigers' – Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and, eventually, China – became Japan's Japan, as their lower labor costs allowed them to end Japan's dominance in many sectors of production. Anticipating this turn of events, by the early 1980s, Japanese companies and government economic planners were already strategizing to shift the economy from heavy industry to high tech and then from high tech to information and cultural products. Most globally circulating media products are played on Japanese-made machines (stereo systems, TV sets, VCRs, CD and DVD players, karaoke machines, and computers), but the majority of the content is produced in Los Angeles and New York. Lacking software of their own, in the 1980s and early 1990s

Sony and other Japanese hardware corporations invested in American movie studios, music labels, and publishing houses (du Gay et al., 1997). The challenge facing Japan in the mid-1990s was to shift from purchasing rights to Western cultural products to producing cultural export products of their own.

Japan has a robust domestic culture industry, with billions of yen spent each year on domestically produced and consumed movies, pop music, television shows, and sports teams. But converting this domestic market to an international one is a daunting task. Despite its success in selling hardware to the West, with the notable exception of computer game sales worldwide and pop music and television show rights in Taiwan and Hong Kong (Iwabuchi, 1998), Japan has had little success and in fact has made relatively few aggressive attempts to export cultural software. Japan's net trade surplus masks the fact that Japan suffers from a big deficit with the West in the exchange of cultural products. American films are among the top grossers in Japan, while Japanese films play only in art houses in the United States. Jazz receives stronger support in Tokyo than in New York, and American and British pop music competes at the top of the Japanese charts while Japanese pop music finds only a niche market outside of Asia. Japanese haute couture has made inroads in the global high fashion world, but sales of Isse Miyake and Hanae Mori are tiny compared to sales of Levis jeans and Calvin Klein underwear in Japan.

Why this cultural trade imbalance? It is primarily an effect of the linguistic and cultural hegemony of the Anglophone West. The cultural and economic power wielded globally over the past three centuries first by England and then by the United States has meant that the Japanese and the rest of the non-English speaking world have had to learn to consume foreign language cultural products while Americans and Britons have not. Since the days of Perry's arrival, the Japanese have understood that to relate to and compete with the United States and Europe, it is they who would have to adapt.

The Japanese have been adapting Western cultural products long enough and well enough (Tobin, 1993) that by the beginning of the new millennium there is no longer a clear, fixed boundary between Western and Japanese things or ideas. Japanese culture, no longer/never pure or unitary, is a hybrid construction that, like all cultures, is continuously reinventing itself (Iwabuchi, 1998; Tobin, 1993). Japanese products exported abroad, including Pokémon, are already a mixture of indigenous and borrowed elements even before they are subjected to repackaging by their Japanese exporters and localization by their foreign importers. Ironically, several of the Pokémon television episodes that have been considered inappropriate for release in the United States feature plot elements that are explicitly Euro-American in origin, elements including the Pokémon characters Misty, Team Rocket, and Ash's mother entering a beauty contest in Acapulco; a six-gun toting game warden who points his pistol at Ash; and a Tarzan-like feral child Ash and Misty meet in the jungle.

Although cultural trade between Japan and the West has been an unequal process, this is not to say that before the Pokémon invasion Japanese culture had not already entered Europe and North America. Japanese aesthetic traditions

have had a subtle but profound influence on Western painting, theater, letters, movies, fashion, architecture and design. Zen has influenced Western spirituality. Judo and karate are the best-known martial arts around the world. Soba, sushi, and wasabi now can be consumed in European and North American shopping malls. Japanese *manga* (comic books) and *anime* (feature length cartoons) are consumed by aficionados overseas. Nevertheless, despite these successes, it was not until Pokémon that a Japanese cultural product broke through as a worldwide consumer craze.

In addition to Western economic, political, and cultural hegemony, another factor contributing to Japan's cultural trade deficit with the West is Japanese ambivalence about the exportability of their culture. Many Japanese believe that their culture is too idiosyncratic to be appreciated abroad and they are not so sure that they like the idea of the rest of the world consuming their culture and sharing their tastes. The Japanese have a term for this ambivalence: *Nihonjinron*, or theories of Japanese uniqueness. When I first lived in Japan in the 1960s, Japanese acquaintances would routinely ask me: 'Can you eat sushi?' At first I wasn't sure what this question meant. I eventually figured out the meaning behind the question was a combination of fear that Westerners would find their culture bizarre or distasteful and an ethnocentric pride that their culture is too special and refined to be appreciated by anyone but themselves. I do not believe that Japanese culture is inherently more idiosyncratic and therefore less globalizable than Euro-American culture. But the Japanese belief in their cultural uniqueness coupled with their ambivalence about being consumed by foreigners can lead to a certain awkwardness or even hesitancy in marketing their culture to outsiders.

The cultural hegemony of the English-speaking West combined with the Japanese belief in the uniqueness and inaccessibility of their culture to produce a late twentieth century dynamic in which Japan, although a major global player in the export of hardware, was only a minor force in the export of cultural products. This all changed with Pokémon. Kurosawa, *Godzilla*, *Hello Kitty*, *The Mighty Morphin Power Rangers*, sumo and sushi found niche markets overseas, but it was the little yellow electric mouse Pikachu who took the world by storm. This success, however, did not come without a price; Pokémon's producers decided that if Pokémon were to make it globally, it would have to reduce what Koichi Iwabuchi (1998) calls its 'cultural odor'.

Glocalization

A common assumption of the global popular culture industry is that for a Japanese cultural product to find a mass market abroad, it must not seem to be too Japanese. De-Japanization can be accomplished during the act of creation, by designing a cultural text to be universal in its themes and lacking specifically Japanese images and references, and/or after the fact, by erasing explicitly Japanese content and references.

These processes are more easily done with some kinds of cultural products than with others. Japan's most successful cultural exports to date have been computer games. The global computer game market originated with Japanese designed games including *Duck Hunt*, *Space Invaders*, *Donkey Kong*, *Super Mario Brothers*, and *Pacman*. These games were relatively easy to export, as they had no explicit Japanese cultural content. *Mortal Kombat* and *Street Fighter* were the first globally distributed computer games that were explicitly Japanese/Asian, with lead characters including sumo wrestlers, ninjas, karate specialists, and kung-fu masters.

But this is not to suggest that there is nothing Japanese about Pokémon. The Pokémon computer game, television show, and movies have many distinctively Japanese elements and concerns. Pokémon's creator, Tajiri Kojiro, has stated in interviews that his dream was to create a computer game that would allow contemporary Japanese children to reconnect with nature through learning to identify and care for insect-like creatures, as he did as a boy who gathered beetles in the woods, an activity that is difficult to pursue in an urbanized Japan. Other readily identifiable Japanese plot elements include the *sensei-deishi* (master-disciple) relationship between the Pokémon characters Satoshi (Ash) and Professor Okido (Professor Oak) and Satoshi's quest, in the Japanese martial arts tradition, to climb the Pokémon trainer ranks until he reaches the level of Pokémon Master.

Elements in Pokémon that are more subtly Japanese include the themes of miniaturization (Du Gay et al., 1997); encapsulation (once captured, the Pokémon 'Pocket Monsters' are trained to live in 'Pokéballs'); metamorphosis (in the 'change-robot', 'Power Up' tradition of *Voltron*, *The Transformers*, and *The Mighty Morphin Power Rangers*); and heroes having 'special' attacking moves (in the tradition of both *anime* and computer fighting games). Another *anime* and *manga* trope that appears in Pokémon is the presence of sexualized girls and curvaceous, mini-skirted young women. Although cuteness is a common feature of Western as well as Japanese cartooning, Pokémon is *kawaii* (cute) in a particularly Japanese way. The aesthetic style of the Pokémon television show and movies is representative of the Japanese *manga* and *anime* tradition that features a clean, flat drawing style, a lack of fluid motion (in marked contrast to the greater three-dimensionality and realistic motion of characters in Disney and Warner Brothers cartooning) and such movie-like effects as overhead, tracking, and point of view shots and the inclusion of special effect shots, such as split screen and the interpolation of negative images. The major human characters in Pokémon are *mu-kokuseki* (nationality-less), neither clearly Japanese nor not Japanese, but minor characters include such unambiguously Japanese figures as ninjas and samurai. Satoshi/Ash and his friends move through a fictional world that includes such culturally generic locations as Pallet Town and Pewter City, but they occasionally enter restaurants with signs and curtains printed in *kanji* and once inside they eat rice balls and slurp noodles.

The artful manipulation of the Japaneseness of Pokémon in both its domestic and export versions has been crucial to its success. The terms 'global localization', 'glocalization', and 'glocal' were coined, some say, by Sony to refer to the

need for a product that is to succeed globally to be modified to be sold in foreign markets (Iwabuchi, 1998). The process that allowed Pokémon to be so successful in overseas markets began not with glocalization but with another factor discussed by Iwabuchi, 'de-odorization', which involves developing cultural products designed from the start to be scrubbed of any obvious Japanese 'cultural odor'.

How systematic and planned was the de-odorization of Pokémon? Tajiri and Kubo deny consciously reducing the Japaneseness of their original products (the computer game and television series, respectively). But Iwabuchi's conceptualizing of de-odorization does not require conscious intent. My hunch is that the de-odorization of Pokémon at the time of its creation was less a conscious global marketing strategy than it was the result of its creators working within already de-odorized genres. Japanese computer games and *anime* are made up of such de-odorized tropes as cultureless landscapes, nationality-less characters, and hybrid intertextual references. Unless the *mise en scene* is explicitly Japanese (as, for example, in a folktale such as *Princess Mononoke* or a domestic comedy such as *Crayon Shinchan*), Japanese *anime* illustrators create *mu-kokuseki* characters because that is how they and their readers expect characters in *anime* to look. I suspect this is what happened with the creation of Satoshi (Ash), Kasumi (Misty), Nurse Joi (Joy), Professor Okido (Oak) and the other only vaguely or not at all Japanese-looking human characters in Pokémon. If the conscious intent of the Pokémon developers from the onset had been to develop a cultureless, globally marketable product, more care would have been taken from the start to avoid the inclusion of *kanji*, Japanese foods, and plots with specifically Japanese intertextual references, such as when 'Bakabondo', a character borrowed from a popular *manga*, turns up in the feral child episode. The presence of such Japanese elements in the original Pokémon game and in the first series of the television series created the need for extensive and, in some cases, no doubt, expensive localization.

When Tajiri and Kubo began their work on Pokémon they had no reason to expect their products would make it big domestically, much less overseas. But by 1999, with Pokémon fever already sweeping the United States, Kubo was fully aware of the need to limit the Japanese odor of Pokémon in order to facilitate localization for the American and other markets. Kubo explains that unlike the original Pokémon television series, considerable care was taken in the production of the Pokémon movies to reduce the Japanese odor:

Another Japanese *anime* TV and movie series called *Sailor Moon* was popular a few years ago. When the movies went on the silver screen in the United States, very little was altered visually. The outcome was a moderate hit, but the series never got to be like the big craze it was in Japan. Our research on this case suggests that things like Japanese writing showing up on signboards in the background and uniquely Japanese family settings distract American kids, preventing them from really becoming absorbed in the movie's fictional world. With these examples in mind, from the start we had our hearts set on thoroughly localizing *Pokémon: The First Movie*, though we may not have been completely successful in doing so. (Kubo, 2000, p. 2)

As it turned out, they were not. Despite their attempts to produce a culture-free product, much work remained for the localizers.

Localizers are key workers in the contemporary culture industry. Japanese computer game makers are among those companies that hire employees in overseas markets to localize their products by, for example, renaming characters and by reducing the intensity of the color of the blood in shooting games. The localizing of Pokémon for the North American market was a collaborative Japanese-American effort. Kubo and Tsunekazu Ishihara of Creatures, Inc. took the lead on the Japanese side while the key American localizers were Gail Tilden of Nintendo of America and Al Kahn (creator of the Cabbage Patch Doll) and Norman Grossfeld of 4Kids Entertainment/Leisure Concepts.

In his accounts of his interactions with his American localizers, Kubo comes across as a somewhat anguished figure, torn, like a novelist whose work is being translated, between the desires to reach a wider audience and to protect the integrity of his original creation, between trusting his American collaborators and fearing they will rob his text of its passion and subtlety:

Once we actually started looking at the requests of Warner Brothers, however, it often gave us headaches. [...] According to them, the Japanese original [script] does not distinguish clearly enough between the good guys and the bad. Such a movie would not be successful in a multiethnic country like the United States, they insisted, because the viewers would not know who to identify with and who to cheer on. In other words, the heroes and villains needed to be identified clearly. They accomplished this by revising the various characters' lines. (Kubo, 2000, p. 3)

Whatever the backstage struggles between creators and translators, the translated versions of Pokémon are of high quality, and this quality has contributed significantly to Pokémon being the most successfully exported Japanese cultural product. A prime example of the quality of Pokémon's localization can be seen in the great care and creativity that went into the renaming of the Pokémon in English and other languages. Following the lead of the Japanese original, the localizers devised names that make it easy for children not only to memorize the Pokémon but to understand the relationship among each Pokémon both to their evolved higher forms and to their family group (e.g., water, fire, earth, or air). The names are rich in both cute puns and in a pseudo-Linnean attention to family and genus. For example, the little lizard with fire on its tail is Charmander in English, his more evolved version Charmeleon, and his most evolved, ferocious version Charizard.

Similarly clever names have been devised for Pokémon's French, Italian, and German versions. The 'grass' type Pokémon originally named Fushigisou – a combination of the Japanese words *fushigi* (strange) and *sou* (plant) – was renamed Ivysaur in English, Herbizarre in French, and Bisaknosp in German. The trading cards, television series, movies, and Game Boy cartridges have been translated into other languages, but without translating the names of the Pokémon. Spanish and Italian versions of the cards are available, with descriptions of their

special attacks fully translated, but the names of the Pokémon are those from the English version, making it difficult for children to appreciate the puns and taxonomic relationships.

What these linguistic examples reveal is that the glocalization of Pokémon is an incomplete and unequal phenomenon. Children in many parts of the world have access to Pokémon, but not equal access. If you speak Japanese, English, German, or French, and live in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Germany, or France you have access to the full range of fully translated and localized Pokémon products. In Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese-speaking countries most of the products are available, but the translations are not as thoroughly localized. In the case of a smaller market country such as Israel, the television show has been translated into Hebrew but the only cards available are in English. In smaller market countries, there is a sense of loss among fans not just about not getting fully translated versions of the full range of products, but also about being behind. Pokémon's product release cycle was collapsed in Israel, with the TV show, cards, and movies introduced over the course of several months rather than, as in Japan and the U.S., several years. This was necessary because by the time Pokémon officially was introduced to Israel, over one hundred TV episodes, two movies, and five versions of the Pokémon Game Boy game had already been produced and released in Japan and the United States, English language versions of these products had already entered Israel through various means, and children were keenly aware of what they were missing and what they should be offered. This dynamic between consumers and producers is very different in a cultural commodity's country of origin where fans feel a sense of excitement about being the first to engage with a new product and enjoy the power of getting to help decide if this product should and will succeed in the marketplace in contrast to the situation in 'downstream' countries such as Israel, Holland, Mexico, and the Philippines where all but the youngest consumers are aware that they are behind the wave. This sense of being behind comes across in statements posted to Pokémon bulletin boards on the Web. For example, in August of 2000, a thirteen-year-old boy from Manila wrote:

Well, I'm from the Philippines, an Asian country. I guess most TV networks here play anime series which have already been shown to other countries. It's a bit annoying to know that other people have already finished the series when we are just halfway through. Well that's how things work around here!!!

That same summer a Dutch fan wrote:

I live in Holland and already have seen all episodes three times or so, but the movie 2000 is not yet here.

Another Dutch fan added later in the summer:

In Holland the first movie is just out for one month so nope I haven't seen the new movie yet. ...tell me, is Brock in the movie?

Pokémon is much less available in poorer countries than richer ones. In countries where Nintendo has no offices, third parties may import Pokémon products on their own, but without a mass marketing campaign and diverse distribution networks, Pokémon's market penetration is small. Pokémon's presence is also limited in countries that are antagonistic to the spread of Western (and Japanese) popular culture. Clerics in Qatar and Saudi Arabia issued a Fatwa (holy edict) against Pokémon in April of 2001, citing the presence of Shinto, Christian, and Zionist symbols and themes. Sheik Yousef al-Qaradawi of The Research and Fatwa Administration of Dubai is quoted in an AP (Associated Press) story (4/5/2001) as saying that Pokémon is "dangerous to a child's mentality and behaviour, involves gambling, promotes Zionism and Darwin's theory of evolution".

The schedule that determines when and where the Pokémon train will stop is set for the most part not in Kyoto or Tokyo but at Nintendo of America headquarters in Redmond, Washington. Pikachu's global adventure has carried him not from Japan to the world, but from Japan to the United States, where he was given a make over before sending him on to the rest of the world. It is Nintendo of America, Hasbro, 4Kids Entertainment, and Warner Brothers, and not their Japanese counterparts that hold the rights for selling Pokémon products in most markets. The versions of the Pokémon cards, television shows, and movies that are available everywhere but Asia are translations of the American rather than Japanese versions. The fact that Pokémon reaches most of the world via the United States means that the global Pokémon empire is not quite the challenge to American pop-culture global hegemony that it first seems to be. Pikachu, at least for the moment, may be outselling Mickey Mouse, but American corporations including Hasbro and Warner Brothers are earning a large share of the profits. Lacking the know-how and global distribution systems for cultural products, Nintendo, Shogakukan, Creatures, Inc., TV Tokyo and the other Japanese corporations involved in the development of Pokémon had little choice but to turn to the United States to gain worldwide distribution. The experience, profits, and confidence Japanese producers are garnering with Pokémon may allow them to develop their own distribution networks in the future. But for now, as both the world's largest market for and exporter of children's culture, the United States is an economic and cultural force more sensibly worked with than against.

Asian markets are the one significant exception to Pokémon reaching foreign countries via the United States. Nintendo and the other Japanese Pokémon producing corporations export their products directly to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and other Asian nations. It is the Japanese rather than the American versions of the Pokémon cards, TV series, and movies that are being marketed in Asia. With China a sleeping giant when it comes to importing children's culture, the Asian market is still relatively small, but Japan's ability to market its cultural creations in Asia has the potential to become a significant economic factor in a Japanese economic recovery.

Iwabuchi (1998) points out that the cultural products Japan exports to Asia are not traditional Japanese products but instead Japanese re-makings of West-

ern cultural products. Memories of Japanese military aggression still fresh, many Asian countries have an antipathy to anything marked as traditional Japanese culture, but these same countries are increasingly open to importing Japan's expertise as a localizer and disseminator of Western popular culture. Iwabuchi points out that the Japanese versions of American and British pop-music and television dramas recently have become more popular in Taiwan and Hong Kong than their Western equivalents. Hong Kong and other Asian countries are eager to import the latest goods and cultural products from Japan because they view Japan as a more advanced capitalist culture and economy and hope that by purchasing Japanese goods they can further their own cultural and economic development.

Unofficial/grassroot localizers

The globalization processes I've discussed so far are all corporate planned and directed. But these official routes of Pokémon's global dissemination are only part of the story of its success. The first versions of Pokémon to make it to the U.S. came not via Gail Tilden's and Norman Grossfeld's carefully designed localization efforts, but instead via unofficial consumption networks. Back in 1997, before Nintendo of Japan directed Nintendo of America to launch a localization campaign for Pokémon and before 4Kids Entertainment began work on translating the TV series into English, Pokémon was already being consumed outside Japan. By the autumn of 1997, just months after the television series was first aired in Japan, pirated versions were being sold and otherwise exchanged hand to hand, by mail, and over the Internet by *anime otaku* (Japanese animation fans) in various locations outside Japan. By the autumn of 1998, as the TV series was first being broadcast in English in the United States, the Japanese versions of Pokémon videos and trading cards were already on shelves in *anime*, role playing, and Japanese import stores around the world and pirated copies of the TV programs, dubbed into Mandarin and Cantonese, were available in small shops in Chinatowns worldwide. By the winter of 1999, when Pokémon fever began to sweep through elementary schools across the United States, there was already a vanguard of kids in the schools knowledgeable about the computer game, cards, and TV series.

In most American and many European communities there is a small group of 'geeky' young people who are experts on Japanese popular culture. Many, but by no means all, of these young people are of Asian backgrounds and most, but not all, are males. These *otaku* – through friendship networks; school-based gaming clubs; informal as well as structured gatherings at role-playing game stores; web sites and list serves; and magazines such as *Giant Robot* – are a repository of cutting-edge knowledge of popular cultural trends in Japan.

I can illustrate the importance of informal dissemination networks through vignettes of three early moments in Pikachu's global adventure:

1) It is January of 1999 and Kenji Takata, a seven-year-old boy who had moved to Honolulu from Tokyo with his parents six months earlier, is suddenly a source of valuable cultural information in his second grade classroom. American children bringing the Game Boys they received for Christmas to school eagerly seek Kenji's advice on how to beat Pokémon Red. He is glad to oblige.

2) I visit an *anime/manga* store in Honolulu in the fall of 1999, just as the Pokémon craze is really getting going in the U.S. When I ask Spencer, the manager, if he has any Pokémon tapes he points me to the *anime* section, but not before giving me a quick lecture that goes something like: 'We have some tapes from the first television series, in Japanese. Right over there, between Macross and Ranma. Are you looking for you or for your kids? You know, Pokémon isn't a children's thing. It's *anime*. A lot of my customers have known about Pokémon since it was first released in Japan, way before all the hype and before the little kids got into it.'

3) In the winter of 2000, Sue Chinn, a University of Chicago undergraduate in my course on 'Children and Popular Culture', explains to me how she happens to know so much about Pokémon. She tells me that what she knows about Pokémon came mostly through her twelve-year-old brother, Tom. Two years earlier, their cousins in Hong Kong sent Tom a VCD (video-CD) that contained pirated copies of episodes of several *anime* (in Japanese), including Pokémon. On a visit to Hong Kong the next summer Tom's cousins took him to software and electronic shops in the Mongkok district where he purchased 'non-taxed' (illegally imported and/or copied) Pokémon cards, videos (some in Japanese, some dubbed into Chinese), and merchandise (mostly unlicensed from Taiwan). (Hong Kong plays a special role in both the Asian and global economies as a broker, mediator, hijacker, and disseminator of Japanese cultural products.) Back home in Chicago, Tom spends his weekends hanging out with his friends at 'Cards and Comix', a comic book/role playing games store in a neighborhood on the city's Southwest side. Although perceived as nerds at school, their knowledge of Pokémon and other Japanese *anime* and role playing games and their access to pirated Japanese cultural products give them celebrity status at their local gaming store and in their *otaku* community.

Young people like Kenji, Spencer, and Tom are key facilitators of Pikachu's global adventure. Although Nintendo complains about unauthorized copying of tapes, illegal importation of games and cards, and posting of web sites that use Pokémon graphics without permission, I would argue that these informal and in some cases illegal routes of introducing Pokémon and other Japanese cultural products abroad do more to facilitate than to interfere with Nintendo's global marketing mission.

Pokémon's pleasures and meanings

The pleasures children find in Pokémon vary from country to country, from rich neighborhoods to poor ones, from young children to adolescents, from girls to boys, and from the beginning to the end of the craze. As discussed above, national and social class variations in children's engagement with Pokémon can be attributed to local customs and traditions and to unequal access to Pokémon products. Drawing on a concept of Michel de Certeau (1984), who makes a distinction between the strategies of the powerful (colonizing governments, invading armies, bosses) and the tactics of the weak (colonial subjects, resistance fighters, employees), we can see children as tacticians who use the means at hand to extract pleasure where and when they can find it. If all that is available to them is stickers, they will create pleasurable forms of Pokémon play around stickers. Children wealthy enough to have their own Game Boys will spend many hours engaged in solitary Game Boy play, which has its own pleasures to offer. It is possible that the kids who have only the TV show and stickers get as much pleasure from Pokémon as the kids with Game Boys and albums full of shinies.

We can also look at the pleasures of Pokémon developmentally. Very young children play Pokémon by being Pokémon: 'I'll be Charizard. You be Squirtle.' The pleasures here are the pleasures of projective identification. Children who are a bit older also engage in dramatic play, but they tend to imagine themselves as trainers rather than as Pokémon: 'I'm Misty and you're Ash.' This developmental sequence may not be universal – Kubo (2000) has observed that American children are more attracted to Ash and the other trainers while Japanese children focus more on the Pocket Monsters themselves. As children get older, they tend to find pleasure less in dramatic play and identification with the characters than in collecting the cards and mastering such arcane information as the point values and market prices of the cards and cheat codes for beating the game.

There seems to be a developmental sequence to the pleasures children find in the Pokémon trading cards. When asked to identify their best card, the youngest children tend to select the one with whom they most readily identify (little girls, for example, choosing Jigglypuff and little boys Squirtle or Charmander). Children a little older identify the best cards as those of the characters that have the most social status: 'Charizard is the best card because he's the coolest.' Social status is gradually replaced by notions of scarcity and monetary value: 'This one is my best because it's the hardest to get. I could sell it for more than \$50.' A smaller group of older children who master the complex rules of the trading card game identify their best cards as those that have the most strategic value.

Another important pleasure of Pokémon is that it provides children with a common culture. One of the downsides of being a child is that you get dragged along to functions where you don't know anybody. During the height of the Pokémon craze, children meeting for the first time had a reliable opening line: 'Who's your favorite Pokémon?' Young children, who tend to have relatively little control over what they wear, can perform their gendered identities and show that they are cool by donning Pokémon T-shirts, caps, and backpacks. The

world of Pokémon is diverse enough to offer children a variety of stylistic options: little boys in North America and in Europe tend to go for Ash caps and brightly colored Pikachu gear. Older boys tend to favor black Pokémon T-shirts, caps, and backpacks, sporting scenes of tough or scary Pokémon, such as Charizard, Mewtwo, and Gengar engaged in battle. Girls tend to go for pink-hued Pokémon gear picturing the cutest (smallest and most infantile) of the Pokémon, characters such as Togepi, Exeggcuter, Wigglytuff, Purin, and Ponyta. Older girls, and even some college students, adorn their backpacks with tiny Pikachu and Clefairy icons.

One of the keys to Pokémon's success is that it allows children to tap into a variety of themes, including competition, fighting, cooperation, friendship, nurturance, and even sexuality. These themes are available to both boys and girls, especially when they are very young. But as children get older, their engagement with Pokémon tends to divide along gender lines. For pre-adolescent boys, Pokémon offers a PG-rated² version of the *Dungeons and Dragons*/*Mortal Kombat* world of adolescent masculinity. For girls, Pokémon's most salient attraction is cuteness.

Cuteness, a powerful theme in contemporary Japanese character merchandising, developed out of the *shojo* (girls) culture of the 1970s. Eager to acknowledge and celebrate Japan's newfound prosperity after the hardships of the war and occupation eras, Japanese society in the 1970s embraced the tastes of adolescent girls for 'fancy' goods and a carefree lifestyle that seemed to value cuteness above all other virtues. The producers of *anime* and *manga* developed cute characters such as *Doraemon*, *Arare-chan*, and *Hello Kitty*, characters who both reflected and appealed to *shojo* culture. Sony and other corporations brought technological sophistication to the culture of cuteness in their development of products that are perky, portable, personal, and miniaturized. In the 1990s, Nintendo was the leader in companies who combined cute hardware with cute software. Pokémon, to date, is the most globally successful of Japan's cute products.

Pikachu's golden years

For all its inherent attributes (virtues as a multidimensional, polysemic product) and all of its marketing muscle, Pokémon seems to be reaching the end of the line. Visiting a toy store anywhere in the U.S. in the summer of 2001, it is clear that Pokémon's shelf space is a fraction of what it enjoyed in the fall of 1999. Pokémon merchandise still available in stores is likely to be marked 'reduced'. The third Pokémon movie opened and closed with one-tenth the hype and much less box office than the original. Perhaps the most telling sign of Pokémon's declining fortunes is that on playgrounds and classrooms across the U.S. it is clear that Pokémon has lost its cool.

And yet, as I write this in 2001, press releases on the Nintendo corporate web site proclaim that Pokémon is thriving. How can we explain this apparent disjuncture between children's declarations that Pokémon is dead and the pro-

ducer's claims that it is still going strong? Some of Nintendo's optimism can be chalked up to corporate hype and to executives whistling in the wind to try to convince themselves and others (including not just customers but also toy store owners, movie theaters, and TV schedulers) that there is still a lot of money to be made on Pokémon. Another way to explain the disparity is to see it as a matter of relativity. Sales of Pokémon products and viewership of the TV series and movies can drop significantly from Fall of 1999 levels and still leave Pokémon as a top selling children's products. Pokémon *Stadium* is not nearly as big as Pokémon *Yellow* was in 1999, but it's still among the top three selling computer games in the world. In other words, Pokémon at its peak was so big that it can drop two-thirds and still be one of the world's most profitable children's products. We should remember that Nintendo's game characters have a very long life (or in the language of computer games, many lives). After all, the *Mario Brothers* are still around, as is *Donkey Kong*. Pikachu himself/herself seems to have reached a level of fame and affection that will allow him/her to live on for many years to come, if nothing else than as an item of nostalgia. However, as we attempt to make sense of Pokémon's residual economic viability, it is important to remember that the Pokémon juggernaut is made up of a loose configuration of companies with different financial stakes and fortunes. Pokémon living on as a Nintendo computer game does not necessarily mean that it will live on much longer as a TV show, nor that there will be more successful movies, nor that sales of Pokémon merchandise will not continue to drop off each year.

Another way to make sense of Pokémon's rise and (apparent) fall is to think about Pokémon temporally and spatially. There are innovative, complex issues of time and space both within the Pokémon narrative and the structuration of the computer game and also in the global circulation of Pokémon, from the moment that it began as gleam in Tajiri Satoshi's mind's eye at his Game Freaks office in Tokyo in 1994 to the 2001 Fatwa banning Pokémon in the United Arab Emirates.

Most children seem to be well aware that Pokémon, as a social phenomenon, exists in time and space. Children know that Pokémon comes from Japan. The fact that children in the U.S. and Europe know the relative values of the Japanese and English versions of the trading cards suggests that they are well aware of the global dimensions of the phenomenon. What children understand most clearly about Pokémon is that it once was hot and now it's not. Age is another important dimension of time in the rise and fall of Pokémon: when Pokémon was new, it was a form of techno-culture that was cool even for older kids to like. Several years later, as the Pokémon phenomenon winds down in the U.S., it is only little kids, losers, and *otaku* who are still interested.

I suggest that to make sense of Pokémon's rise and fall we need to think about time and space not separately, but together, in a sort of Einsteinian notion of relativity (a space time continuum). Pokémon is much older in Japan than in the U.S., older in the U.S. than in Europe, and older in Europe than in Israel, Brazil, and the Philippines. Perhaps what's needed is to view Pikachu's global adventure, as Einstein taught us to view light, as both particle and wave, that is, both as physical commodities that get shipped to specific sites around the globe

and also as a wave of interest and awareness that began in Japan, washed over Hong Kong, Asia, and the U.S., and even now, as I write, no doubt is just reaching some economically and culturally (if not geographically) distant and remote outpost of global consumption. Time is relative: when it's midnight in New York, it's noon in Tokyo. But time is also absolute: the New York stock market opens instantaneously around the globe. Thus in one sense, whenever Pokémon reaches a new market, it is new for the children who are encountering it for the first time. But because the world is globally culturally connected, even before the official wave of Pokémon merchandise, movies, and TV episodes arrive, foretellings will have already come via the Internet and world travelers who bring news and sometimes products with them, making consumers in places like the Philippines and even Holland painfully aware that they are latecomers to the craze. The almost instantaneous pace of the global circulation of information leads to a time compression of product roll outs and life cycles in places like France and Israel, where consumers already know a lot about a new cultural product before its official release. Knowing they are behind, these consumers feel the need to catch up, a feeling of urgency shared by producers who release products rapidly in these downstream markets to make money before their consumers' appetites abate.

Somewhere in the world, for some very young and sheltered children, Pokémon is totally new and fresh and the little yellow mouse Pikachu is young again, waiting to meet his master, Ash. But in the rest of the world, Pikachu is well into his golden years. This is a core reality of globalization: the world is getting smaller, but all points are not equally close in time or space. The travel time of information often precedes the travel time of goods and some destinations are much further away than others, not so much because of their geographic location, as their location in global capitalism.

Notes

1. J. Tobin (Ed.) (forthcoming). *Pikachu's Global Adventure: Making Sense of the Rise and Fall of Pokémon*. Duke University Press.
2. PG = Parental Guidance Suggested

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Globalisation of Children's TV and Strategies of the "Big Three"

Tim Westcott

My brief for this article was to look at two trends in children's television: the globalisation of programme production, in particular the production of animation; and the strategies of (what are, since the acquisition of Fox Family Worldwide by Disney in 2001) three US-based companies – Cartoon Network, Disney and Nickelodeon – which are competing at a global level in the business of making and broadcasting programmes aimed at children.

The second of these trends is closely bound up with the first. The USA is by far the largest marketplace for children's television in the world, with advertisers spending more than \$1 billion a year on reaching the 2-11 age group via television, and billions more being spent on home videos, books, toys and other merchandise linked with popular TV shows. The US is estimated to account for two-thirds of the licensed goods business worldwide, which has a retail value of some \$175 billion.

The "big three"

The box "Profiles of the big three" presents briefly the three companies.

Cable and satellite is available in about three-quarters of US homes, and channels like Nickelodeon, which is on air 16 hours a day, seven days a week, and Cartoon Network, on air 24 hours a day, seven days a week, now take the lion's share of TV viewing and an estimated 80 per cent of advertising impacts. This has become a lucrative business: Nickelodeon is estimated to turn over more than \$900 million a year, and Cartoon Network's gross revenue for 2000 was reported to be \$500 million.

Both of these channels have, over the last decade, looked to the rest of the world for further expansion. Nickelodeon, owned by the media conglomerate Viacom, launched its first international outlet in the UK in 1993. Cartoon Network, now part of an even bigger group, AOL-Time Warner, started satellite feeds to Latin America and Europe in the same year and an Asian service in 1994.

Profiles of the big three

- *The Walt Disney Company* is, in many ways, the paradigm of the global media company and certainly the main reference point in the children's business. The company is present in almost every sector of media activity: film and TV production, broadcasting (both free to air and thematic), home video, licensing and merchandising. It also has its own retail outlets and theme parks and has staked out new terrain on the Internet. The acquisition of Fox Family Worldwide in 2001 gave it a US cable channel (now rebranded ABC Family) and a majority stake in the Amsterdam-listed Fox Kids Europe.
- *Cartoon Network* has retained some of the entrepreneurial characteristics of the Turner Broadcasting entity, which launched the network in 1992. Unlike Disney, Cartoon Network is primarily a broadcasting organisation, although it is now under the wing of a major Hollywood studio grouping. As its global reach has extended, the network has developed its own licensing and merchandising activities and set up its own animation studio in 2000. The foundation of the network was the Hanna Barbera, Warner Bros and MGM animation library.
- *Nickelodeon*, now part of Viacom Inc, was the first children's cable channel, launching in the USA in 1979. The network has been one of the major influences on the children's business as its global development has continued, through its philosophy of talking to its audience on their own terms and the irreverent, offbeat style of its signature programmes. Nickelodeon has also implemented an international channel strategy, accompanied by licensing and merchandising and new media.

The Walt Disney Company, which launched its own channel in the USA in 1983, has followed the other two into the international market, setting up its first international ventures, branded as the Disney Channel, in the UK and in Asia in 1995. Fox Kids Network, part of Rupert Murdoch's Fox Broadcasting empire, made its move into the world market in 1996, forming Fox Family Worldwide, a joint venture with Saban Entertainment. As mentioned above, Fox Family Worldwide is now acquired by Disney.

All three of these groups are using their strong position in the US market as the foundation-stone for a global business. Opportunities have opened up in other territories with the growth of cable and satellite television, which has transformed the TV marketplace and facilitated the launch of a range of thematic services aimed at specific audiences and interest groups. Since Nickelodeon started up in 1979, as the first child-oriented thematic channel, over 113 services aiming for the same audience have sprung up over the world (2001). The big

three have been responsible for almost half of these launches, owning or part-owning no less than 54 channels around the world (Table 1).

Table 1. Branded channels of the big three, 2001

Company	USA	Latin America	Europe	Asia/Pacific	Middle East	Total
Cartoon Network	2	3	8	2	-	15
Disney Channel	2	1	6	4	1	14
Fox Kids	0*	1	11	1	1	14
Nickelodeon	2	1	5	3	-	11

* The two channels of Fox Kids Network in the USA, owned by Fox Broadcasting, now has no link with the channels of the same name in Europe.

Source: Tim Westcott *The Business of Children's Television* (2nd edition, Nov 2001). Screen Digest.

Where it is not thought possible or viable to set up a local network, the big three either make a local language feed available which is beamed in via satellite, or place a block of programming on a network which contains their programmes and is branded with their name. Disney's block strategy includes some local programming which is made by its Buena Vista Productions unit.

Thus, the US market is now dominated by these three players and cable and satellite is one important reason for their growth: Nickelodeon has been the most viewed network by children (aged between 2-11) for several years. It captures over half of the \$1 billion advertising market for this age group. Cartoon Network, a relative newcomer, has seen its ad revenues climb strongly as its distribution has increased.

Both networks are spending heavily on new programming to feed their growth at home and abroad. Nickelodeon invested \$200 million in new programming in 2000, and Cartoon Network is spending \$450 million in the period 1997-2002. Both networks now own their own animation studios, which turn out the majority of their output.

The US market has seen the consolidation of programming supply and broadcast ownership, which has had a dramatic impact on the production scene. This process followed the abolition in 1995 of the "financial interest in syndication" rules imposed by the Federal Communications Commission. These rules prevented one of the networks from owning (and therefore selling or syndicating) their programme output. With "fin-syn" scrapped, Disney bought the ABC network, and Warner Brothers and Paramount launched their own networks. Subsequently, Fox joined up with Saban to go global and Viacom bought CBS.

The impact of consolidation could clearly be seen in the line-up of new children's programmes for the 2000/1 season, also for the traditional broadcasting networks ABC, CBS and NBC (Table 2). Seven series on ABC were produced by Disney-owned studios. Eight of Nickelodeon's new animated series were made in-house and three more came from Klasky Csupo, which has an exclusive output deal with the network. Cartoon Network (not in the table) self-supplied

three of its new series. The CBS children's block is now almost entirely supplied by Nickelodeon. NBC moved out of the children's business several seasons ago, concentrating on the teenage audience on Saturday mornings.

Fox Kids and Kids WB bought most of their new series in from external suppliers, so the door is not completely closed to independents. But in these cases the networks finance less than 30 per cent of the production cost of a new programme, leaving the producer to finance the balance through pre-sales or distribution advances. Very few independents in the US have this capability. Even Columbia TriStar, the only major studio which does not own a US network, has struggled to make its animation output viable.

Table 2. Animated children's series orders by US networks, 2000/1

Network	In-house*	External	Total
ABC	9	0	9
Kids WB	4	6	10
Fox Kids Network	1	6	7
Nickelodeon	8	3	11
CBS	3	1	4

* ABC: in-house = Walt Disney TV Animation, Jumbo Pictures, DIC Entertainment; Fox Kids = Saban; CBS = Nickelodeon.

Note: Correct at beginning of 2000/1 season. Schedules are likely to alter in midseason.

Source: Tim Westcott *The Business of Children's Television* (2nd edition, Nov 2001). Screen Digest.

The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) is the only major US broadcasting outlet not dominated by the "big three". Although the public broadcasters, which make up the network are relatively poor when it comes to investing in programming, PBS dominates the preschool market, one of the more lucrative sectors for licensing and merchandising. However, with the launch of a Nick Junior block on Nickelodeon and the Noggin network, a joint venture between Nickelodeon and Sesame Workshop, this market is also under siege.

The three companies are different (see the different profiles in the previous box), but they do have the following in common:

- Terrestrial or cable and satellite networks (or in some cases both) in the USA;
- Branded thematic channels outside the USA;
- Ownership of a large library of high-quality children's programmes;
- Ownership of major US-based animation studios;
- Worldwide programme sales activities, including "blocks";
- Home video divisions;
- Licensing and merchandising divisions.

Clearly, the fact that these three companies are involved in such a wide range of activities makes them stand out. The sheer scale of their activities makes these companies giants in comparison with those in other countries.

The access to a large volume of attractive programming is the basis of their channel strategy (Table 3). Programming accounts for about 50 per cent of the operating costs of a network. Operating networks also offers support to programme sales operations; each group continues to sell its programming to free TV networks and is able to benefit from the added exposure this gives their properties, as well as collecting additional licence fees.

Table 3. Programme production and distribution of the big three, 2001

Company	Animation production	Number of hours in library
Nickelodeon	Nickelodeon Studios, Klasky Csupo (exclusive output arrangement)	2,150
Cartoon Network	Cartoon Network Studios	2,000
Disney Channel	Walt Disney Animation (TV and feature), Jumbo Pictures	1,100 + 2,750 produced by Saban; after Disney's acquisition of Fox Family Worldwide

Source: Tim Westcott *The Business of Children's Television* (2nd edition, Nov 2001). Screen Digest.

Global domination?

It would be easy to present this well developed global strategy as a programme of global domination on the part of the big three – indeed it is often presented as such. However, a number of factors stand in their way.

1) All three companies are operating under strict financial controls.

All three are (or are units of) public companies. They have not been given unlimited amounts of funding to establish themselves in the international market, so they are only prepared to set up local networks where they stand a chance of making a return on their investment within a few years.

Nickelodeon closed its network in Germany in 1999 because it did not believe the revenues were good enough. The network has also steered clear of France and Italy. Fox Kids Europe, which has been most aggressive in launching channels, is operating independently of its US-based shareholder, Disney.

The three have invested relatively little in local production, preferring to use their channels as an outlet for the new output from the US studios or for archive programming. An internal analysis of cable channel schedules in the UK, which was carried out by the BBC in 2000, suggested that only Nick Junior acquired a significant quantity of UK programming for its schedule – just over 53%. In the period analysed, Cartoon Network carried only 4.2%, Disney Channel 7.3%, Nickelodeon 8.6% and Fox Kids 8.8% of UK programming.

2) Cable and satellite penetration is limited in most countries.

In Canada and the USA, which are both mature cable TV markets, thematic channels are the major players in children's TV. In the major European markets, in Asia and Latin America, however, penetration of cable is mostly well below 50 per cent. Audiences are tiny, and advertisers are reluctant to invest money in thematic channels. The advent of digital broadcasting has made average viewing shares even smaller.

3) Terrestrial channels still dominate children's viewing.

In most territories, it is still terrestrial channels such as BBC1 and ITV in the UK, TF1 and France 3 in France, Rai in Italy and TVE, Antena 3 and Tele 5 in Spain, which account for the lion's share of children's viewing. There are a few exceptions to the rule: in Germany, Super RTL and Kika – which are mainly on cable – are the market leaders, as are Nickelodeon and Cartoon Network in the USA, and YTV in Canada.

4) Competition from the big three has mobilised local players.

The threat of competition has galvanised incumbent broadcasters into a more aggressive strategy. ITV in the UK and France 3 in France are examples of networks which have started to combat thematic channels. In the UK, ITV's viewing share among children in cable and satellite homes actually recovered between 1997 and 1999. Public broadcasters in Belgium and the Netherlands have launched their own branded blocks, partly to take the big three on at their own game.

Local players have also – not always so successfully – entered the thematic channel business. Canal J and Télétoon in France and Kika in Germany, however, all perform respectably against international players. In 2002, the BBC launched the digital channels CBBC for six to 13 year-olds and CBeebies aimed at children under six. The ITV, too, is planning a children's channel in the UK.

Local producers have also learnt from the strategies of the US players in developing a more concerted approach to rights ownership and exploitation. Examples include British companies Gullane Entertainment (with the programme *Thomas the Tank Engine and Friends*), BBC Worldwide (with *Teletubbies* and *Tweenies*) and Hit Entertainment (with *Bob the Builder*).

5) Competition for programme supply is increasing in the international market.

Until the early 1990s, the animation we saw in cinemas and on TV was mostly made in the USA or Japan. Now, an increasing amount of animation is being produced in Europe and in Canada.

A large part of this is due to public policy initiatives (especially in France and Canada), which give financial backing to help the development of domestic production. These two countries are now pivotal to international co-production. Support schemes have also aided development in other countries like Germany and Australia and are now under consideration in Asian countries, notably China and South Korea.

These moves have certainly created a lot more programming: 800 hours of animation was produced in Europe in 1999. While figures for the USA and Japan are not published, it is unlikely that each country's output is greater. As well as filling a large part of schedules, where content quotas favour programming by local producers, this programming is also being sold in the international market in competition with the US producers.

Children's programming is now a buyers' market, and profits from distribution have suffered.

A growing number of companies in Europe have been able to raise funds from stock markets. In 1997, the licensing agent EM-TV was the forerunner of a whole series of flotations on the Frankfurt Neuer Markt (though the company has since run into difficulties as the initial euphoria wore off).

6) Regulation

Content quotas referred to above have favoured European programming in the European region. Broadcasters in Australia and Canada are also expected to acquire or invest in minimum levels of locally originated programming.

7) Content is still king.

The phenomenal success of the Japanese *Pokémon* underlined the fact that the big three do not have a monopoly on creating successful programmes. In addition, the traditional US studio model of programme supply – amassing a large volume of programming and selling it at a low unit price to broadcasters – no longer works. Buyers have a much wider range of programmes to choose from and a wider range of suppliers.

One might also add that the US companies are still striving to get to grips with the international market. To date, it is fair to say that the likes of Nickelodeon and Disney have overestimated the resonance of their brand names in the international market, and underestimated the influence of "local" players in making and broadcasting children's programmes.

It is debatable whether this understanding has percolated through to the US, where programme-makers still regard foreign networks primarily as consumers of their products and generally know and care little about the shows produced in Europe and elsewhere. As a tiny example, I have yet to meet a US children's programmer who recognises Tintin, one of the most famous European cartoon characters!

Time will show

Things will change in the future, particularly as multi-channel television becomes more widespread. Viewing habits of today – where children still watch terrestrial channels more than cable and satellite channels – may count for nothing in five or ten years time.

The provision of children's programmes by commercial players is already coming under pressure as broadcasters assess whether they recover the budgets

spent on the children's audience from advertising. Hard choices will have to be made, and the big US players are probably better placed than anyone else to move in to any gaps that may appear.

Despite these obstacles, the international market remains a major priority for the global players. In Walt Disney Co's 1999 Annual Report, the chairman and Chief Executive Officer Michael Eisner observed that the US contains 5 per cent of the world population but accounts for 80 per cent of the company's revenues:

If we can drive the per capita spending levels for Disney merchandise to just 80% of US levels in only five countries – England, Italy, Germany, France and Japan – then we would generate an additional \$2 billion in annual revenue. (p. 6)

Furthermore, it is not certain that any of these obstacles will remain in place in the medium to long term. Cable and satellite penetration will clearly increase, and the place of children's programming in the schedules of generalist broadcasters will be further undermined. While there is room for the small and medium sized fish to swim in the pond, it may not always be the case.

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Tracking the Global in the Local: On Children's Culture in a Small National Media Market

Ruth Zanker

Researchers in many countries have begun to productively map how children of all ages use media, music and associated merchandise in their everyday lives. Ethnographic audience studies of children's media culture have flourished since the 1980s when easy access to video recording enabled scholars to probe audience responses to texts (television programmes, films, etc.) and to closely observe children's peer group play. There is now rich evidence that demonstrates the idiosyncratic and creative ways that children, like youth, use popular culture in their 'work' of identity formation as well as a source for 'scripts' used in peer group play (Hengst, 1997; Lemish et al., 1998; Kelley et al., 1999; Buckingham, 2000; Davies et al. 2000).

By contrast, ethnographic work on how producers and marketers shape the local cultural resources available for children for their playful (but serious) work of identity formation has been neglected. Understandably, it has been more difficult to gain similar access to the often 'commercially sensitive' decision-making of commissioners, producers and marketers in order to conduct ethnographic work on their decision processes. But this work is important if we are to understand the *institutional* power to shape available imaginative horizons for children. Born, who has conducted recent ethnographic work within the BBC, argues even more forcefully that ethnographic studies of a range of production decision-making moments are critical because they provide evidence of how production always pre-empts consumption, shaping television texts and the ways they set up limits to and condition consumption (Born, 2000: 416).

This article describes how children's culture in a small media market with limited public funding, like New Zealand, is shaped by the media outputs of affluent nations, and suggests in turn, how these global audio-visual flows have implications for the viability of local production and consequently for the range and variety of local cultural resources for children.¹ The article argues that the study of production moments within children's television in a range of countries would enable one to investigate the differentials of power between stakeholders

involved in producing children's popular culture. McChesney (1999) characterizes the current media landscape as being dominated by a handful of transnational media companies, where even second-tier of first world media corporations are driven by a 'mantra' of expand or die. These changes make it as important to undertake production research in a range of locations, as it is to undertake audience research, if one is to grapple with paradoxical global and local tugs within children's cultures.

Certainly New Zealand's physical distance from 'centres' of global corporate power is of no significance in the eyes of New Zealand's children who, as elsewhere (Blumler et al., 1997; Goonasekera et al., 2000) embrace the latest hit programmes. Media time and space have collapsed for children in New Zealand, just as it has for children in India and Spain, who all share enthusiasm for commodified popular culture. Being at the capillary end of arterial capital flows in a far-flung country like New Zealand is something now shared by children in all capitalist cultural environments simply because marketing instrumentality can only *ever* manifest itself in the particularity of *local* children's media environments. *Each* child, whether viewing television in Ireland, San José, Vietnam or Fiji, is now best conceptualized as being 'at the end' of hybrid cultural flows.

Who gets to make television, how and where, have long been the central concerns for democratic conceptions of the media. This is reflected in many national media policy concerns to provide appropriate cultural range, diversity and quality of media provision for local children. However, it is the diverse group of stakeholders in production – programme commissioners, producers, purchasers of children's entertainment products, marketers, line managers and programmers – that continue to shape daily provision for children in broadcasting because it is the result of their combined professional judgements that decides what is available on free-to-air television. This article uses a series of 'production moments' observed during one season of a New Zealand children's weekday magazine programme in order to tease out how negotiations between adult stakeholders in local children's television shaped a 'local' magazine programme. These micro production case studies enable one to observe the implications of recent global shifts in audio-visual trade for 588,000 children in a deregulated national television environment.

Television in New Zealand and the children's programme What Now?

New Zealand, in common with other small or less affluent nations, has never had a commercial-free public service television service. The cost of delivering television to a sparse population spread across a mountainous island nation has seen public money augmented by advertising dollars since first transmissions began in 1961. By the late 1990s, the state broadcaster, Television New Zealand, comprised two channels: TV1, a prestige news and information channel targeting adult upper demographics, and TV2, an entertainment channel targeting house-hold shoppers, young adults and children. This latter popular channel

showed a mix of imported and local programmes for children after school and on weekend mornings, of which only early childhood programming zones and Sunday morning broadcasts were advertising free. During the 1990s, competition for audience share intensified with the entrance of free-to-air TV3² and Sky, a pay service offering Nickelodeon and the Cartoon Network. During the same decade, successive governments required high dividends from its state broadcaster Television New Zealand (TVNZ), thus emphasizing its commercial bottom line rather than public service objectives.

The funding for public service local production objectives during the 1990s was derived from a licence fee of NZ\$110³ charged on television sets, and this fee had remained static during a decade of rising production costs. Over 8 million dollars out of the 45 million dollars of the licence fee⁴ spent on television was dedicated to children's and youth productions by a statutory funding body called New Zealand On Air. Both state-owned TV2 and overseas-owned TV3 could seek public funding for children's programme ideas from New Zealand On Air and the funds were allocated on a competitive basis. Local producers were required to pitch ideas to either state-owned TV2 or overseas-owned TV3, thus ensuring that broadcasters controlled what was pitched for commissioning and where it was scheduled. Local producers found themselves negotiating between the requirements of commercial broadcasters to deliver ratings, and the cultural requirements for New Zealand On Air public funding.

The majority of *children's* production funding was spent on two strands: a daily, repeated, early childhood programme on TV3 and *What Now?*, a magazine strand targeting children between six and 12 years on TV2. In the years of data collection (1998/1999), this magazine strand comprised 40 non-commercial Sunday morning two-hour shows, and 195 half-hour commercial weekday programmes costing approximately 4 million New Zealand dollars. During the research period, the *What Now?* weekday strand was typical of many lower cost magazine programmes targeting six to twelve year olds in Europe, America and Asia. It used youthful presenters in studio links to glue together a mixed menu of entertainment, media gossip, field reporting, skits, drama and informational content, thus delivering elements of public service content within a popular format. During the last years of the 1990s, it was commissioned by TV2, as mentioned a commercially driven broadcasting channel owned by the government but required to make profits. The overwhelming proportion of its production budget came from New Zealand On Air and was required to fulfil local cultural public service objectives. The remainder of the budget was contributed by TV2, partly through a 'licence fee' assessed on the programme's value to the broadcaster in terms of advertising revenue (this was paid partly through the use of in-house facilities) and partly from carefully selected sponsorship deals.⁵

In the following section, this article analyses how global hits challenged the viability of the weekday afternoon strand of *What Now?* during the late 1990s. The challenges to local production presented by global hits (animation in particular) is a theme in recent debates over children's provision in affluent (Blumler et al., 1997) and poor countries alike, but it reaches critical dimensions in na-

tions that cannot afford dedicated public service television channels on which to show a mixed menu of local age specific children's television production (see Goonasekera et al., 2000, for the devastating evidence from Asian nations).

In the section after that, the article tracks how state owned TV2 in New Zealand became just one of many marketing tools used by local and global corporates wishing to brand generic and entertainment products to local children. In this section 'children's television' appears to disappear as a clear object of research, to be replaced by case studies of local and global marketing campaigns involving rights windows, public relations, marketing, and promotional events all of which were designed to shape children's consumer expectations of local children's media culture.

New Zealand (paradoxically the world's first welfare state) dismantled both trade and audio-visual barriers in the mid 1980s when the government of the day embraced neo-liberal economic reforms. This saw the New Zealand local producers increasingly exposed to global audio-visual flows in the absence of the protective local content quotas, licensing or export initiatives used in other countries to nurtured local production industries. Media commentators remain divided about the benefits that this exposure to economic and cultural global flows has brought its citizens over the last decade. At one extreme it is believed that New Zealand has become a

...dumping ground, a laboratory and a franchise for the global conglomerates, led by fast food franchises, Rupert Murdoch and CanWest global systems (Lealand, 1998: 2).

On the other hand there is the view that New Zealand politicians have had the vision to accept the benefits of globalization:

We are moving headlong into a borderless global economy powered by a borderless media. A most remarkable consequence has been the gigantic leap in consumer empowerment and the corresponding disempowerment of Governments (Wiggs, 1999).

Global shifts in audio-visual production and trade

Political economists argue that we are currently experiencing a stage of 'disorganized capitalism' whereby multiple imagined worlds are shaped by complex flows of capital, labour, commodities, information and images. Appadurai, for example, suggests that the nation state is being by-passed by five new dimensions of belonging: ethnoscaples, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes and that these global 'flows' overlap highly diverse ways in different places (Appadurai, 1990: 296). Empirical evidence certainly suggests that during the late 1990s there were several critical shifts in the economic drivers within global media industries and that these have profound implications for children's mediascapes everywhere.

From the mid-nineties onwards, a chaotic process of rapid vertical and horizontal integration of trans-national media companies saw the largest players consolidating, thus increasing their share of global audio-visual markets, and second level media players (including some public service broadcasters like the British BBC and Australian ABC) grappling to expand into specialized global media niches in order to survive (McChesney, 1999). The trans-national power of the top tier entertainment corporations has been further consolidated by widespread national media deregulation, the collapse of regional and global trade barriers, and recent concerted international efforts to defend free commercial speech based on American constitutional interpretations (see, e.g., Wiggs, 1999).

This has provided business synergies between rights windows⁶ related to production, distribution and media platforms and business opportunities related to character licensing and merchandising. Any one global entertainment 'property' is now designed to earn the maximum income from each rights window in a carefully calculated sequence over different releases.

This may see media rights for film, television, video, and multi-media managed over time, in association with merchandising and licensing rights. The increasing use of deficit funding by dominant players in the U.S., based on expected returns from such 'windowing' opportunities, has squeezed the funding resources for smaller children's media producers, at the same time cutting them out from major markets in the U.S. This has also seen smaller companies aligning themselves with major corporate players through output deals, co-production and other ventures. The tipping of production outputs from free-to-air to pay companies was demonstrated in 1998 when the Cartoon Network and Nickelodeon's programming expenditures outstripped that of the combined BBC and ITV children's budgets. Expenditure on original programmes by children-only pay channels has boomed, while the audience share of free-to-air channels, even in larger countries, decreases as global pay options grow (Fry, 1998). In 1998, Nickelodeon earned \$773 million in net U.S. revenue (Flint, 1998).

Figure 1 presents the largest U.S. based media companies delivering material to children during the late 1990s. (Products in italics are among those discussed in the article.)

By the late 1990s, children's productions that became global hits with children were no longer necessarily American. As one leading Canadian producer puts it:

The US has become more of an ancillary market; open to acquisition of internationally-produced product (Kettler, 1998: 14).

In 1997/98, production flows swung in radical new directions when Ragdoll's *The Teletubbies*, originally commissioned by the BBC, became a huge early childhood U.S. hit for PBS (Britt, 1998), followed by the Japanese Nintendo video-game spin off animation *Pokémon* for Warner Bros 'Kids'.

Figure 1. The largest U.S. based media companies delivering material to children during the late 1990s

Company	Disney	Time Warner	News Corp	Viacom
Hollywood distributor	Disney	Warner Bros	20 th Century Fox	Paramount
US networks	ABC (1995) Disney radio	Warner Bros television network	Fox Network Fox Kids radio	United Paramount Network (50%) (1999 CBS)
US cable and interna- tional pay markets	Disney Channel Toon Disney	The Cartoon Network Warner Bros Kids	Fox Family Channel Boyz and Girlz channels planned	Nickelodeon
Production of programme content	Disney	Warner Bros	Saban Entertainment	Viacom
Co-ventures	BBC co-production soap: 'Microsoap'	Nintendo's <i>Pokémon</i> pushes up ratings on WB Kids		Pay channel 'Noggin' in partnership with CTV Workshop
Production/licensing/ merchandising opportunities	10 year global licensing deal for Disney film merchandise in world- wide (18,000+) outlets of McDonald's	<i>Loony Tunes: A pantheon of favourite characters from old cartoon series by Warner Brothers</i>	<i>The Simpsons: A mainstream animation about a nuclear suburban family in the American Midwest that became a top rating programme for children</i>	<i>Rugrats: An animation on family life made from the play-level perspective of American children. A global hit.</i>

The problem of global hits

Rugrats

The success of Nickelodeon is a good illustration of the economic and cultural flexibility of the animation market. The company has positioned itself in the eyes of children through cutting edge animation (for example, *Doug*, *Rugrats*, *Cat Dog*, *Rocko's Modern Life*, *The Angry Beavers*, *KaBlam!*, *Hey Arnold* and *The Ren and Stimpy Show*). In 1998, Nickelodeon's *Rugrats* became the most watched children's animated show in the U.S.A. – with a cumulative 5.3 rating and 2.2 million viewers, based on total U.S. households (Flint, 1998). This enviable audience appeal of *Rugrats* has, in turn, seen it vied for at audio-visual markets by free-to-air national broadcasters in Canada, Britain, Australia and New Zealand to provide the 'appointment viewing' draw card for their mixed local and imported children's viewing zones.

Full service broadcasters had long used the mixed programming strategy of hammocking riskier programmes (as local programmes tended to be) between heavily promoted popular overseas hits. This had worked to the advantage of local children's producers in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in 1997 *Rugrats* in New Zealand was scheduled at 3.30 p.m. on TV2, thus providing a promotional opportunity for the local flagship programme *What Now?* which was scheduled directly afterwards at 4.00 p.m. However, this strategy changed in 1998 when the TV2 programmer shifted *Rugrats* from 3.30 p.m.

(school finishes usually at 3.00 p.m.) to a more desirable position *after What Now?* in order to help audience flow into prime-time. As a consequence the local programme was relegated into the hinterland of off-peak viewing at 3.30 p.m., where its lead-in was an infomercial programme for adult abdominal exercise machines. In 1998, *Rugrats* became the highest non-primetime show for 5-14 year olds in New Zealand, whilst *What Now?* languished with low ratings figures.

At this point it is important to note that programming strategies were based on evidence from electronic 'people meter' ratings, which in New Zealand were drawing on the viewing choices of often less than 200 households – those with children watching after school – out of 450 available people metered homes. Ratings were clearly a statistically untrustworthy measure on which to base the success or otherwise of off-peak local children's programming. The fickleness of ratings figures for off-time child audiences was, embarrassingly, illustrated by events in the middle of 1998 when ratings suggested that children 5-9 years of age were viewing youth programmes, infomercials and late night shows in large numbers. This anomaly was tracked to one Northland metered home where a home-handyman had tinkered with an antenna, thus assigning channels incorrectly. The press reported the audience research company noting that this household was unusual in as much as it contained *four* children aged from five to nine years, thus skewing the *national* ratings (Lewis, 1998). But despite academic criticism, ratings remain the currency for off-peak viewing of children in New Zealand, as elsewhere.

The Teletubbies

In 1997, TV3 bought rights to 260 half-hour programmes of *The Teletubbies*, commissioned by the BBC in Britain from the Ragdoll production house for 2-4 year olds. New Zealand was the second market after South Africa to purchase the programme, from BBC enterprises that owned rights to all territories barring North America, held by the production company Ragdoll. In New Zealand the fad for the programme appeared to engulf the attention of all ages with astonishing speed after it went to air in mid-March 1998, in competition with TV2's *What Now?* (Noone, 1998: 16). It is worthwhile investigating this short, parochial, but startling episode in the cultural history of television, because it offers an excellent illustration of how even the most idiosyncratic programming decision – in this case to schedule an early childhood programme targeting 2-4 year olds after school in competition with a local programme targeting 6-12 year olds – can have unfortunate long term consequences for local production options.

In mid-March 1998, the producer of *What Now?* commented in a matter of fact way in an e-mail to the production team that TV3

...has put *Teletubbies* against us... – the hottest pre-school show in history – but good for us in the long run because it is being watched in equal numbers by the under fours and drug crazed twenties. As expected, it out rated us on day one, but by mid week we overtook it (Palmer, 25/3/98).

It was certainly an unusual decision for TV3 to schedule the early childhood programme in the commercial after-school broadcasting zone because it required that they drop advertisements within the programme in order to comply with non-commercial zoning for early childhood viewing. This saw TV3 in the extraordinary position of giving away advertising inventory in preference for a ratings win, which, according to ratings, was lost back to TV2's later scheduling of *Rugrats*, once *The Teletubbies* had finished! In the event *The Teletubbies* did not fade as a 'fad' as Palmer had predicted. Indeed April focus groups for *What Now?* heard eleven-year-old males skiting about their ability to talk 'Teletubbese' as it exploded into a school-yard cult. *The Teletubbies* continued to win ratings against *What Now?* from its introduction in March until audience researchers stopped tracking ratings in May, thus signalling the decision of TVNZ programmers to 'pull the plug' on *What Now?*, declaring it a terminal ratings disaster. In June, midway through the production year, TVNZ managers pushed for a radical re-versioning of the local magazine programme as a series of interstitials around imported hit cartoons.

What Now? – a programme targeting audiences of 6-12 year olds after school – was destroyed by failing to rate against an imported programme for 2-4 year olds as it exploded into a brief school-yard fad. This story surely demonstrates the vulnerability of all local programmes to ratings judgements, as producers are increasingly chastised for not rating against high budget, heavily promoted overseas hits. Local children's production in New Zealand has become increasingly fraught as commercial programming strategies prevail over earlier British-style 'full-service' programming for children. Meanwhile programmers argue that ratings evidence proves that children prefer overseas hits to 'home-grown over-worthy political correctness' (a manager's comment) and that the only format that works for local children is judicious use of short interstitials around sure-rating imported animation.

But why was *The Teletubbies* such a huge New Zealand fad? Clues come from Paul Greaney, managing director of Hasbro New Zealand at the time, a distributor for *The Teletubbies* merchandise. He comments that 'we knew about the success of *The Teletubbies* in the U.K.' as *The Teletubbies* was launched on after-school television in March with no merchandising available for release. This created a huge pent-up desire for merchandise, which in the end did not arrive in New Zealand until August. But in the intervening months there had been a steady stream of sensational 'news' stories from the United Kingdom picked up from satellite feeds by both TV3 and TVNZ's own news service, about the consumer frenzy for merchandise in Britain. Greaney states that the use of public relations was highly successful in generating a range of news stories in Britain about *The Teletubbies*. In his words 'public relations' in various forms was 'becoming a preferred form of marketing' and 'public relations' kit and video material had been demonstrated to be more cost-effective than advertising (Greaney, 14/2/99). In New Zealand no advertising was required to promote the arrival of *The Teletubbies* merchandise and the programmer of TV3 notes that at no time did BBC Enterprises suggest holding off screenings until merchandise

arrived. It might be concluded that astute public relations had been used to generate buying frenzy. As one TVNZ manager noted, 'there was hysteria out in the shopping malls with mums throttling each other to try and buy the dolls' as the voracious parental desire for toys provided a vindication of the marketing strategy of 'pester power'. This New Zealand frenzy over acquiring dolls, in turn, became a news story in its own right as local media filmed guards on the doors of retail outlets, and then filmed the parents as they stampeded to reach stands merchandise. A case could be made that the craze for *The Teletubbies* constituted a form of media panic orchestrated by public relations and news stories, with the end effect of driving parents to buy.

The following year saw *Pokémon* take such multi-level public relations marketing to new levels: 'Powered by juvenile affluence and the latest multimedia marketing techniques... It has put deep into the shade anything that has come before it, from conkers to yo-yos to Cabbage Patch Kids' (Laurence, 1999: 21). In 1999, *Pokémon* represented the most developed multi-media super-system so far, in a long line of children's media and merchandising collectables. TV2, who had the rights to show it in 1999, claimed huge ratings and clear evidence of fandom as hundreds of letters arrived at the *What Now?* club and were used to line the passages to the studios. These letters described school-yard passions for collecting figurines and cards, as well as memorising names and characteristics of over 100 *Pokémon* characters. The following year, TV2 lost *Pokémon* to TV3 and it is said that TV3's children's advertising income increased by one quarter (Jeremy Scott, 18/9/00).

By the late 1990s, TVNZ faced a series of challenges. Firstly overseas-owned CanWest TV3 had greater buying clout at trade fairs by dint of its size, given networks in Canada, Australia and Ireland. TVNZ, once the local media giant, now lacked clout at global audio-visual fairs. Secondly, by 1999 Nickelodeon became available on pay television in New Zealand. This signalled the beginning of the end of access to hits from Nickelodeon like *Rugrats*. The TVNZ programme buyer might challenge pay television provider Sky over the local first run rights still owned by TVNZ, but it could not ensure first run rights in the future. Local free-to-air broadcasters' access to children's hits was disappearing with the expansion of the reach of global pay access, at the same time that it was becoming economically unviable to commission local programmes.

Integrating global/local media flows

Rights and licensing deals have ripple effects at many other levels of local children's culture, as shall be seen in the following case studies.

Tazos

This is an example of how it is not only new media properties like *Rugrats* and *The Teletubbies* that are carefully groomed as licensed properties. During the late 1990s, Tazo trading cards were a very successful collectable for children in

association with licensed characters from a range of entertainment super-systems. They were first designed for the American food company Fritolay (PepsiCo owned, like Pizza Hut) in the U.S.A. in 1993, but by 1998 Tazo trading cards had become an international marketing hit appealing to children in 28 countries. In the late 1990s, the 30-year-old property *Loony Tunes* was given a global face-lift as a brand extension for the long-shelf life Warner Brothers cartoons, and in 1996 Tazos were launched in Australia for Eta chips in a campaign that licensed *Loony Tunes* characters. On one side of each trading card was a picture of a Warner Brothers cartoon character and on the other side a Tazo logo.

Australian marketers claimed that the craze for Tazo collectables had seen chip sales grow, and by the end of 1997 they claimed that they had grown sales by 41 per cent (Eta/Tazo Proposal to *What Now?*, January 1998). Their research indicated that 86 per cent of kids in Australia thought 'Tazo's' [sic] were very 'cool' and would play and collect more Tazos. Cards could claim several levels of appeal (some targeting parents), the primary one being that they colonized the natural stage of 6-12 year olds' peer group collecting. In phrases from the proposal presented to *What Now?* the campaign ensured that: 'Kids play with each other to win Tazos from their friends' (thus signifying pleasurable, competitive activity); 'Tazos can also be joined together to build and create things' (thus signifying creative activity); 'Where ever kids imaginations take them' (thus signifying productive activity); 'Tazos are found in Eta potato chip bags, similar in concept to how marbles were collected years ago' (thus signifying a continuity with childhood traditions). (Phrases taken from the Eta/Tazo Proposal to *What Now?*, January 1998).

This enthusiasm for collecting Tazos flowed into New Zealand school playgrounds during 1997 and early 1998 in the Australian advertising campaign using *Loony Tunes* characters. Associated public relations included a Tazo 'headquarters', a Fan club (with newsletter), a Web site, Tournaments, and Swap meets. Advertisements appeared during *What Now?* and other children's programme advertising breaks. In January, Eta approached *What Now?* with an opportunity to associate this 'leading edge popularity with the *What Now?* brand'. They asked for a regular segment in *What Now?* called 'The ETA *Loony Tunes* TAZO Zone' for six weeks beginning in early March. They requested clear definition within the programme, billboards opening and closing items, and Eta product available on the set. In return, free Tazos would be made available for a club mail-out and a joint fifteen-second promotion produced, which would screen, preferably, on Sunday morning. This promotion would give *What Now?*

...the opportunity to be associated with a leading edge new kids collection game. TAZO's are interactive, and will become the craze for New Zealand kids to collect! Once the *Looney Tunes* theme is over, ETA will be producing more TAZO's with other characters. If this promotion is a success, *What Now?* and ETA could continue with this association... The TAZO promotion could also be cross promoted on both the ETA and *What Now?* web sites (Eta/Tazo Proposal to *What Now?*, January 1998).

In return for running a phone line competition with the audience about the collectable cards (which involved free product), Eta would offer a prize of a trip to Movie World in Sydney for contestants. *What Now?* could further benefit through the promotion being screened three times on TV2 Saturday morning, between 7.30 and 10.00 a.m. The value of this was calculated in the contract proposal to be 9,504 NZ dollars, of which TVNZ and Eta would split the cost.

But there were problems. The producer of *What Now?* noted that his programme received nothing out of this, and, for their pains, would end up with the commercial clutter of pack shots of chips on the screen which would not help create a critical commercial-free image of *What Now?* for the public-service funder who made the largest budget contribution to the show. Neither would it help the reputation of the programme with health campaigners arguing that there was an association between television advertising, high fat foods, and childhood obesity in New Zealand. Even without these critical image problems, the deal brought no financial gain. No money was offered by Eta for services rendered. Indeed, any production cost was to come out of the TVNZ Sales and Marketing earnings. The proposal notes that 'ETA have currently placed \$95,000 worth of advertising airtime with TVNZ [...] We understand there may be a production fee involved with this concept, so this cost would come out of their existing airtime' (Eta/Tazo Proposal to *What Now?*, January 1998). Costs to *What Now?* would include, at the most conservative count, time spent by the already stretched graphic artist on logos and pack shots, and presenter time used to take live calls for the competition. In the programme producers' view, television exposure on children's television was scant and worth a lot more. They turned it down.

However, that is not the end of the story. Not only did a sister local children's programme funded by the broadcasting fee (shown on Saturday mornings on TV2) agree to an Eta/Tazo deal, but TVNZ's own subsidiary company, TVNZ Enterprises, managed the rights for the new property chosen for a new 'all New Zealand' campaign – *The Simpsons*.

Deal-making: TVNZ Enterprises

Central to understanding wider marketing dimensions is TVNZ Enterprises, an independent corporate profit centre and entrepreneurial unit within TVNZ Sales and Marketing which brokered marketing opportunities in New Zealand for a range of entertainment, food and electronics companies targeting adults and children. In 1998, the TVNZ Enterprises campaign successfully positioned Eta chips as number one chip in schoolyards using Tazos in association with *The Simpsons*. This vindicated their hunch, shared with market researchers in Britain, that Bart's 'eat my shorts!' attitude was 'a powerful global cultural marker for 6-12 year old 'tween' peer culture'.⁷ Every aspect of the creative package was planned. The 'look' was created from a mix of original and stylebook features to tie the colours and imagery used in the local campaign into the wider international signifiers for Tazos and *The Simpsons*:

Each element of the promotion will be of similar 'look' and feature Bart Simpson as the key focus. Art is taken from the styleguide – the 'bursting Bart' logo is the feature of the Eta/Tazo logo and is representative of the image they would like to portray. The purple background is taken from the Tazo material used in other territories. The pink clouds are creative and are inspired from the TV series (TVNZ Enterprises Eta/Tazos Marketing Plan).

The Simpsons promotion included a collectors album to hold a full set of Tazos, on-pack advertising in various forms, point of sale advertising for supermarkets (from A2 posters to Pavement signs and 4 tier display bins), public relations, including giveaway stickers, bus advertising, trade vehicles, samples and copy for press releases. Events included field product give aways. One special event was an 'ETA Tazos All-Stars' sponsored basketball team created to perform alongside 'costume character Bart Simpsons' at the October Auckland marketing expo, Planet 2, organized by TVNZ Enterprises. This complex promotional plan was supported with print advertising to the trade, advertisements and sample give-aways for kids' magazines, like *Disney Adventures* and *Simpsons Comics*. Also commissioned were one thirty second and one fifteen second television advertisements. The association of *The Simpsons* with Eta during 1998 was not only a great success, according to both TVNZ Enterprises and the chip company, it was also high profile – in one promotion the entire side of a metropolitan bus was illustrated with the Simpson's family on their couch, with pack shots of chips and the Tazo logo. Meanwhile, the widely appealing cartoon of *The Simpsons* continued to be a favourite programme for tweens in New Zealand. It was scheduled in primetime on TV2 and out rated any local show targeting children.

It is worth pursuing the Eta/Tazo/*The Simpsons* campaign one stage further because it demonstrates marketing strategies used by a range of corporations targeting children in New Zealand in three useful ways. It illustrates how local New Zealand children's television fits into the marketing strategy of one chip brand in New Zealand. It illustrates how global entertainment brands are licensed within *locally* designed marketing campaigns in order to become part of the cycle of local schoolyard fads, and thus acquire cultural capital with children. Finally it illustrates how the presenters of a local magazine show, embedded in a free-to-air commercial schedule, are inevitably implicated in marketing brands to children.

Licensing and merchandising

As has been mentioned, rights contracts function across a complex range of windows, including time, number of plays, geographic regions, and media. These rights, in turn, are tied to licensing and merchandising opportunities. It was the task of TVNZ Enterprises, as agents for entertainment properties, to negotiate and manage regional licensing and merchandising contracts. During the late 1990s, TVNZ Enterprises was a small and relatively untested team, compared with the large entrepreneurial units attached to other national broadcasters like the ABC and BBC, but it had already demonstrated considerable creative flair in

the way it managed licensing and merchandising rights for a range of imported third-party properties. In 1998, its 'bread and butter' work was for a range of lucrative children's entertainment properties. These included *Rugrats*, *The Simpsons*, *Bananas in Pyjamas* (and, later in 1998, the entire ABC video catalogue), as well as *Thomas the Tank Engine*, *Ren and Stimpy Show*, *Goosebumps* and *Humphrey B Bear*. It also managed retail opportunities for merchandise of global brands because it required cultural sensitivity in a small market to avoid rapid saturation. It was as important to choose the appropriate retail outlet, as it was to decide how much product to release (and when) for long haul 'classics' like *Rugrats* and *The Simpsons*. TVNZ Enterprises, for example, negotiated an exclusive point of sale deal with a department store positioned with families, for *The Simpsons* merchandise.

TVNZ Enterprises, which already managed *Rugrats* merchandise, in October 1998 organized the release of the new *Rugrats* movie, and associated new licensing rights. To launch this event TVNZ Enterprises hosted a morning event for 'Licensees, Retailers and Promotional partners'. 'Fiona Anderson, a much loved ex-presenter from *What Now?* (who still made guest appearances in the *What Now?* comedy soap, *Serial Stuff*) hosted the event as the audience was 'shown how to think like a kid' and 'to maximize involvement in an award winning #1 kids show... *Rugrats*' (*Licencing Now*, November/December 1998). The same *Licencing Now* foreshadowed a pending Krispa chips promotion designed to battle out school-yard chip supremacy at the beginning of the 1999 school year which used *Rugrats* for 'Attention grabbing packaging... In store displays... Cross promotions with other licensed product... Giveaways in pack'.

Planet 2

What Now?'s final unsolicited encounter with the Tazo/Eta campaign occurred in October, 1998, at an event called Planet 2. This was a marketing expo initiated by TVNZ Enterprises, and designed to showcase advertising and marketing clients of TV2 by creating 'the World of Interactive Entertainment' in an events centre in the capital, Auckland. This event used *What Now?* presenters, along with stars from other local children's and youth programmes in roles of 'celebrity MC's for non-stop entertainment'. The stars of *What Now?* used the occasion for a Sunday live link from the event on October 25th, during which they toured the displays, ostensibly to provide *What Now?* viewers with a preview of exciting new products. *What Now?* presenters in their 'celebrity' role at Planet 2 were useful to TVNZ for several reasons. At the level of corporate to corporate communications they helped to market the TV2 brand as an advertising destination for companies wishing to market to children. At the audience level the Brand Manager of TV2 hoped that the effect of *What Now?* doing a live link would be 'one way we can take TV2 into the streets. The kids will go absolutely bananas because Jason, Anths, Shaub [popular presenters] are absolutely fantastic' (Brewster, 9/9/98). At the promotional level their tour of toy displays provided free pre-Christmas public relations exposure for local and global brands with stands at the expo.

Planet 2 is an important site in which to track how the hosts of children's television (as local cultural intermediaries) are used to promote global brands, and how those global brands in turn are used to refine the image of a local show as being in touch with popular culture. Before the event, a press release was sent to prospective corporate clients who might be expected to book space for product promotion. Part of it read:

Planet 2 will be an annual event targeting the youth [sic] market 5-18 years. A large promotion campaign will ensure the 25,000+ anticipated visitors attend the show. The show will spread over four pavilions allowing easy flow through the exhibition and entertainment areas.

The Expo-Centre was physically split, with the 5-12 year olds' section 'focusing on family fun... and a toy land giving gift ideas for Christmas'. The 12-18 year olds were served by an 'Extreme Hall', the name of which signified the shift in address to 'attitude' and the risk-taking play of 'youth' culture. The retail hall was stocked with 'hot' pre-Christmas specials, thus 'capturing all visitors as they move between halls'. Planet 2 was described as ideal for 'new product launches, sampling opportunities or interactively exposing your products'. The physical layout thereby ensured the perceived desirability of an 'easy flow' between the security of family patrolled 'childhood' signifiers and those designed to appeal to youth interest in the subversive cultural pleasures of video games and new technology.

The poster designed to market Planet 2 combines appeals to children and their parents, whilst being careful not to repulse the key early adopters within the 'youth' market. It illustrates the perceived synergy and power of intertextual associations between global brands and local icons from television and, as such, is worth describing in some detail. The background is a star-studded night sky, on which photographs of TV2 stars are 'unfolding' into a circle formation around the Planet 2 logo. At 12.00 o'clock is a young female star of *Mai Time*,⁸ at one o'clock is a photo of the *What Now?* team, followed by other pictures of other TV2 youth presenters, at 3.00 p.m. there is an image of *Bananas in Pyjamas*™, followed by more youth presenters and stars from the local primetime soap of *Shortland Street*, a full suited photo of 'Mr Peanut' with smiling children (representing Eta), and at 11.00 o'clock Bart Simpson bursting out of an animated bubble™. The sponsors logos run along the bottom of the poster and include: TV2 (come and see the TV2 stars live), Phillips Bomb Bass: Have you got the loudest car? Prove it! (car stereos), *Girlfriend* 'Girl Power': Girls only, Give aways, make overs, retail specials, and judge the Hunk! (a style magazine), *Mai Time* Kapa Haka (Maori cultural performance from schools of children ages 10-12 years), Pepsi, Nintendo, Griffins (snacks), Eta (chips), Barbie, Cadbury, Tommy Hilfiger (clothes), Time out leisure centres (computer games), NZ Post (post office), Crayola (drawing equipment) and many more. 'All brought to you by... A smart service event in conjunction with TVNZ Enterprises.' In small figures in the right hand corner of the poster there is a note saying that 'The image of Bart is trademarked, 1998, Twentieth Century Fox Corporation, all rights preserved'.

The poster illustrates the complexity of arrangements between local and global economic, cultural and symbolic capital, as participants fight for promotional space, and synergies derived from association and cross-promotion with other brands. TVNZ Enterprises' *Licensing Now* newsletter featured Planet 2 in its final newsletter for the year. In it a snap of 'Bart Simpson joining in with the Eta Tazos Basketball Team' nudges another one tagged 'Live action in production – *What Now?* crew in action'. It was as important for the presenters of *What Now?* to be associated with the 'breaking news' of 'hot brands' with emerging peer group cultural capital for children, as it was for those brands to be associated with *What Now?* celebrities.

Conclusion

During the late 1990s, free-to-air channels in New Zealand increasingly preferred to programme imported hits over local programmes on the grounds that they rated better with children. This had particular implications for creative and formatting choices of local producers who relied on commissions from commercial programmers in order to access public service funding. But managers of commercial channels were also aware that broadcasting channels were no longer necessarily the first stop advertising shop for children's marketers, as the value of television advertising was weighed up against other branding options. Marketing strategies moved increasingly from bulk television advertising buys made by measures of cost effectiveness per thousand ratings, to strategic branding using a range of communication tactics: public relations, media events, promotions, web sites, direct mail from shops and distributors, as well as contra and sponsorship deals. Thus it can be said that commercial free-to-air local television continues to provide a premium window for marketers to local audiences of children, but this occurs increasingly through programming content contra licensing and sponsorship deals rather than through spot-advertising packages. The work of TVNZ Enterprises illustrates how global entertainment brands are used locally in complex cross-media, cross-promotional campaigns for snack foods and other products. The Planet 2 expo illustrates how local broadcasting brands itself to children's marketers and how a local magazine show, *What Now?*, was positioned within global signifiers as 'cool' for local children. In such a way the state-owned commercial channel TVNZ and its subsidiary TVNZ Enterprises can be seen to function as 'go-betweens' for global and local marketing campaigns, and thus play the roles of powerful cultural intermediaries within the tastes and desires of New Zealand children.

Notes

1. This article draws on data gathered during the course of a larger ethnographic study, conducted by the author, of the production of children's television in New Zealand.
2. A TV3 consortium was granted a broadcast licence in 1987 and was later bought out by the Canadian consortium CanWest.
3. The NZ dollar hovered just below 50 cents US at the time of the study.
4. The licence fee was dropped in 1999 – a political sweetener to voters during pre-election months.
5. There was heated debate over what was appropriate sponsorship for a publicly funded programme during the late 1990s as production costs rose. New Zealand On Air was driven to 'approving' appropriate sponsors (a breakfast cereal company, for example) as part of the programme budget.
6. 'Window' is used to describe the many different opportunities to earn money from selling rights to an entertainment property: for example, a television programme can be sold to different regions, for a certain number of replays, over a certain period of time. Windows can be traded at the production funding stage, or later sold as together or sequentially for different media versions (video, music, books, CD-ROMs, etc.).
7. BBC World documentary *Getting Older Younger* accessed on Prime television NZ on 23/9/00.
8. *Mai Time* is a New Zealand On Air funded programme shown off-peak and targeting Maori and Pacific Island youth with a mixture of imported black and local music clips. It makes a virtue of hybridity and street label savvy.

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“More Than Just TV”: Educational Broadcasting and Popular Culture in South Africa

Clive Barnett

This article discusses an innovative approach to educational broadcasting developed in post-apartheid South Africa, in a broader context of media globalization, international policy transfer, and socio-economic and cultural transformation. I argue that the reorganization of the spatial scales at which media economies and regulatory regimes operate requires the rethinking of established understandings of the relationships between media, children, and citizenship. ‘Globalization’ does not spell the end of national-level public policy, but it does require an adjustment in the objectives of media policies. And in certain respects, contemporary developments open up opportunities for innovation.

I illustrate this argument through a case study of the controversial South African ‘edutainment’ drama series, *Yizo Yizo*. This series has succeeded in establishing and maintaining a large youth audience for educational television by using popular television formats to connect social issues to the everyday life-contexts of ordinary people. And I argue that *Yizo Yizo* embodies a distinctive approach to media citizenship that challenge the conceptualizations developed in the North.

Media-spaces and citizenship

Academic and policy understandings of the relationships between media and citizenship in the North developed in a context where broadcasting emerged as a complex of technologies, organizations, and markets that articulated two spatial scales of social activity: that of the nation-state with that of private domestic, familial home. On the one hand, broadcasting tended to be organized as a set of national institutions, whether publicly owned as in Western Europe, or privately-owned as in the United States, overseen by national policy and regulatory regimes. On the other hand, radio and television were both commodified as domestic technologies. Broadcasting contributed to a process whereby social life

became increasingly focussed upon the private nuclear family at the same time as the real and imaginary horizons of family life were 'stretched' over broader spatial scales through improvements in transport, communications, and mass media. In this context, public service broadcasting developed as the model for normative theories of mass media as vehicles for sustaining participatory forms of citizenship (Keane 1991).

This national and inter-national regulatory regime of broadcasting has in turn been associated with distinctive modes of cultural regulation. Because broadcasting was institutionalized as a domestic technology, media regulation has consistently been concerned with using radio and television to regulate social activities in the home (Silverstone 2000). Radio and television expand the spatial scale over which cultural forms can be circulated, but they also institute a structural separation between producers and consumers of culture. This implies a simultaneous centralization of cultural power in the hands of a relatively small number of institutions, corporations, and elites, and decentralization of the citizenry over which those actors might want to exercise influence. The spatial constitution of radio and television accounts for the fact that exercising power through these mediums is in fact rather difficult, in so far as producers and disseminators of information are not capable of enforcing the ways in which such information is actually consumed (Scannell 1995). There is, then, a fundamental degree of indeterminacy built into the relationships of power and influence characteristic of spatially extensive communications media.

The ambivalence of radio and television helps to account for the lure and repulsion felt by policy makers, elites, and politicians towards the media. Historically, the ambivalent power of the media has been resolved through the establishment of national economic and cultural regulatory regimes that enabled national authorities to 'oversee' their citizens' media practices. This has taken the form of a combination of paternalism and protectionism, whereby national institutions determined the sorts of programmes that audiences should and should not have access to, in order to assure the cultivation of appropriate models of citizenship. And given the private, domestic contexts with which broadcasting regulation has been traditionally concerned, there has been a long-standing tendency to invoke the figure of the innocent child in order to legitimize media and communications policy decisions. This feature of policy-making has important implications for how the relationship between media and citizenship is conceptualized. All citizens can easily come to be characterized in the same terms as the figure of the vulnerable child, primarily as a passive subject in need of protection and guidance (Hartley 1987, Oswell 1998).

In short, in the capitalist North, the economic, technological, and spatial articulation of broadcasting as a set of national systems of domestic cultural consumption has been premised upon and in turn sustained a rather paternalistic conceptualization of media citizenship embedded in the principles of traditional public service broadcasting. Established academic and policy understandings of the relationships between media, domestic space, territorial scale, commodificat-

ion, and citizenship are, however, called into question by contemporary processes of so-called 'media globalization'.

Globalizing media and the end of citizenship?

Globalization is best understood as a process of 're-scaling' through which the spatial congruence between culture, economy, and polity that has previously characterized broadcasting policy has been undermined. However, while economic and political power increasingly flow around and above as well as through nation-state, it is important not to exaggerate the extent of these processes. It is also essential to recognize the role that national policy plays in facilitating economic globalization (Mosco 1996). Populist accounts of globalization suggest that all boundaries have now collapsed and that distance has been finally abolished as a constraint on economic activity and social interaction. It might be more useful to think of 'globalization' as just the latest round in a process of 'creative destruction' of the spatial and temporal configurations of capitalism (Harvey 1982). According to this understanding, to enable certain patterns of mobility (whether the circulation of commodities or the movement of people), it is necessary to embed certain technologies and labor processes in fixed, material spatial configurations. The friction of distance is overcome only by laying in place a material infrastructure of roads, railways, transmitters, and cables that, in a subsequent round of restructuring, will themselves come to serve as impediments to continued accumulation. The maxim that 'the ability to overcome space is predicated upon the production of space' is therefore central to the understanding of contemporary restructuring of media and communications infrastructures (Leyshon 1995).

Media globalization refers to a complex set of related processes, including the restructuring of the ownership of corporations and control over markets leading to the emergence of 'global media players'; the development of new communications technologies, such as Internet and mobile telephony; the increasing convergence of computing, telecommunications, and media; and the reorganization of the scales at which regulatory and policy decisions are made. The dynamic behind this process is the drive to produce new material and institutional infrastructures for the extension of capital accumulation over larger spatial scales at accelerated pace (Harvey 1989). In terms of the analysis developed in the previous section, the globalization of media can be understood as a process that re-articulates the domestic space of the home with a variety of cultural flows operating at various spatial scales, from the local, regional, national, to the global. Satellite, video, and Internet technologies have emerged as cultural mediums that transgress the stable national regimes of policy and regulation that have historically characterized broadcast radio and television.

In both policy and academic debates, media globalization is often presented as a *fait accompli*, an unavoidable process to which governments, policy-makers, and social movements just have to adjust (Low and Barnett 2000). It is clear

that national policy-makers are no longer able to regulate the flow of media commodities in the ways they once were. The possibilities of deploying traditional national cultural policies in support of citizenship is constrained by the contemporary re-scaling of media economies and cultures (Shields and Muppidi 1996). Public service broadcasting has traditionally been the locus for the production of 'quality' educational radio and television for children. The international crisis of public service broadcasting is inextricably linked to the extension of commercialized media and an associated deepening of commodification in everyday life, a process that is driven in no small part by the targeting of children as a market for commercial media products (Buckingham 2000). Media globalization is in turn associated with a reorientation of the discourse linking media and citizenship. Champions of 'globalization' and the 'information revolution' tend to deploy an understanding of citizenship, which focuses upon the expanded *choices* available to citizens as consumers of media commodities distributed through the market.

The increasing accessibility that households, and not least children, have to new media technologies made available through restructured media markets means that the possibilities of national policy effectively regulating what gets into 'the home' is significantly curtailed. There are two points worth making at this point. Firstly, this does not imply that either economic or cultural regulation have ceased to exist. Rather, regulatory regimes are also increasingly re-scaled at levels above those of individual nation-states, as well as being re-ordered around market-friendly principles. For example, the European Union has developed a range of policies aimed at ensuring that legitimate social interests in protecting children from violent or sexually explicit material on the Internet are put in place. Similar trans-national policy initiatives addressing children's media rights have been developed elsewhere, stimulated not least by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The emergence of an international movement supporting media education and children's media rights can be "seen as a direct answer to media globalisation" (von Feilitzen 1999, 25).

Secondly, this spatial restructuring of the sites and scales of media culture and commodification does mean that the role of public policy in supporting participatory citizenship needs to be re-thought. Traditionally, children's access to media has been understood as potentially problematic, particularly in relation to violent and sexual images. Policy has focussed upon controlling access and protecting children from exposure to such material. However, new media technologies and globalized media markets render this policy paradigm highly problematic. While the agenda of children's media rights has gathered steam in recent years, there remains a tendency to reproduce a 'protectionist' paradigm of these rights that might be both increasingly ineffective and conceptually muddled (Buckingham 2000). However, the re-scaling of the spaces of media culture and policy regulation requires that children's competence to participate as citizens in media debates be taken more seriously. In the rest of this article, we evaluate the development of an innovative approach to educational broadcasting in South Africa that indicates the potential for public service broadcasters to

re-conceptualize children as active participants in mediated deliberation over public issues.

Broadcasting, education, and mediated deliberation in South Africa

1. Rethinking educational broadcasting

The history of broadcasting in South Africa stands in contrast to the pattern of development that has served as the norm for the understandings of media citizenship developed in the North. Radio and television were institutionalized as technologies of racial and ethnic separation rather than national integration. The apartheid regime exercised considerable authority over mass media through a combination of state control and extensive censorship apparatuses. At the same time, opposition to apartheid generated a broad range of alternative media traditions, which emphasized citizen participation in a broad range of media practices. These traditions of alternative media practice have informed the new paradigm of educational broadcasting developed since the first non-racial democratic elections in 1994, one which emphasizes the developmental potential of broadcasting in supporting a transformation of educational practices (Criticos 1999). New broadcasting policies have aimed to foster national integration in an international context of increasing globalization of media markets, and in a domestic context of geographically and socially unequal access to media infrastructure.

The South African experience is of interest because it illustrates both the opportunities and limits that media globalization presents to national policy-makers in developing quality educational programming in support of democratic citizenship. The development of a democratic educational broadcasting policy needs to be placed in the broader context of the institutional and economic transformation of broadcasting. The South African Broadcasting Authority (SABC) has been restructured into an independent public service broadcaster, although increasingly dependent on commercial advertising revenue (Teer-Tomaselli 1995, 1998). The SABC's virtual monopoly over both radio and television has been broken since 1996, with the proliferation of commercialized radio stations and the licensing of a new free-to-air television channel. This liberalization of broadcasting has been overseen by a new independent regulatory agency, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) (Barnett 1999b).¹ In 1995, the IBA's policy review gave a clear mandate to the SABC to develop educational broadcasting programming as part of its new remit as national public broadcaster (IBA 1995).

While the restructuring of the broadcasting sector is one context for the development of a new educational broadcasting paradigm since 1994, the other relevant context is the fundamental overhaul of educational policy. Launched by President Mandela in February 1997, the COLTS campaign (Culture of Learning, Teaching and Service) has attempted to address the problem of dysfunctional

schools, which is one of the most shameful legacies of the apartheid era. The campaign

urges community involvement in restoring a sense of professional responsibility among those educators who have lost their professional self-respect, in urging learners to make disciplined use of their opportunity to study, in combating crime and violence in schools, and in ensuring that officials in education departments exemplify the service ethic. (Ministry of Education, 1999)

The SABC and some national newspapers have been key partners in promoting the COLTS campaign.

Soon after the adoption of the COLTS programme a new curriculum framework (Curriculum 2005) was adopted as a radical break from the apartheid past. Apartheid curricula dominated by education theories of racial and religious determinism gave way in 1998 to a progressive outcomes-based national curriculum.

The *Yizo Yizo* television series has attempted to advance the COLTS campaign and show that dysfunctional schools can be rescued, that learners need not be victims and that Curriculum 2005 and outcomes-based education can be implemented in under-resourced schools.

A Soweto student quoted in a *Yizo Yizo* magazine sums up the challenge of the series:

We have to blame ourselves for a lot of our problems. Students always find something to complain about but they don't help each other. They don't study. They sit around and make noise so others can't study. We play tennis in the classrooms. We steal fuses. We break taps, the lights and the windows. Then we suffer in winter. (SABC Education, 1999c)

A distinctive feature of both broadcasting and educational policy-formulation in the 1990s has been a process of international policy transfer, as South African academic, research, and policy institutions have been re-integrated into international networks. The emergence of a broad-based conceptualization of educational broadcasting should also be placed in the context of the changing paradigms of media education developed in South Africa during the course of political transition (Prinsloo and Criticos 1991, Prinsloo 1999). This paradigm-shift acknowledges the multiple media literacies of children, and emphasises the development of educational practices that will contribute towards the empowerment of learners. Since before the 1994 elections, the restructured SABC has shown a strong commitment to innovative and broadly conceived educational uses of its radio and television services. These have included *Soul City*, a health education initiative, and the *Khuhuleka* voter education series, both of which combine elements of education and entertainment in an 'edutainment' format (Bulbulia 1998, Teer-Tomaselli 1996). These initiatives illustrate a commitment to using locally produced mass media programming as one element of a broad strategy of education for citizenship.

In 1996, the SABC and the national Department of Education committed themselves to a partnership to promote constructive uses of broadcasting to

support the general objectives of educational and curriculum reform. An Educational Broadcasting Plan conceptualized broadcasting as having an important role to play in changing public perceptions of the scope and purpose of education, and also as a resource to provide multi-media resource support to teachers and schools. Educational broadcasting was defined in a broad way to include:

programming supporting structured educational provision and the curriculum; programming which in a systematic and structured way seeks to support audiences in their efforts to acquire life and survival skills in order to improve their circumstances;

programming which in a systematic way empower South Africans to understand and better interact with the world, environmental, natural, social, cultural, political, economic, scientific, and technological processes around them (Department of Education 1996).

It is important to emphasize that the subjects of this mode of educational broadcasting are not restricted to children, but include adults as well.

The key to re-conceptualizing educational broadcasting was a strategic plan undertaken on behalf of the SABC in 1998 by the South African Institute for Distance Education (SAIDE). In contrast to the 1996 Educational Broadcasting Plan, which focussed primarily upon the role of broadcasting in schools and during school-hours, the 1998 plan distinguished between *school-based broadcasting services* and *school-educational broadcasting services* (SAIDE 1998). This latter concept encompasses the full range of broadcast and non-broadcast media services that might support educational objectives regardless of when and where they are offered and accessed.

This emphasis upon not educational broadcasting to a niche has been a distinctive impetus of recent South African educational broadcasting initiatives. The broadly conceived re-definition of school-educational broadcasting depended upon drawing lessons from an evaluation of international trends in educational broadcasting. This reorientation also depended upon an acknowledgement of the increasingly complex, dense, and commercialized nature of South African media cultures resulting from the proliferation and opening up of media markets during the 1990s (ibid., 114). The plan strongly recommended that educational broadcasting should "move away from overtly pedagogical programming to allow for more active learning and learner-centred approaches" (ibid., 60). This dovetails with the recommendation that popular programming formats and genres, including documentary, soap-operas, talk-shows, and drama series, should be used as vehicles for educational broadcasting in order to attract large, general audiences (ibid., 118-121).

By defining school-educational broadcasting as part of the general broadcasting environment, the aims and objectives of educational broadcasting no longer focus solely upon the disciplinary matrix of the school, classroom, and teacher-pupil relationship. In turn, this implies that the priorities of the education departments of public broadcasters be focussed on ensuring the effective provision of non-broadcast resources to enable schools and teachers to re-integrate educa-

tional programming into classroom contexts. In short, then, the approach developed in South Africa during the late 1990s rests upon a re-conceptualization of the spaces in which education and broadcasting are articulated together, and upon a revised understanding of the roles and relationships between the actors involved in educational broadcasting projects. This mainstreaming of educational broadcasting in terms of scheduling is associated with a fundamental shift in the style of programming, eschewing traditional top-down didacticism which models appropriate outcomes. In the new paradigm, programmes model processes of acting, with the objective of empowering people to take charge of everyday decision-making.

Importantly, this diffuse notion of educational broadcasting introduces an important element of ambiguity into educational broadcasting. The use of popular formats for educational purposes raises the question of what counts as effective learning outcomes in this paradigm. This is an unavoidable dilemma, given the acknowledgement of the existence of a complex media ecology into which educational broadcasting must be inserted. The policy response to this issue is to emphasize the heightened importance of establishing effective research capacities, both to evaluate programming and to develop effective support material. The importance ascribed to research in ensuring effective learning outcomes is illustrated by the SABC's commissioning of a 'COLTS drama' which would address issues of teaching and learning environments in South African townships. The production of the series only proceeded after extensive qualitative and quantitative research into conditions in South Africa schools (SABC Education 1999b).

This research served as the basis for the development of the scripts for *Yizo Yizo*. *Yizo Yizo* has been developed with the explicit objective of generating public debate about educational issues, and of changing the attitudes and behaviour of students, teachers and principals, and parents. Research has been central to the production, legitimization, and revision of the series; in evaluating the success of the series' explicit objective of altering attitudes and conduct; and also in defending it against the criticism that the graphic depiction of sex and violence was a glorification that encouraged copy-cat behaviour (Simpson 2001).

II. Reality hits the screens: Yizo Yizo

*Yizo Yizo*² was first aired on the SABC's main channel, SABC1, in February 1999, and ran for 13 half-hour episodes. The show was broadcast at prime time in the evenings, in order to ensure maximum audience penetration of both children and adults. The show provoked instant controversy, but also rapidly established a large audience, of between 1.2 to 2.1 million viewers per episode, making it the most watched programme on South African TV. *Yizo Yizo* is the only drama series that shows the lives of ordinary black South Africans living in townships, a topic otherwise reserved for news and documentary series. The show focuses upon the lives of the children, teachers, and parents of a fictional township school, Supatsela High School. The series deals with the impact of socio-economic factors upon children's experiences of formal schooling, including vio-

lence, sexual harassment and rape, and drug abuse; the role of educational professionals in sustaining or undermining effective learning environments; and the role of communities in improving the performance of schools. The programmes were intended to reveal the depth and complexity of the crisis facing South African schools, to model a process of action to create and sustain a culture of learning and teaching, and to stimulate discussion of key educational issues.

In addition to the episodes of *Yizo Yizo* itself, the SABC developed an extensive multi-media strategy, which aimed both to foster public debate and to provide resources for students and teachers to engage with the issues raised by the series. Thus, as the marketing slogan for the series declares, *Yizo Yizo* really is 'More Than Just TV'. This strategy includes the distribution of a full-colour *Yizo Yizo* magazine, targeted at children and young people, combining features on the actors in the series with discussions of the issues addressed in the series. A talk show accompanying the TV series was also broadcast the day after each week's episode, on the national radio station MetroFM, which has the largest youth listenership in the country. A further feature of this multi-media profile for *Yizo Yizo* was the release of a soundtrack CD, which became one of the fastest selling music CDs in the country. Both the soundtrack CD and the *Yizo Yizo* magazine illustrate the use of popular commercial media formats to support the primary objective of stimulating discussion of the television series. The music soundtrack from *Yizo Yizo* is particularly notable, featuring as it does local *kwaito* artists. *Kwaito* is a distinctively South African hybrid form of pop music, mixing elements of imported house, hip-hop, and rap with homegrown traditional and pop music styles (Stephens 2000).

The use of township dance music in the television series was an integral element of the 'reality-effect' created around the programme, and thus a key element in both building a large youth audience and in realizing the objective of stimulating discussion about real-world social and policy issues (Smith 2001a, 31-32). *Yizo Yizo*'s authoritative claim to be 'showing it like it is' depended on a combination of both innovative aesthetic devices (pop music, fast-paced visuals) and the extensive research in contemporary township schools conducted by the production team prior to the making of the series (Motanyane 1999). The contradictory implications of the series' 'realism' illustrates the difficulties faced by forms of educational broadcasting that use many of the stylistic and generic features of popular media culture. In order for the series to succeed as a vehicle for stimulating debate about its subject matter, it has also been necessary for the SABC, Department of Education, and the series' producers to engage in a public process of remedial media education. *Yizo Yizo* became the hook upon which newspaper stories about youth crime and school indiscipline were hung, giving rise to a debate over whether or not the series was promoting copy-cat behaviour by encouraging school violence (Pons 1999).

Thus, as well as opening up debate about educational issues, *Yizo Yizo* has also served as a means by which a public debate about the relationships between media representations and everyday life should be understood. Defenders of *Yizo Yizo* have had to openly acknowledge the ambivalence at the heart

of 'media influence', given that the series was explicitly conceived as a means of "using television to stimulate discussion as a precursor to pro-social action" (SABC Education 1999a, 213). As the cultural theorist and educationalist Njabulo Ndebele observed during the debate around *Yizo Yizo* in 1999, "[i]f we assume that the dramatisation of violence is intended to provoke a social reaction against it, then one must accept that some unintended consequences may result" (Ndebele 1999). Acknowledging this possibility is not a reason to 'censor' graphic representations of violence or sex, but might instead be read as an index of the "serious gaps in the manner in which art and its relationship to life is actually taught, discussed and understood in the classroom" (ibid.). *Yizo Yizo* is premised on the assumption that children have the ability to distinguish between representations of reality and reality itself, since this is the principle that allows a space to be opened up in which the programme can become an occasion for discussion about individual experiences. Any 'effects' the series is meant to have are not direct, but are mediated by the provision of a broad multi-media strategy which facilitates children acting as speaking-subjects in their own right.

Yizo Yizo certainly succeeded in creating an unprecedented level of public debate, both about the state of education in South Africa and about the role of television representations of social issues. Much of this debate was sparked by criticism that the series glamourised violence and gangsterism, presented black communities in a negative light, and used unacceptably graphic representations of sex and bad language (Garson 1999). However, this negative response from some quarters only succeeded in enabling the broader purpose of the series to be more widely disseminated, and thus contributed to getting more people to watch and discuss the series. The series created new knowledge, especially for adults, concerning the conditions of the country's school system, opening up sensitive issues such as sexual harassment, gangsterism, and drug abuse to debate. Thus, *Yizo Yizo* can be characterized as part of a strategy to generate a public sphere based of *mediated deliberation*, in which various forms of mass media have been used to distribute symbolic resources with the intention of generating innumerable, dispersed dialogues about issues of broad public concern (Thompson 1995).

As already suggested, research is crucial to the form of educational broadcasting of which *Yizo Yizo* is an example. The SABC's own evaluation of the first series of *Yizo Yizo*, undertaken in the second half of 1999, focussed upon the effectiveness of the series in stimulating these inter-personal discussions at home and at school (SABC Education 1999a). This research found that the series

was phenomenally successful in its attraction and consolidation of a youth audience. It spoke to this audience in a visually new and exciting way that compelled viewers to watch the series, week after week (SABC Education 1999a, 81).

Furthermore, survey research confirmed that the series

stimulated a phenomenal amount of discussion among its audiences: 77% of learners, 79% of teachers, 72% of principals and 56% of parents said they discussed some aspect of *Yizo Yizo* (ibid., 188).

However, this pattern of discussion was somewhat uneven, with most discussion taking place between students themselves, and discussions between children and parents being skewed around certain topics (ibid., 88). The multi-media support strategy was also identified as being "uneven in the support it provided the process of discussion" (ibid., 9). In particular, the series was found to be significantly less successful in stimulating discussion around issues of rape and sexual harassment. Discussions between children and their parents around this set of issues was found to be limited, and tended instead to focus upon the educational issues raised by the series (ibid., 33). Nor was there much evidence that the attitudes and behaviour of male students had been altered by the series.³ In important respects, representations of gender roles and relations in the series might have undermined the intended message concerning sexual violence (Smith 2001a).

The research evaluation undertaken by the SABC served a variety of purposes. It confirmed that the objectives of the series had been successfully achieved, in providing a platform for public discussion by exposing a set of hidden realities about township schools to public view. The evaluation also found little evidence for the much-hyped copy-cat behaviour the series was said by some to encourage. Thus, the research provided an important element in the public legitimization of the partnership approach to educational broadcasting, enabling the SABC and Department of Education to reiterate the aims of the series and to claim a high degree of success in attaining these objectives (Pretorius 1999, *The Star* 1999). Furthermore, research of this form is an important means by which the opinions of children themselves enter into media debates which are otherwise often monopolized by adults (SABC Education 1999a, 218).

The other purpose of the research was to inform the production of the second series of *Yizo Yizo* (ibid., 254-256). A significant change in the second series, which was first broadcast in February 2001, was the production of hour-long episodes. This reflected research findings that many viewers felt that the half-hour format of the first series did not provide adequate time to wrap-up and resolve different strands of the story line. The second series was accordingly informed by a strong commitment to be clearer in modeling the relationships between actions, consequences, and solutions. The second series was also supported by a revised multi-media support strategy, including material targeted at parents.

A further difference between the first and second series has been the much more visible public support provided by the Department of Education. In 1999, the Department tended not to involve itself in the public media debate around the series, missing an opportunity to use the publicity generated around the series to "put more information before the public on what needs to be done to address the systematic problems in township secondary schools" (SABC Education 1999a, 230). Once again, *Yizo Yizo* was accused of encouraging copy-cat violence (Mecoamere 2001). In 2001, the Department of Education has provided much stronger support for *Yizo Yizo*. Shortly after the beginning of the second series, renewed controversy broke out following an episode in which two male

prisoners were shown having sex. This 'rape' scene was denounced in the National Assembly by an ANC (African National Congress) Member of Parliament, who charged that the series undermined the "norms, values, culture, religion and beliefs of the majority of our people" (Mhlanga 2001). It is significant that these critical attacks on the series depend on an implicit, common sense model of strong media effects, in which children are constructed simultaneously as innocents who are easily influenced into becoming monsters. In response to this controversy, the Education Minister made a clear and unequivocal statement in support of *Yizo Yizo* (Ramsamy 2001). The more visible participation by the Department of Education shifted the terms of the public media debate away from the issue of media effects onto the need to openly debate the issues raised by the series, a position supported by the broadcasting of a live-debate amongst various stakeholders on SABC television following the next week's episode of *Yizo Yizo* (Cape Argus 2001). Once again, in this reorientation of public debate, the extensive research undertaken in producing *Yizo Yizo* was invoked to argue that what was shown in the series was in fact a 'mirror of reality'.

Is this it? Lessons from South Africa

Yizo Yizo has been highly successful in its main objective of opening up the educational crisis in South Africa to broad public debate and inter-personal discussion (Smith 2001b). The success of *Yizo Yizo* rests on the acknowledgement of the reality of a complex popular culture in South Africa, and of the existence of youth audiences who have sophisticated cultural literacies. The basic premise of the series is that children are neither passive dupes, copy-cats, nor innocents-to-be-corrupted, but rather subjects capable of assessing, evaluating, and discussing complex public issues. *Yizo Yizo* illustrates that processes of media globalization do not necessarily eradicate the ability of public institutions to deploy cultural policies for progressive democratic ends. Rather, this example suggests that principles of educational broadcasting need to be adjusted, not least to take advantage of new forms of addressing audiences that the development of complex media cultures make available. Media globalization might well problematise 'protectionist' models of children's media rights, ones in which children are not usually constructed as the agents of their own rights (Buckingham 2000, 198-199). But it also opens up the possibility of using multi-media strategies to facilitate a dialogical model of educational broadcasting in which children themselves are ascribed agency as subjects of public discussion.

Yizo Yizo makes visible a range of issues, so enabling children, teachers, and parents to become informed participants in a public debate around a shared set of reference points. In this way, it illustrates the potential for broadcasting to link up the everyday experiences of ordinary people with broader political debates, by facilitating a set of mediated discussions in homes, classrooms, playgrounds, as well as on radio, television, and in newspapers. Patterns of media consumption in South Africa are not uniformly based in the home, since there is

a significant amount of 'out-of-home' viewing, not least in those township communities upon which *Yizo Yizo* is modeled (Venter and Van Vuuren 2000). *Yizo Yizo* uses a variety of mass media platforms and aspects of contemporary popular culture to cultivate inclusive forms of talking-subjectivity. In so doing, *Yizo Yizo* treats children as citizens, that is, as competent participants in mass-mediated public discourse around issues that directly affect them.

However, while *Yizo Yizo* uses a popular television format to build a large audience, in 'leaving' the classroom and by deploying the aesthetics of popular culture it relinquishes a significant degree of control over the messages that can be hoped to be instilled through educational broadcasting. This is a feature inherent in any policy aiming to govern the conduct of populations through the *distanciated* mediums of radio and television broadcasting (Barnett 1999a). This accounts for the importance of providing effective support materials on this model of educational broadcasting. But even if these support strategies are effective, the formal features of 'edutainment' introduce an inherent ambiguity into the process of communication. The primary finding of the SABC's evaluation of the first series of *Yizo Yizo* was that the series had been successful in raising issues, but less successful in providing "practical and actionable solutions" (SABC Education 1999a, 143). This led to some practical revisions, such as the introduction of hour-long episodes. However, it might also be the case that there is an unavoidable trade-off between broadening access to audiences that popular format programming allows, and the 'didactic' content in terms of 'practicable solutions' that this sort of programming can hope to deliver. The 'reality' revealed by *Yizo Yizo* is, after all, dependent upon the highly sophisticated manipulation of conventional codes of genre and format (Smith 2001a, 12). The effective deployment of these conventions to establish the 'authenticity' of the programme introduces a degree of distance between medium and message, a space that allows debate to proceed, but also inevitably means that the 'appropriate' messages might get lost in transmission.

The uncertainty surrounding the learning outcomes of popular 'edutainment' programming is connected to a further limitation on presenting *Yizo Yizo* as an unproblematic model for educational broadcasting. *Yizo Yizo* has been produced in a particular moment in South African popular culture:

The continual expansion of the mass media coupled with the removal of the cultural boycotts mean that young South Africans now can receive any amount of media programming from abroad (Prinsloo 1999, 182).

As already suggested, *Yizo Yizo*'s success depends in no small part on its conscious use of aesthetic features of an increasingly internationalized and commercialized popular culture in South Africa. This is exemplified by the role of music in the series. The use of *kwaiito* music as the soundtrack drew upon an emerging commercial culture, which is a testament to the influence of international markets for cultural commodities upon South African popular culture. In turn, the series gave a significant boost to the further commercial profitability of this

genre, raising the profile of artists and boosting sales. The series fits into the pattern whereby

[t]he media have responded to the changing consumer base by targeting an increasingly black audience and in doing so they propose identities that mark success with a consumer lifestyle and matching gendered subjectivities (ibid., 182).

Yizo Yizo in fact illustrates the uneven process through which the institutional restructuring of post-apartheid mass media is contributing to the construction of a 'black-youth market' for commodified popular culture. The week after the controversy over the 'male rape' scene controversy in *Yizo Yizo 2*, in March 2001, the SABC's marketing department ran a full page advertisement in the business pages of national newspapers in South Africa, using the publicity generated around *Yizo Yizo* to encourage potential advertisers that the show illustrated the potential of locally produced television content to reach a broad audience of youth, black, and male viewers with disposable income. This campaign reflected the difficulty in attracting advertising for the series, despite its record-breaking viewing figures. The South African advertising industry has been slow to target the growing black middle class as a key market segment (*Saturday Star* 2001a). This raises serious problems for the SABC, which is heavily dependent on commercial advertising revenue, in continuing to finance the series (*Saturday Star* 2001b).

The case of *Yizo Yizo* thus illustrates the contradictions of producing public service broadcasting with universal social objectives, in a context in which public service broadcasters are increasingly dependent upon advertising for their continued operation. The ability to participate in the sort of extended, mediated public debate stimulated by *Yizo Yizo* remains socially uneven, shaped as it is by access to social and material resources which are the conditions of participation in informed debates about public policy and popular culture. While, on the one hand, the success of *Yizo Yizo* demonstrates that citizenship and consumerism are not necessarily diametrically opposed principles, the difficulty in attracting adequate advertising expenditure is partly a function of entrenched socio-economic inequalities which indicate that the complicity of an increasingly commercialized South African broadcasting system with the commodification of 'black youth markets' might contribute to the broader segmentation of social groups that will entrench inequalities of access to media technologies and cultural competencies.

In conclusion, *Yizo Yizo* serves as an example of the continuing relevance of public policies that endeavour to support and sustain citizenship participation using locally produced mass media programming. South African broadcasting in the 1990s has emerged from a history of division and fragmentation to pursue innovative nation-building media projects that take advantage of the opportunities opened up by processes of media globalization to realize the principles of active media-citizenship rooted in the struggle against apartheid. What this example illustrates is that in an era of media abundance, in which traditional forms

of media regulation have been rendered problematic by the spatial restructuring of media markets and technologies, paternalist and protectionist models of children and media policy are likely to be increasingly anachronistic. Media globalization makes more dialogic models of children's media-citizenship both more viable and all the more imperative.

Notes

1. The IBA was superseded by the Independent Communications Authority (ICASA) in 2000, responsible for both broadcasting and telecommunications regulation.
2. *Yizo Yizo* means 'the way it is', 'this is it' (Smith 2001a, 6).
3. It should be acknowledged that the extent of sexual harassment and sexual violence against female students is a much deeper issue than one that can be solved by a single television series (Human Rights Watch 2001).

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Domesticating Disney: On Danish Children's Reception of a Global Media Giant

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Media globalisation is as old as the media itself. Indeed, the so-called medium-theory school predicates its divisions of societal development on the various ways in which communications media cross borders of time and space (Innis [1950]1972, McLuhan [1964]1997, Meyrowitz 1994). Yet, few will dispute that during the last two decades the unprecedented growth in the number of satellites in the sky and optic cables under the sea has put transborder television and Internet communication at the centre not only of societal development but equally of economic and cultural change. So, it is only natural that media have assumed an increasing importance as constitutive elements in contemporary theorisings on globalisation (e.g., Wallerstein 1991, Herman & McChesney 1997). Amongst the key characteristics of media globalisation today are technological convergence and economic commodification, temporal immediacy (or near-immediacy), spatial ubiquity, and increasing interaction between senders and receivers.

Several globalisation theorists have called for more empirical grounding of globalisation theories, including media globalisation (e.g., Ferguson 1992, Yoshimoto 1994). My main contention, which I hope to substantiate in the following, is that a user, or reception, perspective is as central to the empirical development of media globalisation as it is marginal to most contemporary theories on that topic. Furthermore, I argue that children are as visible to media conglomerates as they are invisible to the scholarly eye in most empirical reception studies made on media globalisation (e.g., Lull 1988, Jensen 1998, but see Livingstone & Bovill 2001). So, to investigate children's take on processes of media globalisation may add theoretical nuances and empirical insights to our understandings of phenomena that in all probability will remain at the core of academic as well as general interest and importance.

Finally, I suggest that inconspicuous everyday routines are as focal to most media users as they are neglected in conceptualisations on media globalisation. Be they from a political-economy perspective or from a more cultural-studies perspective, most studies on media globalisation harbour dichotomous views on these processes that I find it imminent to question and possibly revise. Political

economists will argue in terms of conceptual taxonomies, such as homogenisation/heterogenisation and global/local (Garnham 1990, Gershon 1997, Demers 1999), while cultural studies researchers will argue in terms of national/universal cultures and mainstream/diaspora cultures (Wallerstein 1991, Morley & Robins 1995, Gillespie 1995, Kolar-Panov 1997, Qureshi & Moores 1999).

Such dichotomies easily, if often unwittingly, lend themselves to inferences that the in between, the grey zones are empirically homogeneous and hence conceptually uninteresting. Such inferences are perhaps particularly questionable to draw within cultures that are constituted upon discourses of national identity such as is the case in, for example, many countries on the European continent. If scholars studying these (media) cultures focus only on distinctive articulations of otherness, they leave unanswered whether the official discourses on national homogeneity are, in fact, identical with people's claims to their cultural identities. The political implications are as obvious as they are unwarranted: most cultures, it is argued, have existed in a pure and untainted form until the advent of visible others. Instead, when unpicking processes of media globalisation, we may heed Swedish ethnologist Orvar Löfgren who speaks about the necessity in cultural analyses to distinguish between what he calls Sunday culture and everyday culture, or cultural discourses and cultural practices (Löfgren 1990). By applying such a dual, analytical perspective also on the inconspicuous forms of culture, we may unravel nuances and ambivalences in the seeming homogeneities.

Denmark is one of the seemingly homogeneous cultures in Europe, a country that in official tourist brochures boasts of being the oldest kingdom in the world, and a country in which geographical borders follow linguistic boundaries. In the following, I shall approach media globalisation from an inconspicuous, juvenile reception perspective by analysing ways in which Danish children appropriate a stable and ubiquitous part of their everyday media fare, namely Disney.

Disney: A global media oldie

Together with Coca Cola, Disney is perhaps the best-known brand name in the world. Most people know of and have personal experiences with one or more of the company's products. Moreover, the Walt Disney Company is among the oldest global media conglomerates. Most people therefore develop their experiences with Disney in relation to a tradition of reception which they may accept or oppose but which they can rarely ignore. Taken together, the global reach and the age of the Walt Disney Company makes it a unique object for studying children's contemporary reception of media globalisation, a process that is invariably situated within and shaped by patterns of family and peer interaction and cultural preferences.

The significant transformations in global forms of mediated communication in the 1980s and 1990s are illuminated with particular clarity in the Disney

Company's business development. In 1984, a thorough transformation of leadership began to turn a slumping, if still lucrative, family business into a streamlined corporation that intensified global marketing of the Disney brand name, while simultaneously diversifying the company's business activities beyond the Disney label itself through corporate partnerships and strategic alliances. Capitalising on the recent VCR boom in many countries, the so-called Team Disney, under CEO Michael Eisner, started off by carefully orchestrated global video releases of the company's rich animated feature library. In 1989, Buena Vista Home Entertainment was founded as the international coordinator of Disney's home video and interactive businesses, followed one year later by the formation of the Walt Disney International, a centralised branch coordinating all overseas activities. In 1995, the takeover of Capital Cities/ABC turned Disney into the world's leading media mogul while increasing the company's U.S. assets in news and sports programming and adding publishing and multimedia to its area of control (Wasko 2001: pp. 36-7). While Disney's global leadership was ousted in 2000 by the merging of AOL/Time Warner, the company is still ranked as one of the six so-called first-tier media conglomerates in the world, characterised by vertical integration and a complex network of interlocking ownership and management (Herman & McChesney 1997). Both mergers signal economic convergence of new and old media that dramatically enhance possibilities of cross-selling and cross-promotion.

Seen from a European perspective, the revamping of Disney has meant a unification of Disney output and distribution. Today, most European children have daily access to one or more satellite channels featuring Disney animation films; they witness regular, and limited, reissues on VHS (and now increasingly DVD) home video; yearly releases of new cinema features are paralleled by computer games and music CDs; and they are often accompanied by visits to McDonald's with which Disney made a ten-year contract in 1996 giving the fast-food chain exclusive global rights to promote Disney products in its restaurants. Merchandise is boosted by a plethora of Disney stores in major cities, on-line services can be accessed via the Internet, and since the opening of Euro Disney outside Paris in 1992, the corporation can add theme park to its potential offerings for European children.

In Denmark, Disney cartoons in the cinemas were seen by an average of 500,000 people (equalling ten per cent of the population) by the late 1990s, and Danish households with children aged 3-10 may claim an average, yearly purchase of four Disney videos that are watched 34 times on average (Bach 1997). As CEO Michael Eisner pronounced in 1998:

It doesn't matter whether it comes in by cable, or telephone lines, computer or satellite. Everyone's going to have to deal with Disney (quoted in Wasko 2001: p. 222).

The Disney universe facing European children today is very different from that which their parents knew during their childhood. Unlike the U.S.A., in many European countries and regions Disney until the mid-1980s meant print media

on an everyday basis to which was added a sprinkling of ritual cinema visits to watch the latest animation film and a Christmas show on television. Not least within Northern Europe, print media has held sway until recently as a defining feature of the Disney universe for media users (Drotner 2001a, Hagen 2001). In Denmark, a weekly comic, *Donald Duck*, has been brought out since 1949 by the publisher Egmont H. Petersen, now The Egmont Group, which is the world's leading publisher of Disney print media, and the Nordic countries still top the international list of Disney comic consumption (Christiansen 1998).¹ It is within these complex parameters of unified global production and diversified local traditions of reception that contemporary children approach and appropriate Disney.

Juvenile Disney: Traditions of research

Particularly in the U.S.A., Disney has always been associated with animated film and the theme parks. This focus is reflected in academic studies on Disney, most of which are of U.S. origin and with perspectives ranging from panegyric praise to ideological critique (e.g., Feild 1942, Dorfman & Mattelart [1971]1975, Bryman 1995). Both animated film and theme parks, however, are nearly always constructed as being connected to fantasy and children, either real ones or the child in all of us. Not surprisingly, the company itself has closely monitored users' receptions, starting in the 1930s with informal studio previews (Ohmer 1991). More unexpectedly, the reception take on Disney has received relatively little scholarly attention (Real 1973, Stone 1975, May 1981, Wasko 2001, Wasko et al. 2001). Perhaps most unusual of all, there has been no empirical, academic study of the Disney universe as seen from a juvenile perspective.

All of the existing academic studies have young adults, indeed university students, as informants. Naturally, this sampling method does not invalidate or diminish the research results, as long as the researchers are aware of the analytical specificities of their sample. But it does imply that the results invariably reflect informants' past experiences with Disney rather than their present engagements with the company and its products. In her encompassing investigation of the Disney brand, and based on the previous studies, Janet Wasko sums up what she terms audience archetypes in the U.S. Disney reception: "fanatic", "fan", "consumer", "cynic", "uninterested", "resister", and "antagonist" (Wasko 2001: pp. 195-218). As a participant in the largest of these studies, a comparative reception study encompassing 18 countries around the world (Wasko et al. 2001), I became interested in studying how these categories apply to children today. In short, I became interested in studying how contemporary children, rather than adults, articulate their understandings of the Disney universe in view of the company's intensified global marketing and cross selling.

The present article is part of a major study I have undertaken (Drotner 2002a) in which the primary data are based on in-depth interviews made in 2000 with 48 children (24 girls and 24 boys in the age bands 6-7 years and 11-12

years, respectively) and one or both of their parents. The youngest age band represents the core group of juvenile Disney users, while the older age band represents children who are growing out of Disney while still being objects of the company's globalised production and distribution pattern. Half of the informants live in the greater Copenhagen area and the other half in a provincial town; all interviews with the children were conducted in their rooms, while parents were interviewed in the living room or kitchen.

While the overall study charts transformations of reception between parents and children, in the following I limit myself to the children's perspective. I focus on informants' discursive articulations of the popularity of animated films (both cinema and video releases). This focus is chosen because it is a key area in which children negotiate their understanding of the Disney universe.

Domesticating the foreign

Animated narratives, not theme parks or merchandise, are what Danish children primarily think Disney is about, and television and particularly videos are their main narrative entry points. Despite the diverse range of Disney products, and despite many informants' possession of a good number of these products (*Donald Duck* magazines, computer games, music cassettes, toys and other merchandise), all informants immediately and intuitively refer to animated film and figures in speaking about their perceptions of and experiences with Disney. As in other small language communities and unlike most other films imported to Northern Europe, Disney animation is dubbed in Denmark, and so it is not so visibly marked as foreign. Most of the children know Disney animation is from the U.S.A. (Drotner 2002a), but this knowledge has no bearing on their pronouncements and priorities.

While Team Disney has been at pains to widen their filmic range of cultural representations in an obvious attempt to counter critique of stereotyping, none of our child informants remark on cultural divergences. Indeed, a number of children, both younger and older, have difficulties in correctly locating figures in relation to country of origin. Mulan is erroneously taken to go to war in Japan, not China, while Jane is said to leave Tarzan and go back to the U.S.A., not Great Britain. In the present context, these errors are analytically interesting, not so much as indications of Danish children's poor knowledge of geography, but as signs of their narrative priorities. Most of these priorities are thematically and aesthetically motivated by and centre on scenes in the plot. And so the film critic may easily conclude that children's mistakes in national labelling is a result of Disney's unchanged ideological representations, whereby multiculturalism remains superficial and unimportant aesthetic glosses on a static deep structure favouring white, male heterosexuality.

But children's appropriations are more complex than such a simple conclusion allows for. Quite a few of the informants focus on elements that are not key narrative elements, but elements that are central to themselves. One recurring

example is from *Tarzan* (recently released at the time of the interviews). Particularly young children focus as much upon the initial killing of Tarzan's parents as upon the later killing of Kerchak, his gorilla father. The filmic function of the initial scene is to get the real action in the gorilla tribe going, but not so for Susan, aged five:

It all starts with [Tarzan] being little, and his mom and dad they travel over to a jungle and they build a house. They live there, and then a leopanth [sic] comes and kills the mom and dad. Then a gorilla comes and... ahm... sneaks in. Then he [sic] sees a little baby lying... and some blood [Susan swallows], and a tiger rushes forward who will attack and who follows them. All of a sudden it is shaken off, and then Tarzan grows up, and when he grows up he becomes very big and strong. And he has some friends, and then the gorilla gets killed, the king gorilla. And Tarzan becomes king and Jane becomes queen.

Children's reception is selective and not least with young children it seems motivated primarily by problematics that are focal in their own lives. They will often forget titles of films and use as mental props McDonald's figures, sitting on shelves in their rooms, or point to their bedclothes with figures from, e.g., *The Lion King* or *101 Dalmatians* as a guide to the interviewer. In their accounts of Disney narratives, children take in what to them are foreign features and domesticate them so as to serve very immediate ends. So, in the age band 5-6, we find informants very preoccupied with the youngest or smallest figures, who are not always protagonists, and with being rescued and found ("I like things about being saved", says Liv aged six). Also, endings are recounted with an emphasis on characters being reunited or returning home.

These are all discursive elements of harmony. In psychological terms, we may speak, with Höjjer (1998), of narrative harmony operating like transitional objects in Winnicott's sense, that is, objects which help the child overcome and deal with its basic fright of separation and loss (see also Rydin 1996). Within a cultural perspective of analysis, one may note that these elements are embodied enactments: young informants (and quite a few older ones) accompany their pronouncements with gestures, jumps and songs, all of which operate as ways of demonstrating their mastery, be it of fear or of feats. One small boy climbs up his bunk bed to demonstrate Tarzan's artistry with lianas, while Ditte, aged five, recounts a scene in *A Bug's Life* as follows:

Ditte: Where the little one must go away from the others, I think that is so sad.

Int.: Yes.

Ditte: I think that was a pity.

Int.: But he returns, doesn't he?

Ditte: Yes, I know. And do you know what... I think it is fun when those grasshopper dwarfs [the bugs] say... [Ditte screams].

Int.: They say that?

Ditte: Yes, because they have made a bird, and then it comes and they... [Ditte screams again].

Int.: Is that the bird saying that?

Ditte: No, it's the bugs, because they get scared, the grasshoppers are afraid, and they go... [scream] with the bird following them just behind.

Young children's obvious joy in enacting particular scenes is paralleled by their thematic priority of temporal and spatial reversals – Donald Duck sledging up a hill or the big Genie coming out of a small bottle in *Aladdin*. Such features must hold a particular attraction to an age group who has just mastered the rules of regularity and a knowledge of how everyday things operate.

Media literacy

In many countries, Disney products top the list of sell-through videos that are also among the videos that children watch most often. Many of our informants estimate to have seen particular videos 15-20 times, and so it should come as no surprise that they are able to quote snippets of dialogue and recite songs. The repeated showings also operate as tools for informal training of media literacy, that is, users' abilities to perceive formal properties and thematic modalities of expression (image, music, words, text) so that they are able to remark on these perceptions (e.g., Taylor 1998, Silverblatt 1999, Tulloch 2000).² Naturally, children do not watch Disney's animated films in order to learn something; in fact most of them say they like the films because they are entertaining. Nor is children's informal media literacy a result of the company's perceived policy of producing educative entertainment.³ Rather, the repetitive nature of children's reception patterns, and here primarily their video viewing, acts as an imperceptible aid in forming aesthetic and substantive tools of distinction.

Irrespective of age, children articulate often quite acute genre inferences. For example, they recognise certain scenes from their videos being repeated in the weekly television shows *Disney Fun* (Disney sjov), shown at 7 p.m. on DR1, one of the two national public service channels, and they notice the orchestration of scenes ("you cannot have two sad scenes in a row"). Six-year-old Anna remarks that in *Toy Story 2* (she pronounces the number in English) the cowgirl paints rainbows, sun and rain on:

...I think it is the Gold-digger, I think it happens on him. But you don't see it in the film, but I do think it happens on him when she sees him. Oh, I think he really needs some makeup [her voice imitates that of the figure].

Several informants propose such inferences, a feature that may be seen as a way in which they lay claim to knowledge about narrative and thematic structures. Also, children in both age bands comment on formal modalities, such as particular voices recurring from one video to the next, or, as six-year-old Brian notes:

When you go to the cinema, then sometimes they speak more slowly, and then something happens... boom... then you hear a bang in the cinema, and then you know you are being scared.

Such comments are signs of a type of informal media literacy that parallels what Anthony Giddens calls practical knowledge (Giddens 1991). It cannot be taken as proof of a media literate generation in the sense of a generation who systematically develops and applies competences in understanding, analysing, and possibly expressing itself via the media. But, I would argue, such informal media literacies are a necessary, if insufficient, basis on which formal media competences may successfully be developed.

From inclusiveness to exclusiveness

While children in both age bands express an insight into thematic and formal properties of the Disney texts, an insight that is often based on repeated viewings, these expressions are also clearly differentiated according to age. Young children are inclusive in their pronouncements, that is, they rarely express a dislike for a specific film as such; rather they judge elements on the basis of their internal narrative function: some characters are evil and meet with a just fate when dying. Also, they comment less frequently than older children on formal modalities. Older children are more reflexive of such traits, and some of them are clearly at pains to demonstrate taste distinctions. They speak about “grand effects”, “really smashing colours”, and “it looks almost real”. William, aged 11, prefers a particular scene in *The Lion King* when:

...Scar and Simba fight standing on their hind legs. And it is made in slow, so they stand like this [William demonstrates slow-motion movements] fighting each other. I thought that was very well made.

12-year-old Filis describes her preference for *Toy Story I* in the following manner:

I like the way you see, like if you are a toy, you see things from below many times, and I like that a lot.

It is an apt description of a subjective camera angle and Filis notes how that makes her “get into the film more”.

It is also older informants who repeatedly draw on contextual information culled from other films or magazines, the Internet or friends. Victor, aged 12, parallels a computer-animated war scene in *Mulan* with a scene in *Star Wars*, both of which are shot from above, and 11-year-old Camilla comments on the style of *Tarzan* that “it looks like *Hercules* with soft colours – new”. Alexander, who is also 11 years, likes the *Tarzan* video, too, “especially when Tarzan surfs the branches”. Perhaps as a reaction on the interviewer smiling at this remark, Alexander explains that he has read that the artist drew Tarzan’s flying feats after having watched his own sons’ skateboarding.

As could be expected given their more advanced cognitive and linguistic capabilities, older children also focus more than the younger ones on thematic structures in their accounts. For example, *Toy Story 2* is said by the children to be “about friendship, like the first one”; *Tarzan* is “about growing up in a society and finding out that you are not what you think you are”; and *The Lion King* is “about being left and then found again”. While many young informants pay attention to harmonious traits, as we saw, older informants are more interested in traits of independence and resilience. Peter, aged 12, explains why he likes *Peter Pan*:

It's about children who dare do something. They can survive without their parents and – they dare do something new, they are not afraid... When they quarrel, they go away; but they soon become friends again when there are no adults. I like that.

For older girls, in particular, *Mulan* holds a position as a character of independence. Several informants pronounce their preference for the film as one that singles itself out from the rest. 12-year-old Sophie explains:

Sophie: [*Mulan*] is total fun. And it is so different.

Int.: Different in what way?

Sophie: It's just no one ever made something about such a strong woman [Sophie pronounces ‘woman’ in a wry voice]. In any film... She can do so much. She is just better than all others.

Sophie does not remark on *Mulan*'s ethnicity but on her gender. It is not Disney's attempts at representing multiculturalism, but feminism that are at stake here. Sophie's wry voice in describing *Mulan* as a strong woman indicates a certain distance to the feminist implications of her remark. As many girls her age (and their older sisters, as well), feminism is a “mother thing” that they do not feel part of. Still, she and other informants clearly sympathise with a strong girl character, which is worth noting in view of the recurrent criticism of continued ideological conservatism levelled against Disney after the company's attempts at introducing more independent-minded female protagonists with *The Little Mermaid* (1990) and *Pocahontas* (1995) (e.g., Bell et al. 1995, Byrne & McQuillan 1999).

Older children, and especially boys, with well-educated parents are the most explicit in using their taste markers as ways in which they signal a certain distance to parts of the Disney narratives. They will comment on aspects in the plots (“a weird way to die”) or on the endings. Says Victor: “[The film] ends well as Disney films always do.”

Anna, aged 12, whose cousins live in Britain, prefers to watch Disney videos in English:

...because then it's the first time they are made. Because [afterwards] people start adding new sound and so on [...] But I still think it is ok to have [Disney] films in Danish for the little kids to see.

Anna uses English as a quality marker and as a marker of a more grown-up taste without forfeiting the existence of dubbed Disney films. Her comment allows her to dissociate herself from aspects of Disney without disbanding with the narrative universe altogether. Like many older children and adolescents in Denmark, Anna associates a mastery of English with access to more advanced quality media output.

In public debates, such pronouncements are often taken as indications of Americanisation, of children's preferences for Hollywood over more homegrown output. But such easy conclusions harbour more vexed problems of globalisation regarding cultural and linguistic diversity. In small language communities it is simply very difficult to sustain a varied media output, particularly fiction, in the national language that appeals to a range of age groups and to both genders, and so young users in small European countries in great numbers turn to English-speaking fiction, since they are more likely to find something to their liking (Drotner 2001b).

Analytical migration

This article has examined children's discourses on what they deem popular Disney animated films. It has been demonstrated how informants lay claim to particular cultural and social positions in handling processes of media globalisation, positions that differ according to age, gender and class. As is evident, these discourses cannot easily be accommodated within Wasko's audience archetypes listed in the introduction to this article. This is due, not only to geographical differences (the U.S.A. vs. Denmark), nor even to differences of age (adults vs. children). It is equally a result of different methodologies (content or textual analysis of interviews vs. discourse analysis of interviews).

These differences are a good example of the complexities involved in analysing children's reception in a global perspective. Disney is central to nearly all children's media culture. Yet, it is still only part of a media fare that in many countries encompasses both print, audiovisual and interactive media, both fact and fiction, both national, regional and transnational output. And this output is appropriated within contexts varying according to age, gender, ethnicity and region. The empirical complexities of media globalisation point to the necessity of developing both theoretical and methodological frameworks that can match the empirical complexities at both macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. These complexities can best be met by developing a convergent media science (Drotner 2002b). Few studies can incorporate such complexities at all levels of their research design and analysis. But all scholars may draw on other empirical investigations, be open to theoretical traditions that differ from their own, and be specific about the analytical range and limitations of their own findings.

Let me therefore state that the above analyses need further contextualisations both in terms of media and user perspectives on the study, i.e., both in terms of analysing other media output used by my respondents and in terms of other

media uses as temporally and spatially situated practices. What the present analysis does highlight are children's discursive strategies in claiming global Disney animation as their own. While respondents' preferences differ according to age, gender and ethnicity, and the locales of appropriation, I believe that their discursive practices may be generalised beyond those empirical diversities. If this is no guarantee of global scholarship, at least it speaks well of the possibilities of analytical migration.

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Notes

1. Today, the Egmont Group, comprising 110 companies in 27 countries, has five areas of production: Egmont Comic Creation (Serieforlaget) which is the largest publisher of comics in Europe; Egmont Books which is the largest publisher of children's books in Europe with a yearly output of over 60 million books; Egmont Magazines publishing 30 magazines in Scandinavia; Egmont Entertainment encompassing videos, computer games, music and, increasingly, on-line services; Nordic Film and TV established in 1992 with the purchase of the world's oldest film company, the Danish-owned Nordic Film (Nordisk Films Compagni). Egmont's turnover in 2000 was 1.5 billion EUR (Balleby 1998, <http://www.egmont.dk>).

The Egmont Group is by far the largest licence holder with the Walt Disney Company Nordic A/S, founded in 1960, based in Copenhagen, and directing the corporation's business in Northern Europe. The company takes in ten per cent of the total Disney sales in Europe, not including videocassettes and computer games. Disney Nordic sells Disney products for c. 3-3.5 billion Danish kroner per year (c. 0.5 EUR) – again minus video cassettes and computer games. Despite its limited population of just over five million, Denmark is the best-selling Disney country in Europe (Mietle 1997).

Due to a change in management and a stricter obedience to the Walt Disney Company's well-known secrecy, it has not been possible to update the above information, nor the information provided by Christiansen (1998).

2. Among the many definitions of media literacy, I prioritise definitions that take an ability to verbalise and hence enable acting on one's abilities to be a key factor in facilitating media literacy. Such abilities are vital in order to foster a wide and varied development of media literacy within democratic societies that are ever more dependent upon mediated discourses. For a discussion of different media facilitating different forms of media literacy, see, e.g., Drotner 2000.
3. In the U.S.A., Disney Educational Productions creates audiovisual material for, e.g., schools and libraries as well as educational toys, play equipment, classroom furniture and teaching aids. The Disney website offers teachers ideas for lesson plans and one may order Disney Educational videos. The company claims that its Disney Magic English series is the best-selling English proficiency programme in the world, and Disney sponsors "Teacher of the Year" awards and "Doer and Dreamer" scholarships to high school students (Wasko 2001: pp. 51, 65; Bell et al. 1995: p. 7).

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Between Here and There: Israeli Children Living Cultural Globalization

Dafna Lemish

Studying the role of media in the lives of children and young people in Israel throughout the last decade has highlighted the operations on their lives of two seemingly conflicting forces – globalization and localization. The focus of this article is to discuss how these two forces are actually mediated by children.

As with their counterparts throughout the world, Israeli children are born into a world, which is global and local. They accept this situation as the normal state of their life. They engage in similar activities as well as share media preferences and interests of children from very diverse backgrounds all over Europe (Livingstone & Bovill, 2001). Mediated globalization was found in Israel as well as in eleven other European cultures to be closely linked to age and class: the older the child from middle and upper classes is, the more he and she relate to the wider world and position themselves within it. Taste markers such as media products (mainly American) and media language (mainly English) play an important role in this positioning process. Mastering the English language, playing computer games, surfing the Internet, preferring American movies and television series – are all associated with children's exercising of a sense of social belonging and personal distinction (Lemish, Drotner, Liebes, Maigret & Stald, 1998).

A central focus of media studies in many countries has been on articulating how children comprehend and understand media texts, e.g., television programs, advertisements, computer games, and the like. Several studies have focused on the role of informal mediation by families in enhancing young children's comprehension and learning from texts, as well as their role as socializing agents. Such mediation studies typically concentrate on parents' restrictions on viewing times and contents, on content comprehension, and on the production of textual meanings. The general conclusion to be drawn from these studies is that, as a result of family influences, children differ, among other things in their attitudes toward media, their uses of media, and their communication patterns. Furthermore, media-meanings attained by children are understood to result not only from individual cognitive processes, but also from their learning orientations and

expectations about texts, which are socially shared (Buckingham, 1993). This suggests that social class, race, and gender play significant roles in the processes of meaning production. Studies on children and media that considered macro system variables and involved relations at the level of subculture or culture, referred mainly to occupation, income, education, and ethnicity (such as Atkin, Greenberg & Baldwin, 1991). However, they overlooked the more general concerns that differ across cultures – national identity, deep social or political conflicts, national goals, and the differing characteristics of media systems.

Yet, Korzenny and Ting-Toomey (1992) do suggest variable clusters that should be considered in cross-cultural research and that bear relevancy to the issue at hand. One cluster, which they label antecedent variables, includes social, political, historical, cultural, and media contexts. Similarly, Berger (1992) stated that the goal of cross-cultural studies is to gain insights into issues such as national character and related social, political, and belief systems and values. All of these have an impact on the specific forms of tension between global and local forms of culture.

In the following pages, I wish to present an integrative summary of research I conducted over the last decade, which will illustrate how these mediation processes work in one particular case study – Israel.

The Israeli media scene

First, the specific culture, Israel, differs from other cultures, in the historical development of dominating media, institutional characteristics, the ideology attached to the media, the mechanisms of control, as well as in preferred genres and content, and the public's perceptions of the media's roles in identity formation. The official discourse describes the national culture as follows: Israel, founded in 1948, consists of Jewish immigrants from all over the world. The country's formative years were characterized by efforts at creating cultural integration and the development of a collective identity, as well as by wars and security concerns. The country is characterized by major social-political-religious divisions over the peace process with the Palestinians, and the Jewish and/or democratic character of the state. Twenty percent of Israel's population of over 6 millions are non-Jewish citizens of Muslim, Christian and Druze faiths, mostly of Arab national identity.

Israel has a well-developed infrastructure of communication, including various commercial and public television and radio stations, cable systems, satellite connections, a thriving print industry and a flourishing market for imported products, such as books and magazines, computer and video games, films, music compact discs and tapes. It has a strong public broadcasting tradition that resisted for many years the introduction of commercial television. This position was based on fear of the possible negative influence of the capitalistic value system and foreign cultural attributes on important national efforts to recreate and nourish the development of a unique Jewish Israeli culture. The argument

that television contributes to cultural imperialism and Americanization of Israeli culture continues to be raised consistently throughout five decades of debate about Israeli television.

The studies

The following is a brief description of several studies of children and media, which I conducted in Israel and which form the base of the analysis presented in this article:

- *Kindergartners' Understandings of Television* (Lemish, 1997; Lemish 1998a) was a cross-cultural analysis that compared 48 American and 25 Israeli kindergartners' understandings of television through in-depth interviews regarding their viewing preferences, perception of "what's real" on television, "what's news", and the meaning and purpose of commercials.
- *Spice Girls' Talk* (Lemish, 1998b) analyzed the reception of this highly popular pop-music female group by 39 pre-teen age girls studied through focus group interviews. The study revealed that the Spice Girls serve as a site of struggle with gender construction, as the girls confront issues of "Girl Power", multiple femininities, idols and whores, "sisterhood", race, and sexual violence.
- *Global Culture in Practice* (Lemish, Drotner, Liebes, Maigret & Stald, 1998) was a preliminary exploration of how globalization becomes embedded in the lives of children and adolescents in Denmark, France and Israel. This research analyzed 336 in-depth interviews with children and adolescents aged 6-17, and was part of larger cross-cultural European study (Livingstone & Bovill, 2001).
- *Perceptions of the U.S. through a Wrestling Television Series* (Lemish, 1999) analyzed 901 questionnaires completed by 8 - 12 year old children and 254 face-to-face interviews with the same population. It focused on their understanding of the differences between their own culture and the American origins of the WWF series.
- *The Rise and Fall of a Virtual Pet* (Bloch & Lemish, 1999) studied the place that a trans-national toy, the Tamagotchi, originally from Japan, had in Israeli children's lives and what it signified for them in terms of relationships, gender identity, and existential predicaments.
- *The Teletubbies* (Lemish & Tidhar, 2002) studied the perceptions of 44 mothers and childhood-experts of this BBC toddlers' television series. Gathered through personal interviews, the results lend support to the claim that audiences actively employ interpretive processes in contending with foreign texts: appropriating universal values through local ideologies; approaching the foreignness of the global with interpretive critical attitudes; contending with linguistic barriers in the attempt to maintain local identity; offering

polysemic interpretation of texts; and, finally, integrating global representations within local rituals. It also highlights the crucial role mothers may play in reconciling the global and the local and is discussed within the framework of parental mediation.

- *The Pokémon* (Lemish & Bloch, forthcoming) studied the perceptions of 46 6-11 year olds interviewed through focus group discussions of this Japanese animated series. The study analyzes children's perceptions of the meanings and values expressed in the series as they relate to issues such as relationships, violence, gender, heroism and cuteness.

In addition, this article draws upon several other on-going research projects on Israeli children's perceptions of popular culture, based mainly on focus group discussions. All Israeli children in these studies are Jewish, mostly but not exclusively, of middle-class.

Mediating the global and the local

Returning to my initial claim, I want to argue that for the children studied the issue of globalization and localization

is not a matter of oppositions. That is, we should not view this phenomenon via dichotomies such as globalization versus localization, international versus national or universal versus particular. Rather, globalization involves the linking by children of their own locales to the wider world. At the same time, localization already incorporates trends of globalization (Lemish, Drotner, Liebes, Maigret & Stald, 1998, pp. 552-3).

Further, I contend that Israeli children's media world provides evidence for at least three forms of mediation between the two extremes of the global and the local. First is the consumption of original local texts saturated with local values and world-views (such as ethnic music, national holidays' ceremonies, or news coverage) along side with the transnational, sometimes ideologically clashing, types of texts. The second form of mediation refers to the consumption of local media texts that exemplify the Israeli version of another culture's product (such as a local soap opera or all-boys pop group). Finally, there is consumption of global texts within a local context and the process of endowing them with meanings made relevant to one's own situation (what Robertson, 1994, calls "glocalization"), as has been documented in studies conducted in the tradition of audience reception. As a result of these processes, we see the emergence of a hybrid children's culture composed of both global and local dimensions.

Universalism

The studies suggest that children do not share a perspective that assumes contradiction, or even tension, between traditional local values and global (i.e., American or late modernity) values, as typified primarily by commercialism, globaliza-

tion, privatization, and individualization (Fornäs & Bolin, 1995). In fact, they perceive universal values – such as friendship, love and cooperation – as global. This perspective dismisses the global-local binary opposition by ascribing to a “utopian” (perhaps naive) world-view of harmony, unity, and shared human values. Indeed, one quality marker of popular texts, such as American series (comedies, soaps, drama) and popular music, is the sense that they cater to the universal interest in relationships, human emotions and interpersonal conflicts. The popularity of soap operas (such as *Beverly Hills 90210*, *Dawson Creek*, or *Baywatch*) is a case in point. Children discuss the universal appeal of soaps in terms of relationships, expression of feelings, dreams and hopes, and romance, and often do not care about their origins. As a 13-year-old girl said:

It doesn't matter [if a soap is Israeli or American]. This one is about people and that one is about people (Lemish, Drotner, Liebes, Maigret & Stald, 1998, p. 548).

Similarly, the Japanese Tamagotchi toy represents for children a site of caring and nurturing human relationships, signifying the life cycle from birth to death.

This analysis suggests that young audiences wish to find symbolic spaces of a shared world consisting of people and relationships, devoid of particular contexts or cultural boundaries or local conflicts. Similarly, the Internet provides another transnational social space. The notion of a utopian world appears often in the children's discourse suggesting that they perceive the Internet as offering direct “human” contact across national borders, and even more important for these children, across local familial borders, where there is no mediation of parents, teachers, schools or computer stores. Media seem to connect young audiences to the imaginary social “center” of humankind.

Social relief

In addition, Israeli children seem to be searching for relief from the contextualized social pressure of which they cannot escape in their everyday life. The deep social conflicts and debates over the nature of Israel as a state, and existential dilemmas stemming from the relationship with the Arab world, occupy a central place in both private and public discourse. In fact, all socializing agents – such as family, educational systems, media, religious institutions, mandatory military service, youth movements, etc. – exert their influence with regard to these dilemmas. Israeli kindergartners, for example, understand that news is “real” and that it deals with what is relevant to their personal lives – mostly issues of war and peace. They are greatly concerned with issues of national security, with threats to society as a whole, and with the people who are in charge of maintaining the social order, i.e., ministers, armed forces, and mayors.

Children's television programs produced locally take pride in emphasizing national identity by highlighting holidays, tradition, historical sites, the Hebrew language, national heroes, the longing for peace, and the like. Military presence is salient in both the private and public realms of life. Hourly news broadcasts,

and the talk they inspire, convey anxiety, insecurity, and physical threats. In this reality, the highly debated television violence issue is greatly amplified and gains additional meanings and concerns absent from mainstream academic discourse (see, e.g., Carlsson & von Feilitzen, 1998).

Such, for example, was children's elaborate explanations denying the violent nature of the *Pokémon* series. This is exemplified by the tactic of comparing the series to other, more realistic and "gory" television programs, suggesting that children develop their own criteria for defining "violence", as has been argued by other researchers (Buckingham, 1996; Tobin, 2000; van der Voort, 1986). The tactics included identifying "rules" of battle-conduct, perceiving the Pokémons as animals and therefore attributing the violence to the world of the wild or distinguishing violence from fighting. However, these data have particular relevance when considering the routine realistic television fare to which Israeli children are exposed, which includes live scenes from military battles, including firing of shots and occasional horrifying sights of the victims of bombings, lynchings, executions on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The ever-present bloodshed and the continuous debate over the concept of "peace" presents a conflict that children seem to be trying to reconcile by redefining the significance of violence when it serves what is defined as "a good cause". This is expressed in Israel in seemingly conditional slogans such as "Peace, but not at any cost", or conflicting expressions such as "soldiers of peace", the need to "wage a battle for peace", or even "fight a war against violence". It is not surprising, therefore, that for the Israeli young audiences, animated Pokémon fights that adhere to certain rules and never end in bloody deaths are not perceived as violence at all.

Contending with foreignness

Designed for a global market, many of the transnational media texts consumed by Israeli children were produced with a special effort to be as universal and culture-free as possible, and so to cater for the interests of young audiences worldwide. However, the data in my research lend support to the active interpretive processes that audiences are engaged in when contending with foreign texts. While recognizing the foreignness in the global texts, I found that a dual process takes place: appropriation of global values on the one hand, and on the other hand, attempts to impose local meanings on some of them. For example, in a discussion of the Spice Girls, a group of 12 year olds incorporated the Spice Girls' message of "Girl Power" as relevant to their understandings of their positioning as girls in Israeli society:

One girl said: Not long ago on MTV... they had this nice dance and they dedicated it to Princess Diana. They said she had Girl Power.

Her friend added: And Madonna too.

When asked what they meant by that, one answered: Something special in her character. She does things with her singing or with helping other people.

When asked specifically, “Does it matter that it is Girl Power and not just power?” she answered in the affirmative, explaining: Because this is something that singles out women and girls.

Many of the girls perceived the concept of Girl Power to be a demonstrative opposition to boys. In answering a direct question, “What does the Spice Girls’ power mean?” a mixed group of nine to eleven year olds responded in a similar fashion:

That girls are better.

There are boys that think that they are better than girls, so the Spice Girls try to prove that it is not so.

They want to show that girls are important too.

In the discussion that followed, the interviewees gave examples from their own experiences in Israeli society for the unjustified claim that boys consider themselves better than girls:

Why do boys think that they are better? For example, in sports... A. proves that it is not true because she plays soccer better than most of the boys in her class!

And boys can be ballet dancers. My brother, for example, is a very good dancer and he thinks there is no difference between boys and girls. Because he tries to prove to some of the people that he dances and it doesn’t mean that he is a girl.

The unfolding of this particular discussion was an illuminating illustration of the way the Spice Girls were recruited as ideological support in everyday experiences of gender inequality and prejudice experienced by pre-teen girls in Israel (Lemish, 1998b).

The complementary process of imposing local meaning became evident, for example, in their discussion of the one black singer, Melanie B., framed as Scary Spice, the one who breaks the rules, acts wildly, has long curly “messed-up” hair and a pierced tongue. For the Israeli participants who were primarily of European origin, this character, perceived as an “other”, seemed very meaningful. While openly expressing “politically correct” acceptance of the foreign character, their discourse revealed a sense of anxiety mixed with curiosity, as they related the issue of race to that of sexual violence, revealing rumors of Melanie B. having been a victim of rape and abuse. Since I was not able to confirm a grain of truth in these stories, it raised the possibility that the girls were removing the sexual-crime threat from their own context and being by attaching it to the culturally removed “other”.

Children’s discussion of the animated series *Pokémon* provides another illustration of the working of these processes. The importance of friendship was clearly prioritized by the children across gender and age. Values such as love, devotion, self-sacrifice, assistance, comfort, and concern were singled out as being the most crucial in human relationships:

The most important thing is not to win and to earn medals and stuff. The most important thing is to be loyal, to appreciate the things your Pokémon wants, and to love him. To win is not everything, the first thing is to be with friends, explained a nine year-old girl.

In addition, togetherness was a central theme in their discussion:

...they are friends who go everywhere together, play together, feed their Pokémons together, share their experiences with each other, they do everything together, described a nine year-old boy.

The empowering nature of group identity was also evident in discussions of the emotional support provided by team members by relieving loneliness and providing a sense of respect and love. The value of group identity, and unity, known in Hebrew as “gibush” or crystallization, has been shown to be a highly prized key symbol in Israeli culture, fostered and encouraged throughout the entire educational system and in the military service that is compulsory for both males and females (Katriel, 1991).

Prioritizing collectivism over individualism, attributed, among others, to the Japanese culture in contrast with the American, seemed to find an echo with Israeli children who integrate both points of view (Katz, Haas & Gurevitz, 1997). On one hand, children are raised to perceive themselves from an interdependent view as part of a collective devoted to the goals of the society at large. This is achieved through a collective ethos based on the Zionist nation-building ideology, and what remains influenced by the original socialist political system, as well as by means of a variety of socializing agents emphasizing national consciousness and responsibility. Yet, on the other hand, Israeli society has been going through a transition through growing individualism and materialism typical of late modernity processes, or what others have referred to as Americanization.

The integrated view of traditional collectivism with western individualism was expressed in children’s appropriation of “togetherness” for the realization of individual aspirations. A nine year-old boy illustrates this point when he explains why he would like to be Charmander (a favorite Pokémon):

Because I would feel good, that I am developing and helping somebody, and I would have a good feeling, because I have done something good today.

Friendship, thus, surfaced as a central theme in children’s interpretation of *Pokémon*, yet clearly they applied their social knowledge to its understandings and implications for the benefits of the individual as well as the collective (Lemish & Bloch, forthcoming).

Hybrid culture

The working of all of these processes hand in hand supports Robertson’s argument (1994) regarding the increasing interconnectedness of many seemingly clashing local cultures which typifies global culture.

A striking example was evident in a discussion with a group of 12-year-old religious girls who expressed strict religious beliefs (including those of modesty, morality, obeying religious laws, tradition) and at the same time admired the Spice Girls' music and Jean-Claude Van Damme's action movies. At one point in the interview they engaged in a heated discussion on the necessity for modest clothing and total obedience to God. And, a minute later, they described their admiration for performers characterized by exaggerated sexual appearances and extremely violent behaviors. This seeming contradiction of opposing value systems did not appear to bother the girls. In this hybrid world they are living in, you can preach – and believe in – traditional family values, but at the same time view the American situation comedy *Love and Marriage* which mocks all family values (Lemish, Drotner, Liebes, Maigret & Stald, 1998, p. 550).

Yet, a central question remains, as to why some foreign elements of media texts are adopted by young audiences (such as the centrality of cuteness in the *Pokémon* series, or the glorified nature of American society as highlighted in the WWF wrestling programs), and others are rejected (such as the goal of becoming a Master in the *Pokémon* series, or the seemingly sexual promiscuity of the Spice Girls), while yet others inspire a very contextualized interpretation (the Teletubbies' home is perceived as a bomb-shelter, or the definition of violence is adjusted to reality) to be of central interest.

Concluding words

The interpretation of the research presented here suggests that Israeli children's readings of popular texts should be understood within the unique context of present Israeli culture, where issues of war and security, masculinity and force, militarization of civil society, egalitarian ethos, "us" and the "others", are central in children's construction of social life. In this sense, *Pokémon*, *The Teletubbies*, news, or the Spice Girls can never be truly "global" products and are always contextually read and interpreted. Young Israeli audiences bring with them to the media consumption situation their personal experience and knowledge, cultural background, gender and social identities, and integrate their understandings of the texts within a general social context. They approach the foreignness of the global with interpretive critical attitudes, while appropriating global values within local ideologies. This is much in line with a host of other recent studies indicating the flexibility of local cultures as they assimilate and accommodate global trends in a process of glocalization. It is through these children's eyes that our undercurrent value system becomes visible and the effectiveness of the work of socialization most evident.

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The Meanings of Television for Underprivileged Children in Argentina

Roxana Morduchowicz

The relationship between children and the media has been the focus of research in parts of the world, but has been explored to a much lesser extent – or not at all – in most countries. According to international studies, one of the most unresearched dimensions in this field is the knowledge children acquire from the media, what they learn from them, and the way these young spectators, never passive audience members, receive and interpret the media messages (Jacquinot, 1995).

Moreover, research on children and media, and on media education, has often ignored social differences, perhaps due to a common conception that social context does not affect the relationship that the young develop with the media (Neveu, 1989). Thus, although there are a number of studies on how children from low-income families make use of and receive the media, such studies are rare.

Nevertheless, children do not escape the social dimensions when they select or interpret a television program or a particular newspaper or magazine. Children construct widely different meanings according to their cultural experiences and the social context to which they belong. The fact that children from different social classes switch on the TV to watch the same program does not imply communion and uniformity in their reception of the same message. Can we, for instance, place on a strictly equal level those children who watch a TV program because of a lack of any other recreational activity, and those who leave the same program on as background sound while playing with electronic toys in their rooms (Mariet, 1993)?

Every child is an individual marked by his or her personal history. But at the same time, and not less important, s/he is also member of a social class. This fact strongly conditions the child's more or less promising opportunities of social success (Chombart de Lauwe & Bellan, 1979)

It is true that each child's history is *unique* and that this uniqueness is developed following a specific logic of this *singular* person's identity or subjectivity. It

is also true that living in, for example, a low-income area does not directly determine the characteristics and personality of the children there, or, still less, their whole lives. The individual is not a simple incarnation of a social group, or a direct result of his or her economic context (Charlot, 1997).

However, taking an interest in young people as singular subjects does not mean forgetting the fact that individuals are constructed by, and construct, their lives in a *social context*. Singularity cannot be understood unless considered with reference to the world in which this singularity is constructed. Although the social context does not (and can not) directly model or determine a person, it is certainly the *universe of meaning* from which a person builds his/her own world and perception of reality.

It is this universe of meaning, and this perception of reality constructed in a social context, that we were interested in exploring when we decided to analyze the *particular* relationship students from *low socio-economic families* in Argentina establish with the media, a relationship that affects their perception and links to culture, to the school, to the world, and to themselves. Social, economic and cultural restrictions are reflected in the media practices and the experiences of low-income families (Danos & Dionisio, 1986).

Of all media, television plays a fundamental role in the life of low-income families in Argentina. These families do not buy newspapers and seldom listen to the radio at home. Instead, television is usually on from very early in the morning until quite late in the evening. The family of low socio-economic status in Argentina, often consisting of seven to eight members, usually lives in only one room, in which the screen occupies an important place. This place is also reflected in the children's lives.

Television is the most important companion for children in this social context: They wake up with TV, they have their meals with it, they spend their afternoons and do their homework with it, and they go to sleep with it on. The screen quickly becomes the friend that fills their solitude, the sister that listens to their secrets and, quite often, the mother that takes care of them.

Argentina – a globalized television country

Argentina has five national (open, or over-the-air broadcast) television channels. During the military dictatorship (1976-1984), all five channels were state-owned. Since democracy returned, four of these channels have gradually become privatized and only one has remained public. Satellite television from other countries has spread rapidly, mainly via cable, during the 90s in Argentina, one of the countries with access to most satellite channels (about 100¹), and with the highest percentage of cable subscribers in the world. Eighty to ninety percent of the population has access to some 50 various TV channels. Almost all children in the study presented in this article have access to both open and cable TV, though their families may not pay the subscription.

On Argentine open television, an estimated 60 percent of programs are imported, particularly from the USA (fiction series) and Latin America (soap

operas). Among the satellite channels, some carry programming produced in Latin America and Europe, and several are thematic, devoted to news, sports, or music videos (such as CNN and MTV). However, the majority of satellite channels transmit US-produced or US-based films, series and cartoons.

All children in the study watch both cable and open TV, especially the private channels. The children watch mainly foreign programs. As their favorite shows, they choose cartoons from the USA and Japan on cable, and American series on open TV. Argentine soap operas starring children and produced for children are their third, but much less pronounced, choice.

Taking the many international satellite television channels into account, and the percentage of imported programs on open TV, as well as children's favorites consisting of foreign programs, we can say that Argentina is one of the most television globalized countries in the world. The meanings of television for underprivileged children in Argentina will, thus, also give an idea of the consequences that media globalization has for these children.

The study

Two hundred and thirty students in the third and fifth grades (7 to 11 year olds) in eight classes in Buenos Aires were surveyed in the project, which was performed in the late 90s (Morduchowicz, 1999). The children attended four schools defined by the city government as 'schools at serious pedagogical risk', because of the extremely difficult economic conditions of the students' families and the high percentage of truancy, pupils not having been promoted, and the occurrence of drop-out before the seventh grade (the end of primary school in Argentina).

The children were asked to fill in questionnaires with fifteen open-ended questions. Thirty of these students were interviewed after the survey for half an hour each, so that the researcher could better understand certain answers.

The research findings were analyzed regarding three main issues:

- the children's television viewing
- the children's favorite genres
- the children's learning from television.

How much do children watch?

The first item studied was the children's media consumption in terms of time spent with the media. Watching television is their favorite activity when they get out of school. This preference was reflected in the number of hours that they spend watching TV daily. The vast majority (80%) watches more than five programs per day (equivalent to five hours) and the other 20 percent watches between three and four programs (hours).

One reason for spending five hours in front of the TV is that the children studied are home from school until late at night (some go to bed between 11 and 12 p.m.). During the afternoon they watch because they choose to do so. From supper on, they watch because their parents do:

I watch all afternoon programs beginning at midday, when I come back home. Afterwards I take a bath. When my father gets home we have supper watching the news and after that a movie at 10 pm. I stay awake until the end, sometimes until midnight. (Diego, 10 years old)

I watch television a lot, starting when I come back from school. And I go to bed very late. (Ezequiel, 8 years old)

The children usually know and mention each and every program they watch. They can list the programs they watch one by one, including the channels and the schedules of the programs, from the moment they come home from school until late at night. Thus, it is not surprising that the great majority knows before turning on the television what they want to see; they rarely turn it on to 'see what's on'.

The average television consumption among children in low socio-economic families, five hours a day, is one hour and ten minutes above that of an average child of the same age in Argentina. An average Argentine child in primary school watches three hours and fifty minutes per day (Chaffee, Morduchowicz & Galperin, 1998).

There are similar French findings: Children whose mothers have not completed primary school studies tend to watch television almost an hour more per day than those whose mothers have acquired university degrees (Neveu, 1989). Children's TV watching is, thus, inversely proportional to the mother's schooling.

In middle-class families, television is on so that *certain* programs at *certain* specified times can be watched, according to research in France. Television in middle-class families is not part of the family daily rituals (e.g., supper). There are other activities that take place after school: reading books and magazines, listening to music, playing games, playing sports, etc. Among children in low-income families, however, television is on the whole day, and is simultaneously shared with other activities, such as meals, schoolwork and house chores. For these children, everything seems to happen in front of the screen. Television is quite integrated into the *family intimacy and routine* of low-income groups (Pasquier, 1999).

Furthermore, children in high and middle-class families tend to organize the time they spend in front of the screen. They often own a VCR, with which they record their favorite programs while they are participating in other activities. Children can then organize their television practice more freely by selecting the content and the time they want to watch (ibid.).

The physical place of the television set

The hours children of low socio-economic families in Argentina spend in front of the screen are also related to the compensating function television has in these contexts, reflected even in the *physical place* the screen is given in the house.

This physical place has a significant meaning. Generally situated in the center of the room in the Argentine households studied (as mentioned, in many cases the only room in the house), in a quite visible place, the TV is located where all glances meet. (Middle-class families, on the contrary, often place the TV in a more discreet place such as the corner of the living room and/or in the bedroom. The TV might also be hidden inside a specially designed piece of furniture, or be disguised among books and records.)

In lower-class families in France, the television set is generally big, occupying and organizing the whole room, ready to receive the cult status the whole family gives it, night after night in a shared ceremony (Pasquier, 1999). This is also true of Argentina:

The television set is in the room where we live. When I go to school, my mother takes it to grandma's house, who lives nearby. At night we bring it back home. (Elena, 7 years old)

The television set is on one corner of the table. My house is like a big room, there is the kitchen on one end, then the table with the television on it in the center, and then the beds on the other side. (Norma, 10 years old)

Television seems to be a fundamental organizer of these Argentine family lives. Programs often regulate the family routine (e.g., supper during the news). Programs also usually generate discussions among the members of the family, around topics that allow them to talk more easily about themselves. The *family reunion* around the TV set is an essential dimension in understanding the way children from lower classes watch their programs.

A great deal of international research shows that the middle-class family sitting together in front of the television set has become an unusual picture today – due to large living space at home, many television sets being placed in several rooms, money, and several available options of activities. Nevertheless, there is a context in which this collective experience still exists in many countries: among *low-income families*, not least at mealtimes. There is, in this context, a shared TV-watching experience that contradicts the alarming discourse about family atomization caused by television.

The placing of the TV set in the center of the room also contributes to constructing the 'us' concept (parents and children together in front of the screen) that explains the absence of guilt for the high consumption among these families (for adults and children, as well). In middle-class families, on the other hand, children may feel guilt that television occupies time that should be devoted to other 'more legitimate' activities.

Television time for low-income families in Argentina is a *meeting time*. TV has become the essential topic in their daily conversations. Even more, televi-

sion is a strong link between mothers and children. Children in these families watch their favorite programs *with* their mothers. TV time in these contexts turns out to be a time for *intimacy* and *complicity* between the mothers and their children. Most children say they watch television after coming home from school, generally in the company of some family member: mother, brothers or sisters. Yanina (10 years old) watches TV with her brother and mother. Elena (7 years old) watches with her grandparents, her uncle and her brother Diego:

I watch television with my mother, lying on the bed. When she goes to cook supper, I watch with my brother. I almost never watch TV alone.

For these children, television means a *sense of community* and plays a unification role, especially at night. This family unification is essential in understanding the *freedom* these children feel when talking about what they watch: there is no guilt, no self-censorship.

What do children watch?

Although children from lower classes say they rarely watch TV by themselves, control by their mothers or other adults over their viewing is almost non-existent. Their mothers' being at home in front of the TV is not connected with a control over the time devoted by the child to the screen or over the kind of program s/he watches. As the Argentine children say:

I watch whatever I want. (Martín, 8 years old)

I watch as much as I want. (Diego, 10 years old)

Several international studies indicate that among better off families, television is often used as a 'discipline tool'. The parent-child relationship is mediated by rules, among them those associated with TV. Middle-class children discover, from their most tender age, the rules of use and prohibitions connected with television. Among middle-class families, discourse about TV is often a discourse about education. Control over TV seems, on the adults' part, to mean being 'good parents', concerned about the child's future. Among the middle classes, the limited place that TV holds in family life has to do with the fact that television is perceived as an 'invader', taking over other more socially and culturally legitimated forms of access to learning and knowledge.

The reluctance that middle-class families show toward TV can be explained by the fact that, according to their standards, educational success is achieved through the written word and not through audiovisual image. For lower-class families, on the other side, the small screen is a source (rather than a problem) for the children's learning and education.

When an underprivileged Argentine child mentions some kind of control, the restraint is often due to reasons that have nothing to do with educational rules:

Sometimes they tell me, 'turn the TV set off, it's very hot'. The appliance begins to overheat and they are afraid it will catch fire. (Norma, 10 years old)

Sometimes, my granny asks me to turn the television set off in the afternoon, because she wants to take a nap. But I usually watch whatever I want. (Yanina, 10 years old)

Not only is the control over time spent in front of the TV set almost non-existent, but, as appeared above, so is the authority over children's program choices. The children say that they themselves choose the shows they watch. And when asked 'Does your mother or your father recommend any particular show to you?' the common answer seems to be 'No':

Int.: What programs does your mother want you to watch?

Vanesa (10 years old): I don't know, she doesn't tell me anything. Maybe she wants me to watch the ones I actually watch.

Int.: Who makes the choice of the programs you watch?

Ezequiel (8 years old): I by myself.

Int.: Does your father or your mother recommend any particular program to you?

Ezequiel: No.

Int.: And what program would they recommend to you?

Ezequiel: I have no idea. None.

Since lower-class parents themselves are high consumers of TV, they often share the programs *with* their children. For these children, parents are significant *partners* to talk with about television. The children perceive watching a TV program as a moment of great intimacy, affection and love. It is a *shared* time. Similarly, according to a French study, a mother writes the following to a French popular TV show: 'Among the moments we enjoy most is when we watch the soap opera together every evening. It is like coming together to share thirty minutes, which go by so fast...'. (Pasquier, 1999).

Regarding the kinds of programs that lower-class children watch on television, and their favorite genres, certain research points to a homogenization of media tastes, resulting from a strong TV impregnation and consumption (Danos & Dionisio, 1986). Lower-class children are very close to *fiction programs* and show little interest in the 'serious' ones (documentaries, news, etc.) (Neveu 1989). Furthermore, these children usually choose action programs with violent content, in which they look for physical and sexual strength assertion models, widely spread in the context they live. Lower-class children reveal a preferential taste for shows that give priority to action over words, movement over stillness, outside over inner spaces. They are interested in sports, variety shows and, above all, action films, as long as there is not too much talking in the program.

Argentine children's preferred programs are very similar to these. Action films and cartoons, both genres mainly foreign-produced, take the lead, fol-

lowed by serials starred in by and designed for children. Contest shows (in which the award is money) and musical programs (particularly Argentine and other Latin-American popular genres) also hold a significant place among children's options. When choosing their favorite cartoons, these children mention action cartoons: *Zodiac Knights*, *Power Rangers*, *Ninja Turtles*, *Karate Kid*, "*A*" *Brigade*, *Robocop*. Action is what explains their choice:

I like it because there's a lot of suspense and action. (Raúl, 9 years old)

Diego (10 years old): I like those movies because there's fight in them. And because I learn karate.

Int.: Why do you want to learn karate?

Diego: To defend myself.

The Argentine children studied express a particular preference about every program, which gives priority to action and image rather than to words and dialogues. Relationship with words is a quite difficult issue for them. They usually talk about the restraints they experience in following such TV programs. A sudden ending in a movie and too much talking in a scene are among the main reasons the children mention to explain their difficulties in understanding certain programs. Slow motion, omissions, vocabulary restrictions, fast leaps in time and space (different settings) and a discontinuous narrative line are also difficulties that keep these children from understanding certain programs, and therefore they avoid them.

Int.: What do you find most difficult to understand in a TV show?

Diego (10 years old): Some movies, like *Indiana Jones*, because everything seems to be OK and suddenly a problem arises and it goes too quick and you can't understand anything.

Television has things that I find difficult to understand. In movies, for instance, when a lady is pregnant and is about to have a baby and then they jump to another thing in another place and we do not know anything else about the lady. (Elena, 7 years old)

I don't understand a movie if there is too much talking. I don't like people who talk all the time in a show... (Romina, 10 years old)

What is a hero?

The *heroes* that lower-class boys and girls prefer belong to the world of *physical strength*. For the children, a hero-oriented identification process comprises thinking of themselves in 'the same situation' as the hero. Children from underprivileged families do not choose heroes who succeed in the real world, since their own experience has already taught them that this success is quite unlikely for them.

They seem to have learned that it is better to choose fiction and imaginary worlds, and to identify themselves with a hero who inhabits an unreal universe, a good hero endowed with a magical power and thereby renowned (Chombart de Lauwe & Bellan, 1979). A hero for the Argentine children is:

Somebody who saves people. (Elena, 7 years old)

The one who saves the whole country, solves problems and puts thieves in jail. (Romanella, 8 years old)

Someone who is good, fights against evil and always wins. (Diego, 10 years old)

Physical strength and righteousness are the features that best define a hero for children from underprivileged families. The heroes indistinctly chosen by boys and girls of all ages in the study are Superman, Power Rangers, Wonder Woman, Spider Man and Zodiac Knights. All these heroes belong to a fictional realm and are endowed with magical powers. Heroes are *good and renowned*. They belong to the universe of the imaginary and the unreal. Almost no child talks about a hero linked to success, intelligence, or labor and economic achievements in the real society. Norma (10 years old) offers us some explanation as to why these children choose this kind of hero:

I'd like to be like Superman, because he can fly and lift a lot of things that a human being can't. If I could do that, I'd feel great. Moving around, flying and being stronger than anybody. So, I'd be good and nothing evil would happen to me.

Television viewing without guilt

Television plays a *compensating role* for children from lower classes, firstly, because it is one of the few entertaining activities in which these children participate, and, secondly, because it is perceived as a learning source and is often valued for its educational function. The compensating and family-unifying functions that TV has among these groups explain, as mentioned, the children's lack of guilt in discussing the programs they watch.

The reason why lower-class families watch TV *without guilt* is that television does not have any negative meaning for them. TV use is not an illegitimate activity. Talking about TV is not forbidden. On the contrary, TV is rewarding. Television viewing is, no doubt, one of the few rewarding experiences these children have. This kind of TV consumption with neither complex nor guilt is also reflected in open access to the screen, which, as mentioned, is not linked to any system of restrictions. For these Argentine children, the screen means access to knowledge, practices and interpersonal relationships.

Among middle-class families, at least according to research from certain countries, television is held responsible for setting aside more valued activities: reading, homework, sports, games. Television viewers from middle and upper

classes learn quickly and from early on how to respond to these rules: what must and must not be said in order to belong to a desired community and to be part of a desired social class (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1985; Danos & Dionisio, 1986). Children from lower-class groups, on the other hand, show a greater freedom to talk about their favorite programs, even with their teachers at school:

I like to talk about what I watch on television. When we are in the classroom, sometimes I tell the teacher about the program that I watched the day before. But she seems not to be very happy about it, because she changes the subject at once. (Diego, 9 years old)

I like to watch television. And TV is very important to me. Because it's the only thing I can do after school. But when we are at school, the teacher doesn't want us to talk about it. (Irene, 10 years old)

In more privileged social contexts, TV consumption is less exclusive and 'confronts a competition' with other more legitimate activities: museums, theaters, books, cinema, exhibitions, etc. Among children from lower-class families, cultural consumption is almost entirely devoted to TV.

The findings from the Argentine study strongly support that children from lower-class families are less selective than are their middle-class peers when watching TV. They are less selective about the programs (basically fiction shows) and are less diversified with respect to the media in general. As mentioned, television is practically the only medium systematically present in their everyday world.

The students' neighborhood, the urban space in which they live, and the respective existence – or lack – of cultural alternatives, recreational options or public libraries, determine the children's access – or non-access – to a wide cultural diversification. Whatever cultural activity we may refer to (drama, music, painting, jazz or movies), children develop richer and more diversified knowledge in a social and cultural context in which there are more offers and opportunities available to them (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1985). In our study, children say:

I've never been to a cinema. I figure it's a place with a very big screen, and I would be able to watch television cartoons much bigger. (Sandra, 8 years old)

Museums? I don't know what they are. I've never gone to one. (Ramón, 10 years old)

How do I have fun? Usually, watching television. (José, 10 years old)

In this limited cultural diversification, television fulfills a recreational deficit. It quickly becomes a source of direct satisfactions. Lower-class families in Buenos Aires buy a TV set because they 'cannot afford a movie ticket'.

Int.: Why do you like watching TV so much?

Diego (10 years old): Because it's the only thing I can do.

On Saturdays and Sundays, television is always on at home, because we don't go out anywhere. (Elena, 8 years old)

Television means a way of escape, as well: 'Television helps us dream...', 'People like us identify themselves with things we'll never be able to get.', 'When we watch television on Christmas, and they show champagne, cakes, food... It is as though we ate that... In a way, it is our food...'. 'Sometimes, TV is for us a sort of salvation...'. (cf. Danos & Dionisio, 1986).

Among lower-class children, television watching is, then, more intense, less controlled, more permissive and without signs of guilt.

What do children learn from television?

What do children learn from television? What do they expect from it?

As mentioned, the compensatory function performed by television for these underprivileged families is *not* exclusively restricted to replace a recreational deficit. Since streets and avenues are dangerous places for children, and since they must often stay at home to take care of their younger brothers and sisters, television is the only bridge to that closed real world to which they have no access, other than via the screen. The children in our study say they 'learn a lot' from television. They value its educational role, and express high expectations for the TV programs they watch. Other research shows, as well, that students from lower-class families say they expect advice from the news programs, and that television helps them with their daily homework (Gruau, Roussel, Bertrand & Corset, 1990).

It is true that the Argentine lower-class children do speak about fun:

Int.: Why do you like watching TV so much?

Child A: I have fun. I like it.

Child B: It's funny.

Child C: It's amusing.

However, there is always something else besides fun:

I love Big Man because he teaches things; for example, he teaches how to keep a handkerchief from tearing or how to make a tin can come back to me when I throw it forward. (Diego, 10 years old)

Children learn from television: information, judgments, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors and values. Even more important: they learn ways to understand reality. They learn meanings. There are two types of knowledge that they receive from television: *cognitive knowledge* and *social knowledge*:

What I liked most were the facts I learned about the dinosaurs. (Martín, 11 years old)

When I watch cartoons, I learn how to behave at table. (Romina, 8 years old)

Television (and more recently new information technologies) has changed the way people construct knowledge and relate television to knowledge. Television viewing – we believe – is *always educational*. Students from lower-class families perceive many TV programs as sources of information and learning, even if these shows would not be judged as educational according to mainstream standards (cf. Jacquinot, 1997).

As we have said, children from lower classes expect television to help them with their homework. They often mention what they have learned from TV about ‘polluted water’ or the ‘dinosaurs’ (cognitive knowledge) and, equally important, they value a program that taught them how ‘to ask a girl out’ or how ‘to behave at the table during dinnertime’ (social knowledge).

Television is always educational, because it influences the things children learn, both the content and the way of learning, a process in which rationality and emotion, information and disorganized representations blend. The media act on the students’ knowledge and on their relationship to knowledge (Jacquinot, 1996).

A study in the Ivory Coast, Africa, showed that a significant number of the lower-class respondents found westerns and thrillers educational because ‘they allow us to learn how to defend ourselves’, ‘they teach a lot of things about the way people dress and live’ or ‘they teach us a great deal about the facts of the world’ (Jacquinot, 1995). A French television program for teenagers helped and guided suburban children in their initiation to a love life. The show was for them a way to learn about sexual roles and it meant an initiation to the grammar of love games (Pasquier, 1994).

Lower-class Argentine children also learn, and are motivated to learn, from the most diversified television genres, how to behave in daily life, and how to acquire access to new knowledge and information. Young TV viewers can build complex social uses out of simple television serials. Some of these serials, e.g., those starred in by children and directed toward a child audience, engage them in a reflection on themselves, on their friends and on their parents. Programs become an opportunity for them to discuss their own representations about family, friendship, gender, love, etc. However, they learn from TV without perceiving the program as an explicitly educational show:

From an action serial that I like a lot, I learn karate and how to control my mind. And that is useful in defending myself. (Diego, 10 years old)

We like musical shows because we learn how to dance. (Yanina, 10 years old)

When I watch cartoons I learn what I must and what I must not do. Do not steal, do not curse, do not say dirty words. Cartoons teach you how to behave. Cartoons teach you a lot of things. (Romina, 8 years old)

From TV I learned a trick where you covered a bottle and the water wouldn’t spill from it. (Yanina, 10 years old).

I learn things from television when I watch the news. In a news program I heard that you mustn't throw garbage in the river because fish may die, and that you mustn't drive to work because cars pollute the air. (Christian, 11 years old)

In the end...

Among other things, we have spoken about the time that underprivileged children in Buenos Aires spend in front of the screen, the programs these children watch, and the knowledge they receive from their favorite TV shows.

The particular relationship that lower-class children establish with the screen has, no doubt, an important influence on the way they perceive the world. In order to understand the link these children construct with knowledge, with the media and with the culture, it is necessary to understand the way and the socio-cultural context in which they watch, think of and value television. For television is, as we have seen, an essential part of their cultural identity.

Note

1. Estimated number. No one actually knows how many TV channels are transmitted by satellite from other countries to Argentina. Information from Noemí S. Sosa, Federal Broadcasting Committee, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2001.

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Remembering Violence: Media Events, Childhood and the Global

Keval J. Kumar

Memories of the events of childhood and early youth are rarely the subject of research in communication studies. Memories of early media experiences are much less so. Memories are perhaps felt to be too slippery to pin down and to analyse, almost impossible to quantify or to describe precisely. That perhaps explains why the subjective experiences of childhood memories have yet to become the stuff of 'scientific' empirical research, despite contemporary interest in the violence that children are regularly exposed to in films, television, video 'nasties', computer and video games, cartoons, the print media, and in recent years on the Internet and the World Wide Web (cf. Carlsson and von Feilitzen 1998, von Feilitzen and Carlsson 1999, 2000). But research suggests that it is the violence in factual television, especially in news programmes, that children and young people find most disturbing, and even frightening (cf. Hargrave 1993, Ralph et al. 1999). It also appears that violent events in national and international news are remembered for a much longer time than other news, and such memories can be stark, vivid, and precise, though sometimes muddled and exaggerated. These 'constructions' of the memories of media events of childhood and early youth are the subject of the research effort reported here,¹ and in particular those events that are intrinsically violent such as wars, assassinations, deaths, and communal clashes. The primary focus is on the memory of media images of violent events that took place during the respondents' childhood and adolescence.

It was to study the media memories of three generations of the 20th century in different cultures that Professor Ingrid Volkmer of Augsburg University (also a Visiting Scholar at MIT) initiated a two-year international research project entitled 'Global Media Generations 2000'.² The research was to be conducted in ten countries around the world – Australia, India, Japan, Austria, Germany, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and United States – from November 1998 to June 2000. Through a process of common reflection and discussions held in New York in November 1998 researchers from the participating countries concluded that the focus group method would be the most appropriate for the

international comparative study. Three focus groups (with around six respondents each), one for each generation, would be held in each country. Some open-ended questions related to memories of the media events occurring during the childhood periods of the three generations were also agreed upon. Three age-cohorts were selected for the focus group discussions: 70-75 years of age, 40-45 years, and 15-20 years. These age cohorts would be taken to represent the three generations of the 20th century in each of the ten countries.

This article offers an analysis of these three generations' memories of the media events of their childhood, and the global nature of these memories, with particular reference to the situation in India. The basis of the analysis will be transcripts of the focus groups conducted with the three age-cohorts. The main questions that will therefore be addressed in this article are: What kind of memories do the three generations of Indians have of the media events of their childhood, especially of those events that reported violence? What form do these memories take with reference to both national events and international events? What makes an event 'international' or 'global'? Are there any generational differences in the memories of the media events of one's childhood? And how are these 'narratives' of childhood events 'constructed' in terms of the geography, chronology and 'politics of memory'?

Media memories and focus group dynamics

The subject in this study was, thus, the prompted and unprompted memories of the media experiences of childhood and early youth, and as a corollary, of the memories of the national and international events of the same period. Focus group discussions present a dynamic social situation in which a small group of four to six respondents shares and exchanges views on a selected subject. In all, nine men and six women participated in the three Indian focus group discussions. The youth group comprised two boys and three girls, the middle-aged group comprised three men and one woman, and the elderly group four men and two women. The participants were largely from well-educated middle-class families representing different regions and different cultural backgrounds of India. Except for one Muslim man and one Christian woman, the majority of participants belonged to the dominant Hindu religion. The participants were selected purposively as the study was an attempt to explore the relationship between memory of childhood events on one hand and the experience of the media on the other.

The researcher animated the 15-20 and 40-45 age groups himself, the first at his residence in Pune (India) in late August 1999, and the second at his temporary residence in Bahrain in the Gulf in June 1999. The above-70 age group was animated by a research assistant at his residence in Pune (India) in late August 1999. The focus groups with the young and middle-aged two age-cohorts were conducted in English; the third focus group with the elderly was conducted in Marathi, the first language of the respondents.

At no stage of the focus group discussions was there an attempt to veer the discussions to the recalling of violent events, except in the case of international

events where a list of ten events were arbitrarily selected for each period (the 1930s and 40s, the 1960s and 70s, and the 1980s and 90s). Violent events of the respondents' childhood and early youth were not the subject of the research project, but violence as a major theme emerged from the focus group discussions as the respondents talked about their media memories. The researcher was struck by the selection of 'assassinations', 'wars', deaths, communal conflicts, street riots and political events, as the respondents told and retold their childhood experiences.

While there has been much research into the violent content of the media, especially on television and film, hardly any research exists on the 'narratives of remembered violence' among media users. Menon and Bhasin (1998) have analysed women's memories of the real-life violence of the partition of India. But media memories deal with remembered violence of events reported in the mass media; the nature of talk about violence in the media of one's childhood and early youth differs remarkably. Barnhurst and Wartella (1998) have looked at the memories of American university communication students about their childhood experiences of television (and not of violence on television); however, these memories (or 'life-histories') were written down in the form of personal essays. The research focused on the media experiences and the written texts of young people's memories. Uchida (1999) has done a close critical analysis of 'popular memory' in Japanese society since the Meiji Restoration, with particular attention to the Ministry of Education songs for ordinary primary school readers. Schlesinger et al. (1992) have looked at women's discourse about violent scenes in television programmes (such as *Crimewatch* and *East Enders*) and a feature film (*The Accused*) in 14 focus groups conducted in community locations in Britain. The 1993 survey of the Broadcasting Standards Council (of England) tested 'in detail people's attitudes to violent materials in each of news, reconstruction programmes and documentaries' (Hargrave 1993). The research reported in this article is different in focus: memories of violent events, both national and international, which were highlighted by the media during the respondents' childhood and early youth, and as narrated in focus groups held in a home environment.

Remembering childhood events – the older generation

Thus, six Marathi-speaking residents of the city of Pune participated in the focus group discussion conducted for the elderly group (aged 70 and above).³ Four men and two women from the high-caste Maharashtrian Brahmin community took part. Among the men, two were graduates who had worked in the field of education, one an engineer, and the fourth a high school-educated clerk in a government department. One of the women participants was a graduate who had worked as a Labour Officer in the State Government, and the other a housewife, educated up to high school. The majority of the participants were in their early or late seventies.

The participants in the focus group discussion were all members of a homogenous socio-cultural class/caste in the western Indian state of Maharashtra.

This class has historically been a privileged section of society. This was the class that pioneered the education movement in Maharashtra in the late 18th and early 19th century. This was also the class that was involved in the social reform movement during the same period. This same class/caste has therefore dominated the cultural scene of Maharashtra for several decades. This 'elite' class and its culture – often termed Brahmani or 'Puneri' culture – continues to dominate even today. Several of the leading personalities in literature, theatre, arts, education, and religious and social reform movements emerged from this very class. The decades-long hegemony of the class was challenged successfully several times during the last century, though this challenge was raised in the areas of politics and economics rather than in the area of culture.

The media environment in the 1930s and 1940s

It is against this background that the childhood memories of the six participants need to be seen and read. The formative years of the participants coincided with that period (the thirties and forties) when the Brahmanical culture was dominant and unchallenged in western India. The most influential newspapers of the time were run and edited by scholars who belonged to the same social class (cf. Kumar 2000, pp. 61-69, for a brief history of the Indian press).

The participants in the focus group discussion said that they were listeners to radio broadcasts in their childhood and early adolescence, though not very regular listeners. This was primarily because their families could not afford to own radio sets. Indeed, five out of the six participants bought their first radio sets only in the 1960s (when they were all in their thirties). There were few radio sets prior to the sixties, but almost all neighbourhoods used to have at least one set (cf. Kumar 2000). So, listening to the radio 'used to be a social experience'. Thus for the majority of participants, listening to the radio was 'a special occasion', associated most of the time with some important political event, such as the end of World War II, Mahatma Gandhi's assassination, or the riots that followed it. For most of the focus group participants, listening to the radio was always a social experience wherein about ten persons gathered around the set to listen together to the news and other programmes. In fact, most of their media experiences were social in character, always in a group – with the family or with neighbours.

The newspapers the participants said they read regularly during their childhood and early youth were local Marathi dailies, but two of the men said that they also read English newspapers like the *Times of India* and the *Bombay Chronicle*. The families of all the six participants used to subscribe to at least one newspaper. 'There used to be many newspapers and we read them either at home, in school or at neighbours' homes', said one participant.

Apart from the mass media such as radio and the press, the participants spoke of their exposure to traditional mass media such as public speeches, religious prayer gatherings such as 'keertans', and religious-social events like Ganesh festival. Several well-known public speakers frequently mentioned in the focus group discussions were also from the same class. The participants

dwelt at length on their memories of public lectures they attended. The great orators they mentioned included N.C. Kelkar, Raosaheb and Achyut Patwardhan, Acharya Atre, and Savarkar. The discussion is replete with references to such public speeches. One woman participant said:

Being women, we had a lot of limitations in accessing information through the mass media. Public lectures and 'keertans' filled that vacuum.

Traditional media like 'bhajans' (group singing) and 'keertans' (religious gatherings) were employed at that time to disseminate political messages. Those leaders who employed such methods of popular education came to be known as 'rashtriya kirtankars' (or national prayer-leaders) (cf. Kumar 2000, pp. 253-266, for an account of the major folk/traditional media in India). Public lectures were an effective instrument for political education. As one of the participants put it: 'Public lectures used to be held in small towns like Ahmednagar.' One participant recalled having listened to public lectures given by the Patwardhan brothers, Madan Mohan Malviya, Subhaschandra Bose and Manavendranath Roy. He declared that these public speeches contributed much to his political education. He added that these speeches used to be of greater interest to them than films.

A vital feature of the participants' media experience was that it was 'mediated' by significant others like grandparents, parents, siblings and other members of the joint/extended family. In most cases, the terms and conditions of their media exposure were determined by the elders in a joint family, the men folk in particular. The participants recalled their fathers taking them to the neighbours' homes to listen to the radio. As young members of the family, it was their duty to read the newspapers aloud for the benefit of all the other members of the family. So, while one read the newspapers, others 'heard' the news. This tradition of reading the news aloud for the benefit of the family was continued when the participants started their own families. One participant said that much of the credit for the general knowledge and awareness of his own son (now a practicing doctor) should be traced to this tradition:

We used to believe the newspapers cent-per-cent during those days. Today, we are not sure about any of the newspapers. They have lost their authenticity. They have been sold to the capitalist forces.

Media events of the 1930s and 1940s

The 1930s and 1940s were perhaps the most turbulent period in Indian and world history. The world events of the period included World War II, the rise of Hitler and the Holocaust, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fall of the British Empire, and the spread of Communism. For India, too, these two decades were equally turbulent: the rise of Mahatma Gandhi and his movement of Non-Violence against the British regime, the Salt March, the partition of the Indian sub-continent and its aftermath, and the assassination of Gandhi. Besides, there were several national and local movements and events, which electrified the nation. The freedom struggle left few untouched or unmoved. The period wit-

nessed the rise and spread of several political ideologies in India, from rabid fundamentalism to radical humanism. These took on different colours in different regions of the land. In Maharashtra, this spectrum of political ideologies was marked on the extreme right by fundamentalist organisations like the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS) led by K.B. Hedgewar, and on the left by Dange and his Communist Party. So politically charged was the nation during the 1930s and 40s that even religious celebrations like the Ganeshotsav took on political connotations. Political events were therefore recollected very vividly by the focus group participants.

Their 'public memory' thus revolved round media and politics. Political events and personalities were reported vigorously in the media of the period. Indeed, political news dominated the press as much as it does even now, more than fifty years after Independence. Even the regional media have a strong political orientation. This perhaps explains why the references to political events and their reporting in the media dominated the focus group discussions rather than the events related to the social, cultural and economic conditions of the country.

Mahatma Gandhi's assassination

At the very beginning of the focus group discussion, one of the men participants narrated his experience of reading the editorials in the *Daily Agrani* (Daily Frontier), a paper run by Nathuram Godse, the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi. In the focus group participant's view,

Agrani used to carry detailed articles on the Hindu-Muslim riots in different parts of the India after Independence. The coverage of Naokhali riots were especially inflammatory. I used to stay in Ahmednagar at that time and the situation there was very tense.

He recalled the details of the page layout of the *Lokshakti* (a Marathi daily), which carried the news about the bomb explosion during a prayer meeting led by Gandhi, and later his assassination on 30th January 1948. The man participant also remembered the tense situation in his hometown when Gandhi was arrested during the 'Quit India' movement. He recalled how pamphlets were widely distributed and very frequently. Indeed, as many historians would vouch for, pamphlets were low-cost and vital media used by nationalist leaders to spread the struggle for freedom throughout the country.

Several memories of the group were associated with Mahatma Gandhi's assassination. There was a definite touchiness/sensitivity about these memories. This is perhaps because the Brahmins of Maharashtra had to face the wrath of the public, since Nathuram Godse, the Mahatma's assassin, was a Maharashtrian Brahmin. The participants talked about their experiences of the anti-Brahmin riots in the State following Gandhi's assassination.

'International' events

The majority of the focus group participants could recollect 'international' events of the 1940s (that is, when they were all in their early youth), but only after some prompting from the animator. They knew about the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the end of World War II, but could not associate any media memory with the events. (The schedule of ten 'international events' was drawn up rather arbitrarily by the group of ten researchers in a brainstorming session, with no particular attention to media coverage of these events. Indeed, there were no set criteria for an event to be termed 'international'.)

Only one participant could remember seven out of the ten 'international' events listed in the schedule. He said that he remembered the Berlin Olympics, but the memory of that event was etched in his mind because of its Indian context:

Hitler refused to shake hands with Dhyani Chand and told him: You are just a colonel there (in India); if you were a German I would have made you a General.

In sum, this group of the elders of the city of Pune talked freely about their recollections of the media of their childhood and youth. There are no references to television in the recollections; references to the cinema are few and far between. Going to the cinema was possibly associated with feelings of guilt among the higher castes, while television came into their lives only in the early 1980s when the participants were over the age of fifty. While access to the radio was extremely limited, access to newspapers was fairly widespread. And it was a common practice for newspapers to be read aloud in most homes so that literate and illiterate, young and old, were kept abreast of happenings in the country and in the world.

However, far more vital than the modern mass media for the participants were the traditional media such as public speeches, 'bhajans', 'keertans', the theatre, and pamphlets. All the participants stressed that these low-cost and familiar media were the main sources of their political information. These provided them a 'political education' during the 1930s and 1940s. And unlike the 15-20 year old group, which lambasted the media, this group was supportive and appreciative of reporting of national events in the English and Marathi newspapers of the thirties and forties.

These focus group participants recalled national events such as the freedom struggle movement, the Non-Violence movement of Mahatma Gandhi, without much prompting. However, they could remember international events such as World War II, the Berlin Olympics, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and so on, only after some prompting from the animator. Besides, while their memories of national events were narrated in a vivid manner, those related to international events were often unclear and vague, and even distorted (as when they insisted that it was Edward VIII, and not Edward VII who had abdicated the throne of England). Of course, there were also some significant local events, which did not find a single mention in the discussion. These related to events

such as protests and agitations which sought to challenge the Brahminical orthodoxy.

The middle generation – the radio generation

Two married men and a married couple made up the focus group of the second age cohort, 40-45 years of age. The couple was Hindu while one of the married men was Muslim, and the other a Christian. The couple and the Muslim hailed from Karnataka, the Christian from Kerala. All four were well-educated and worked as trainers in a professional engineering and management institute.

The medium the four participants had greatest access to in their childhood and early youth was the radio, not television. Television entered their lives only in the mid-eighties when they were well above the age of 25 or so. Radio was indeed the most important medium and also the most liked (cf. Kumar 1999, for an account of the development of radio and television in India). Their memories of the media during their childhood are also related to newspapers and magazines. The names of newspapers and magazines they had read as children and young men came back to them, though several titles had become defunct. For instance, they remembered reading *The Illustrated Weekly of India* (now defunct), a publication of the Times of India Group, and *Sport and Pastime* (also defunct), a sports publication of the Hindu Group in Madras. Only one of the participants, Shoba,⁴ recalled that there were any restrictions or controls on their reading, or on their listening to the radio. (This contrasts with the experience of the 15-20 year old generation, which resented the control of parents in what they read). Shoba recalled:

I don't think I had so much freedom to listen to radio or watch TV. There were a lot of restrictions. Timing, what to watch and what not to watch. My father was more like a military officer; everything had to be done at that particular time.

As mentioned previously, the social nature of media experience was also emphasized by the 70-75 year old group.

The four participants of the middle generation could recall the following national events from the period 1965-75: the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971, the pre-Emergency years, the split of the Congress Party, the National Elections in Kerala, Cricket tests, the Jayaprakash Narayan movement in Bihar and Gujarat, and the Emergency regime of Indira Gandhi (1975-77). The participants recalled, often without much prompting from the animator, these events which were widely reported on radio and in the press. But it is noteworthy that radio was experienced primarily as a medium of entertainment while the press was perceived as a provider of political information.

The Indo-Pakistan War (1965)

The sole Muslim participant in the focus group recalled in particular one programme on All India Radio between 10.30 and 11.30, which catered to the needs of the prisoners of war, especially those who had been taken away to Pakistan:

This was one programme I used to listen to with great interest. Everyday I used to listen to that.

He vaguely remembered the 1965 war with Pakistan:

I think during my childhood days it was radio that played a major role. Not until 1968 I was actually exposed to other media. I was pretty young, though I have a very vague memory of the 1965 war. I was at that time maybe five years old. So I don't really remember those things. My father... he was a government servant. I don't have very good memories of the 1965 war.

Indira Gandhi and the Emergency

John, another participant, recalled the Emergency regime (1975-77) of Indira Gandhi and the role of the media at the time:

One strong memory about media events strikes my mind now... during July 1975, when the internal emergency clamped by Mrs. Gandhi. I still remember that very strongly, because then I was a college student... I was in the final year of my studies, we were very active in collecting information about what is happening in the country. At that time, both the radio as well as the press, newspapers, and everything that was possible. And this was a time when media got so much importance because even people who were not that much really interested in media events, they were interested in reading magazines, newspapers, because that was a terror period in our country. At least that was the feeling I had.

Khan also recalled the JP (Jayaprakash) Movement that preceded the Emergency:

JP (Jayaprakash Narayan) Movement I had heard about, I was only nine at that time. I was too young to follow... What had happened in 1977 (the internal emergency) I was following... that was the time Indira Gandhi was humbled and the Janata Party came to power, and Morarji (Desai) became the Prime Minister. Actually, it was a government of wise people, but could not pull on for a long period of time.

International events

The international events the participants recalled without any prompting, included the Cyprus crisis, man's first landing on the moon, the Vietnam War and the liberation of Bangladesh. Some prompting brought back memories of the Watergate crisis in Washington, and the Cultural Revolution in China. However, memories of the events and the media reports related to the rise of the Palestine

Liberation Movement, Woodstock, the OPEC crisis, the Prague Spring and the 1968 Student Revolution, were very faint and vague.

Khan: International events? Especially I remember Vietnam. Watergate, of course, but not much, but then I had followed it up later on the BBC, when they telecast it just before the Clinton scandal; they had carried a series of shows on TV, as to how Watergate took place, how he was trying to bug all information of all opposition members, and then finally how he had been asked to resign. This I followed up much later, but not when it did.

Uday: No, international news I was not interested in anything much, other than science development, technological revolution. I hate all wars. But since it (Vietnam) concerned all of us, I was following it up to some extent.

John summed up his memories of Vietnam in just one word: 'Napalm'. The television image of the naked girl running across the screen was seared into the focus group participants' memories. (Focus groups conducted in other countries in the project, too, associated the Vietnam War with this media image, though the participants could not say with any certainty that the picture was that of the girl running towards the camera or away from it.)

The main source of Khan's memories of international events was newspapers and magazines. He had access to magazines like *Time*, *Newsweek* and later *India Today* ('my favourite magazine'). He recalled these two international events without any prompting:

Especially, I was keenly following two international events: one was the Cyprus crisis, the other was the Vietnam War which was going on during those days. We were especially following the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge... We used to read the local newspapers (in Kannada and English), reports especially about the 1970-71 Vietnam War, and the way these people used to drive out all these anti-Khmer Rouge. Then there was an event in my college – to have a kind of mock-United Nations. So that time I took part in it. The issue discussed: the whole thing surrounding the Cyprus crisis. That was one event which really, clearly (is) vivid in my memory.

He also remembered after some prompting the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the OPEC crisis but hardly anything about the 1968 student Revolution in Europe and elsewhere:

Yes, the Soviet invasion and especially I remember, I was not born when in 1956 the Hungarian invasion took place, but I had read about it in *Time* and *Newsweek*. They had... the Soviet tanks had rolled into the streets of Budapest, then the way they had suppressed the... Then of course I was reading the novel of Saul Bellow, who was himself a Hungarian I think. So he had – his novel which got him the Nobel Prize, if I don't remember wrongly, I think... the Dean in December. In that he says how he was annoyed by the Soviet presence, how they suppressed human rights and all the things. Then, of course, now I remember in 1984 Nobel Prize literature winner: Gabriel Garcia Marquez.

Animator: Any memories of the OPEC crisis?

Khan: OPEC crisis? Of course, it was there in 1975, after the Egyptian war which had failed. Then of course it was the Saudi Prince – King Feisal I think. He made one open statement: cut all supply of the western countries, especially Japan, US and then the crisis of oil prices which went up 38-39 dollars. This is the thing I remember about that.

Animator: Any memories of the 1968 student revolution?

Khan: I had heard about it.

The younger generation – the TV generation

The third age cohort was represented by two boys and three girls; they were all undergraduate students in colleges of the Pune University. One of the boys was from New Delhi, the second from Calcutta. Two of the girls were from Calcutta and the third from Jamshedpur. They were from middle-class families. The Delhi boy was from a Panjabi/Sikh family, while the boy and the two girls from Calcutta were from Hindu families; the Jamshedpur girl was from a Roman Catholic family.

All five participants had good access to the mass media right from their early years. Television and the press were the media they apparently spent most time with. They were aware of the major national and international events of the 1980s and 1990s, and the source of their information was invariably the media, though word-of-mouth, too, played a vital role. Of the three age cohorts studied, this was the most critical of the media, especially the press and television. It was also the group that talked (often angrily) about the negative role of the media in fomenting violence and fundamentalism. It was the group that readily recollected incidents/events of violence at the national and international levels.

The major national events the youth group could remember and were eager to talk about were: Indira Gandhi's assassination, Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and its aftermath, the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in national politics, the Kargil skirmish, and the killing of Christian missionaries in Bihar. The majority of events remembered – all without much prompting from the animator – were intrinsically violent in nature, and largely associated with the political and the religious life of the nation. Further, they were events that were highlighted by the mass media. It is possible that the main source of such knowledge was the mass media, though other sources like the family and the peer group were influential sources, too.

Rajiv Gandhi's assassination: memories of the 'human bomb'

How did they come to know about these events in the first place? After a brief warming-up session in which the events were listed by the participants, the discussion focused in the beginning on their memories of the assassination of

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the hands of a suicide bomber near Madras. The assassination took place when the five participants were around ten years old. 'DD⁵ flashed the news at 11.00 p.m.', declared Dev, though the others in the group contested this; they insisted that the news was flashed at 10.40 p.m. But Meeta remembered that she got the news from her mother the same night:

I remember I was sleeping at the time. My mother came and told me that Rajiv Gandhi is dead. She had seen some people in a sort of procession. I remember for one whole week all TV programmes were stopped. I remember the cremation. Another thing I remember that my father had a magazine... that magazine my father showed to my mother. But we were not allowed to see that magazine. My father had kept it in the almirah. We were very curious what was in that magazine. One day my mother was away, I opened the almirah. It said: Children should not be shown this magazine. Because there were lots of violent scenes. Many pictures were there, but I guess it did not affect me much because I was already hooked into Hindi movies.

Yashwant, too, associated the news of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination with the same issue of the magazine, *Outlook*:

My father and mother never used to show it to me, and hid it somewhere. My brother and I said we had to see what was in the magazine. My mother and father go out and we climb up the cupboard... take it out somehow. I realize I just conked off. My brother asked me what happened. I said, 'Kuch nahi hua' (Nothing at all has happened). Then I started crying. Then I realized something bad must have happened. I knew about human bombs, because I had always read about suicide bombers of Japan, but this human bomb and the state in which it left the bomber and the bombed was not expected by me.

The other members of the group were also shocked. Dev of New Delhi put it this way:

A gentleman, a lady screamed: Rajiv is dead, Rajiv is dead. My dad was shocked, my mom was shocked. Of course we were also shocked. But we were shocked the next morning. It just gave a shock.

He, too, remembered the 'human bomb' aspect of the news story:

He was blown out by the LTTE – a lady put a bomb on herself, a human bomb; we were introduced to the concept of explosives.

Nabo of Calcutta remembered that she was in Class V at the time, and that she did not go to school that morning:

It was quite early in the morning when I got up and I heard my neighbours. They were making a lot of noise... Some people came to my house and they said 'Rajiv Gandhi is dead'. Oh my God, how did this happen? It was like a stunning surprise. I never used to watch the news first and foremost. That news was very shocking to me.

She also recalled that it was a Tuesday, and that she wouldn't be able to watch *Chitrabaar* (a popular film-based TV program) on Wednesday... 'we were quite frustrated'. But the focus group participants said they were all happy that schools would be closed and they would have a holiday. Yashwant summed up the feeling thus:

The first thing that came to my mind when Rajiv Gandhi died: Thank God school is closed. We can play our guts out...

The aftermath: communal tensions

At least two of the group recalled that in the aftermath of the assassination some tension was present in the community, and that some trouble or riots were expected. This was possibly because of what happened in New Delhi in the aftermath of the assassination of Indira Gandhi six years earlier. Dev, the Panjabi/Sikh from New Delhi, recalled:

There was a big scare that bombings would take place there... Delhi being a very crowded place.

Meeta, a Hindu from Calcutta, was more specific:

The place where I used to stay was a totally Muslim area. It was supposed to be a violent prone area. I was personally never affected because from the age of four when I went to school, no Muslims commented on us. So the death was a news item, not something personal for me. Because Muslim people used to work in our place, they were economically dependent on us. In our school, the (Muslim) drivers were very nice. I mean I never had a bad experience of (people) killing each other. Maybe it was going on in other parts of the country but not in my life.

Indira Gandhi's assassination

Memories of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination naturally led to talk about his mother Indira Gandhi's assassination at the hands of her own Sikh bodyguards six years earlier, in 1984. The participants were far too young (four to five years old) to remember very much. Dev put it in this dramatic manner:

As far as I remember, I have no memories of Indira Gandhi being assassinated just other than... maybe because I am a Panjabi, the sardars (Sikhs) being burnt alive. That was a very bad scene. One scene I remember, in fact, two scenes. A sardar was simply chopped off right in the middle of the road, and secondly, there is an old man 60 years of age, they put a tyre in his neck, put petrol on him, and burnt him off. I saw the man being burnt alive. I was dragged inside. I don't know what state I was in for two-three days. I wasn't sent to school. It was all war going on the road. Manslaughter, total manslaughter, I remember (it is) still very much a part of mind. It was scary.

Demolition of the Babri mosque at Ayodhya

One memory of violence led to another as the group got into the spirit of the focus group discussion. There was no stopping them now: their memories were prodded on by others in the group, and the members were all ears ready to share and even to wallow in the experience. Talk about the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, and the riots that followed in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and other parts of the country, led naturally to the group remembering their introduction to terms like 'Hindu fundamentalism', the names of political parties like the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), and the role of the media.

Nabo said she 'didn't remember anything... nothing', and Marie associated Ayodhya with being kept indoors all the time, and with having had the same food day and night in her boarding school. 'We had Maggie's (noodles) for boarders' night', she humorously recalled. She added:

Ayodhya... I came to know of it very late. I remember the people around us. There were a lot of Hindus around us, so they were also against the Muslims. They shouldn't have done that; that shouldn't have happened.

But Dev, Yashwant and Meeta had stronger memories of the aftermath of the demolition of the mosque in Ayodhya. Dev recalled that he was studying in a German school in New Delhi at the time:

It was a cosmopolitan society. Religion never mattered: you're a Muslim, a Hindu or whatever. It was just our own world to us. They used to come and tell me: You know who burnt Ayodhya? We used to come home and used to see the 'aunties' (neighbours) talking. Each one had a different version; each one of them had to say something, and perhaps it's not true. It was more of rumours than reality.

Ayodhya and the mass media

The popular film *Bombay* seemed to have brought alive to the respondents the violence associated with the aftermath of the Ayodhya mosque's demolition. Meeta remembered:

I saw the violence and all that. I was never affected by this violence. I felt they were exaggerating. I don't think such things happened.

Yashwant, too, remembered that the film *Bombay* 'exaggerated a little bit', though the Ayodhya incident did not affect him. He recalled that he lived in a Muslim area in Calcutta:

I used to play with Muslim friends, and Muslim maidservants used to come and work at my place... no problem at all... [...] I never saw anything so drastic as killing, murdering, this and that, or burning, that was shown on TV or in the movie *Bombay*.

There was an article he had read at that time, he recalled:

It was so stupid I felt; we were talking about Aurangzeb breaking all the temples at one point of time and then what would happen if the Hindus broke down one masjid. I said that it does not have any basis. What is history? We were talking about history repeats itself and all, but I said these figurative meanings had no sense in this term when you don't talk about breaking down a masjid. It doesn't make any sense in breaking down a Muslim masjid to portray yourself or your party to be something or other...

Meeta, too, recalled that she had read in the papers that 'it was not Babar who actually built it; it was somebody else'. She said that her 'grandmother had gone to that place when the mosque was still there. She said that the mosque was there but that it was nothing, and just next to it a small wooden shed where pooja (worship) used to go on'.

Dev, Meeta and Yahswant flayed the role played by the media in reporting the issue:

Dev: I think more than the issue itself, the media killed it. It was media that was solely responsible for actually making a big thing out of it. Of course, it was a fire that was expected to rise, but I think media (played) a very bad role in it. It actually got people angry.

Meeta: Today the BJP is in a position. It started at that point of time and the media and the other political parties actually helped the BJP what it has become today... Though we may be in the majority we need some security, we need some voice.

The rise of Hindu 'fundamentalism'

The group attributed the rise of Hindu 'fundamentalism' to the media coverage of the BJP and the Ayodhya question:

Yashwant: The birth (of the BJP) was from Ayodhya. The media had put itself... BJP is a saffron party and all. I was talking about the newspapers and TV in general.

Meeta, in particular, believed that the media's negative publicity helped the BJP, that the constant use of terms like 'Hindutva' and 'fundamentalism' to describe the BJP, the Bajrang Dal, the RSS and the Shiv Sena helped the BJP.

International events

The international events were not as readily recalled as the national events. Also, the young teenagers were not as forthcoming (to begin with) in expressing their views on so-called global events. They were unanimous that the death of Princess Diana was certainly not an 'international issue' whereas Mother Teresa's demise merited international media attention. Princess Diana did not have much importance for the boys in the group, but at least one of the three girls was convinced that her work for landmines and also her beauty were enough to give her international attention and to elevate her to an international status. Mrs

Clinton came down to attend her funeral, she argued, and heads of state gave her due recognition. Clearly, their vote was for Mother Teresa (three of the participants were from Calcutta, the city of the Mother). The boy from Delhi, however, voted for Baba Amte, the veteran social worker from western India.

The Gulf War and Saddam Hussein

Mention of the Gulf War and the more recent NATO attacks on Belgrade demonstrated that the images of television were still fresh in the young people's memories. Saddam Hussein was not necessarily the villain of the piece for these young minds who were high school kids at the time of the Gulf War. The more recent NATO bombardments of Yugoslavia, too, were condemned outright; the focus group participants were cynical about the media hype on the attacks. This excerpt from the discussion illustrates the trend of the views and memories expressed. Memory and opinion are mixed up gloriously here. This exchange also illustrates the 'politics' of memory:

Dev: The Gulf War reminds me of tanks burning and other stuff. Seeing every day the jets firing, the missiles launched, and the petrol on fire, the commodity prices going higher, and all those countries that were dependent for oil on these Gulf countries plus Indians coming back. It was a very bad thing. Saddam really acted like a maniac... for no reason killing his own people.

Marie: All I remember about the Gulf War was that Saddam Hussein could never be found. Looking for him... there were two or three Saddams (laughter all round)... That was very interesting.

Meeta: The only thing I remember is my dad telling me about the Gulf War, the water getting polluted, the birds and animals dying in large numbers...

Nabo: Even I remember the same thing... the birds flying, black water... its effects on nature... I remember.

Meeta: I was in Class IX or X. In the Modern History class, they said that the USA had followed the policy of the policeman, a big stick policy. Then I remember my father telling us: Surely, Saddam has done something wrong, not having the right to go into Kuwait and start destroying everything he gets. USA is practicing the big stick policy.

Yashwant: ...I am a great follower of Hitler and I like him a lot... Saddam Hussein and his racist policy in Iraq; it was absolutely an internal (matter). He had occupied Kuwait that was... the United Nations were against it. Fine. But I don't understand why we say that the Gulf War was between the U S of A and Iraq.

Dev: USA has always done this. It's no more United Nations. It's just US. It is in fact a very strategic position – oil, the black gold.

Meeta: USA has been following this policy. Not only in Kuwait, in South America, everywhere. Panama Canal.

Dev: What China did in Taiwan.

Meeta: Ya, the same thing.

German re-unification

On the re-unification of Germany, Yashwant, an unabashed admirer of Hitler, remembered:

...people were happy that Germany is united, and West Germany will never next *play* (East) Germany. I remember my father, actually my grandfather, told me lots about this. He was already close to Subash Chandra Bose when he was going to Germany. So he was telling me about the Second World War all the time... There was this West Germany and East Germany. Then my grandfather becomes nostalgic and says: One day or the other, India and Pakistan are going to shake hands and become one India again...

Meeta took up the discussion on German re-unification and on Hitler. She said her father, too, was an admirer of Hitler:

He admires Hitler a lot. So when the German teams united, he was very happy. He said: If West Germany wins the World Cup... my father used to identify the whole East Bengal team with Hitler. They're the Hitler... (trails off).

Dev, an alumnus of a German school in New Delhi, chipped in:

The day the Berlin Wall was brought down, there was a grand celebration. We had a great time, you know. In fact, the Germans announced a big campus for us. We had a great campus, but we didn't have a new building, we needed a new building for new courses coming up... Today, if you go and see it, it is a magnificent piece of building with all those photos of Germany. We also got a few students from Germany under the student exchange scheme. They used to come and they used to talk. Actually German kids grew up faster than Asians. We asked them what they had. They said: We had the Berlin Wall. That's all. That was a great incident.

The articulate young people who comprised the group were as forceful in recalling national and international events of the 1980s and 1990s as in expressing their opinions on political matters and on the role of the media in sensational reporting. They took clear positions on events, issues and personalities, and expressed them in strong language. Memories and opinions were often confused in the discussions; they remembered political events as much as they 'politicised' memory. For them the memory of political events was no different from the 'politics' of memory.

Conclusions: Remembering childhood media events

The focus group discussions with three age-cohorts representing three generations of the 20th century raises several interesting questions about the form and substance

of Indian memories of the violent events of childhood and early youth. What, for instance, are the social and cultural conditions that influence such memories and what is the role played by the media? Further, what is the relationship between such memories and knowledge, especially the knowledge of reality? What is the kind of knowledge provided by the media in relation to national and international events? How reliable, valid and significant is such media-based knowledge?

These are some of the philosophical questions that need to be addressed in order to fully appreciate the significance of the research reported here. We are dealing, of course, with personal and subjective experiences of childhood and early youth with particular attention to the mass media, as they are articulated and 'constructed' in a focus group setting. The discourse of such 'talk' about media experiences of childhood deserves close cultural analysis.

Violent events taking place in India were recalled much more vividly and with much greater emotional involvement by the younger generation than by the middle-aged or elderly generation. One could sense anger and even cynicism as the younger generation recalled the events of their childhood and the role played by the media in reporting violent events such as assassinations, wars and Hindu-Muslim communal tensions. This could have been for several reasons. In the first place, it could have been because the media (especially television and the press) were more widespread and more accessible during the childhood of the younger generation than during the childhood of the middle and the elderly generations. The middle-aged cohort, for instance, had no access to television, and the cohort of the elderly had extremely limited access to radio and the press. The older people's main source of information was public meetings, theatre and the folk media. Secondly, the distance from the event (chronology) was not so remote for the 15-20 year-olds. They were recalling media events of just a decade ago while those from the first and second generations had to take their minds back to over six and two decades, respectively. Thirdly, it could have been because many more violent events took place, though it is more likely that fewer violent events actually occurred during the childhood years of the younger age-cohort but were reported more extensively in the press, and on radio and television, at a time when these mass media had witnessed massive expansion.

These three focus group discussions with nine men and six women of India suggest that recollecting such 'media experiences' in a small focus group has the potential of turning into a cathartic exercise for some participants, but uncomfortable for others. Some experiences, especially national events, are in all three generations more vividly and more accurately remembered than others that are geographically and chronologically distant. For instance, memories of the freedom movement, of the assassinations of Mahatma Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi are more sharply etched in Indian memory than so-called 'international' events like the Vietnam War, Watergate, the 1968 Student Revolution, or the death of Princess Diana.

In any case, what is it that makes one media event 'international' or global and another merely local or regional or even national? A major factor is the amount of attention given to such events in the mass media, that is, the agenda-

setting function of the mass media. There is extremely seldom, if ever, something intrinsic to an event that renders it naturally 'local', 'regional', 'national' or 'global'. What, for instance, gave the death of Princess Diana or that of Mother Teresa a 'global' character was the continuous 'live' coverage for days together by the transnational networks such as the BBC, CNN, and the transnational news agencies such as Reuters and Associated Press and their television units. Further, Princess Diana and Mother Teresa were already media celebrities much before their tragic deaths; the media, especially cable and satellite television, capitalized on this celebrity status of both. Thus, the global character of an event or even a personality is dependent on the media, and in particular transnational media, which distribute their visual and textual content around the world. A small earthquake, a sex scandal or a minor racial skirmish in the United States or in Britain are reported as 'global' events; in contrast, national elections or workers' strikes in any Asian or African nation, are not reported at all by the transnational news agencies. For events, personalities and scandals taking place in any Asian or African country, to qualify as 'global', they need to have a larger than life dimension, must affect or touch the richer countries in a dramatic manner, must be totally unexpected, and involve large populations and cataclysmic destruction. And, of course, they must make for exciting television pictures.

It is evident then that 'global events' are media 'constructs' as much as the memories of those events are. The phenomenal expansion of the media, especially cable and satellite television during the last decade, has meant that many more events begin to take on a 'global' dimension than was the case earlier when few countries had access to more than a couple of terrestrial channels.

Besides being very selective, memories of childhood media events are affected by distance (both in terms of time and the extent of personal experience) from the events or people remembered. Chronological proximity to the event is a vital variable, but so is the cultural proximity in relation to the event remembered. Besides the 'geography' and the 'chronology' of media memory there is the question of the 'politics' of memory. We do not talk about our memories of events that touch on questions of personal or collective guilt, what we might term 'the politics of memory'. The group of 70-75 year old Pune Brahmins who took part in the focus group discussion did not even once mention the struggle of the dalits (literally, the 'crushed') against Brahmin dominance. Nor did they at any stage refer even indirectly to the partition of India. It was also observed that the 15-20 year-olds did not feel very comfortable talking about the Mandal riots and the demolition of the Babri mosque.

Further, some memories are extremely vivid: participants can recall the exact dates, names, and media images of events. Other memories are very faint and muddled; even prompting does not jog the memory. Media images are, after all, ephemeral and fleeting in nature. Is this possibly related to why some memories are so unclear and hazy and often confused? Apparently, there is more to memory than the images and sound bites of the mass media. Such images and sound bites often get mixed up with the whispers and rumours in the family and the community, as the young generation's talk about the Ayodhya demolition and the aftermath revealed.

A final question that needs to be raised regarding the nature and dynamic of memory in relation to the media is: What is the role of social and cultural events (rather than the media *per se*) in jogging the childhood memories of different generations? Are memories influenced by the culture and the religion we belong to and the times we live in? Are there cultural differences, for instance, in the *way* we remember and recall the violent events of our childhood and early youth? The three focus group discussions reported here suggest that culture, religion, language, age, social class/caste, and above all, personal experience of events, are vital variables that influence *what* we remember and even the very *way* we remember. There is what one might broadly term 'the politics of memory', for we remember most what is of intimate concern to us and to our community, and gloss over the unpleasant and the uncomfortable. The 'globalisation' of news and its control by a handful of media conglomerates (such as Time Warner-AOL, Reuters and Associated Press) has led to round-the-clock distribution of 'global images' of violence. From the perspective of childhood these 'global images' are stark and real (and often disturbing and frightening), and some of them more than others remain buried in the memory long after the child has grown into a young adult. Media images of violence and conflict, it appears, have a much greater chance than other images of remaining with the adult far into middle and old age.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference of the International Association of Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), Singapore, July 17-20, 2000.
2. The project was supported by RTL (Radio and Television Luxembourg), Cologne, and UNESCO, Paris.
3. The focus group with the 70-75 year-olds was conducted in Marathi by Vishram Dhole, Lecturer in the Department of Communication Studies, Pune University. This section was written in collaboration with him.
4. The names of all participants in the focus group discussions have been changed. However, suitable pseudonyms (first names only) have been selected so as to reflect the religious and community identities of the participants.
5. Doordarshan, the national network of Indian television.

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Globalisation and Children's Media Use in Sierra Leone

Mohamed Zubairu Wai

In today's world the rapid increase and spread of modern technology has ensured that information flows quite easily across national and continental boundaries. The pervasive effect of transnational media companies, equipment and services is now felt in every corner of the globe. On a computer with Internet facility, on satellite television channels or on the radio, an occurrence in South-east Asia, for instance, is just a click or tuning away from Europe, America or even Africa. Because of the huge profits that the media business generates around the world, the media market has witnessed considerable restructuring in recent years to the extent that national media markets are now being incorporated into a new global media framework. The major decisions in the media business – production, distribution and marketing – are being made by the leading multinational media companies in America, Europe and Asia (specifically Japan). The consequences of this trend have been stupendously palpable as people everywhere in the world can now claim to have access to media content and services of varying proportions and from various places around the globe.

What does this mean for media and children in the country of Sierra Leone? Is the media market in Sierra Leone becoming caught up in the transnational media structure referred to above? Are children being engulfed by this trend? If yes, what is the proportion compared to other countries? If no, why?

Country profile

Sierra Leone is a small West African country, bounded by the Republic of Guinea on the north and northeast, the Republic of Liberia on the southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean on the southwest and northwest. The country's population is estimated at 4.3 million people.¹ The capital, Freetown, a peninsula on the Atlantic coast, is the largest and most populous city in the country. About 36 per cent of the country's population lives in Freetown.²

Almost 55 per cent of the total population in Sierra Leone are children and young people up to 18 years of age. This means that about 40 per cent of the population is of school age, 6 to 18 years,³ although some children begin school earlier than required. Sixty per cent of all children enrolled in schools in Sierra Leone live in Freetown.⁴

However, not all parents can afford to send their children to school. The primary school enrolment ratio⁵ in Sierra Leone is approximately 50 per cent, whereas the secondary school enrolment ratio is approximately 18 per cent, and, naturally, far fewer inhabitants attend higher education.⁶ The combined primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolment ratio is 27 per cent, meaning that the years of schooling in 2000 were on average 2.4 years.⁷ The adult illiteracy rate is 68 per cent.⁸

Sierra Leone was established in 1787 by British philanthropists as the home of freed slaves. It became a crown colony in 1808, and, in 1896, a protectorate was declared over the outlying hinterland. It gained independence in April 1961 as a constitutional monarchy within the commonwealth, and became a republic in 1971. Today, Sierra Leone is a multi-party democracy practising the presidential system of government.

However, a civil war raged in the country during 1991 to 2001.⁹ The war affected children more than any other group of Sierra Leoneans.

Though endowed with enormous amounts of natural resources, years of neglect and bad governance have ensured that for the past couple of years, the United Nations has named Sierra Leone as the least developed country in the world – 57 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line.¹⁰

The first survey on children's media use

In Sierra Leone studies on children's rights issues, especially media and the way they affect children, are limited at best. This article presents a survey, undertaken by the author for The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen at Nordicom, which is the very first of its kind in the country. It seeks to examine the level of children's media access and media use, as well as children's preferences for different media contents. The study focuses on children in Freetown, who have far better access to media equipment and services than do children elsewhere in the country. For example, television coverage is at present limited to only the Freetown peninsula area.

A quantitative survey with children of school age (6-18 years) was conducted in Freetown over a four-month period between December 2000 and March 2001. About 2,000 questionnaires were sent to homes and schools. Concerning the sample itself, Freetown was divided into three zones – East, West and Central. Each zone was further subdivided into ten areas, and each area allocated at least 60 questionnaires distributed on a random basis. For the youngest children and those unable to read or write, the services of older persons (myself, parents, elders, or any educated person present) were utilized in filling the questionnaires. In these instances, it was stressed that the child's answers must

be recorded exactly as they were given. When returned and properly sorted, 1,867 questionnaires remained for analysis.

Additionally, another group of 500 children aged 14 to 18 years was randomly selected through school registers and interviewed in person during this period. The same three-zoning format was used and five senior secondary schools were randomly selected in each zone. At least 35 children were randomly sampled through school registers in each of the 15 schools. The questions in these interviews were the same as in the above-mentioned questionnaires, but in this separate study the children were asked to discuss in some detail and give their views on some of the topics raised.

Table 1 shows the proportions of the more than 2,300 children surveyed by age and gender.

Table 1. Proportions of children surveyed, by age and gender (cell %)

	6–13 years	14–18 years	Total
Boys	24	30	54
Girls	19	27	46
Total	43	57	100

The first section of this article presents the statistical findings of the survey regarding children's media access and amount of media use. These data are based on the 1,867 questionnaires in the quantitative part of the survey.

In the second section, the media market in Sierra Leone is described with special focus on children's preferences for different media contents in order to give a deeper understanding of the country's relation to media globalisation. Here the findings to a greater extent represent 14-18 year-olds attending school.

Children's media access and overall media use

Tables 2 and 3 help to explain children's media access and overall media use in Sierra Leone. Table 2 shows the availability of media in children's homes in Freetown. The differences are striking compared to Western countries. Radio and audio cassette player are the only media that at least half of the Sierra Leonean children claim to have at home. In, for example, the US and many European countries, the majority of children have in their homes several television sets, cable/satellite TV, video, radio, audio cassette player, CD player, computer, game machines and books.¹¹

Table 3 presents the Sierra Leonean children's use of the different media at least once a week, which here is regarded as a measure of children's overall access to the media. A comparison of the two tables shows the disproportionate distribution of media in terms of, on one hand, availability in children's homes and, on the other, the overall media accessibility to children in Freetown. The overall access is higher for all media, and – measured as weekly use – at least

half of the children have access to television and video besides radio and sound cassette player.

Various factors are responsible for this discrepancy, one of which is poverty. Most families cannot afford even some of the most traditional media equipment such as radio and television. And since children in Sierra Leone regard media in general, and television and video in particular, as a means of entertainment and passing time, those children whose parents cannot afford to provide such media equipment and facility at home go to their neighbours' homes, or to video centres and mini-cinemas, to gain access to the media. Unavailability of television and video at home has led to the springing up of video centres and mini-cinemas all over the capital, and in other major towns in the country, to accommodate the needs of this growing clientele. The practice of children going to neighbours' homes to watch some of their favourite programmes on TV is a trend acceptable among adults, as well, and this has helped to make media accessible to many children who ordinarily lack them in their homes.

Table 2. Availability of media in children's homes in Freetown, by age and gender (%)

	All children	Age		Gender	
		6 –13 years	14 –18 years	Boys	Girls
Print media	35	39	32	34	36
Radio	75	74	76	79	71
Audio cassette player	53	40	63	51	55
CD player	24	20	27	23	25
Television	43	34	49	46	41
Cable/satellite TV	4	3	5	5	3
Video	39	39	39	40	38
Computer	1.0	0.7	1.2	1.01	1.0
Internet access	0.33	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.3

n = 1,867

Table 3. Children's overall media access/weekly media use in Freetown, by age and gender (%)

	All children	Age		Gender	
		6 –13 years	14 –18 years	Boys	Girls
Print media	38	26	47	47	27
Radio	87	78	89	87	89
Audio cassette player	67	62	71	63	71
CD player	39	34	39	30	31
Television	71	70	71	71	72
Cable/satellite TV	11	9	13	13	11
Video	53	40	63	51	55
Computer (with Internet access)	3	1.97	3.76	2.7	3.4

n = 1,867

Children's media habits

However, overall availability, or weekly use, does not mean that children in Sierra Leone use these media every day. Table 4 presents the regularity of media habits among the children surveyed.

Table 4. Regularity of children's media habits in Freetown (%)

Use the medium	Print media	Radio	Audio cassette player	CD player	TV	Cable TV	Video
Every day	3	30	7	3	6	1	5
4–6 days/week	5	22	20	5	10	2	8
2–3 days/week	10	20	25	11	40	5	22
Once a week	20	15	15	20	15	3	18
Less than once a week	62	13	33	61	29	89	47
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

n = 1,867

Comparing Tables 3 and 4 we find that, although almost 90 per cent of the children have access to radio or use it at least once a week, the proportion claiming to use it most (4 to 7) days of the week is about 50 per cent, whereas other children listen to the radio less often. Nevertheless, radio is the medium that children use most; this is consistent with the fact that radio is the most widely accessible media equipment in Freetown.

As regards other listening media, children use sound cassettes much more often than CDs but less often than the radio.

In fact, most children do not use CD players at all and less than a tenth use them 4–7 days of the week. The figures are the same for print media – most children do not have access to them and only a small minority use them many days a week.

TV and video viewing is more common than reading, and of these two media television comes to the forefront. However, Table 4 shows that most children (40%) watch TV for 2–3 days per week. Only 16 per cent do so 4–7 days a week. This is so even though 43 per cent have TV at home (Table 2) and 71 per cent have regular access to it (Table 3).

This finding may be surprising when compared to other countries, where most children who have television at home watch it every day or almost every day. Various factors are responsible for this. Firstly, Freetown witnesses frequent power cuts and electricity failure. Power is rationed and some districts of Freetown only receive power supply three or four times per week, and even then it is only for between 6 and 12 hours, occasionally at odd hours. Disconnection of power in homes for failure to pay electricity bills on time is also very common. Also to bear in mind in this context is that national television broadcasts only 6 hours a day on weekday evenings – but more hours on weekends.

Secondly, access to television in homes is controlled and supervised by adults. Furthermore, most children who attend school are either required to attend extra lessons after school, or to help with the household chores, leaving them with less time for recreation on weekdays. The situation for children living in Freetown and not going to school is even worse.

Finally, most children are only interested in entertainment programmes. Some would be in bed when the feature films they prefer are aired late at night. Since they are expected to rise early to perform chores such as sweeping before going to school, most parents encourage their children to study at night and go to bed early.

Generally, children have more access to media equipment and services on weekends. Then, more children prefer to watch TV, or TV and video, at the home of someone else, or in the mini-cinemas and video centres if they can afford it.

This picture is almost the same when taking cable/satellite television into account, as few children have access to and watch such channels. As shown in the previous tables, only 4 per cent of the children surveyed claim to have a satellite dish at home, and 11 per cent claim to have general access to cable TV networks. The majority are older children (aged 14 to 18 years).

Some children gain access to videocassettes through friends and relatives abroad who send them as gifts, or by buying such items in the open market. Others borrow from their friends. The proportion of the category of children with access to such video products is, however, quite small.

As Tables 2 and 3 have shown, access to – and, with that, knowledge of operating – computers, CD-ROMs, digital games and the Internet is very limited; thus these new media were not included in a question about frequency of media use during a week (Table 4). It is only those children whose parents are affluent enough to afford the costs who have access to such digital media equipment. This is not to suggest that no children in Sierra Leone have, for instance, video and computer games. Some digital games are available in shops selling electronic goods. Some children who have family members abroad also receive such products from time to time as gifts. But these occurrences are few.

In sum: How much do children use the media?

The above tables provide an understanding of children's access to and quantitative use of media in Sierra Leone. However, it must be repeated that the figures do not represent children's access to and use of media in the entire country, since media accessibility and usage are far more widespread and concentrated in Freetown, where a third of the population lives, than elsewhere in the country. The capital, Freetown has a much better infrastructure to accommodate media equipment than do other parts of the country. In addition, the most affluent stratum of the population lives in Freetown.

Thus, if the survey were distributed to include the entire country, the figures would be considerably reduced. A survey covering the whole country is extremely difficult to conduct at present for logistical reasons. Certain parts of the country are still inaccessible to normal vehicular traffic. However, from what we know, children's preferences for the various media are generally the same throughout the country.

In short, access to media still remains a great luxury for most children in Sierra Leone and much work is to be done if this situation is to change.

The following section presents the media structure and children's preferences for different media contents.

Broadcast television

The expansion of traditional media in Sierra Leone has been limited severely by the recently concluded civil war. The Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service Television (SLBSTV) is the only broadcast TV station in the country. In fact, it was only restored to the air in 1993 after having gone out of service in late 1985. After its restoration, its coverage has been limited to the Freetown peninsula area, which means that the bulk of the country do not ordinarily have access to its programming. Also, it broadcasts for only about six hours on weekdays (6 p.m. to midnight) and about twelve hours on weekends and holidays (a first segment between 10 a.m. and noon and a second segment from later in the afternoon to midnight).

SLBSTV is a state-owned corporation supervised by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It is supposed to be an autonomous self-financing parastatal generating income from advertising and sponsorships from private sources, and providing television services for the government and its citizenry. The station's autonomy is, however, compromised because there is a great deal of political interference in its operation. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has a hand in the running of the station and its officials can be hired or fired on the directives of the ministry. Self-financing is a problem as well, and the station relies largely on government grants. This makes it very difficult for the corporation to assert its autonomy and stave off political interference. Some of the programmes shown on TV are political propaganda material.

The content shown on TV in Sierra Leone has a preponderance of foreign import. SLBSTV has neither the sophisticated mechanism and equipment nor the finances and professionally trained personnel to undertake such ambitious ventures as maintaining a string of foreign correspondents reporting from other countries or producing high quality documentaries and films. It does not even have the capacity to relay events live from around the country. It has no locally produced international news segment but relies on CNN for its international news coverage. The local news is on at 8 p.m. every evening. CNN is on SLBSTV every day for about 30 minutes starting at 9 p.m. SLBSTV also relies on foreign cable

networks, mainly CFI, TV Africa, CNN, Euro-Sport, for its international sport coverage. Almost all major international sporting events¹² are broadcast on SLBSTV.

Foreign documentaries and features are also frequently shown on TV. They include documentaries produced by organisations such as UNICEF, UNDP, Action Aid, and those obtained from foreign TV channels such as CNN (*Perspectives*, *People in the News*), BBC (*The African* by Ali Mazrui) and SABC (*Africa, Search for Common Grounds*). There are also some locally produced documentaries on TV, but their proportion is quite small compared to the foreign import.

Sierra Leone is yet to witness the revolution in the production of films and music videos. Naturally, there is no thriving indigenous film industry in Sierra Leone. There are, however, a few poorly recorded television dramas but these are few and far between. For now, any discussion on locally produced Sierra Leone movies must necessarily be non-existent. The films normally featured are western (especially American blockbusters) and third-rate low budget Nigerian and Ghanaian movies. It is interesting that young people (especially young girls and women) clamour for Nigerian movies given their sometimes-poor sound, picture and artistic qualities. Perhaps it is simply because young persons can identify with the characters, scenes and situations in the genre of Nigerian films preponderant in Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone also has yet to develop the expertise, obtain the equipment and put in place the mechanism to locally produce music videos for her local artists. Thus, while music by local artists heard on radio is quite substantial, it is only those artists who can afford the luxury of producing music videos abroad who are seen on TV. Apart from these, the bulk of music videos on TV in Sierra Leone is foreign import, mostly American and British rap, R&B and pop music, reggae and calypso from the UK, Jamaica and the Caribbean, and African music from mainly South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Guinea (the capital of Conakry) and Senegal. The main music programme on SLBSTV, *Musical Mix*, features music videos from around the world and is aired on Saturday nights. It is very popular with children because it is dominated by western pop music.

SLBSTV normally begins its transmission at 6 p.m. every weekday with 30 minutes of children's programmes. Among others, these are animated cartoons of which all are foreign import. There are, however, some locally produced programmes in which children participate both in production and presentation, and on weekends more time is given to the broadcast of children's programmes. On the whole, however, little time is allocated to children's programming, although children are among the most enthusiastic viewers of the programmes developed by SLBSTV and comprise a considerable proportion of the viewers.

The effects of the recently concluded civil war and the absence of competition in the TV medium in Sierra Leone are some of the reasons why children are not given much consideration when TV programmes are developed. Further, the government is too overwhelmed with other aspects of development after the devastating war to be preoccupied with children's rights issues, let alone children's usage of media. This is valid also for the priorities of the children's rights organi-

sations in Sierra Leone. The war affected children greatly and these organisations are more concerned with other aspects of children's rights. It is important to note, however, that SLBSTV practices a great deal of internal self-regulation in developing its programme schedules and only broadcasts programmes with clear adult themes, such as some of the 'R'-rated ('restricted') films, after 10 p.m., a time at which it is generally held that children should be asleep.

Also, it should be pointed out that the broadcasting of children's programming is one thing and children's viewing it is entirely another, since – as mentioned previously – adults determine TV usage in the homes and children must watch in their presence. Apart from some programmes in which children feature, and *Wan Pot*, a popular local TV comedy shown on Saturdays and repeated on Thursdays, as well as the above-mentioned *Musical Mix*, children in the ages studied prefer programmes with adult themes, such as the feature films shown every day between 10 p.m. and midnight.

Cable/satellite television and videos

As discussed, the availability of cable or satellite television is severely restricted to an affluent few in the big towns, especially Freetown. Recently, because of the presence of British troops, the cable TV station BFBS (British Forces Broadcasting Services) for the British forces deployed in Sierra Leone could be accessed in some homes without satellite dishes in Freetown. Apart from this station, it is only those families who can afford satellite dishes – which are quite expensive in Sierra Leone – who can access other popular transnational TV channels, such as CNN, CFI, BBC World and MTV.

SLBSTV relies mainly on videotapes pre-recorded in Europe or the US, which can be procured on the open market in Freetown. There is also a thriving business in pirated videotapes, DVDs, CDs and sound cassettes from mainly Asia and Nigeria. AOL-Time Warner, Walt Disney, Viacom, Vivendi-Universal, Bertelsmann, News Corporation and Sony may be the leading entertainment companies in the world but direct access to their products and services in homes for children through cable TV networks as is the case in western Europe, the US and Japan, is severely limited to a few children in Freetown.

As is the case with broadcast TV, several children gain access to satellite stations by going to video centres or homes with satellite dishes.

Mini-cinemas and video centres

The mini-cinemas and video centres referred to are not standard theatres, but makeshift film parlours that are more interested in making money off children. The admittance fees are rather expensive. Standards at such places are appalling, to say the least. And since government does not regulate their operations, these film parlours are practically left to their own designs. Some even operate illegally, and regularly show 'R'-rated action and horror thrillers as well as 'X'-

rated sex films. Especially boys also watch major football league games on TV at these video centres.

The video centres' primary targets are children, who form a large proportion of their clientele. The grandeur of standard cinema as a place of entertainment declined in the late 1980s and early 1990s; cinema going suffered greatly as adults preferred passing their time with other media. Thus the successors that developed, mini-cinemas and video centres, targeted children. The effect on children of the content of the materials shown at such places is a possible area of future research.

Computers and the Internet

Almost all children surveyed have very little or no knowledge of computers, let alone have access to one. Poverty, ignorance and illiteracy are responsible for this situation. Only about 3 per cent of the children surveyed claim to have access to computers and Internet services in some way (Table 3), and in these cases it is restricted to those whose parents are affluent.

This picture is even worse elsewhere in the country. And it is not a situation peculiar to children alone. Most adults in Sierra Leone are computer illiterate. Internet services are quite expensive and the services are not as efficient or properly developed as in other West African states such as Senegal or Gambia, for instance. Because of the cost, having an ordinary e-mail account is viewed as prestigious and enhances one's social standing and status.

A great deal of work must be done by policy planners, media producers and practitioners if knowledge of computers in Sierra Leone is to be broadened and if the Internet is to be widely accessible and used as a regular and major means of communication and information for both adults and children. There is, of course, the much-hyped talk of introducing computer education as part of the regular school curriculum, but save a couple of private schools in Freetown, this plan is yet to be implemented. And until it is, discussion on the accessibility and impact of computers and the Internet on children in Sierra Leone will remain a limited area of evaluation.

For adults, however, there are a number of computer training institutes springing up across Freetown, where certificate courses in software application systems such as MS Windows 95/98, Word and Internet access can be pursued. However, those who attend these institutes are mostly young adults who have either completed normal secondary schooling or dropped out of school.

Radio, audio cassettes and CDs

The above picture sharply contrasts with that of radio. Radio is, as we have seen, the most widespread medium with almost 90 per cent of children in Freetown having overall access to radio services, and 75 per cent of all children surveyed having a radio set in their homes.

Anyone with a multi-band radio receiver can easily access programmes by the world's leading broadcasters, such as the BBC, VOA, RFI, and Deutsche Welle. To increase their global audience, it is now common practise for these corporations to establish repeater stations in many cities around the world, especially in Africa. In Freetown, for instance, both the BBC and RFI have repeater FM stations, which broadcast their programmes via satellite 24 hours a day. Some VOA programmes can be heard on Sky FM 106.6. Other FM stations also air programmes from some of these corporations in different proportions and at various times of the day in Freetown.

This strategy, however effective it may be in marketing the programmes of the corporations referred to above, is not of much significance to children, since they regard radio, especially FM stations, as a medium more for entertainment than for listening to news broadcasts.

Apart from the intermittent airing of programmes obtained from some of the foreign news corporations referred to above, most of the programmes produced and aired by the radio stations based in Freetown are produced locally. There are at least 7 FM stations in the capital (and one, Kiss 104 FM, in Bo, the second city).

The national broadcaster, the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), is the only radio station in Sierra Leone that broadcasts on both FM and short wave, and covers the entire country. It broadcasts mainly in English (the official language of Sierra Leone) and some of the major local languages – Krio, Mende, Temne and Limba. The programmes it develops and airs include national and international news, talk shows and phone-in programmes, discussions and features on topics such as religion, politics, economics, and security. As the official government broadcaster, it also carries a great deal of propaganda material, government releases, and policy statements, some of which, however, are downright boring to children. Although the war increased people's interest in listening to news broadcasts on the radio, children's attitude towards radio has largely remained the same. For them, the radio is an instrument created primarily for amusement.

Radio Democracy FM 98.2, broadcasting almost exclusively in Krio, the *lingua franca* of Sierra Leone, is the most popular radio station both among children and adults in Freetown, not least because of the popular locally produced programmes it airs: A discussion/phone-in feature called *Patient, Beatrice and Elfreda* focuses on love and relationships between married couples; the *Jambo Show*, a local phone-in comedy show aired every Saturday morning, offers features such as local comedians, African music and quizzes; *Heart to Heart* is also a feature phone-in programme on Saturday mornings, on which young people seek advice on sexuality, love and relationships and share their problems and experiences with others.

The Voice of the Handicapped FM 96.2 is also popular largely for its controversial stands on national, political and social issues. It is significant because it is owned and operated by handicapped people. It has, in a way, contributed to changing people's attitudes towards handicapped people in Sierra Leone. One

such person, M. B. Attila (blinded in both eyes) is not only a popular radio producer and presenter, but is also a DJ and local music artist considered among the nation's best. There are, however, no handicapped children working for the station either on a part-time or full-time basis.

On all the radio stations in Freetown, music and entertainment constitutes a huge part of the programmes, and it is in this segment that children are the most interested. The amount of airtime given to playing music on radio varies from station to station but music is played at different times of the day, every day, on radio. The popular music culture among children in Sierra Leone, especially in Freetown, is by and large western oriented, and perhaps it is in this area, among others, that it could be said that media globalisation is having its greatest impact on children in Sierra Leone. This impact is felt in the music played on radio, in audio cassettes and CDs that children play, and even in music videos played on TV. The proportion of foreign, especially western, music on radio (as well as on TV) is quite substantial. Young boys and girls in Freetown prefer in particular American rap, R&B, pop music and to some extent calypso and reggae. It is quite easy to forget that one is in Africa when in a typical Freetown nightclub. The western artists most popular among young people in Freetown are also mostly young American and British artists representing the above-mentioned music genres. And since some of these artists are very young, it is quite simple for children to identify with them. It is a common practice for young boys and girls to form groups and call themselves Tupac Boys, Thug Angels, Destiny's Child, Spice Girls, etc., or for individuals to simply refer to themselves as Makaveli, DMX, Ja Rule, Craig David, J. Lo, etc., all in imitation of the western music tradition and their favourite groups and solo artists.

This is not to suggest that there is no African music tradition among young people in Sierra Leone. The music tastes of rural and urban children differs slightly in that the former tend to identify somewhat more with traditional and African music (local and foreign), while the latter are more western oriented with little taste for African music. Some local Sierra Leone music artists (both at home and abroad) and some African music stars enjoy success in the urban Sierra Leone music scene from time to time.

However, the artists likely to make the greatest impression on the youth are those who give a tinge of western bias to their music or those whose music could be danced to in clubs and at parties. Jimmy 'B', an internationally acclaimed Sierra Leone music star, is very popular among the young because he has mastered this art. So also are Yvonne Chaka Chaka, the South African music star, Angelique Kidjo of Benin, Kanda Bongo Man of Gabon, Awilo Logumba of Cameroon, and Shaka Bundu and Lucky Dube, both of South Africa. Any African artist who produces a song in the genre referred to above is likely to be successful in the Sierra Leone children's music scene. It is interesting, however, that Youssou Ndour, the internationally acclaimed Senegalese music star, enjoys very little popularity among children and young people in Sierra Leone, mainly because of the nature of the music he plays.

The proportion of African music on radio especially from South Africa, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea Conakry, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and from local Sierra Leonean artists is quite substantial, but its appeal to the youth is very limited. (African music, though, enjoys a huge popularity with the older generation.)

Print media

As for print media, not used much by the majority in Sierra Leone, local newspapers are the least preferred by children. However, they show a great deal of interest in foreign magazines, especially those dealing with entertainment and celebrities. These are hard to come by, for they are quite expensive. Most children only manage to have a glance at such magazines in school with their friends whose parents are affluent enough to afford it.

Advertising

Advertising is a strong force in the media business in Sierra Leone. Most businesses have realized that a clever advertising ploy can influence peoples' tastes and, with that, the effective marketing of a particular product or service. It is therefore common to see businesses, goods and services being advertised on media in Sierra Leone – mainly on TV, radio and in the print media: newspapers, magazines, billboards, handbills, etc. Most media houses depend heavily on the income generated through advertising.

Advertising on the Internet, on the other hand, is a trend only just beginning in Sierra Leone. Those businesses that can afford this luxury now have websites on the net. But this strategy only goes to show that Sierra Leonean businesses are catching up with the rest of the world in terms of maintaining a website. For effective marketing of products and for the Sierra Leoneans, especially children, this does not amount to much, since knowledge of and access to Internet services is severely limited.

On radio and TV, however, advertising is big business. The amount paid for the advertisement of a particular product or service is determined by the length and duration of the advert and the time that it is aired. Advertising periods are divided into 'peak' and 'off peak' periods. Peak periods are times when it is expected that an advert aired would be received by a larger audience, such as in the evenings when most people will have returned from work and are resting at home, which is why peak period advertisements are more expensive. Some businesses or organisations also sponsor whole programmes on radio and TV or buy specific airtime in order to market their products or explain their plans, policies, etc., to the public. Most adverts on TV and radio also have large music content. Sometimes, whole songs are composed. To captivate the interest of especially children and young people, the latest songs hitting the airwaves are used in adverts.

Most of the adverts on radio and TV are produced locally. While many are relatively professionally done, attractive and interesting, others are downright unintelligent and less attractive. The products, services and organisations advertised are both local and foreign and the type of advert used is sometimes determined by the origin of the product being advertised. The Sierra Leone Brewery (SLB), a government parastatal that brews beer and distributes other foreign alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages such as Guinness and Amstel Beer, is one of the biggest sponsors of both TV and radio programmes through advertising. Almost all the adverts it airs on TV and radio are professionally produced abroad. Other businesses dealing with foreign electronic and technology goods, such as LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics, also use adverts produced abroad. Businesses marketing foreign manufactured cigarettes are using foreign adverts, as well. These businesses are spending huge sums of money in sponsoring programmes on TV and radio just to market their products.

In the above categories of adverts, children are seldom used and there is no evidence to suggest that children are specifically targeted. It should be pointed out, however, that even though the programmes these businesses sponsor are not children's programmes, yet they are programmes that are very popular with children. There is no way the adverts will not reach children when they are linked with the children's favourite programmes.

However, there are other genres of adverts that are directly targeted at children, especially young girls. These include adverts marketing beauty products, dresses, shoes, foodstuffs such as chocolates, biscuits and toffees, baby products, discotheques, beauty salons, and so on. Various other adverts intended to spread information and education on sexuality, HIV/AIDS and safe-sex practices are also targeted largely at children, especially adolescents. In these categories, children are not only the intended consumers but are also used in the production of the adverts.

The marketing of interactive digital games may be big business in the western world, but this is not so in Sierra Leone. There is not a single advert on TV marketing such goods. This should naturally be taken within the context of the nature of the digital media in Sierra Leone.

In conclusion: Impact of media globalisation in Sierra Leone

When studying the role of media globalisation in Sierra Leone, one is faced with a complex paradoxical situation. This is so because most children in Sierra Leone have access to few media, yet the impact that media globalisation is having on children in Sierra Leone, especially those in Freetown, seems so great that it would be easy to forget that media is still an unattainable luxury for a great many children in the country. The paradox is shocking and confusing.

Childhood has been under attack in Sierra Leone for a long time now. The civil war helped to destroy the innocence of children in ways inconceivable. Children as young as eight years old, for instance, were made to commit horrendous

dous crimes during the ten-year war period. Those who did not come under the direct influence of the insurgents may have witnessed numerous sorts of cruelties, which can simply not be shut out of their memories in a hurry. Today, many children see themselves as grown-ups because of some of these experiences. The media, too, is in some respect exacerbating the situation. Media content on radio, television, in magazines and even in newspapers are produced and marketed by adults for an adult audience. Most of these materials, because of the way they are marketed, end up being consumed by children. The effect is that most children must see themselves either as adults or through the eyes of adults, which is bad for both their physical and psychological development and well-being.

The advertisements on TV and in magazines usually portray skewed images about life to children – vivid images of beautiful women in sexy clothes, belly-exposing blouses, tight jeans, miniskirts, high-heel shoes, etc. Western music videos, especially American rap and R&B, British pop, and Jamaican reggae dance hall music even further exacerbate the situation. Half-naked, beautiful, mostly young girls, dancing and exposing their sexiness, mostly adorn music videos. This has immense implications for children's cultural identity and the way they look at themselves. So also have their dress patterns, behavioural and social lifestyles been influenced by this trend. A common sight is children of all ages gleefully clad in flimsy dresses in the streets of Freetown. The traditional African dress pattern is very quickly being eroded.

Globalisation, it is true, is opening significant new avenues for media programming and is offering children variety in terms of media content relating to communication, information and entertainment. Media houses in countries where there is little public funding for programme development, such as Sierra Leone, now have the chance to air programmes of high quality, which they ordinarily would not have been able to produce by themselves. This helps children's overall growth process in that it introduces them to experiences, cultures and materials of varying sources and sorts.

However, the opportunities for education, communication and entertainment are being overwhelmed by commercial considerations in that much of the media contents has been tied to advertisements. As such, excessive commercialism and profit maximisation have now become the hallmarks of media globalisation. This is destroying childhood and placing much more pressure on children than they can handle. The sometimes lurid, poor quality and violent content of foreign media marketed to children, all in the name of choice and democracy, as well as the strong and excessive advertising linked with the marketing of such programmes, are destroying the beautiful points of globalisation. Even traditional programmes on TV are interspersed with advertisements. This aggressive commercialism only helps to alienate the child while increasing commercial pressure, which further confuses him/her.

Regulating children's access to harmful foreign media content would also prove a large problem when Sierra Leone will be more incorporated into the global media market. For now, transnational media content via satellite televi-

sion networks, interactive digital games, etc., have not yet, in the true sense of the word, started taking root in Sierra Leone, and their impact at this stage could not be assessed. It will, naturally, be a long time before such media content becomes widely available to Sierra Leonean children, but plans must be drawn now so that the authorities will not be caught by surprise when this finally happens. For at present media globalisation, on the whole, still does not apply to Sierra Leone, since children in this country generally have access to few media. In spite of the great impact that media globalisation appears to have on children in Sierra Leone, globalisation in its true sense should perhaps be seen as a process for only affluent nations, and for small affluent minorities of the populations in poorer countries.

Notes

1. United Nations Development Programme (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York, Oxford University Press. The projected population growth rate per year for Sierra Leone, according to the UNDP, is 3.2 per cent between 1999 and 2015.
2. United Nations Development Programme (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York, Oxford University Press.
3. Sierra Leone adopted the 6-3-3-4 system of education, under which children are required to start effective schooling at age six and obtain six years of primary education. This is followed by three years each of both junior and senior secondary schools, and finally four years of university.
4. Ministry of Education, Freetown, Sierra Leone, December 1998. Dr. Alpha Wurrie, Minister of Education, released this figure during a symposium held by the government to explain government policies to the people.
5. The school enrolment ratios are gross ratios and indicate the total number of children enrolled in a schooling level – whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level – expressed as a percentage of the total number of children in the relevant age group for that level.
6. UNICEF (2002) *The State of the World's Children 2002* (<http://www.unicef.org/sowc02/fullreport.htm>)
7. United Nations Development Programme (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York, Oxford University Press.
8. United Nations Development Programme (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York, Oxford University Press.
9. The civil war began in March 1999 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, led by Foday Sankoh, attacked Bomaru, a town on Sierra Leone's southeastern border with Liberia. After several years of hostilities characterized by unmitigated brutality and carnage, the United Nations brokered a peace agreement between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF in the Togolese capital, Lome, in July 1999. The disarmament of the rebels was finally completed in 2001 by UNAMSIL, the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, deployed in Sierra Leone.
10. United Nations Development Programme (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York, Oxford University Press.
11. Roberts, Donald F., Foehr, Ulla G., Rideout, Victoria J., and Brodie, Mollyann (1999) *Kids & Media @ The New Millennium. A Comprehensive National Analysis of Children's Media Use*. A Kaiser Family Foundation Report, Menlo Park, C.A., from which a number of tables and comments are reprinted under the heading "Children's Media Use in the U.S.A." in *News from*

ICCVOS, The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2000, pp. 7-11.

Livingstone, Sonia, Holden, Katharine J. and Bovill, Moira (1999) "Children's Changing Media Environment. Overview of a European Comparative Study", in Cecilia von Feilitzen and Ulla Carlsson (Eds.) *Children and Media. Image, Education, Participation*. Yearbook 1999 from The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen at Nordicom, Göteborg University, pp. 39-59.

12. Such as the Olympic games, Football World Cup, African Nations Cup, European Nations Cup, UEFA Champion's League and some of the Golden League Grand Prix of the IAAF.

Digital Kids: The New On-Line Children's Consumer Culture

Kathryn C. Montgomery

The above-mentioned article is reprinted in the Clearinghouse Yearbook 2002, *Children, Young People and Media Globalisation*, pp. 189-208, by permission of Sage Publications, Inc. from Dorothy G. Singer & Jerome L. Singer (eds.) (2001) *Handbook of Children and the Media*, Thousand Oaks, Sage, pp. 635-650, copyright © 2001 by Sage Publications, Inc. The permission is granted for non-electronic print format only.

Interested readers of this CD-ROM are therefore kindly referred to the printed version of the Clearinghouse Yearbook or to the book edited by D.G. Singer & J.L. Singer.

A brief presentation of Kathryn Montgomery's article is available in the introduction of the Clearinghouse Yearbook, please see pp. 21-22, included in this CD-ROM.

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
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Children in the World

Demographic Indicators


Figure 1. Children in the world, 2000 (per cent of the total population)



Note: For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.


Source: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef)

Figure 2. Median age by major area 1950, 2000 and 2050



Note: For categorisation of regions, see page 257.
Source: World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision (United Nations Population Division)

Figure 3. Median age by continent 1950, 2000 and 2050



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision (United Nations Population Division)

Table 1. Ten countries with the oldest and ten countries with the youngest populations, 2000 (median age)

Oldest population		Youngest population	
Country	Median age (years)	Country	Median age (years)
Japan	41.2	Yemen	15.0
Italy	40.2	Niger	15.1
Switzerland	40.2	Uganda	15.4
Germany	40.1	Burkina Faso	15.6
Sweden	39.7	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	15.6
Finland	39.4	Angola	15.9
Bulgaria	39.1	Somalia	16.0
Belgium	39.1	Burundi	16.0
Greece	39.1	Zambia	16.5
Denmark	38.7	Benin	16.6

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision (United Nations Population Division)

Table 2. Demographic indicators in different countries of the world, 2000

	Total population (millions) 2000	Population age composition			Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000
		0-14 yrs % 2000	15-64 yrs % 2000	65+ % 2000	
AFRICA					
Algeria	30.3	34.8	61.0	4.1	70
Angola	13.1	48.2	49.0	2.8	45
Benin	6.3	46.2	50.9	2.7	54
Botswana	1.5	42.1	55.1	2.8	40
Burkina Faso	11.5	48.7	48.1	3.2	47
Burundi	6.4	47.6	49.6	2.9	41
Cameroon	14.9	43.1	53.2	3.7	50
Cape Verde	0.4	—	—	—	70
Central African Republic	3.7	43.0	53.0	4.0	44
Chad	7.9	46.5	50.4	3.1	46
Comoros	0.7	—	—	—	60
Congo	3.0	46.3	50.4	3.3	51
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	51.0	48.8	48.4	2.9	51
Côte d'Ivoire	16.0	42.1	54.8	3.1	48
Djibouti	0.6	—	—	—	43
Egypt	67.9	35.4	60.5	4.1	67
Equatorial Guinea	0.5	—	—	—	51
Eritrea	3.7	43.9	53.2	2.9	52
Ethiopia	62.9	45.2	51.9	3.0	44
Gabon	1.2	40.2	54.0	5.8	53
Gambia	1.3	40.3	56.6	3.1	46
Ghana	19.3	40.9	55.8	3.2	57
Guinea	8.2	44.1	53.2	2.8	48
Guinea-Bissau	1.2	43.5	52.9	3.6	45
Kenya	30.7	43.5	53.7	2.8	51
Lesotho	2.0	39.3	56.6	4.2	46
Liberia	2.9	42.7	54.5	2.9	52
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	5.3	33.9	62.7	3.4	70
Madagascar	16.0	44.7	52.3	3.0	53
Malawi	11.3	46.3	50.7	2.9	40
Mali	11.3	46.1	49.9	4.0	51
Mauritania	2.7	44.1	52.7	3.2	51
Mauritius	1.2	25.6	68.2	6.2	71
Morocco	29.9	34.7	61.2	4.1	68
Mozambique	18.3	43.9	52.8	3.2	39
Namibia	1.8	43.7	52.5	3.8	45
Niger	10.8	49.9	48.1	2.0	45
Nigeria	113.9	45.1	51.9	3.0	52

Table 2. Cont.

	Total population (millions) 2000	Population age composition			Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000
		0-14 yrs % 2000	15-64 yrs % 2000	65+ % 2000	
Rwanda	7.6	44.3	53.1	2.6	40
São Tomé & Príncipe	0.1	—	—	—	—
Senegal	9.4	44.3	53.2	2.5	53
Seychelles	0.08	—	—	—	—
Sierra Leone	4.4	44.2	52.8	2.9	39
Somalia	8.8	48.8	49.6	2.4	48
South Africa	43.3	34.0	62.4	3.6	52
Sudan	31.0	40.1	56.4	3.4	56
Swaziland	0.9	41.6	55.0	3.5	44
Tanzania	35.1	45.0	52.6	2.4	51
Togo	4.5	44.3	52.6	3.1	52
Tunisia	9.5	29.7	64.4	5.9	70
Uganda	23.3	49.2	48.3	2.5	44
Zambia	10.4	46.5	50.5	2.9	41
Zimbabwe	12.6	45.2	51.6	3.2	43
ASIA					
Afghanistan	21.8	43.5	53.7	2.8	43
Armenia	3.8	23.7	67.6	8.6	73
Azerbaijan	8.0	29.0	64.2	6.8	72
Bahrain	0.6	—	—	—	73
Bangladesh	137.4	38.7	58.2	3.1	59
Bhutan	2.1	—	—	—	62
Brunei Darussalam	0.3	—	—	—	76
Cambodia	13.1	43.9	53.3	2.8	56
China	1,275.1	24.8	68.3	6.9	71
Cyprus	0.8	—	—	—	78
Georgia	5.3	20.5	66.6	12.9	73
India	1,008.9	33.5	61.5	5.0	63
Indonesia	212.1	30.8	64.4	4.8	66
Iran	70.3	37.4	59.2	3.4	69
Iraq	22.9	41.6	55.5	2.9	62
Israel	6.0	28.3	61.9	9.9	79
Japan	127.1	14.7	68.1	17.2	81
Jordan	4.9	40.0	57.2	2.8	70
Kazakhstan	16.2	27.0	66.2	6.9	65
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.	22.3	26.5	67.6	5.9	64
Korea, Rep. of	46.7	20.8	72.1	7.1	75
Kuwait	1.9	31.3	66.5	2.2	76
Kyrgyzstan	4.9	33.9	60.0	6.0	68

Table 2. Cont.

	Total population (millions) 2000	Population age composition			Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000
		0-14 yrs % 2000	15-64 yrs % 2000	65+ % 2000	
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	5.3	42.7	53.8	3.5	53
Lebanon	3.5	31.1	62.8	6.1	73
Malaysia	22.2	34.1	61.8	4.1	72
Maldives	0.3	—	—	—	67
Mongolia	2.5	35.2	61.0	3.8	63
Myanmar	47.8	33.1	62.3	4.6	56
Nepal	23.0	41.0	55.2	3.7	59
Oman	2.5	44.1	53.4	2.5	71
Pakistan	141.3	41.8	54.5	3.7	60
Philippines	75.6	37.5	58.9	3.5	69
Qatar	0.6	—	—	—	70
Saudi Arabia	20.3	42.9	54.1	3.0	72
Singapore	4.0	21.9	70.9	7.2	78
Sri Lanka	18.9	26.3	67.4	6.3	72
Syrian Arab Rep.	16.2	40.8	56.0	3.1	71
Tajikistan	6.1	39.4	56.0	4.6	68
Thailand	62.8	26.7	68.1	5.2	70
Turkey	66.7	30.0	64.2	5.8	70
Turkmenistan	4.7	37.6	58.1	4.3	66
United Arab Emirates	2.6	26.0	71.3	2.7	75
Uzbekistan	24.9	36.3	59.1	4.7	69
Viet Nam	78.1	33.4	61.3	5.3	68
Yemen	18.4	20.0	66.9	13.1	61
OCEANIA					
Australia	19.1	20.5	67.2	12.3	79
Cook Islands	0.02	—	—	—	—
Fiji	0.8	—	—	—	69
Kiribati	0.1	—	—	—	—
Marshall Islands	0.1	—	—	—	—
Micronesia	0.1	—	—	—	—
New Zealand	3.8	23.0	65.4	11.7	78
Palau	0.02	—	—	—	—
Papua New Guinea	4.8	40.1	57.5	2.4	57
Solomon Islands	0.4	—	—	—	68
Tonga	0.1	—	—	—	—
Tuvalu	0.01	—	—	—	—
Vanuatu	0.2	—	—	—	68

Table 2. Cont.

	Total population (millions) 2000	Population age composition			Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000
		0-14 yrs % 2000	15-64 yrs % 2000	65+ % 2000	
EUROPE					
Albania	3.1	30.0	64.2	5.9	73
Andorra	0.1	—	—	—	—
Austria	8.1	16.6	67.8	15.6	78
Belarus	10.2	18.7	68.0	13.3	69
Belgium	10.2	17.3	65.7	17.0	78
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.0	18.9	71.2	9.9	74
Bulgaria	8.0	15.7	68.1	16.1	71
Croatia	4.6	18.0	67.8	14.1	74
Czech Republic	10.3	16.4	69.7	13.8	75
Denmark	5.3	18.3	66.7	15.0	76
Estonia	1.4	17.7	67.9	14.4	71
Finland	5.2	18.0	67.0	14.9	78
France	59.2	18.7	65.3	16.0	79
Germany	82.0	15.5	68.1	16.4	78
Greece	10.6	15.1	67.4	17.6	78
Hungary	10.0	16.9	68.4	14.6	71
Iceland	0.3	—	—	—	79
Ireland	3.8	21.6	67.1	11.3	77
Italy	57.5	14.3	67.6	18.1	78
Latvia	2.4	17.4	67.8	14.8	70
Lithuania	3.7	19.5	67.2	13.4	72
Luxembourg	0.4	—	—	—	77
Macedonia, TFYR	2.0	22.6	67.4	10.0	73
Malta	0.4	—	—	—	78
Moldova, Rep. of	4.3	23.1	67.6	9.3	67
Netherlands	15.9	18.3	68.1	13.6	78
Norway	4.5	19.8	64.9	15.4	79
Poland	38.6	19.2	68.7	12.1	73
Portugal	10.0	16.7	67.7	15.6	76
Romania	22.4	18.3	68.4	13.3	70
Russian Federation	145.5	18.0	69.9	12.5	66
Slovakia	5.4	19.5	69.1	11.4	73
Slovenia	2.0	15.9	70.2	13.9	76
Spain	39.9	14.7	68.3	17.0	78
Sweden	8.8	18.2	64.4	17.4	80
Switzerland	7.2	16.7	67.3	16.0	79
Ukraine	49.6	17.8	68.3	13.8	68
United Kingdom	59.4	19.0	65.3	15.8	78

Table 2. Cont.

	Total population (millions) 2000	Population age composition			Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000
		0-14 yrs % 2000	15-64 yrs % 2000	65+ % 2000	
Yugoslavia	10.6	20.0	66.9	13.1	73
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN					
Antigua & Barbuda	0.1	—	—	—	—
Argentina	37.0	27.7	62.6	9.7	73
Bahamas	0.3	—	—	—	69
Barbados	0.3	—	—	—	77
Belize	0.2	—	—	—	74
Bolivia	8.3	39.6	56.4	4.0	62
Brazil	170.4	28.8	66.1	5.1	68
Chile	15.2	28.5	64.4	7.2	75
Colombia	42.1	32.8	62.5	4.7	71
Costa Rica	4.0	32.4	62.5	5.1	76
Cuba	11.2	21.2	69.2	9.6	76
Dominica	0.1	—	—	—	—
Dominican Republic	8.4	33.5	62.2	4.3	67
Ecuador	12.6	33.8	61.5	4.7	70
El Salvador	6.3	35.6	59.4	5.0	70
Grenada	0.1	—	—	—	—
Guatemala	11.4	43.6	52.8	3.5	65
Guyana	0.8	—	—	—	63
Haiti	8.1	40.6	55.7	3.7	53
Honduras	6.4	41.8	54.8	3.4	66
Jamaica	2.6	31.5	61.3	7.2	75
Mexico	98.9	33.1	62.1	4.7	73
Nicaragua	5.1	42.6	54.3	3.0	68
Panama	2.9	31.3	63.2	5.5	74
Paraguay	5.5	39.5	57.0	3.5	70
Peru	25.7	33.4	61.8	4.8	69
St Kitts & Nevis	0.04	—	—	—	—
St Lucia	0.2	—	—	—	73
St Vincent	0.1	—	—	—	—
Suriname	0.4	—	—	—	71
Trinidad & Tobago	1.3	25.0	68.4	6.7	74
Uruguay	3.3	24.8	62.3	12.9	74
Venezuela	24.2	34.0	61.5	4.4	73
NORTH AMERICA					
Canada	30.8	19.1	68.3	12.6	79
United States	283.2	21.7	66.0	12.3	77

Table 2. Cont.

	Total population (millions) 2000	Population age composition			Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000
		0-14 yrs % 2000	15-64 yrs % 2000	65+ % 2000	
REGIONAL SUMMARIES					
Sub-Saharan Africa	618.1	44.4	52.6	3.0	48
Middle East and North Africa	343.3	37.8	58.6	3.6	66
South Asia	1,353.7	35.1	60.3	4.6	62
East Asia and Pacific	1,875.6	26.9	66.8	6.2	69
Latin America and Caribbean	513.4	31.5	63.0	5.4	70
CEE/CIS and Baltic States	476.6	—	—	—	69
Industrialized countries	861.0	—	—	—	78
Developing countries	4,850.8	—	—	—	62
Least developed countries	667.6	—	—	—	51
World total	6,041.8	30.0	63.1	6.9	63

Notes: Countries with no available data are excluded.

— Data not available or too uncertain to be used.

For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.

Sources: Total population & Life expectancy: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef), Population age composition: World Development Indicators 2002 (World Bank)

Education

Table 3. Children attending school, 1995-1999

	Primary school enrolment ratio* (gross)		Per cent of primary school entrants reaching grade five	Secondary school enrolment ratio (gross)	
	male	female		male	female
Sub-Saharan Africa	82	69	66	28	22
Middle East and Northern Africa	95	84	88	64	55
South Asia	99	81	54	52	33
East Asia and Pacific	107	105	87	66	60
Latin America and Caribbean	105	107	76	49	53
CEE/CIS & Baltic States	98	94	—	82	82
Industrialised countries	104	103	99	105	107
Developing countries	98	89	73	55	46
Least developed countries	84	69	61	23	14
World total	99	90	75	61	54

Notes: *Gross primary or secondary school enrolment ratio: the number of children enrolled in a level (primary or secondary), regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the same level.

— Data not available or too uncertain to be used.


For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.

For data on separate countries, see page 225 ff.

Source: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef)

Table 4. Illiteracy rate 2000, population aged 15-24 years (per cent)

	Male %	Female %	Total %
Africa	18	28	23
America	4	4	4
Asia	11	19	15
Europe	0.2	0.2	0.2
Oceania	0.3	0.3	0.3
Developing countries	12	20	16
of which:			
Sub-Saharan Africa	18	27	23
Arab States	15	28	21
South Asia	23	41	32
East Asia and Oceania	2	4	3
Latin America and Caribbean	6	6	6
Least developed countries	27	42	35
Industrialised/developed countries	0.3	0.4	0.4
World total	10	17	13



Note: Adult illiteracy is defined as the percentage of the population aged 15 years and over who cannot both read and write with understanding a short simple statement on his/her everyday life.

Source: Unesco Institute for Statistics - Assessment of February 2002

Table 5. Adult literacy rate, 2000 (per cent)

	Male %	Female %	Total %
Sub-Saharan Africa	69	54	61
Middle East and Northern Africa	75	54	65
South Asia	66	40	53
East Asia and Pacific	93	80	87
Latin America and Caribbean	89	87	88
CEE/CIS & Baltic States	99	96	97
Industrialised countries	—	—	—
Developing countries	82	66	74
Least developed countries	61	40	51
World total	85	74	79

Notes: Percentage of persons aged 15 years and above who can read and write.

—Data not available or too uncertain to be used.

For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.

For data on separate countries, see page 225 ff.

Source: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef)

Table 6. Education in different countries of the world

	Total adult literacy ¹ 2000 %	Primary school enrolment ratio ² (gross) 1995-99		Secondary school enrolment ratio ² (gross) 1995-97		Primary school enrolment/attendance ³ (net) 1994-2000 %
		male	female	male	female	
AFRICA						
Algeria	63	97	93	65	62	97
Angola	—	95	88	—	—	50
Benin	37	91	60	24	10	63
Botswana	77	119	118	61	68	84
Burkina Faso	23	48	33	11	6	27
Burundi	48	68	55	9	5	47
Cameroon	75	88	74	32	22	73
Cape Verde	73	122	114	54	56	99
Central African Republic	46	70	50	15	6	43
Chad	54	83	46	15	4	39
Comoros	74	99	85	21	16	60
Congo	81	82	75	62	45	—
Congo, Dem.Rep.of the	67	70	51	32	19	59
Côte d'Ivoire	47	82	60	33	16	57
Djibouti	51	45	33	17	12	33
Egypt	55	103	96	80	70	86
Equatorial Guinea	83	139	118	—	—	89
Eritrea	30	64	54	24	17	37
Ethiopia	39	52	31	14	10	44
Gabon	71	134	130	—	—	83
Gambia	37	78	66	30	19	52
Ghana	70	82	72	45	29	74
Guinea	41	68	40	20	7	39
Guinea-Bissau	37	85	52	9	4	42
Kenya	82	89	88	26	22	74
Lesotho	84	96	92	25	36	65
Liberia	53	72	53	31	12	34
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	80	110	110	95	95	96
Madagascar	47	104	103	16	16	57
Malawi	60	142	128	21	12	83
Mali	40	60	40	14	7	40
Mauritania	40	88	79	21	11	54
Mauritius	84	105	106	64	64	97
Morocco	49	94	76	44	34	70
Mozambique	44	86	65	9	5	44
Namibia	82	126	126	56	66	86
Niger	16	36	22	9	5	37

Table 6. Cont.

	Total adult literacy ¹ 2000 %	Primary school enrolment ratio ² (gross) 1995-99		Secondary school enrolment ratio ² (gross) 1995-97		Primary school enrolment/attendance ³ (net) 1994-2000 %
		male	female	male	female	
Nigeria	64	75	65	33	28	56
Rwanda	67	88	88	12	9	66
São Tomé & Príncipe	—	—	—	—	—	93
Senegal	37	73	58	20	12	49
Seychelles	88	101	101	—	—	100
Sierra Leone	36	59	41	22	13	41
Somalia	—	18	9	10	6	12
South Africa	85	98	86	76	91	87
Sudan	57	48	43	21	19	40
Swaziland	80	119	112	55	54	100
Tanzania	75	77	76	6	5	53
Togo	57	126	89	40	14	69
Tunisia	71	119	112	66	63	94
Uganda	67	129	114	15	9	87
Zambia	78	102	100	34	21	67
Zimbabwe	93	111	105	52	44	85
ASIA						
Afghanistan	36	53	5	32	11	24
Armenia	99	92	98	85	91	—
Azerbaijan	97	97	96	73	81	88
Bahrain	88	103	104	91	98	97
Bangladesh	41	98	95	25	13	82
Bhutan	47	82	62	7	2	53
Brunei Darussalam	92	109	104	71	82	91
Cambodia	68	95	84	30	18	65
China	85	105	104	72	65	99
Cyprus	97	100	100	96	99	96
Georgia	100	95	95	78	76	98
India	56	99	82	59	39	76
Indonesia	87	117	110	55	48	93
Iran	77	111	102	81	73	97
Iraq	58	110	95	51	32	93
Israel	96	96	96	84	89	—
Japan	—	101	102	99	100	100
Jordan	90	93	93	52	54	95
Kazakhstan	98	100	100	80	89	100
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	100	108	101	—	—	—
Korea, Rep. of	98	98	99	102	102	97

Table 6. Cont.

	Total adult literacy ¹ 2000 %	Primary school enrolment ratio ² (gross) 1995-99		Secondary school enrolment ratio ² (gross) 1995-97		Primary school enrolment/attendance ³ (net) 1994-2000 %
		male	female	male	female	
Kuwait	82	101	97	65	65	87
Kyrgyzstan	97	98	98	75	83	97
Lao People's Dem.Rep.	62	125	103	34	23	69
Lebanon	86	113	108	78	85	98
Malaysia	88	95	96	58	66	94
Maldives	96	125	122	49	49	98
Mongolia	99	103	103	48	65	90
Myanmar	85	102	99	29	30	68
Nepal	41	140	104	49	25	66
Oman	72	100	95	68	65	89
Pakistan	43	99	69	33	17	46
Philippines	95	118	119	71	75	90
Qatar	81	106	100	81	79	94
Saudi Arabia	77	97	90	65	57	76
Singapore	92	95	93	70	77	93
Sri Lanka	92	103	101	71	78	90
Syrian Arab Rep.	74	98	93	45	40	99
Tajikistan	99	96	94	81	72	93
Thailand	96	93	90	38	37	80
Turkey	85	98	96	68	48	72
Turkmenistan	—	—	—	—	—	80
United Arab Emirates	87	104	102	77	82	98
Uzbekistan	99	100	100	99	87	78
Viet Nam	93	110	107	44	41	94
Yemen	46	89	45	53	14	58
OCEANIA						
Australia	—	101	101	150	155	95
Cook Islands	—	113	110	—	—	98
Fiji	93	111	110	64	65	99
Kiribati	—	—	—	—	—	71
Marshall Islands	—	134	133	—	—	—
New Zealand	—	101	101	110	116	100
Papua New Guinea	76	42	66	17	11	—
Solomon Islands	—	104	90	21	14	—
Tonga	99	124	120	—	—	95
Tuvalu	98	100	100	—	—	100
Vanuatu	—	105	107	23	18	90

Table 6. Cont.

attendance ³	Total adult	Primary school enrolment ratio ²		Secondary school enrolment ratio ²		Primary school enrolment/
	literacy ¹	(gross)		(gross)		(net)
	2000	1995-99		1995-97		1994-2000
	%	male	female	male	female	%
EUROPE						
Albania	—	106	108	37	38	90
Austria	—	104	103	105	102	91
Belarus	99	101	96	91	95	85
Belgium	—	104	102	142	151	97
Bosnia-Herzegovina	93	100	100	—	—	94
Bulgaria	99	100	99	77	76	98
Croatia	98	94	97	81	83	95
Czech Republic	—	105	103	97	100	91
Denmark	—	102	101	120	122	99
Estonia	98	95	93	100	108	87
Finland	—	98	99	110	125	98
France	—	106	104	112	111	100
Germany	—	104	104	105	103	86
Greece	97	93	93	95	96	90
Hungary	99	104	102	96	99	97
Iceland	—	98	98	109	108	98
Ireland	—	103	102	113	122	100
Italy	98	101	100	94	95	100
Latvia	100	101	100	82	85	93
Lithuania	100	99	96	85	88	—
Luxembourg	—	88	94	72	76	—
Macedonia, TFYR	—	100	98	64	62	96
Malta	92	108	107	86	82	100
Moldova, Rep. of	99	96	95	78	81	99
Netherlands	—	109	107	134	129	100
Norway	—	100	100	121	116	100
Poland	100	97	95	98	97	97
Portugal	92	130	124	102	111	100
Romania	98	101	99	79	78	96
Russian Federation	99	108	107	83	91	93
Slovakia	100	99	98	92	96	—
Slovenia	100	98	98	90	93	95
Spain	98	110	108	116	128	100
Sweden	—	103	103	128	153	100
Switzerland	—	108	107	94	88	96
Ukraine	99	87	86	88	94	—
United Kingdom	—	114	114	120	139	98
Yugoslavia	98	69	70	62	66	97

Table 6. Cont.

attendance ³	Total adult	Primary school enrolment ratio ²		Secondary school enrolment ratio ²		Primary school enrolment/
	literacy ¹	(gross)		(gross)		(net)
	2000	1995-99		1995-97		1994-2000
	%	male	female	male	female	%
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN						
Antigua & Barbuda	82	—	—	—	—	98
Argentina	97	110	108	73	81	96
Bahamas	96	99	99	88	91	99
Barbados	98	102	100	90	80	100
Belize	80	105	98	47	52	91
Bolivia	86	99	95	40	34	87
Brazil	85	100	96	31	36	95
Chile	96	104	102	72	78	89
Colombia	92	103	103	70	75	90
Costa Rica	96	109	108	47	50	91
Cuba	96	97	97	76	85	94
Dominica	—	93	105	—	—	89
Dominican Republic	84	93	93	34	47	94
Ecuador	92	99	98	53	55	90
El Salvador	79	94	94	30	35	78
Grenada	—	133	118	—	—	98
Guatemala	69	100	89	26	24	77
Guyana	98	91	86	73	78	95
Haiti	49	128	124	21	20	42
Honduras	81	96	98	29	37	86
Jamaica	87	96	92	63	67	93
Mexico	91	107	117	64	64	97
Nicaragua	64	101	104	45	53	80
Panama	92	106	102	60	65	91
Paraguay	93	113	110	42	45	85
Peru	90	123	121	72	67	87
St Kitts & Nevis	—	101	94	—	—	89
St Lucia	—	121	119	—	—	—
St Vincent/Grenadines	—	99	83	—	—	84
Suriname	94	129	125	50	58	89
Trinidad & Tobago	98	99	98	72	75	88
Uruguay	98	113	110	77	92	93
Venezuela	93	90	93	33	46	84
NORTH AMERICA						
Canada	—	103	101	105	105	95
United States	—	102	101	98	97	95

Table 6. Cont.

attendance ³	Total adult	Primary school enrolment ratio ²		Secondary school enrolment ratio ²		Primary school enrolment/
	literacy ¹	(gross)		(gross)		(net)
	2000	1995-99		1995-97		1994-2000
	%	male	female	male	female	%
REGIONAL SUMMARIES						
Sub-Saharan Africa	61	82	69	28	22	60
Middle East and North Africa	65	95	84	64	55	81
South Asia	53	99	81	52	33	71
East Asia and Pacific	87	107	105	66	60	95
Latin America and Caribbean	88	105	107	49	53	91
CEE/CIS and Baltic States	97	98	94	82	82	87
Industrialized countries	—	104	103	105	107	96
Developing countries	74	98	89	55	46	80
Least developed countries	51	84	69	23	14	58
World total	79	99	90	61	54	82

Notes: Countries with no available data are excluded.

For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.

Data in *italics* refer to years or periods other than those specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition, or refer to only a part of a country.

—Data not available or too uncertain to be used.

¹ Percentage of persons aged 15 and over who can read and write.

² Gross primary or secondary school enrolment ratio: the number of children enrolled in a level (primary or secondary), regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the same level.

³ Derived from net primary school enrolment rates as reported by UNESCO and from national household survey reports of attendance at primary school.

Source: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef)

Child Labour and Economy

Child Labour

The term “child labour” does not encompass all work performed by children under the age of 18. Many children carry out work that is entirely consistent with their education and full physical and mental development.

However, the International Labour Organization identifies three categories of child labour to be abolished:

- a) Labour performed by a child who is *under a minimum age* specified in national legislation for that kind of work.
- b) Labour that jeopardizes the physical, mental or moral well-being of a child, known as *hazardous work*. This comprises a) working in the mining and construction sectors; b) working in other occupations or processes considered as hazardous by their nature or the circumstances in which they are carried out; and c) working excessive hours (> 42 hours per week).
- c) The *unconditional worst forms of child labour*, which are internationally defined as slavery, trafficking, debt bondage and other forms of forced labour, forced recruitment for use in armed conflict, prostitution and pornography, and illicit activities.

Source: *A Future Without Child Labour* (International Labour Office)

Global Estimates for the Year 2000

- Of an estimated 211 million children aged 5-14 engaged in some form of economic activity, 186 million children are engaged in child labour to be abolished (including in its worst forms).
- Of an estimated 141 million children aged 15-17 engaged in economic activity, 59 million children are engaged in child labour.
- “Economic activity” is a broad concept that encompasses most productive activities undertaken by children, whether for the market or not, paid or unpaid, for a few hours or fulltime, on a casual or regular basis, legal or illegal; it excludes chores undertaken in the child’s own household and schooling. To be counted as economically active, a child must have worked for at least one hour on any day during a seven-day reference period. “Economically active” children is a statistical rather than a legal, definition. It is *not* the same as the “child labour” referred to with regard to abolition.

Source: *A Future Without Child Labour* (International Labour Office)

Table 7. Estimates of economically active children aged 5-14 in 2000¹


Region	Number of economically active children (millions)	Percentage of economically active children (per cent)	Percentage of economically active children in total child population ¹
Development (industrialized) economies	2.5	1	2
Transition economies	2.4	1	4
Asia and the Pacific	127.3	60	19
Latin America and the Caribbean	17.4	8	16
Sub-Saharan Africa	48.0	23	29
Middle East and North Africa	13.4	6	15
Total	211.0	—	16

—Figures not available

¹ The estimates are prone to higher error rates than the corresponding global estimates as a result of the reduced number of data sets available for their calculation. Rounding errors mean that percentage totals do not equal 100. The groupings follow the categories adopted in the ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM). The total number of children aged 5-14 in the world in 2000 was approximately 1200 million, of which the Asia-Pacific region accounted for 28 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa for 7.4 per cent.

Source: *A Future Without Child Labour* (International Labour Office)

Figure 4. The pyramid of working children: children involved in the different categories of economic activity, 2000 (millions)



Source: *A Future Without Child Labour* (International Labour Office)

Table 8. Estimated number of children involved in the unconditional worst forms of child labour, 2000 (millions)

Type of worst form of child labour	Number of children (in millions)
Forced and bonded labour	5.7
Forced recruitment into armed conflict	0.3
Prostitution and pornography	1.8
Other illicit activities	0.6
Trafficked children ¹	(1.2)
Total	8.4

¹ Children are generally trafficked into another worst form of child labour. Therefore, the number of trafficked children cannot be included in a calculation of the total number of children in the worst forms of child labour, as this would result in double-counting.

Source: *A Future Without Child Labour* (International Labour Office)

Table 9. Sectoral distribution of working children in developing countries, 2000 (per cent)

	%
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing	70.4
Manufacturing	8.3
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels	8.3
Community, social and personal service	6.5
Transport, storage and communication	3.8
Construction	1.9
Mining and quarrying	0.8

Source: K. Ashagrie in *A Future Without Child Labour* (International Labour Office)

Figure 5. Working children by type of work 2000, 5-14 years old (per cent)




Note: Based on a survey conducted in 49 developing countries. Children are counted as working if, during the week before the survey, they were engaged in paid or unpaid work for someone who is not a member of the household, did housekeeping chores for 4 or more hours per day, or worked for a family farm or business.

Source: Unicef Statistics 2000

Editors' note: A child can perform more than one kind of work, why the percentages of paid, unpaid, domestic and family work sum up to more than the percentage of any kind of work.

Figure 6. Working children by place of residence 2000, 5-14 years old (per cent)



Note: Based on a survey conducted in 49 developing countries. Children are counted as working if, during the week before the survey, they were engaged in paid or unpaid work for someone who is not a member of the household, did housekeeping chores for 4 or more hours per day, or worked for a family farm or business.

Source: Unicef Statistics 2000

Editors' note: A child can perform more than one kind of work, why the percentages of paid, unpaid, domestic and family work sum up to more than the percentage of any kind of work.

Table 10. Number of children under 15 years in poor and non-poor households in 21 countries, 1998-2000

Country	Poor	Non-poor	All households
Argentina	3.0	0.4	1.3
Bolivia	3.4	1.3	2.3
Brazil	3.6	0.8	1.8
Chile	2.5	0.9	1.5
Costa Rica	3.3	1.0	2.0
Ecuador	3.4	1.4	2.9
El Salvador	3.7	1.1	2.4
Guyana ¹	2.6	1.4	1.8
Honduras	4.2	1.7	3.1
Indonesia ²	1.7	—	1.2
Malawi ³	5.4	4.2	5.0
Mali ³	11.5	9.2	10.4
Mexico	4.0	1.1	2.3
Nepal ⁴	3.5	2.5	—
Nicaragua	4.9	1.8	3.3
Panama	3.2	0.8	1.9
Paraguay	4.3	1.3	2.8
Peru	3.7	1.1	2.4
Philippines ³	6.0	5.0	—
Tanzania ³	7.2	5.0	6.0
Uruguay	2.8	0.5	1.2

Notes: The poor and the non-poor have been defined at the national level.

¹ Number of children under 17 years

² Number of children under 9 years

³ Household size

⁴ Number of children under 14 years

—Data not available or too uncertain to be used.

Source: *Poverty Reduction Begins with Children* (Unicef)

Overall Measures of Economic Inequality


- The world's richest 1% of people receive as much income as the poorest 57%.
- The richest 10% of the U.S. population has an income equal to that of the poorest 43% of the world. Put differently, the income of the richest 25 million Americans is equal to that of almost 2 billion people.
- The income of the world's richest 5% is 114 times that of the poorest 5%.

Source: Milanovic in Human Development Report 2002 (UNDP)

Between 1975 and 2000 impressive growth in East Asia and the Pacific increased its per capita income –in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms –from about 1/14th of the average per capita income in OECD countries to better than 1/6th. Over the same period Sub-Saharan Africa suffered the reverse, with its per capita income dropping from 1/6th of that in OECD countries to only 1/14th, owing both to its own drop in income and to consistent growth in OECD countries.

The worst-off sub-Saharan countries now have incomes 1/40th or less of those in OECD countries. Latin America and the Caribbean suffered a slight deterioration relative to OECD countries, with its average per capita income dropping from a bit less than half to a bit less than a third, while Arab States dropped from a quarter to a fifth.

Source: Human Development Report 2002 (UNDP)

Figure 7. Population below US\$1 a day, 1990-1999* (per cent of total population)

Notes: * Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading.

—Data not available.


For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.

For data on separate countries, see page 239 ff.

Source: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef)

Table 11. Richest and poorest countries, 1820-1992 (GDP per capita, in 1990 US\$)

Richest					
1820	US\$	1900	US\$	1992	US\$
United Kingdom	1,756	United Kingdom	4,593	United States	21,558
Netherlands	1,561	New Zealand	4,320	Switzerland	21,036
Australia	1,528	Australia	4,299	Japan	19,425
Austria	1,295	United States	4,096	Germany	19,351
Belgium	1,291	Belgium	3,652	Denmark	18,293
Poorest					
1820	US\$	1900	US\$	1992	US\$
Indonesia	614	Myanmar	647	Myanmar	748
India	531	India	625	Bangladesh	720
Bangladesh	531	Bangladesh	581	Tanzania, U.Rep of	601
Pakistan	531	Egypt	509	Congo, Dem.Rep.of	353
China	523	Ghana	462	Ethiopia	300



Source: Human Development Report 1999 (UNDP)

Table 12. Child labour force and economy in different countries of the world

	Labour force children ages 10-14 years % of age group		Population living below \$1 a day % of total pop.	Percentage share of income or consumption ³ 1985-1999 ²				
	1980	1999	1990-1999 ²	Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Highest 20%
AFRICA								
Algeria	7	1	2	7.0	11.6	16.1	22.7	42.6
Angola	30	26	—	—	—	—	—	—
Benin	30	27	—	—	—	—	—	—
Botswana	26	15	33 *	—	—	—	—	—
Burkina Faso	71	47	61	5.5	8.7	12.0	18.7	55.0
Burundi	50	49	—	7.9	12.1	16.3	22.1	41.6
Cameroon	34	24	—	—	—	—	—	—
Central African Republic	—	—	67	2.0	4.9	9.6	18.5	65.0
Chad	42	37	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo	27	26	—	—	—	—	—	—
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	33	29	—	—	—	—	—	—
Côte d'Ivoire	28	19	12	7.1	11.2	15.6	21.9	44.3
Egypt	18	10	3	9.8	13.2	16.6	21.4	39.0
Eritrea	44	39	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia	46	42	31	7.1	10.9	14.5	19.8	47.7
Gambia	—	—	54	—	—	—	—	—
Ghana	16	13	39	8.4	12.2	15.8	21.9	41.7
Guinea	41	32	—	6.4	10.4	14.8	21.2	47.2
Kenya	45	40	27	5.0	9.7	14.2	20.9	50.2
Lesotho	28	21	43	2.8	6.5	11.2	19.4	60.1
Madagascar	40	35	63	5.1	9.4	13.3	20.1	52.1
Malawi	45	33	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mali	61	52	73	4.6	8.0	11.9	19.3	56.2
Mauritania	30	23	29	6.2	10.8	15.4	22.0	45.6
Morocco	21	3	2	6.5	10.6	14.8	21.3	46.6
Mozambique	39	33	38	6.5	10.8	15.1	21.1	46.5
Namibia	34	19	35	—	—	—	—	—
Niger	48	44	61	2.6	7.1	13.9	23.1	53.3
Nigeria	29	25	70	4.4	8.2	12.5	19.3	55.7
Rwanda	43	41	36 *	9.7	13.2	16.5	21.6	39.1
Senegal	43	29	26	6.4	10.3	14.5	20.6	48.2
Sierra Leone	19	15	57 *	1.1	2.0	9.8	23.7	63.4
South Africa	1	0	12	2.9	5.5	9.2	17.7	64.8
Tanzania	43	38	20	6.8	11.0	15.1	21.6	45.5
Togo	36	28	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tunisia	6	0	2	5.9	10.4	15.3	22.1	46.3

Table 12. Cont.

	Labour force children ages 10-14 years % of age group		Population living below \$1 a day % of total pop. 1990-1999 ²	Percentage share of income or consumption ³ 1985-1999 ²				
	1980	1999		Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Highest 20%
Uganda	49	44	—	6.6	10.9	15.2	21.3	46.1
Zambia	19	16	64	4.2	8.2	12.8	20.1	54.8
Zimbabwe	37	28	36	4.0	6.3	10.0	17.4	62.3
ASIA								
Armenia	0	0	8	—	—	—	—	—
Azerbaijan	0	0	2	—	—	—	—	—
Bangladesh	35	29	29	8.7	12.0	15.7	20.8	42.8
Cambodia	27	24	—	6.9	10.7	14.7	20.1	47.6
China	30	9	19	5.9	10.2	15.1	22.2	46.6
Georgia	0	0	2	—	—	—	—	—
India	21	13	44	8.1	11.6	15.0	19.3	46.1
Indonesia	13	9	8	8.0	11.3	15.1	20.8	44.9
Iran	14	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Israel	0	0	—	6.9	11.4	16.3	22.9	42.5
Japan	0	0	—	10.6	14.2	17.6	22.0	35.7
Jordan	4	0	2	7.6	11.4	15.5	21.1	44.4
Kazakhstan	0	0	2	6.7	11.5	16.4	23.1	42.3
Korea, Rep. of	0	0	2	7.5	12.9	17.4	22.9	39.3
Kuwait	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kyrgyzstan	0	0	—	6.3	10.2	14.7	21.4	47.4
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	31	26	26	9.6	10.2	14.7	21.4	47.4
Lebanon	5	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Malaysia	8	3	—	4.5	8.3	13.0	20.4	53.8
Mongolia	4	2	14	7.3	12.2	16.6	23.0	40.9
Myanmar	28	24	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nepal	56	43	38	7.6	11.5	15.1	21.0	44.8
Pakistan	23	16	31	9.5	12.9	16.0	20.5	41.1
Philippines	14	6	—	5.4	8.8	13.2	20.3	52.3
Saudi Arabia	5	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Singapore	2	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Sri Lanka	4	2	7	8.0	11.8	15.8	21.5	42.8
Syrian Arab Rep.	14	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tajikistan	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Thailand	25	14	2	6.4	9.8	14.2	21.2	48.4
Turkey	21	9	2	5.8	10.2	14.8	21.6	47.7
Turkmenistan	0	0	21	6.1	10.2	14.7	21.5	47.5
Uzbekistan	0	0	3	7.4	12.0	16.7	23.0	40.9
Viet Nam	22	7	—	8.0	11.4	15.2	20.9	44.5

Table 12. Cont.

	Labour force children ages 10-14 years % of age group		Population living below \$1 a day % of total pop. 1990-1999 ²	Percentage share of income or consumption ³ 1985-1999 ²				
	1980	1999		Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Highest 20%
Yemen	26	19	16	6.1	10.9	15.3	21.6	46.1
OCEANIA								
Australia	0	0	—	5.9	12.0	17.2	23.6	41.3
New Zealand	0	0	—	2.7	10.0	16.3	24.1	46.9
Papua New Guinea	28	18	—	4.5	7.9	11.9	19.2	56.5
EUROPE								
Albania	4	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Austria	0	0	—	10.4	14.8	18.5	22.9	33.3
Belarus	0	0	2	11.4	15.2	18.2	21.9	33.3
Belgium	0	0	—	9.5	14.6	18.4	23.0	34.5
Bulgaria	0	0	2	8.5	13.8	17.9	22.7	37.0
Croatia	0	0	2	9.3	13.8	17.8	22.9	36.2
Czech Republic	0	0	2	10.3	14.5	17.7	21.7	35.9
Denmark	0	0	—	9.6	14.9	18.3	22.7	34.5
Estonia	0	0	2	6.2	12.0	17.0	23.1	41.8
Finland	0	0	—	10.0	14.2	17.6	22.3	35.8
France	0	0	—	7.2	12.6	17.2	22.8	40.2
Germany	0	0	—	8.2	13.2	17.5	22.7	38.5
Greece	5	0	—	7.5	12.4	16.9	22.8	40.3
Hungary	0	0	2	8.8	12.5	16.6	22.3	39.9
Ireland	1	0	—	6.7	11.6	16.4	22.4	42.9
Italy	2	0	—	8.7	14.0	18.1	22.9	36.3
Latvia	0	0	2	7.6	12.9	17.1	22.1	40.3
Lithuania	0	0	2	7.8	12.6	16.8	22.4	40.3
Macedonia, TFYR	1	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Moldova, Rep. of	3	0	11	6.9	11.9	16.7	23.1	41.5
Netherlands	0	0	—	7.3	12.7	17.2	22.8	40.1
Norway	0	0	—	9.7	14.3	17.9	22.2	35.8
Poland	0	0	2	7.7	12.6	16.7	22.1	40.9
Portugal	8	1	2	7.3	11.6	15.9	21.8	43.4
Romania	0	0	3	8.9	13.6	17.6	22.6	37.3
Russian Federation	0	0	7	4.4	8.6	13.3	20.1	53.7
Slovakia	0	0	2	11.9	15.8	18.8	22.2	31.4
Slovenia	0	0	2	8.4	14.3	18.5	23.4	35.4
Spain	0	0	—	7.5	12.6	17.0	22.6	40.3
Sweden	0	0	—	9.6	14.5	18.1	23.2	34.5
Switzerland	0	0	—	6.9	12.7	17.3	22.9	40.3

Table 12. Cont.

	Labour force children ages 10-14 years % of age group		Population living below \$1 a day % of total pop. 1990-1999 ²	Percentage share of income or consumption ³ 1985-1999 ²				
	1980	1999		Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Highest 20%
Ukraine	0	0	3	8.6	12.0	16.2	22.0	41.2
United Kingdom	0	0	—	6.6	11.5	16.3	22.7	43.0
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN								
Argentina	8	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bolivia	19	13	29	5.6	9.7	14.5	22.0	48.2
Brazil	19	15	9	2.5	5.5	10.0	18.3	63.8
Chile	0	0	2	3.5	6.6	10.9	18.1	61.0
Colombia	12	6	11	3.0	6.6	11.1	18.4	60.9
Costa Rica	10	5	7	4.0	8.8	13.7	21.7	51.8
Dominican Republic	25	14	3	4.3	8.3	13.1	20.6	53.7
Ecuador	9	5	20	5.4	9.4	14.2	21.3	49.7
El Salvador	17	14	26	3.4	7.5	12.5	20.2	56.5
Guatemala	19	15	10	2.1	5.8	10.5	18.6	63.0
Haiti	33	24	—	—	—	—	—	—
Honduras	14	8	41	3.4	7.1	11.7	19.7	58.0
Jamaica	0	0	3	7.0	11.5	15.8	21.8	43.9
Mexico	9	6	12	3.6	7.2	11.8	19.2	58.2
Nicaragua	19	13	—	4.2	8.0	12.6	20.0	55.2
Panama	6	3	10	3.6	8.1	13.6	21.9	52.8
Paraguay	15	7	20	2.3	5.9	10.7	18.7	62.4
Peru	4	2	16	4.4	9.1	14.1	21.3	51.2
Trinidad & Tobago	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—
Uruguay	4	1	2	5.4	10.0	14.8	21.5	48.3
Venezuela	4	0	19	3.7	8.4	13.6	21.2	53.1
NORTH AMERICA								
Canada	0	0	—	7.5	12.9	17.2	23.0	39.3
United States	0	0	—	5.2	10.5	15.6	22.4	46.4
REGIONAL SUMMARIES								
Sub-Saharan Africa	35	30	43	—	—	—	—	—
Middle East and North Africa	14	5	—	—	—	—	—	—
South Asia	23	16	40	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia and Pacific	26	9	16	—	—	—	—	—
Latin America and Caribbean	13	9	12	—	—	—	—	—
CEE/CIS and Baltic States	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—
Industrialized countries	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Table 12. Cont.

	Labour force children ages 10-14 years		Population living below \$1 a day % of total pop. 1990-1999 ²	Percentage share of income or consumption ³ 1985-1999 ²				
	1980	1999		Lowest 20%	Second 20%	Third 20%	Fourth 20%	Highest 20%
Developing countries	—	—	26	—	—	—	—	—
Least developed countries	—	—	35	—	—	—	—	—
World total	20	12	24	—	—	—	—	—

Notes: Countries with no available data are excluded.

For regional summaries country list, see page 259 f.

* Data refer to years or periods other than those specified in the column heading, differ from the standard definition, or refer to only a part of a country.

—Data not available or too uncertain to be used.

¹ Children ages 10-14 in the labour force are the share of that age group that is active in the labour force. Reliable estimates of child labour are difficult to obtain. In many countries child labour is illegal or officially presumed not to exist and is therefore not reported or included in surveys nor recorded in official data. Data are also subject to underreporting because they do not include children engaged in agricultural or household activities with their families.

² Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified in the column heading.

³ Percentage share of income or consumption is the share that accrues to deciles or quintiles of the population ranked by income or consumption. Percentage shares may not add up to 100 because of rounding. Figures in *italics* refers to consumption shares by percentiles of population ranked by per capita consumption. Non *italics* refers to income shares by percentiles of population ranked by per capita income. Because the underlying household surveys differ in method and in the type of data collected, the distribution indicators are not strictly comparable across countries.

Sources: Population below \$1 a day: *The State of the World's Children 2002* (Unicef), Labour force & Percentage share of income or consumption: *World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty* (World Bank)

Media in the World

Table 13. The largest media companies in the world by turnover 2001 (millions of US\$) and their main media activities

Company	Domicile	Total turnover (US\$ millions)	Media turnover ¹ (US\$ millions)	Media share of total turnover (%)	Radio	TV	Film	Music	News- papers & periodicals	Magazines	Books
1 AOL Time Warner	USA	38,234	38,234	100	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
2 Viacom Inc. ²	USA	23,228	23,228	100	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
3 Vivendi Universal ^{3,4}	France	51,392	18,587	36		x	x	x		x	x
4 The Walt Disney Company ³	USA	25,269	15,675	62	x	x	x			x	x
5 Bertelsmann AG ^{3,5}	Germany	17,951	15,230	85	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
6 News Corporation ³	Australia	13,234	13,234	100	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
7 Sony Corporation ³	Japan	60,275	9,280	15	x	x	x	x			
8 Reed Elsevier	The Netherlands	6,578	6,578	100					x		x
9 Gannett Co. Inc.	USA	6,344	6,344	100		x			x		
10 Pearson PLC	Great Britain	6,084	6,084	100					x		x
11 NBC - National Broadcasting Company	USA	5,769	5,769	100	x	x					
12 Tribune ⁶	USA	5,253	5,253	100	x	x			x		
13 NHK - Nippon Hoso Kyokai ³	Japan	5,248	5,248	100	x	x	x				
14 Kirch Group ⁷	Germany	5,100	5,100	100		x					
15 ARD - Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ⁸	Germany	4,845	4,845	100	x	x					
16 BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation ³	Great Britain	4,557	4,557	100	x	x				x	
17 EMI Group - Electric and Musical Industries Group ³	Great Britain	3,849	3,849	100				x		x	
18 Clear Channel	USA	7,970	3,746	47	x	x					
19 RTL Group ^{3,9}	Germany	3,632	3,632	100	x	x					
20 Wolters Kluwer	The Netherlands	3,438	3,438	100					x		x

¹ Media turnover refers to revenue from advertising, publishing, radio or television transmissions, TV and film production, music publishing, subscriptions, government support, etc. Printing of products other than one's own, distribution services, retail sales, theme parks etc. are not included.

² CBS consolidated since the date of the merger, May 4, 2000

³ Fiscal year 2000/2001

⁴ Former Vivendi, name changed in connection with the merger with Seagram and Canal+ December 2000. Telecom (Cegedel) not included in media revenues.

⁵ CLT-Ufa/RTL Group consolidated since 1 January 2000

⁶ Times Mirror consolidated

⁷ Fiscal year 2000, total turnover estimated, source *Variety's* Global 50

⁸ Fiscal year 2000 ⁹ Former CLT-Ufa. See also note 5.

Source: *The Nordic Media Market 2002* (Nordicom, Göteborg University)

Table 14. The largest entertainment companies world-wide, by revenue 2000-2001 (in billions of US\$)

Media company*	Domicile	Revenue 2000-2001
AOL-Time Warner	USA	36.2
Walt Disney	USA	25.4
Viacom	USA	23.4
Vivendi-Universal	France/USA	22.1
Bertelsmann	Germany	19.1
News Corp.	USA	13.8
Sony (music, film, TV div. of Sony Corp.)	Japan/USA	9.3

*Publishing companies without major holdings in film, TV or music do not qualify for *Variety's* Global 50. In the case of conglomerates that derive significant revenue from non-entertainment sources, *Variety* has broken out combined entertainment and/or media assets, such as Sony Corp.'s music, film and TV divisions. Figures are rounded.

Source: *Variety*, August 27-September 2, 2001

Table 15. Internet users and population, world total and by continents, 2001-2002

	Internet users		Population	
	Millions	Per cent	Millions	Per cent
World total	544.1	9.0	6,055.1	100
of which:				
Africa	4.15	0.8	784.4	13
Asia/Pacific	157.5	28.9	3,712.9	61
Europe	171.4	31.5	728.9	12
Latin America	25.3	4.6	519.1	9
Middle East	4.6	0.9	*	*
North America	181.2	33.3	309.6	5


*The Middle East is included in Asia in the UN population statistics; NUA has chosen to present Internet statistics separately for the Middle East.

The statistics on Internet users as of February 2002 are estimates.


Sources: NUA Internet Surveys, United Nations Population Division

Figure 8. Uneven diffusion of technology – old and new. Internet users still a global enclave

The large circle represents world population.
Pie slices show regional shares of world population.
Dark wedges show Internet users.




Source: Human Development Report 2001 (UNDP)

Figure 9. World on-line population by language, March 2002 (per cent)

Note: Share of total on-line population by language zone (native speakers).

Source: Global Reach

Figure 10. Per cent of web pages by language, 2000 (per cent)

Source: eMarketer

Table 16. Media in different countries of the world

	Telephone subscribers per 100 inh. 2001	Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inh. 2001	Daily newspaper (circulation) per 1 000 inh. 1996-2000	Radio receivers per 1 000 inh. 1997	Television sets per 100 inh. 1998	Personal computers* per 100 inh. 2001	Internet users per 10 000 inh. 2001	Electricity consumption kWh per inh. 1999
AFRICA								
Algeria	6.36	0.32	27	242	6.75	0.71	19.27	581
Angola	1.23	0.64	11 *	54	12.4	0.13	44.35	84
Benin	2.86	1.94	5.3	110	9.07	0.17	38.78	53
Botswana	21.60	16.65	27	154	2.69	3.89	154.13	—
Burkina Faso	1.09	0.61	1.3 *	34	0.61	0.14	17.18	—
Burundi	0.58	0.29	2.4	69	0.97	—	8.75	—
Cameroon	2.71	2.04	6.7	163	8.11	0.39	29.60	184
Cape Verde	21.48	7.21	—	183	4.55	—	274.60	—
Central African Republic	0.56	0.29	1.8	83	0.54	0.19	5.29	—
Chad	0.41	0.27	0.2	236	0.18	0.15	4.92	—
Comoros	1.22	—	—	141	0.4	0.55	34.39	—
Congo	5.53	4.82	—	126	0.82	0.39	1.75	48
Congo, Dem.Rep.of the	0.32	0.29	2.7 *	376	4.27	—	1.14	43
Côte d'Ivoire	6.25	4.46	17	161	7.00	0.61	42.82	—
Djibouti	2.01	0.47	—	84	7.26	1.09	51.32	—
Egypt	14.63	4.33	31	317	12.71	1.55	92.95	900
Equatorial Guinea	4.66	3.19	4.9 *	428	10.71	0.53	19.15	—
Eritrea	0.84	—	—	100	1.4	0.18	26.21	—
Ethiopia	0.52	0.04	0.4	202	0.51	0.12	3.88	21
Gabon	12.97	9.79	30	183	13.56	1.19	122.35	700
Gambia	5.84	3.22	1.7	165	0.35	1.27	134.63	—
Ghana	2.08	0.93	14	236	11.48	0.33	19.36	204
Guinea	1.01	0.69	—	49	4.1	0.40	18.70	—
Guinea-Bissau	0.98	—	5.4	43	—	—	32.60	—
Kenya	2.60	1.60	9.4	108	2.1	0.56	159.78	126
Lesotho	2.03	1.53	7.6 *	52	2.41	—	23.15	—
Liberia	—	—	16 *	329	2.14	—	—	—
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	11.83	0.90	14 *	259	14.3	—	35.84	3,876
Madagascar	1.25	0.90	4.6	209	4.56	0.24	21.29	—
Malawi	0.95	0.48	—	258	0.23	0.11	17.28	—
Mali	0.82	0.39	1.2 *	55	1.13	0.12	25.69	—
Mauritania	0.98	0.27	0.5 *	146	9.12	0.98	25.48	—
Mauritius	50.56	25.00	118.8	371	22.79	10.83	1316.67	—
Morocco	19.60	15.68	28	247	15.99	1.31	131.45	430
Mozambique	1.28	0.84	2.5	40	0.39	0.35	7.43	53
Namibia	12.16	5.59	19	143	3.17	3.64	251.68	—
Niger	0.21	0.02	0.2	70	2.64	0.05	10.69	—
Nigeria	0.71	0.28	27 *	226	6.71	0.68	17.57	85

Table 16. Cont.

	Telephone subscribers per 100 inh. 2001	Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inh. 2001	Daily newspaper (circulation) per 1 000 inh. 1996-2000	Radio receivers per 1 000 inh. 1997	Television sets per 100 inh. 1998	Personal computers* per 100 inh. 2001	Internet users per 10 000 inh. 2001	Electricity consumption kWh per inh. 1999
Rwanda	1.09	0.82	—	101	—	—	25.16	—
São Tomé & Príncipe	3.63	—	—	272	22.7	—	600.00	—
Senegal	6.50	4.04	5.3	141	4.08	1.86	103.5	114
Seychelles	81.87	55.15	46	560	19.04	15.00	1125.00	—
Sierra Leone	1.02	0.55	4.7	253	2.63	—	14.37	—
Somalia	—	—	1.2 *	53	1.27	—	—	—
South Africa	32.35	21.00	34	355	12.46	6.85	700.58	3,776
Sudan	1.75	0.33	27 *	272	14.14	0.36	17.61	46
Swaziland	9.61	6.47	27 *	168	10.66	—	137.25	—
Tanzania	1.60	1.19	3.9 *	280	2.06	0.33	83.41	55
Togo	3.07	2.04	3.6 *	219	2.05	2.15	107.37	—
Tunisia	14.90	4.01	23.0	224	19.82	2.37	412.37	911
Uganda	1.72	1.43	2.1	130	2.62	0.31	26.64	—
Zambia	1.72	0.92	14	120	13.67	0.70	23.48	540
Zimbabwe	4.27	2.41	19	102	2.94	1.21	73.26	894
ASIA								
Afghanistan	—	—	5.6	132	1.2	—	—	—
Armenia	14.63	0.66	—	239	21.69	0.79	142.05	957
Azerbaijan	19.09	7.97	—	23	25.43	—	32.13	1,750
Bahrain	67.15	42.49	117	580	41.94	14.18	1,988.65	—
Bangladesh	0.79	0.40	9.3	50	0.71	0.19	11.43	89
Bhutan	2.03	—	—	19	1.92	0.58	36.23	—
Brunei	53.46	28.94	69	302	63.85	7.46	1,044.78	7,124
Cambodia	1.91	1.66	1.7	128	12.34	0.15	7.44	—
China	24.99	11.17	—	335	27.18	1.93	260.00	758
Cyprus	110.68	46.43	111	406	16.66	25.11	2,215.66	3,671
Georgia	21.25	5.39	—	590	47.2	—	45.70	1,312
Hongkong, China (SAR)	142.43	84.35	786 *	684	43.13	38.46	4,586.14	5,178
India	3.94	0.56	60.5	120	6.91	0.58	68.16	379
Indonesia	6.17	2.47	22.8	155	13.57	1.07	186.19	345
Iran	17.80	2.30	26	263	15.66	6.97	62.29	1,407
Iraq	—	—	20	229	8.25	—	—	—
Israel	128.46	80.82	288 *	524	32.18	24.59	2,304.86	5,689
Japan	116.85	57.17	578	956	70.7	34.87	4,547.10	7,443
Jordan	27.12	14.39	75.4	271	4.33	3.28	409.11	1,207
Kazakhstan	12.52	3.62	—	395	23.41	—	61.64	2,448
Korea, Dem.People's Rep. of	—	—	199 *	146	4.81	—	—	—
Korea, Rep. of	108.44	60.84	—	1,039	34.58	25.14	5,106.83	5,160
Kuwait	48.79	24.82	377	678	49.14	13.19	1,014.71	14,011

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Kyrgyzstan	7.89	0.54	15	113	4.37	—	105.74	1,512
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	1.46	0.52	3.7	145	0.41	0.28	17.73	—
Lebanon	40.74	21.25	141 *	907	35.21	5.62	858.00	1,778
Malaysia	49.86	29.95	163	434	16.61	12.61	2,394.96	2,474
Maldives	16.92	6.83	19	129	3.86	2.22	370.37	—
Mongolia	12.43	7.62	27	142	6.3	1.37	156.31	—
Myanmar	0.61	0.03	8.6	96	0.72	0.11	2.07	71
Nepal	1.34	0.07	11 *	38	0.37	0.34	25.43	47
Oman	21.34	12.37	28	607	59.54	3.24	457.49	2,880
Pakistan	2.90	0.55	40.4	94	8.79	0.41	34.49	321
Philippines	17.72	13.70	82	161	10.77	2.20	259.30	454
Qatar	56.76	29.31	161	450	80.84	16.39	655.74	14,871
Saudi Arabia	25.81	11.33	59	321	26.01	6.27	134.40	4,710
Singapore	116.37	69.20	324	744	34.77	50.83	3,630.91	6,641
Sri Lanka	8.10	3.77	29	211	9.25	0.79	78.52	255
Syrian Arab Rep.	12.09	1.20	20	278	6.84	1.63	36.12	863
Taiwan	153.89	96.55	—	—	34.2	22.32	3,369.70	—
Tajikistan	3.66	0.03	21 *	143	28.49	—	5.22	2,163
Thailand	21.27	11.87	64	234	23.61	2.67	556.11	1,352
Turkey	58.70	30.18	110	178	28.63	4.07	377.22	1,396
Turkmenistan	8.39	0.21	6.7	289	20.07	—	16.55	944
United Arab Emirates	111.66	71.97	170	355	29.41	15.83	3,392.39	10,643
Uzbekistan	6.83	0.25	3.3	465	27.28	—	59.39	1,650
Viet Nam	5.30	1.54	4.0	107	17.96	0.99	49.31	252
Yemen	3.01	0.80	15 *	64	27.33	0.19	8.89	110
OCEANIA								
Australia	109.77	57.75	296 *	1,391	63.89	51.71	3,723.05	8,884
Cook Islands	—	—	105	711	—	—	—	—
Fiji	20.24	9.25	51	636	9.68	6.08	182.48	—
Kiribati	4.51	0.48	—	212	2.22	2.50	250.00	—
Marshall Islands	6.68	0.70	—	—	—	5.00	128.57	—
Micronesia	8.33	—	—	—	2.07	—	337.84	—
New Zealand	109.27	62.13	362.4	997	50.12	38.56	2,806.98	8,426
Palau	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Papua New Guinea	1.53	0.18	15	91	2.38	6.10	280.71	—
Solomon Islands	1.80	0.21	—	141	1.44	4.75	43.33	—
Tonga	9.40	0.14	7 *	619	5.07	—	101.76	—
Tuvalu	—	—	—	384	—	—	—	—
Vanuatu	3.54	0.17	—	350	1.32	—	273.63	—

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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN								
Antigua & Barbuda	79.12	31.77	91	542	45.18	—	652.03	—
Argentina	40.24	18.61	123 *	681	28.88	5.34	800.28	1,938
Bahamas	59.69	19.66	99	739	89.62	—	549.45	—
Barbados	56.93	10.64	199	888	28.34	9.33	373.83	—
Belize	26.00	11.55	—	591	18.01	13.52	737.70	—
Bolivia	14.78	8.74	55 *	675	11.53	2.00	144.07	390
Brazil	38.35	16.66	43.1	434	31.63	6.26	463.61	1,811
Chile	57.92	34.02	98 *	354	23.25	8.39	2,001.99	2,309
Colombia	24.44	7.38	46 *	524	21.68	4.21	269.61	772
Costa Rica	30.54	7.57	88	261	38.68	17.02	933.63	1,426
Cuba	5.17	0.07	118 *	352	23.93	1.96	106.79	973
Dominica	30.98	1.56	—	647	17.5	7.50	777.77	—
Dominican Republic	23.22	12.38	27.5	178	8.45	—	214.53	646
Ecuador	17.04	6.67	96.5	348	29.32	2.33	254.43	620
El Salvador	21.84	12.50	28.3	465	24.98	2.19	79.67	568
Grenada	39.16	6.41	—	615	32.45	13.00	520.00	—
Guatemala	16.17	9.70	33 *	79	12.58	1.28	171.13	341
Guyana	13.73	4.54	74.6	498	5.92	2.64	1,091.95	—
Haiti	2.07	1.11	2.5	53	0.49	—	36.28	40
Honduras	8.33	3.61	55 *	410	8.96	1.22	61.68	449
Jamaica	46.68	26.94	63 *	483	32.32	5.00	384.91	2,294
Mexico	33.55	20.06	93.6	329	26.09	6.87	348.72	1,570
Montserrat	—	—	—	626	—	—	—	—
Nicaragua	4.90	2.99	30 *	265	19.01	0.96	98.54	268
Panama	35.53	20.70	62	299	18.7	3.79	317.01	1,310
Paraguay	25.52	20.40	43	182	10.09	1.42	106.44	789
Peru	13.67	5.92	84 *	273	14.36	4.79	1,149.73	654
St Kitts & Nevis	59.99	3.12	—	701	24.39	19.05	516.10	—
St Lucia	—	—	—	746	21.08	—	—	—
St Vincent	24.04	2.08	—	690	16.19	11.61	308.57	—
Suriname	36.69	19.11	67.7	728	21.74	—	330.00	—
Trinidad & Tobago	41.33	17.34	123	533	33.15	6.92	923.08	3,527
Turks- & Caicos Islands	—	—	—	504	—	—	—	—
Uruguay	43.76	15.47	293 *	603	24.19	11.01	1,190.12	1,871
Venezuela	37.55	26.35	206 *	472	18.5	5.28	527.77	2,493
Virgin Islands (UK)	—	—	—	470	—	—	—	—
Virgin Islands (US)	85.86	28.90	437	1,119	63.21	—	1,003.22	—

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NORTH AMERICA								
Canada	97.51	32.00	158	1,067	71.49	39.02	4,352.73	15,260
United States	110.87	44.42	212	2,116	84.73	62.25	4,995.10	11,994
EUROPE								
Albania	13.79	8.82	37	259	16.08	0.76	25.19	783
Andorra	74.05	30.18	60 *	227	40.0	–	897.44	–
Austria	127.47	80.66	296 *	751	49.56	27.95	3,194.10	6,176
Belarus	29.23	1.35	151.9	292	31.36	–	41 1.87	2,704
Belgium	124.02	74.72	161	797	51.04	34.45	2,799.26	7,286
Bosnia-Herzegovina	16.80	5.74	–	267	4.06	–	1 10.65	–
Bulgaria	55.06	19.12	116.4	537	36.56	4.43	746.27	2,899
Croatia	74.22	37.70	115	337	26.7	8.59	558.91	2,674
Czech Republic	103.32	65.88	254	803	44.66	12.14	1,362.66	4,682
Denmark	146.00	73.67	283.3	1,145	56.87	43.15	4,471.77	6,030
Estonia	80.75	45.54	174	698	48.01	17.48	3,004.59	3,435
Faeroe Islands	–	–	145	582	32.27	–	–	–
Finland	132.61	77.84	445.5	1,498	64.03	42.35	4,302.83	14,366
France	117.88	60.53	218 *	946	60.14	33.70	2,637.72	6,392
Germany	131.77	68.29	304.8	948	58.01	33.60	3,642.54	5,690
Greece	128.06	75.14	–	475	46.57	8.12	1,321.25	3,854
Greenland	76.60	29.86	18 *	483	37.52	–	3,565.70	–
Hungary	87.22	49.81	465.5	690	43.74	10.03	1,484.01	2,874
Iceland	148.41	82.02	335.7	950	35.59	41.81	6,794.43	23,110
Ireland	121.39	72.94	149	697	45.59	39.07	2,331.40	5,011
Italy	131.00	83.94	104	880	48.33	19.48	2,757.76	4,535
Latvia	58.77	27.94	135.1	715	59.28	15.31	723.10	1,851
Lithuania	56.61	25.32	93	513	37.63	7.06	679.16	1,769
Luxembourg	175.03	96.73	328	683	61.92	51.45	2,266.03	12,755
Macedonia, TFYR	37.27	10.92	21	206	25.21	–	342.47	–
Malta	88.40	35.40	127	669	49.74	22.96	2,525.31	3,763
Moldova	20.18	4.78	13.3	736	29.69	1.59	136.67	620
Netherlands	136.02	73.91	306	980	54.34	42.85	3,291.72	5,993
Norway	154.57	82.53	569.5	917	57.9	50.80	5962.9	24,248
Poland	55.53	26.02	101.7	522	41.4	8.54	983.72	2,388
Portugal	119.84	77.43	32.0	306	52.29	11.74	3,494.13	3,616
Romania	35.52	17.24	–	319	22.56	3.57	446.63	1,511
Russia	28.11	3.79	105	417	41.98	4.97	293.00	4,050
Slovakia	68.55	39.74	130.6	581	40.18	14.81	1,203.26	4,216

Table 16. Cont.

	Telephone subscribers per 100 inh. 2001	Cellular mobile subscribers per 100 inh. 2001	Daily newspaper (circulation) per 1 000 inh. 1996-2000	Radio receivers per 1 000 inh. 1997	Television sets per 100 inh. 1998	Personal computers* per 100 inh. 2001	Internet users per 10 000 inh. 2001	Electricity consumption kWh per inh. 1999
Slovenia	116.06	75.98	168.5	403	35.27	27.57	3,007.52	5,218
Spain	108.64	65.53	100.3	331	50.61	16.82	1,827.45	4,497
Sweden	150.98	77.07	410.2	932	53.12	56.12	5,162.74	14,138
Switzerland	144.17	72.38	373.2	979	53.55	49.97	4,040.17	7,291
Ukraine	25.64	4.42	175.2	882	49.04	1.83	119.29	2,306
United Kingdom	136.06	78.28	331	1,443	64.22	36.62	3,995.01	5,384
Yugoslavia	41.59	18.71	106	296	25.53	2.34	561.80	—

* Estimated data

—Data not available or too uncertain to be used.

Sources: *Human Development Report 2002* (UNDP), *Unesco Institute of Statistics: Culture and Communication Statistics*, *Unesco Statistical Yearbook '99*, *World Telecommunication Development Report: Reinventing Telecoms 2002* (ITU)

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Appendix 1.

Categorisation of Regions

For statistical convenience, the regions are classified as belonging to either of two categories: more developed or less developed. The group of less developed regions is further divided into least developed countries.

More developed regions

Australia/New Zealand, Europe, Northern America and Japan

Less developed regions

All the regions of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia

Least developed countries

Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Dem. Rep., Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision (United Nations Population Division)

Appendix 2.

Income Classification of Countries

World Bank classifications (effective as of 1 July 2001).

Income averages are calculated using data from countries as grouped below.

High income (GNP per capita of \$9,266 or more in 1999)

Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong China (SAR), Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States

Middle income (GNP per capita of \$756 – 9,265 in 1999)

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Rep. Of), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea (Rep. Of), Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Macedonia (TFYR), Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa (Western), Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela

Low income (GNP per capita of \$755 or less in 1999)

Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo (Dem. Rep. of the), Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Dem. Rep., Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova (Rep. Of), Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania (U. Rep. Of), Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Source: World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (World Bank)

Appendix 3.

Regional Summaries Country List

Regional averages are calculated using data from the countries as grouped below.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola; Benin; Botswana; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Rep.; Chad; Comoros; Congo; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Côte d'Ivoire; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gabon; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Niger; Nigeria; Rwanda; Sao Tome and Principe; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe

Middle East and North Africa

Algeria; Bahrain; Cyprus; Djibouti; Egypt; Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Occupied Palestinian Territories; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Sudan; Syria; Tunisia; United Arab Emirates; Yemen

South Asia

Afghanistan; Bangladesh; Bhutan; India; Maldives; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka

East Asia and Pacific

Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; China; Cook Islands; East Timor; Fiji; Indonesia; Kiribati; Korea, Dem. People's Rep.; Korea, Rep. of; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Malaysia; Marshall Islands; Micronesia, Fed. States of; Mongolia; Myanmar; Nauru; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; Thailand; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu; Viet Nam

Latin America and Caribbean

Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Rep.; Ecuador; El Salvador; Grenada; Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Jamaica; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent/Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago; Uruguay; Venezuela

CEE/CIS and Baltic States

Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Rep.; Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova, Rep. of; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia; Tajikistan; TFYR Macedonia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan; Yugoslavia

Industrialized countries

Andorra; Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Holy See; Iceland; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Malta; Monaco; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; San Marino; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States

Developing countries

Afghanistan; Algeria; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Cape Verde; Central African Rep.; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Cook Islands; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Cuba; Cyprus; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Rep.; East Timor; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Fiji; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Ghana; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jamaica; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati; Korea, Dem. People's Rep.; Korea, Rep. of; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia, Fed. States of; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nauru; Nepal; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; Niue; Occupied Palestinian Territories; Oman; Pakistan; Palau; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Qatar; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent/Grenadines; Samoa; Sao Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Solomon Islands; Somalia; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Swaziland; Syria; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Uganda; United Arab Emirates; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe

Least developed countries

Afghanistan; Angola; Bangladesh; Benin; Bhutan; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cape Verde; Central African Rep.; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Djibouti; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gambia; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Kiribati; Lao People's Dem. Rep.; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Maldives; Mali; Mauritania; Mozambique; Myanmar; Nepal; Niger; Rwanda; Samoa; Sao Tome and Principe; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Somalia; Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Tuvalu; Uganda; Vanuatu; Yemen; Zambia

Source: The State of the World's Children 2002 (Unicef)

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Published yearbooks

One of the most important tasks of *The UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children, Youth and Media* is publication of its yearbook.

Four yearbooks have previously been released.

Compiled and written by Cecilia von Feilitzen & Catharina Bucht: *Outlooks on Children and Media. Child Rights, Media Trends, Media Research, Media Literacy, Child Participation, Declarations. Yearbook 2001.*

The aim of Yearbook 2001, *Outlooks on Children and Media*, is to give a broad outline of children and media in the world, focusing on media literacy in the manifold sense of the word. The concept of 'media literacy' has been given a great many definitions worldwide, something that is touched upon in the book. What we have in view here is knowledge of children and media, and efforts made to realise children's rights in this respect, not least their right to influence and participate in the media. The yearbook contains a review of recent and current international trends in media literacy including research on children and media – that is, summarising examples of/references to research and practices, important conferences and declarations related to the area, and a selection of relevant organisations and web sites.

Cecilia von Feilitzen & Ulla Carlsson (eds): *Children in the New Media Landscape. Games, Pornography, Perceptions. Yearbook 2000.*

The 2000 yearbook contains three topics focused on the new media landscape: *violence in video and computer games, pornography on TV and the Internet, and audiences' perceptions of violence and sex in the media*. That these subjects have been highlighted here is related to the increased and changed media output facilitated by new technology – and to the consequences of this new situation, primarily as concerns children and young people. The research on video and computer games, and on children's relationships to pornography on the Internet and in other media, is new and poses, therefore, also many questions.

Cecilia von Feilitzen & Ulla Carlsson (eds):

Children and Media. Image, Education, Participation. Yearbook 1999.

The 1999 yearbook mediates *knowledge on initiatives and activities that promote children's competence as media users*. Presented in this issue is a number of articles by scholars, educators, media practitioners and representatives of voluntary organisations from around the world who work with media education and children's participation in the media. Among other additional features in this issue are sections on how children are represented in the media, as well as international and regional declarations and resolutions concerning children and the media.

Ulla Carlsson & Cecilia von Feilitzen (eds): *Children and Media Violence. Yearbook 1998.*

In this first yearbook, great importance is placed on research into *the influences of media violence on children and youth*. With the aim of increasing awareness and knowledge about children, youth and media violence, the Clearinghouse is dedicated to promoting a comprehensive picture of the findings based on decades of international research in the area. The book also contains, among other things, articles on children's media situation, statistics on children and media around the world, an overview of regulations controlling the media, etc.

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